In Re the Marriage of Rolf , 323 Mont. 216 ( 2004 )

No. 04-109
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 276IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
DAVID LEROY ROLF,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
CHRISTINE MARIE ROLF,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR-98-86082,
The Honorable Ed McLean, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Laurence J. Ginnings, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Terry L. Wolfe, Sol & Wolfe Law Firm, PLLP, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 15, 2004
Decided: October 5, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant David Leroy Rolf (David) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. He appealed the judgment of the District
Court awarding marital assets to his former spouse, Christine Marie Rolf (Christine). This
Court remanded for further determination regarding the value of the estate and its
distribution. In re Marriage of Rolf, 2000 MT 361, 303 Mont. 349, 16 P.3d 345 (Rolf I).
On remand, the District Court awarded Christine a smaller portion of the marital estate and
maintenance.
¶2 David subsequently appealed the second judgment of the District Court awarding
reduced marital assets and maintenance awards to Christine. This Court affirmed the District
Court’s maintenance award and remanded for further determination regarding the value of
the estate and its distribution in lieu of the supplemental maintenance award. In re Marriage
of Rolf, 2003 MT 194, 316 Mont. 517, 75 P.3d 770 (Rolf II).
¶3 David now appeals the third opinion and order of the District Court awarding
Christine supplemental maintenance. We affirm.
¶4 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶5 1. Whether the District Court erred in awarding supplemental maintenance?
¶6 2. Whether the District Court erred in awarding supplemental maintenance based
upon the appreciated marital estate?
¶7 3. Whether the District Court interjected fault into its determination of maintenance?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶8 This is the third appeal to come before this Court in this matter. Details of the
2
dissolution proceedings and subsequent appeals are found in our decisions in Rolf I and Rolf
II.
¶9 To summarize, David and Christine were married on November 29, 1996, having
endured a tumultuous three-year courting. The couple eventually separated and dissolved
their marriage on February 4, 1999. Following the dissolution, the District Court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution on April 2, 1999. Among
many findings, the District Court determined the marital estate had increased $78,778 in
value and awarded Christine $80,000 of the value of their Bitterroot Valley home in addition
to other personal items and expenses. Rolf I, ¶ 41. The District Court did not enter a specific
award for maintenance, finding an “award of maintenance to be inappropriate in this matter
in view of the allocation of property . . . .” Rolf II, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). David appealed.
¶10 David’s contention in his first appeal was his marriage to Christine was too brief to
warrant a substantial property award, and further, the Bitterroot Valley property was a pre-
marital asset unsuitable for inclusion in the marital estate. He also maintained the estate did
not increase in value during their brief marriage.
¶11 We issued our decision in Rolf I on December 27, 2000, affirming the District Court’s
decision to consider the parties’ pre-marital cohabitation in apportioning the marital estate.
However, we determined the District Court abused its discretion when it included the
Bitterroot Valley home in the marital estate, awarding Christine a portion of the home’s
value without a proper finding of its appreciated worth. We remanded to the District Court.
¶12 Upon remand, Judge John Larson recused himself and Judge Ed McLean assumed
jurisdiction. A remand hearing was then held. On December 26, 2001, the District Court
3
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Rolf II, ¶ 13.
¶13 On this second remand, the District Court adopted most of the findings of fact from
the first decision, including the marital estate estimate of $78,778. In addition to awarding
Christine $39,000 of the marital estate, the District Court also granted $2,000 per month in
maintenance for a period of twenty-four months to restore Christine to the condition she was
in prior to the marriage. David again appealed.
¶14 David’s primary contention in his second appeal was the District Court exceeded its
jurisdiction by hearing issues outside the scope of our remand and failed to develop any
evidence supporting the appreciation and distribution of the marital estate.
¶15 We issued our opinion in Rolf II on August 4, 2003, affirming the District Court’s
decision awarding maintenance for twenty-four months and remanding for clarification of
the balance of its $39,000 award. Specifically, this Court directed the District Court to
determine whether the award was intended as a supplement to the twenty-four month
maintenance award or a distribution of the increased value of the marital estate. If the
former, the court was to clearly state its intention and ensure it was supported by the record;
if the latter, we directed the court to vacate the distribution.
¶16 On remand, the District Court determined the $39,000 award was intended to
supplement the twenty-four month maintenance award. David appeals.
ISSUES
¶17 1. Whether the District Court erred in awarding supplemental maintenance?
