State v. Foley ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                            06/09/2020
    DA 19-0332
    Case Number: DA 19-0332
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2020 MT 152N
    STATE OF MONTANA,
    Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    STEVEN MICHAEL FOLEY,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC-13-344 (C)
    Honorable Heidi J. Ulbricht, Presiding Judge
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Steven Michael Foley, Self-Represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
    For Appellee:
    Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Rob Cameron, Assistant
    Attorney General, Helena, Montana
    Travis R. Ahner, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: May 6, 2020
    Decided: June 9, 2020
    Filed:
    cir-641.—if
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
    Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
    serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
    Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
    Reports.
    ¶2     Representing himself, Steven Michael Foley (Foley), appeals from an Order on
    Petition for Restitution Adjustment entered in his criminal case in the Eleventh Judicial
    District Court, Flathead County. We affirm.
    ¶3     Foley pled guilty to attempted deliberate homicide for the shooting of his wife,
    Jodi Stimson (Stimson), and was sentenced on November 18, 2014. Foley was ordered to
    pay restitution of $10,095.06 for Stimson’s medical expenses. After the shooting, Stimson
    sought a divorce from Foley and a decree was entered on May 29, 2014 (amended on
    June 16, 2014), that, in part, awarded Stimson $10,095.06 for her medical expenses.
    ¶4     Foley filed a petition in the District Court on April 5, 2019, requesting an
    “adjustment” in restitution in his underlying criminal case. Foley’s petition alleged: (1) the
    restitution amount should be offset for the amount he was ordered to pay in the divorce
    proceeding; and (2) the District Court failed to consider his ability to pay at the time of
    sentencing. On May 16, 2019, the District Court denied Foley’s petition.
    ¶5     In his appeal, Foley raises numerous issues, many of which are intertwined with his
    marital property distribution decreed five years earlier.        Foley argues comparative
    2
    negligence should reduce restitution in the instant underlying criminal proceeding; he is
    entitled to do community service in lieu of making restitution payments to Stimson; the
    District Court erred by failing to credit Foley for a vehicle in the dissolution decree; and
    the District Court erred by imposing restitution without considering Foley’s ability to pay.
    ¶6     This Court has consistently held that it will not consider issues raised for the first
    time on appeal. In re T.E., 
    2002 MT 195
    , ¶ 20, 
    311 Mont. 148
    , 
    54 P.3d 38
    . We will
    construe Foley’s arguments and allegations of error broadly but will only address those
    issues first raised in the trial court. Accordingly, we will only consider whether the
    District Court clearly erred in denying Foley’s request to modify restitution in his criminal
    case, the proceeding from which this appeal has been filed. With respect to Foley’s
    restitution in his criminal case, we apply the same rule and consider only those issues first
    considered by the trial court.
    ¶7     Foley argued in the District Court that it was error to require him to pay restitution
    after Stimson already had a civil judgment for her medical expenses awarded in the decree
    of dissolution. Foley also contends that the District Court did not consider his ability to
    pay when it awarded restitution in his criminal case.
    ¶8     The District Court recognized that, pursuant to § 46-18-201(5), MCA, the
    sentencing judge must require payment of full restitution to the victim. The District Court
    concluded there would be no risk of a double payment or unjust enrichment by requiring
    the payment of Stimson’s medical expenses in both cases. The District Court reasoned that
    satisfaction of the decree’s requirement that Foley pay Stimson $10,095.06 for the medical
    3
    expenses he caused would also satisfy his sentencing requirement that he pay $10,095.06
    in restitution for her medical expenses. We agree. The District Court’s interpretation of
    the law was correct and its findings of fact, to the extent any were made, were not clearly
    erroneous. State v. Conley, 
    2018 MT 83
    , ¶ 9, 
    391 Mont. 164
    , 
    415 P.3d 473
    .
    ¶9     Foley also contends the District Court did not consider his ability to pay when
    ordering restitution. The State corrected its restitution figure to reflect Stimson’s medical
    expenses, and Foley stipulated to the State’s recommended changes regarding restitution.
    In its order denying Foley’s post-judgment motion, the District Court also indicated it had
    considered Foley’s financial background as reflected in the Presentence Investigation
    Report when Foley was sentenced. Regardless, Foley’s alleged error that his ability to pay
    was not considered by the court amounts to an objectionable sentence, which must be raised
    in the trial court at the time of sentencing or it is waived. State v. Coleman, 
    2018 MT 290
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    393 Mont. 375
    , 
    431 P.3d 26
    . The condition that Foley pay Stimson’s medical expenses
    does not amount to an illegal sentence, which may first be considered on appeal.
    Coleman, ¶ 7.
    ¶10    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
    Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
    Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
    applicable standards of review. Affirmed.
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    4
    We concur:
    /S/ MIKE McGRATH
    /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
    /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
    /S/ JIM RICE
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DA 19-0332

Filed Date: 6/9/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/9/2020