Stinchfield v. City of Sidney ( 2022 )

11/01/2022
DA 21-0348
Case Number: DA 21-0348
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 222NROBERT STINCHFIELD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF SIDNEY,
Defendant, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Richland, Cause No. DV-20-11
Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William A. D’Alton, D’Alton Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Gerry P. Fagan, Afton E. Ball, Moulton Bellingham PC, Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 21, 2022
Decided: November 1, 2022
Filed:
Vir--
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Robert Stinchfield (Stinchfield) appeals from two Seventh Judicial District Court
decisions denying his motions for partial summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law in his wrongful discharge from employment action. We affirm.
¶3 Following ongoing concerns regarding unsafe behavior, the chief of the Sidney
Police Department (the Department) recommended Stinchfield’s termination from the
Department. The mayor of Sidney accepted the recommendation and terminated
Stinchfield from his position as an officer on November 5, 2018. Stinchfield brought a suit
for wrongful discharge against the City of Sidney (the City). On motion for summary
judgment, and again on motion for judgment as a matter of law, Stinchfield argued that the
City had not followed its own personnel policies when it terminated Stinchfield, in
violation of § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. The City also filed its own motion for summary
judgment. The District Court denied the motions and, following a four-day trial, the jury
found in favor of the City. Stinchfield appeals the denial of his motions for summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law, while the City cross-appeals the denial of its
motion for summary judgment.
2
¶4 This Court reviews a district court’s decision on motions for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law de novo for correctness. Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 2007
MT 43, ¶ 18, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.3d 727; Krajacich v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2012
MT 82, ¶ 13, 364 Mont. 455, 276 P.3d 922. Summary judgment is only appropriate where
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Krajacich, ¶ 13; M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Judgment as a matter of law is
properly granted only when there is a complete absence of any evidence which would
justify submitting an issue to a jury and all such evidence and any legitimate inferences
that might be drawn from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. Johnson, ¶ 11; M. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
¶5 A discharge is wrongful if the “employer materially violated an express provision
of its own written personnel policy prior to the discharge, and the violation deprived the
employee of a fair and reasonable opportunity to remain in a position of employment with
the employer.” Section 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. Stinchfield argues that the City violated
Policy 2.14 of the City of Sidney Employee Policy Manual (Policy Manual), which requires
a supervisor to contemporaneously notify an employee and conduct an investigation into
alleged policy violations upon learning of them.1 However, the “Exemptions” section of
the Policy manual states:
The disciplinary procedures outlined in this manual do not apply to
the police department. In addition, certain police personnel polic[i]es or
policies related to safety sensitive functions may differ from this manual.
1
Trial testimony indicated that Stinchfield’s supervisors had repeatedly verbally informed
Stinchfield of his deficiencies and had considered at length how to address these shortcomings,
eventually putting him in remedial placements in hopes of improving his skills.
3
The City of Sidney recognizes that sworn members of the Police Department
are governed by a set of rules, regulations, polic[i]es, procedures, directives,
and disciplinary guidelines, some of which may be statutorily provided for.
Therefore, it is intended that the polic[i]es contained in this manual shall act
in conjunction with those Department rules, regulations, policies,
procedures, directives and disciplinary guidelines as established and shall
apply to any areas of employment by the City of Sidney, not specifically
covered by Department rules, regulations, policies, procedures, directives,
and disciplinary guidelines.
All such personnel should contact their supervisor for copies [of] the
applicable personnel and disciplinary policies.
(Emphasis added.)
¶6 The procedures outlined in Policy 2.14—which commences with the statement that
“City employees are subject to disciplinary action”—are clearly “disciplinary” in nature,
and therefore subject to the Policy Manual’s language exempting police department
personnel. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the exemption section clearly indicates that Policy
2.14 is not applicable to City police officers such as Stinchfield.
¶7 Stinchfield’s primary contention is that the mayor, by attaching Policy 2.16, titled
Employee Grievance, of the Policy manual to Stinchfield’s termination letter, conceded
that the Policy Manual applies to police officers like Stinchfield. However, even if the act
of attaching a grievance policy to a termination letter could somehow preclude the effect
of the plain language of the Policy Manual’s exemption section for purposes of
§ 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA, the mayor’s act was not, in any event, inconsistent with the
language clearly stating that only “disciplinary procedures,” not grievance policies, are
exempted.
¶8 The remainder of Stinchfield’s legal arguments are difficult to discern. He quotes
numerous pages from the trial transcript and disputes various items of testimony by City
4
witnesses regarding whether the Department had or applied disciplinary or termination
procedures of its own, and whether the Department in fact “investigat[ed]” (rather than
merely “evaluat[ed]” or remediated) Stinchfield’s alleged performance deficiencies.
However, police officers such as Stinchfield are clearly exempted from applicability of
Policy 2.14 and Stinchfield himself asserts that there was no other termination policy
promulgated by either the City or the Department that was applicable to him. Contrary to
Stinchfield’s argument, the Department’s alleged lack of its own termination policy did not
override the plain meaning of the opening sentence of the Policy Manual’s Exemption
Section.2 Stinchfield fails to point to an applicable personnel policy and therefore cannot
show that the undisputed facts or evidence demonstrate that the City violated its own
policies under § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. The District Court did not err in denying
Stinchfield’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.
¶9 Because the District Court did not err in denying Stinchfield’s motions and we
therefore uphold the jury verdict in favor of the City, we need not reach the issue raised by
the City’s cross-appeal regarding whether the District Court erred in denying the City’s
motion for summary judgment.
2
In his Reply Brief, Stinchfield asserts that Department policies do not afford sufficient
pre-termination due process to officers such as Stinchfield. A reply brief must be confined to new
matter raised in the brief of the appellee. M. R. App. P. 12(3). The City does not make due-process
arguments in its Response Brief and, moreover, Stinchfield did not raise a constitutional due
process claim in his Opening Brief, nor does he show on appeal where this argument was preserved
below.
Also in his Reply Brief, Stinchfield brings up allegations of poor conduct and performance
by his then-supervisors at the Department. He fails to show how such allegations are relevant to
the question of whether he demonstrated an absence of disputed fact material to, or evidence
justifying submission to a jury regarding, the question of whether the City had violated an express
provision of its policy pursuant to § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA.
5
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶11 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
6