Smith v. Johnson ( 1997 )


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  •                                          No. 97-
    :1 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    ALEX E. SMITH and TRUDY L. SMITH,
    husband and wife,
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    ROBERT L. JOHNSON and ANITA A. JOHNSON,
    husband and wfe.
    Defendants and Appellants
    APPEAL FROM:      District Courl of the Tenth Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Fergus,
    Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Judge Presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    Robert L. Johnson, Attorney at Law, Lewistown, Montana
    For Respondents:
    Michael Ridgcway, Attorney at Law, Hubble & Ridgeway,
    Stanford, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: December 23, 1997
    Decided: December 3 0 , 1 9 9 7
    Justice Lt'. W~lliamLeaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    P~trsuantto Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal
    Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published
    by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supren~e
    Court and by a report of its
    result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group.
    This is an appeal from the Tenth Judicial District Court's February 23, 1997 order
    dismissing Count 11 and its May 2, 1997 order striking the Appellants Robert L. and Anita
    A. Johnson's (Johnsons') amended answer, cross-claim, and demand for jury trial and
    denying their request to expunge certain portions of the court's "Explanatory Comment."
    Respondents Alex and Trudy Smith (Smiths) purchased real property on a contract
    for deed fi.oni the Johnsons. The Johnsons contracted to provide "guaranteed access" to the
    property. However, at the time of the transaction, there was no guaranteed access to the
    property. The only access onto the property was via a road crossing over property owned by
    a neighbor of the Smiths. The Johnsons took the position that they were only required to
    provide the access once the contract had been paid in full.
    To obtain the guaranteed access, the Smiths sued the Johnsons, requesting that the
    court allow them to prepay the contract and require the Johnsons to provide the guaranteed
    access (Count I). In Count 11 of the complaint, the Smiths sought to quiet title to a separate
    road which the Johnsons were using to access the Johnsons' residence and which crossed
    property owned by the Smiths. The parties filed cross-motions for sulnmary judgment.
    At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the Johnsons represented that
    they had the necessary easement which would provide the access that the Smiths were
    demanding. The Smiths reviewed the easement document and determined that it was
    satisfactory. Mr. Johnson then prepared a stipulation dismissing Count I. There was no
    request by either party for fees or costs at that time. Mr. Johnson, an attorney representing
    himself and his wife, and counsel for the Smiths signed the stipulation and, pursuant to this
    stipulation, the court dismissed Count I with prejudice.
    With regard to Count 11, the court denied the Johnsons' motion for summaiy judgment
    and ordered the parties to mediate. When the parties were unable to mediate Count 11, the
    Smiths offered the Johnsons an easement over the road in question. However, the Johnsons
    would not accept the easement unless the Smiths agreed to pay the Johnsons' costs and
    attorney fees. The Smiths refused to agree to pay the fees and costs. Instead they, on their
    own motion, dismissed Count I1 with prejudice. The Johnsons objected and requested fees
    and costs relating to both Counts I and 11. The District Court granted the Smiths' motion to
    dismiss Count 11 with prejudice and denied the Johnsons' claim for costs and fees with an
    explanatory comment which stated, inter alia: "With the settlement [on Count I], plaintiffs
    prevailed on the easement issue, and defendants prevailed on the prepayment issue." The
    Johnsons' various post-judgment motions to expunge this language were denied, and the
    Johnsons appealed to this Court.
    On appeal, the Johnsons appear to contend that they are entitled to attorney fees as
    prevailing partics under the provisios~s the contract for deed. The stipulation of dismissal,
    of
    however, does not provide that either party prevailed nor does it provide that either party is
    entstled to attorney fees. The partles are bound by that stipulahon and order of d~smtssal.The
    Distrlct Court's denial of the Johnsons' request for costs and attorney fees as to Count I is
    affirmed.
    Count I1 of the amended complaint is a quiet title claim. As such, it does not come
    within the purview of the contract provision allowing attorney fees to the prevailing party in
    an action to enforce the terms of the agreement. The District Court did not e n in denying
    attorney fees in the dismissal of Count 11.
    The Johnsons also ask this Court to remand to the District Coart with instructions to
    expunge that part of the "Explanatory Comment" in which the court, notlng that the Sm~ths
    prevailed on the easement issue and the Johnsons prevailed on the prepayment issue,
    concluded there was no prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. Johnson is apparently
    concerned that the court's explanatory comment might give nse to further litigation.
    The Johnsons have cited no authority whereby this Court can edit or dictate the terms
    of the District Court's rationale. We can affirm decisions of thc district court regardless of
    whether the court reached the decision for the right reasons. Clark v. Eagle Systems, lnc.
    (1906), 
    279 Mont. 279
    ,
    927 P.2d 995
    . Since we have affirmed the District Court's denial of
    attorney fees, it matters not why the court denied the fees. At worst, the court's comments
    could be considered dicta. Furthermore, since the court dismissed both counts of the
    complaint with prejudice, the Johnsons' fears of futui-c litigation are unfounded. The
    Johnsons' request for a remand is denied.
    The Smiths have requested that, pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., we Impose
    reasonable attorney fees upon the Johnsons for filing an appeal without substantla1 or
    reasonable grounds. That request IS denied, and the appeal is affirmed with each party to pay
    their own costs and fees.
    Justice"
    We concur:
    December 30, 1997
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that the followrng certified order mas sent bq United States mail, prepaid. to the
    follo\\ing named:
    Robert L. Johnson
    Attorney at Law
    SUITE 507 MONTANA BUILDING
    LEWISTOWN M 1 59457
    Michael Ridgeway
    Attomeq at Law
    PO BOX 556
    STANFORD MT 59479-0556
    ED SMITH
    CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF MONTANA
    BY:.          +&
    Deputy
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-407

Filed Date: 12/30/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016