State v. Gates ( 1982 )

No. 82-48
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O NONTANA
F F
1982
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
J A Y LEE GATES,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The H o n o r a b l e
Douglas G. H a r k i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
F e r g u s o n & M i t c h e l l ; C o l l e e n M. Dowdall, M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , &Iontana
R o b e r t L. Descha~nps, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : May 20, 1982
Decided: J u l y 1 5 , 1982
Filed: dU- L 5 198%
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I , H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of
the Court.
D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f
h i s p r o s e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . W affirm.
e
On December 30, 198G1, defendant was charged by
information with forgery, a felony, He p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y
on J a n u a r y 7 , 1981. On F e b r u a r y 25, 1981, a hearing was
held on defendant's pro s e motion to change his plea to
guilty. After extensive interrogation, the District Court
accepted defendant's guilty plea and on April 8, 1981,
s e n t e n c e d him t o t w e n t y y e a r s a t t h e Montana State Prison.
D e f e n d a n t was d e s i g n a t e d a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r .
Also at the April 8 hearing, defendant's attorney
requested that defendant be allowed to change h i s p l e a to
not guilty by reason of insanity, which was denied, and
thereafter a notice of a p p e a l was filed. While t h e a d d i -
tional transcripts were being prepared, defendant filed a
pro s e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . When t h e D i s t r i c t
Court s e t t h i s motion f o r h e a r i n g , t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l was
withdrawn. After a hearing on S e p t e m b e r 28, 1981, defen-
d a n t ' s m o t i o n was d e n i e d , and he a p p e a l s .
One i s s u e is p r e s e n t e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Did t h e
D i s t r i c t Court abuse its discretion i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s
motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a ?
Both parties cite State v. Huttinger (1979),
Mont . ,
- 595 P.2d 363, 36 St.Rep. 945, as setting the
s t a n d a r d s by which t o j u d g e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . In Huttinger
we s e t out the factors to be c o n s i d e r e d when reviewing an
a t t e m p t e d withdrawal of a g u i l t y p l e a :
"The t h r e e f a c t o r s of which we s p e a k a r e ( 1 )
t h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s -
t r i c t C o u r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e e n t r y o f
t h e g u i l t y p l e a a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s under-
s t a n d i n g of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , ( 2 )
t h e promptness with which t h e d e f e n d a n t
a t t e m p t s t o w i t h d r a w t h e p r i o r p l e a , and ( 3 )
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a was
a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n
which t h e g u i l t y p l e a was g i v e n i n e x c h a n g e
f o r d i s m i s s a l of a n o t h e r c h a r g e
Mont. a t
. . ."
, 595 P.2d a t 3 6 6 , 36 S t . R e p . a t
947.
Both sides agree that the second and third factors
are inapplicable, i.e., t h e motion t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y
plea was made in a timely fashion and there was no plea
bargain in this case. This brings us t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
the first factor--the adequacy of the District Court's
i n t e r r o g a t i o n a t t h e t i m e p l e a was e n t e r e d .
In this regard appellant points out that defendant
had n o t d i s c u s s e d t h e c h a n g e of h i s p l e a t o g u i l t y w i t h h i s
a t t o r n e y and t h a t t h e r e was some l a c k o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and
rapport between defendant and his attorney at that time.
Appellant argues t h a t from these facts i t c a n be presumed
t h a t defendant d i d n o t f u l l y understand t h e consequences of
h i s g u i l t y plea.
Appellant also contends t h a t defendant's testimony a t
t h e h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w h i s g u i l t y p l e a i n d i -
c a t e d he was e n t e r i n g the plea for reasons other than the
f a c t t h a t he was g u i l t y . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he f e l t he had
been i n t h e M i s s o u l a County j a i l t o o l o n g and t h a t he h e a r d
v o i c e s t e l l i n g him t h a t p l e a d i n g g u i l t y was t h e o n l y way t o
y e t o u t of there. Finally, appellant argues t h a t the f a c t
that the District Court knew that defendant had been in
s e v e r a l mental i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d have i n f l u e n c e d t h e judge
t o a l l o w t h e withdrawal of t h e g u i l t y p l e a .
