Boyer v. Sparboe , 51 State Rptr. 60 ( 1994 )

NO. 93-142
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
BILL BOYER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v-
ROBIN C. SPARBOE, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Charles W. Sparboe, Deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Mark D. Parker, Parker Law Firm, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
James P. Murphy, Murphy & Kirkpatrick, Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 7, 1994
Decided: February 2, 1994
Filed:
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Bill Boyer (Boyer) appeals from a judgment, entered after a
bench trial, of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone
County, finding in favor of the defendant. We reverse.
The issue on appeal is as follows: did the District Court err
when it concluded that Boyer was barred from retrieving his
property from the estate due to his failure to file a creditor's
claim?
Bayer had known and been friends with the owner of Treasure
State Gold and Silver (Treasure State), Charles Sparboe (Chuck),
for years. In addition, Boyer and Chuck did business together for
a number of years, buying and trading metals.
By 1988, Boyer had accumulated a great deal of gold and silver
and was concerned about its safety. Chuck offered to store the
gold and silver in his safe at Treasure State. Chuck showed Boyer
the safe and told Boyer that other people stored their coins and
metals there.
On June 22, 1988, Boyer brought approximately $40,000 worth of
gold and silver to Treasure State. He left the gold and silver
with Chuck, and received a storage receipt which itemized the
property as follows:
$4,000 face 90% Quarters (4 - Buckets of l,OOO.OO)
15 - 100 oz. Eng Ex (3 Bags of 5 Each)
500 Silver Dollars (1 Bag)
48 1 oz. U.S. Gold Eagles (2 Full Tubes 1 w/8)
1 Blue Midland Bank Bag - Price & sell what is in it
Bayer never removed the gold and silver from Treasure State.
On July 31, 1990, Chuck was murdered, and Boyer attended his
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funeral. About two weeks after Chuck's death, Boyer contacted
Aaron Sparboe (Aaron), Chuck's son, with his condolences and also
to discuss his [Bayer's] property. Aaron assured Boyer that the
property was in good hands, and said "[t]he only thing we might
have to do is replace some of the Gold Eagles with Canadian Maple
Leaves." Aaron told Boyerto bring in the original storage receipt
and he would be given his property.
Boyer talked to Aaron approximately five or six more times
over the next two years, and Aaron assured him each time that his
property would be returned upon the presentation of the original
receipt.
Boyer did not remove his property immediately after Chuck's
death, as he believed, based on Aaron's representations, that his
property was safe. However, Boyer later decided to remove the
property; he believed the metals market was "waffling back and
forth" and wanted to put his money into a better investment.
Boyer was unable to locate his original receipt, but had a
copy of the receipt. When Bayer went to Treasure State with the
COPY, Aaron and Chuck's other son, Jim Sparboe (Jim), refused to
return the property. They admitted to Boyer that they had his
property, but said they would not release it to Boyer without an
original receipt. On March 9, 1992, Boyer filed a complaint
seeking recovery of his gold and silver.
At the bench trial held on October 23, 1992, Boyer testified
that he had diligently searched for the original receipt but was
unable to locate it. However, as a matter of course, he made
copies of all his receipts and put them in a notebook at his place
of business. He testified that he made a copy of the original
receipt the day he received it. He further testified that he
believed the original receipt was placed in a "tax box" and, when
he moved three times in five years, that box was inadvertently
thrown out.
Defendant Robin Sparboe (Robin), widow of Chuck and the
personal representative of his estate, testified that the only
reason she would not return Bayer's property was because he had not
brought in the original receipt. She further testified that she
had absolutely no evidence that indicated Boyer had already picked
up the property at issue, and admitted that the original receipt
had not been returned to Treasure State. Robin said she would
honor Bayer's claim if he presented the original receipt, and
testified that Treasure State had honored claims of other people
who had not filed creditor's claims with the estate.
Aaron testified at trial that he had returned stored property
to people who presented original receipts without filing creditor's
claims, and that he had never refused to return property to those
people. Aaron also testified as follows:
If there was a client that [Chuck] was a good friend with
or somebody he knew well, they didn't have an original
receipt, I know he never would ask for it. If they said
they didn't have it with them, no big deal. He knows
them. . . .
He further stated that he had no evidence that Boyer had already
retrieved his property.
Jim testified that he had allowed people with original storage
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receipts to retrieve their property regardless of whether they had
filed creditor's claims with Chuck's estate. He stated that he had
no evidence that Bayer had received his property. Jim further
testified that the requirement that an original receipt be
presented before property would be returned was not written down
anywhere, but that customers were told of the requirement upon
storing their property. However, there was absolutely no evidence
that Bayer was told by his friend, Chuck, that an original receipt
was required to be presented before Bayer could retrieve his stored
property. There was also no evidence at trial that Bayer ever
received the property at issue.