¶18 We review the division of marital property and maintenance awards to determine
whether the findings of fact upon which the District Court relied are clearly erroneous. In
4
re Marriage of Lee (1997), 282 Mont. 410, 417, 938 P.2d 650, 654. “A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the district court misapprehended
the effect of evidence, or if our review of the record convinces us that the district court made
a mistake.” In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, 2002 MT 309, ¶ 17, 313 Mont. 74, ¶ 17, 60 P.3d
441, ¶ 17. Absent clearly erroneous findings, this Court will affirm a district court’s division
of property unless we identify an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Gerhart, 2003 MT
292, ¶ 16, 318 Mont. 94, ¶ 16, 78 P.3d 1219, ¶ 16. A district court may award maintenance
after the marital property has been equitably divided pursuant to § 40-4-202, MCA, and the
court has properly applied the criteria of § 40-4-203, MCA. In re Marriage of Weed (1992),
254 Mont. 162, 168, 836 P.2d 591, 594.
¶19 On his third appeal, David argues there is insufficient evidence in the record to
support the District Court’s determination of $39,000 in supplemental maintenance. He
asserts the court, in weighing the factors enumerated in § 40-4-203, MCA, should have
considered Christine’s ability to support herself both before and after the marriage through
various means of employment, as well as her own testimony regarding her modest living
expenses. He bases this argument on the assertion the supplemental award is not based on
necessity, but rather Christine’s attempt to garner more money than the standard of living
which she could achieve on her own.
¶20 In response, Christine asserts the District Court correctly determined the supplemental
maintenance award based on factors set forth in § 40-4-203, MCA. She contends the
standard of living of the parties, not merely of the spouse seeking maintenance, is considered
in determining the award of maintenance. Further, she argues her inability to provide for
5
herself through employment was established clearly through the record, noting her destitution
upon dissolution forced her to move in with her daughter and son-in-law and their four
children.
¶21 Section 40-4-203, MCA, governs awards of maintenance. The statute provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . , the court may grant a
maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment. . . .
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods
of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after
considering all relevant facts including:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs
independently . . . ;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training or enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(c) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage;
(e) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(f) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
¶22 Although a district court must consider each of the factors listed in § 40-4-203, MCA,
it is not necessary the court make specific findings of fact regarding each factor, so long as
this Court can determine that the trial judge considered each factor. In re Marriage of
Grende, 2004 MT 36, ¶ 38, 320 Mont. 38, ¶ 38, 85 P.3d 788, ¶ 38. Based on our review of
the record, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support a supplemental
maintenance award. While David claims the court “failed to make any findings concerning
Christine’s income and expenses,” the record contradicts this assertion. The District Court
determined an award of $2,000 a month for twenty-four months would not allow Christine
6
to meet the deficiency between her pre- and post-dissolution wages, improve her standard
of living, or afford a residence without additional help. Specifically, the District Court found
“the award of $39,000 would allow Christine to obtain her own residence with some prospect
of ownership or to otherwise place herself into a standard of living” resembling that which
she enjoyed during the marriage. The District Court also recognized “Christine had a job in
the Scottsdale Memorial Hospital that paid approximately $12.50 per hour. After the
dissolution, she was forced to take employment that paid $8.50 per hour.” Moreover, the
standard of living to which Christine had grown accustomed greatly increased during the
course of the marriage. The District Court noted Christine’s testimony that “[David] paid
me monthly payments of a little over four thousand dollars . . .” during the course of the
marriage, making her resulting destitution more difficult. Indeed, by David’s own testimony
and $1,000,000 net worth, the District Court found the lifestyle of the marriage was such that
“Christine’s income alone plus $2,000 a month would not support her for any amount of
time.”
¶23 It is also worth noting that our opinion in Rolf II dealt substantially with the District
Court’s factual findings on the second remand, many of which directly addressed the issue
of maintenance. Indeed, this Court affirmed the District Court’s previous findings that
Christine was unable to provide for herself adequately and suffered emotionally as a result
of the relationship, having initiated counseling to deal with her problems. Rolf II, ¶ 36. We
noted that § 40-4-203(2)(e), MCA, provides the emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance is a factor to be considered by a district court in awarding maintenance. Rolf
II, ¶ 36. As we stated in Rolf II, “[t]here seems little doubt that, given David’s income and
7
net worth, Christine’s limited hourly wages would not allow her to support herself according
to the standard established during her marriage to David, who has accumulated an estate
worth $1,000,000.” Rolf II, ¶ 40. Thus, David’s current argument that the District Court
failed to consider this evidence on his third appeal, after this Court affirmed the previous
findings, is misplaced.
¶24 “We have recognized that district courts face a considerable task in determining a
maintenance award . . . . [I]n the final analysis, it is not a question of whether we would be
persuaded to reach a different conclusion after considering the same evidence. Rather, the
test is whether the district court had adequate evidence to support its conclusions.” In re
Marriage of Haines, 2002 MT 182, ¶ 23, 311 Mont. 70, ¶ 23, 53 P.3d 378, ¶ 23. In this case,
we hold the District Court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the award of supplemental maintenance to
Christine.
