City of Great Falls v. R. Sandoval ( 2020 )

09/01/2020
DA 19-0412
Case Number: DA 19-0412
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2020 MT 221N
CITY OF GREAT FALLS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RICKY EROS SANDOVAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DDC 18-690
Honorable John W. Parker, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel V. Biddulph, Ferguson Law Office, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Rob Cameron, Deputy
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Neil Arnie Anthon, Great Falls City Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 5, 2020
Decided: September 1, 2020
Filed:
cir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Ricky Eros Sandoval (Sandoval) appeals from his conviction after a bench trial in
Great Falls Municipal Court, Hon. Steven B. Bolstad, presiding, of use of an electronic
communication device—his cell phone—while operating a motorized vehicle, a first
offense misdemeanor, in violation of the Official Code of the City of Great Falls,
§ 10.8.050.1 Pursuant to the Ordinance, the Municipal Court imposed a fine of $200, and
a surcharge of $15. Sandoval was also convicted in the same trial of driving while his
license was suspended, in violation of § 61-5-210, MCA. For that offense, he was fined
$350, and sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 360 days suspended.
¶3 Sandoval appealed to the District Court, Hon. John W. Parker, presiding,
challenging, as stated in his supporting brief, “the City of Great Falls Municipal Court’s
conviction of the Defendant for one count of Use of Electronic Communication Device, in
violation of Great Falls City Ordinance 10.39.110, following a Bench Trial.” Sandoval’s
briefing formulated four issues, including whether the City had proven the “use” element
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The record alternately references the ordinance’s former codification citation of § 10.39.110.
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of the electronic device Ordinance beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the electronic
device Ordinance was unconstitutional on three separately stated grounds: void for
vagueness, equal protection, and being overbroad such as to operate as a deprivation of
liberty. Sandoval’s brief argued these issues regarding the Ordinance in detail, but did not
reference his conviction for driving while his license was suspended.
¶4 The City moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing the Uniform
Municipal Court Rules of Appeal, which require, for an appeal from a municipal court
criminal judgment, that the “minimum amount in controversy, fine or restitution shall
exceed $300.00 before the district court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, except if the
judgment includes incarceration, no minimum fine may be required for appeal.”
U.M.C.R.App. 1(b)(2). The electronic device Ordinance did not subject Sandoval to the
possibility of incarceration. The Rules also provide that, upon petition by an aggrieved
party, the district court may, in the interests of justice, accept appellate jurisdiction of a
judgment notwithstanding the amount in controversy. U.M.C.R.App. 3. Sandavol’s brief
did not make such a request or argument. The District Court thus dismissed the appeal,
reasoning:
The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal July 19, 2018 that did not provide
notice of the judgment or ruling that was the subject of this appeal. The
Defendant did not file a petition for this Court to hear this appeal, in the
interest of justice, pursuant to Rule 3 U.M.C.R.App. Pursuant to Rule 1
U.M.C.R.App., the amount in controversy in this matter does not exceed
$300.00 and the Municipal Court Judgment did not include incarceration.
Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter on appeal.
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¶5 In response to the City’s motion to dismiss, Sandoval filed, without seeking leave
to depart from the District Court’s briefing order, a “Supplemental Brief in Support of
Appeal,” in which he argued the District Court’s jurisdiction was established under the
U.M.C.R.App. 1(b), when considering Sandavol’s fine and incarceration imposed for his
conviction of driving with a suspended license, and, that the court should accept the appeal
in the interests of justice under U.M.C.R.App. 3. However, other than referencing
Sandoval’s sentence for driving with a suspended license, Sandavol made no argument that
his conviction of that offense was invalid or otherwise necessitated review in the interests
of justice. The District Court did not reference Sandavol’s supplemental brief in its
dismissal order. Sandavol appeals.
¶6 “On [] appeal from the Municipal Court, the District Court function[s] as an
intermediate appellate court. See §§ 3-5-303 and 3-6-110, MCA.” City of Bozeman v.
Lehrer, 2020 MT 55, ¶ 6, 399 Mont. 166, 459 P.3d 850 (citing City of Bozeman v. Cantu,
2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461). Upon subsequent appeal to this Court,
we review the case “as if the appeal originally had been filed in this Court.” Lehrer, ¶ 6
(citation omitted).
¶7 On appeal, Sandoval argues that the appellate parameters stated by the Uniform
Municipal Court Rules of Appeal constitute an “impermissible limit on the district court’s
constitutional jurisdiction,” but that, in any event, the limitation should be viewed “as one
of procedure rather than jurisdiction.” Whether the limitations on appeals under the
Municipal Court Rules of Appeal are technically considered “jurisdictional” or
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“procedural,” this Court has previously affirmed application of the Rules as jurisdictional
in nature, and Sandoval made no effort in the District Court to challenge that precedent, or
argue the Rules were unconstitutional. See City of Kalispell v. Koestner, 2001 MT 53,
¶ 12, 304 Mont. 315, 21 P.3d 622; City of Bozeman v. King, 2016 MT 300, ¶ 13, 385 Mont.
376, 384 P.3d 481. Thus, Sandoval’s conviction in the Municipal Court for violating the
Ordinance was not subject to appellate review by the District Court under application of
U.M.C.R.App. 1(b).
¶8 Sandoval argues the interests of justice necessitated review by the District Court in
light of his sentence for driving with a suspended license, but again does not articulate why
his conviction of that offense compelled appellate review. Sandoval’s original brief to the
District Court made no argument challenging his conviction of driving with a suspended
license, focusing exclusively on this conviction for violation of the Ordinance. His
subsequent supplemental brief raised the conviction as a proffered means of obtaining
appellate jurisdiction under U.M.C.R.App. 3, but failed to offer any argument that the
conviction was invalid to justify the appellate review of the conviction in the interests of
justice.
¶9 On similar grounds, Sandoval makes a brief alternative argument that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance (IAC) for failing to seek review by either using the
total fines he received for both offenses to bring his case within the jurisdictional
parameters of U.M.C.R.App. 1(b), or by arguing the interests of justice exception under
U.M.C.R.App. 3. However, “counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every
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non-frivolous issue on appeal,” and, to overcome the presumption of effective assistance,
a claimant must demonstrate the issue not pursued was meritorious. Miller v. State, 2012
MT 131, ¶ 14, 365 Mont. 264, 280 P.3d 272. As noted, nothing was offered to the District
Court or has been offered to this Court to demonstrate that appeal of Sandoval’s conviction
of driving with a suspended license had merit such that failure to appeal the conviction
constituted ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. Sandoval urges only that an
apparently valid conviction for driving with a suspended license should nonetheless have
been appealed for the sole purpose of attempting to bring his appeal of the Ordinance
violation within the appellate parameters of the Rules.
¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents
no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent
or modify existing precedent. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question
controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶11 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
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