On November 6, 1992, the District Court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court concluded that Bayer's
claim was a "deposit for exchange" pursuant to § 70-6-108, MCA, and
that Bayer's failure to file a creditor's claim with the estate
barred his claim. Section 72-3-803, MCA. Bayer moved for
reconsideration on November 25, 1992, which was subsequently denied
by the District Court on December 15, 1992. Judgment was entered
on July 8, 1993; from that judgment, Bayer appeals.
Our standard of review relating to conclusions of law is
whether the trial judge's interpretation of the law is correct.
Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803
P.2d 601, 603.
The District Court held that the storage receipt constituted
a "deposit for exchange," which necessitated the filing of a
creditor's claim with the estate. In its Memorandum filed with the
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court
reasoned that, because Boyer did not necessarily expect to receive
back the identical property he stored, a deposit for exchange was
created pursuant to § 70-6-107, MCA. This created a
debtor/creditor relationship under § 70-6-108, MCA; thus, the
District Court reasoned, Bayer's failure to file a creditor's claim
was fatal to his action. While the District Court's conclusion
that a "deposit for exchange" was created was correct, we have
previously held that, in certain limited circumstances, a creditor
may, nevertheless, not be required to file a claim with the
decedent's estate. That controlling precedent was not cited by the
attorneys in this case, and the District Court failed to consider
this precedent. Therefore, under the specific facts of this case,
we hold that the District Court erred in concluding that Boyer was
required to file a creditor's claim and in entering judgment
against Boyer.
We have previously held that an estate could be estopped from
raising a claimant's failure to file a creditor's claim as a
defense under certain, limited conditions. Northwestern Bank of
Lewistown v. Estate of Coppedge (1986), 219 Mont. 473, 478, 713
P.2d 523, 526. In Coppedqe, the deceased, George, and his wife,
Helen, borrowed money from the Northwestern Bank for farming
expenses. George and Helen signed three promissory notes and a
security agreement. The notes were also secured by a guaranty from
George's mother. George died and Helen was appointed the personal
representative of his estate. She provided notice to creditors as
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required by statute, but, Northwestern Bank never filed a
creditor's claim or commenced a court proceeding to collect its
claim. However, Northwestern Bank did negotiate with the estate's
attorney for payment or renewal of the notes. Coonedse, 713 P.2d
at 525.
Nearly two years after George's death, Northwestern Bank filed
a complaint seeking the unpaid amount due on the notes. The trial
court entered judgment for the bank, and, on appeal, the estate
claimed that the judgment against it was invalid because
Northwestern Bank failed to file a creditor's claim within the
statutory time limits. Northwestern Bank countered that the estate
knew of the bank's claim. We held that:
Such knowledge, however, does not dispense with
Northwestern Bank's need to file a creditor's claim. If
Northwestern Bank can prove that the attorneys for the
estate representedthatbecause they knew of Northwestern
Bank's claim, no creditor's claim need be filed and if
the Bank relied on this representation, the estate could
be estopped from raising Northwestern Bank's failure to
file a creditor's claim as a defense. . . .
Coowedqe, 713 P.2d at 526. We remanded for a hearing to determine
whether the estate, by or through its attorneys, represented to the
Northwestern Bank that it need not file a creditor's claim.
Cowwedse, 713 P.2d at 527. We note that at least one jurisdiction
has adopted a similar principle of law. See Matter of Estate of
Frandson (N.D. 1986), 383 N.W.2d 807.
In this case, Boyer contacted Aaron approximately two weeks
after Chuck's death and discussed his stored property. At that
time, Aaron told Boyer "not to worry" and that the property was
safe. Aaron told Boyer to bring in his storage receipt and the
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property would be returned upon demand. Robin, Aaron and Jim all
testified that they had paid many other customersf claims without
the necessity of filing a creditor's claim, even after the
statutory period had expired. In addition, Chuck had returned
stored property in the past without the presentation of an original
receipt. There was absolutely no evidence that Chuck ever told
Boyer that an original receipt was required to retrieve his
property, nor is there any evidence that Boyer has, in actuality,
received his property. In addition, Boyer had a valid explanation
for the loss of the original receipt. Similarly, there is no
question that Chuck's estate had actual knowledge of Bayer's claim,
and that, based upon the family's representations, Boyer assumed
his claim was intact and that no creditor's claim needed to be
filed. See Coppedqe, 713 P.2d at 526. Therefore, based upon the
facts of this case, we hold that the estate is estopped from
denying the existence and validity of Bayer's claim and that the
District Court erred in entering judgment in favor of the estate.
We wish to emphasize that the rationale behind the statutory
requirement that a creditor's claim be filed is sound and should
not be easily dispensed with. However, under very limited
circumstances, as in this case, where an estate has actual notice
of a claim and makes representations to the claimant which lead the
claimant to believe that it is not necessary to protect his claim
by filing a creditor's claim under 55 72-3-801 et seq., PICA, the
estate will not be able to use the failure to file a creditor's
claim as a defense to bar the claim.
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I Reversed and remanded for e
I
I We Concu