¶25 2. Whether the District Court erred in awarding supplemental maintenance
based upon the appreciated marital estate?
¶26 We review a district court’s division of marital property to determine whether the
findings of fact on which the court relied are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Engen,
1998 MT 153, ¶ 26, 289 Mont. 299, ¶ 26, 961 P.2d 738, ¶ 26. If the findings are not clearly
erroneous, we will affirm the distribution of property unless the court abused its discretion.
Engen, ¶ 26. To conclude that a district court abused its discretion in dividing marital
property, we must determine that the district court acted arbitrarily without employment of
conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.
Engen, ¶ 26.
8
¶27 On appeal, David argues the District Court erroneously found the marital estate had
appreciated in value to $78,778 and then arbitrarily awarded half the marital estate’s
appreciated value as supplemental maintenance without considering an actual decrease in his
marital assets.
¶28 In response, Christine contends the District Court properly considered the
intermingling of the property distribution and maintenance statutes as applied by this Court
in Rolf II pursuant to §§ 40-4-202 and -203, MCA.
¶29 As we stated in Rolf II, it is well established that §§ 40-4-202 and -203, MCA,
covering distribution of property and maintenance, respectively, “must be considered
together.” In re Marriage of Hilt (1984), 209 Mont. 140, 146, 679 P.2d 783, 786. As
indicated in the Commissioners’ Note to these statutes, the “dual intention [of the
maintenance and property sections] is to encourage the court to provide for the financial
needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than an award of maintenance.” Hilt, 209
Mont. at 145, 679 P.2d at 786. According to this Court, property and maintenance awards
are to be considered in tandem, with a clear preference for awarding property first. Hilt, 209
Mont. at 145, 679 P.2d at 786.
¶30 The maintenance statute specifically contemplates awarding maintenance when the
court considers “all relevant facts including the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him . . . .” Section 40-4-203(2)(a),
MCA. In this case, the District Court originally determined $39,000 in property and twenty-
four months of maintenance at $2,000 per month would allow Christine to maintain a
semblance of her previous standard of living. Without the property award, which the District
9
Court has now clarified as being a supplement to maintenance, Christine would be without
sufficient funds to maintain her former standard of living. As we stated in Rolf II:
Thus, if the district court in the original proceeding had intended to award
Christine $80,000 from the value of the marital home in lieu of maintenance,
and had made such an intent clear, together with making the necessary
findings supporting an award of maintenance, then the $80,000 award could
conceivably have been sustained as maintenance, even without a showing that
the home had increased in value and that Christine’s efforts facilitated the
maintenance of the property.
Rolf II, ¶ 23. The District Court has clarified its ruling and determined the $39,000 does
supplement the maintenance award of $2,000 a month for twenty-four months. The District
Court’s decision to award maintenance was supported by appropriate findings of fact which
were, in turn, amply supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the award of
maintenance to Christine.
¶31 3. Whether the District Court interjected fault into its determination of
maintenance?
¶32 A district court has broad discretion to adopt any reasonable valuation of property and
maintenance supported by the record, In re Marriage of Bee, 2002 MT 49, ¶ 34, 309 Mont.
34, ¶ 34, 43 P.3d 903, ¶ 34, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court on such matters. In re Marriage of Oehlke, 2002 MT 79, ¶ 21, 309 Mont. 254, ¶ 21,
46 P.3d 49, ¶ 21.
¶33 On appeal, David contends the District Court interjected fault into its determination
of maintenance. Specifically, David asserts the language used by the District Court in
awarding Christine maintenance is indicative of its consideration of marital misconduct.
¶34 In response, Christine argues the supplemental award was not based on “fault” but
rather reflects the District Court’s attempts to grapple with determining Christine’s standard
10
of living during the marriage.
¶35 Based on our review of the record, we conclude the District Court did not consider
marital fault in determining Christine’s maintenance award. The District Court’s Opinion
and Order appropriately recognizes the difficulty of accurately determining David’s marital
estate’s value due to his systematic non-disclosure. In this light, and after assessing
Christine’s reasonable needs and monthly expenses in relation to David’s estate, it properly
concluded an award of $39,000 plus $2,000 per month for a period of twenty-four months
would reflect the standard of living Christine enjoyed during the course of the marriage.
¶36 Therefore, we hold the District Court’s decision regarding the amount of maintenance
was supported by appropriate findings of fact which were, in turn, amply supported by the
record. Accordingly, we affirm the award of maintenance to Christine.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
11