The S t a t e r e f e r s u s t o l a n g u a g e i n Muttinger wherein
we quoted from S t a t e v . Lewis ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 474, 485,
582 P.2d 3 4 6 , 352, a s f o l l o w s :
". . . when i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e , t h e
D i s t r i c t Court c a r e f u l l y , a s h e r e , examines
t h e d e f e n d a n t , f i n d s him t o be c o m p e t e n t , a n d
d e t e r m i n e s from him t h a t h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y
is v o l u n t a r y , he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e c h a r g e and
h i s p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t , he i s n o t a c t i n g
under t h e i n f l u e n c e of d r u g s o r a l c o h o l , he
a d m i t s h i s c o u n s e l i s c o m p e t e n t and he h a s
been w e l l a d v i s e d , and h e d e c l a r e s i n o p e n
c o u r t t h e f a c t s upon which h i s g u i l t is
b a s e d , t h e n a p l e a o f g u i l t y a c c e p t e d by t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e b a s i s of t h a t examina-
t i o n w i l l be u p h e l d .. .I1
The State argues that the District Court complied
with t h e above s t a n d a r d and even went beyond t h a t i n q u e s -
t i o n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h e S t a t e p o i n t s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g
f a c t o r s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a r e f u l l y examined t h e d e f e n d a n t
and determined that defendant was competent and that the
p l e a of g u i l t y was b e i n g v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d . D e f e n d a n t was
f u l l y a d v i s e d o f t h e c h a r g e and p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t and was
n o t under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f d r u g s o r a l c o h o l .
With regard to the element in Lewis regarding the
competency of counsel, the State argues that the lack of
communication d i d n o t deny d e f e n d a n t e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of
c o u n s e l b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t had p r e v i o u s l y been f u l l y a d v i s e d
on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e and t h e p r o b l e m s between d e f e n d a n t
and h i s c o u n s e l were o n l y p e r s o n a l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s . Finally,
t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h e f a c t s i n open
c o u r t a b o u t how he had f o r g e d t h e c h e c k s .
Both parties agree that the denial of a motion to
w i t h d r a w a g u i l t y p l e a r e s t s i n t h e s o u n d d i s c r e t i o n of t h e
t r i a l c o u r t and w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l , absent the
showing of a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . Huttinger, supra; S t a t e ex
rel. Gladue v. Eighth J u d i c i a l District ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont.
509, 575 P.2d 65. W f i n d t h a t t h e r e was no a b u s e of d i s -
e
cretion here.
After reviewing the t r a n s c r i p t of the hearing where
defendant entered his guilty plea, the District Court
entered detailed findings regarding what had occurred at
that hearing. In addition to the elements required by
Lewis, s u p r a , t h e c o u r t a d v i s e d him o f h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l b y
jury, t o be c o n f r o n t e d w i t h w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him, and t h a t
he had the right not to incriminate himself. Defendant
stated he was in possession of all his faculties (and it
appeared to the District Court that he was) and that the
f a c t h e was t i r e d o f being i n t h e Missoula County j a i l had
not influenced his decision to plead guilty. Moreover,
d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e a s o n h e was p l e a d i n g g u i l t y was
b e c a u s e h e had c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i ~ n e , w h i c h h e knew t o b e an
unlawful act. Defendant acknowledged there was no plea
bargain in the case and that the judge could impose a
maximum s e n t e n c e o f t w e n t y y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n
f o r the crime.
We hold that the District Court's interrogation of
the defendant a t the time of entering t h e g u i l t y p l e a was
adequate in t h i s case, satisfying the f i r s t element of the
Iiuttinger test, supra. Since both parties agree that the
two other factors are inapplicable to this case, we find
that the District Court did not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n in
denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
Gladue, supra.
Affirmed.
2 4 4 $1 %4,
Chief J u s t i c e
We c o n c u r :