Debuff v. DNRC ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                              03/16/2021
    DA 20-0071
    Case Number: DA 20-0071
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2021 MT 68
    DANIEL G. DEBUFF and SANDRA L. DEBUFF,
    Petitioners and Appellees,
    v.
    MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
    AND CONSERVATION, an agency of the State of Montana,
    Respondent and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:           Montana Water Court, Cause No. WC-MAPA-2019-01
    Honorable Stephen R. Brown, Associate Water Judge, Presiding
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Barbara L. Chillcott, Brian C. Bramblett, Special Assistant Attorneys
    General, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation,
    Helena, Montana
    For Appellees:
    John E. Bloomquist, Bloomquist Law Firm, P.C., Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: November 18, 2020
    Decided: March 16, 2021
    Filed:
    cir-641.—if
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1    The Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC or the
    Department) appeals from the Order on Petition for Judicial Review entered by the
    Montana Water Court, reversing DNRC’s Final Order and remanding the matter to DNRC
    for further proceedings. We state the contested issues as follows:
    Did the Water Court err in its rulings regarding:
    1. Whether DNRC improperly relied upon either the geologic map or the 1987
    Final Order?
    2. Whether DNRC’s determination that the source aquifer was not discontinuous
    was clearly erroneous?
    3. Whether DNRC’s failure to consider evapotranspiration evidence provided by
    DeBuff was arbitrary and capricious?
    4. Whether DNRC’s determination that the water was not legally available and
    would have an adverse effect on senior appropriators was arbitrary and capricious?
    We reverse in part and affirm in part, and conclude that the Water Court correctly remanded
    the matter to DNRC for further proceedings.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2    The real property involved herein is owned by Daniel and Sandra DeBuff (DeBuff).
    It is an agricultural property located south of the Big Snowy Mountains within hydrologic
    Basin 40A, situated in Section 35, Township 10 North, Range 17 East, Wheatland County.
    Topographically, the property generally slopes from north to south. There are several sets
    of springs on the DeBuff property. Living Springs flows into a wetland complex, and does
    not connect to any other surface water feature, save for the occasional storm or runoff
    2
    event. There are four other springs, three of which are on DeBuff property and a fourth on
    a neighboring parcel, which are collectively referred to informally as the “southern
    springs.” South of the southern springs is Elk Creek, which is subject to the water rights
    of several third parties.
    ¶3     DeBuff proposes to divert groundwater by means of four wells on their property and
    a groundwater pit, with the wells discharging water into the pit to create a water storage
    unit with an approximate capacity of 19.5 acre-feet, which is designed to be pumped to a
    center pivot irrigation system. The wells are sourced by shallow groundwater from an
    unconfined gravel and sand aquifer system. According to Dr. Willis Weight, an engineer
    and hydrogeologist, and consultant for DeBuff, the aquifer is recharged from melt-off from
    the Big Snowy Mountains to the north, and thins or “pinches out” as it flows to the south.
    The proposed period of diversion for the project would be annually, between April 20 and
    October 10, for irrigation purposes.
    ¶4     In 1984, DeBuff applied with DNRC for a water use permit to appropriate ground
    water from the source aquifer. A contested hearing was held, after which the application
    was denied in the 1987 Final Order, wherein DNRC determined DeBuff had failed to prove
    that the water rights of senior appropriators downstream to the source aquifer would not be
    adversely affected by the proposed appropriation.       DNRC dismissed the application
    without prejudice to a reapplication by DeBuff should sufficient evidence become available
    to satisfy the burden of proof regarding adverse impacts to senior appropriators.
    3
    ¶5     Beginning in November 2013, Weight conducted a series of assessments to examine
    the feasibility of DeBuff’s proposed appropriation.       A preliminary aquifer test was
    conducted that consisted of a 74-hour pumping test at 160 gallons per minute, resulting in
    a cone of depression in the aquifer water levels that extended up to 1,800 feet. Another
    74-hour pumping test was conducted in September 2014 at a rate of 425 gallons per minute,
    resulting in a cone of depression of up to 2,000 feet, although full recovery was realized in
    less than four hours. During the second test, a gauge installed on one of the southern
    springs indicated no response or impact from the water draw. A third test conducted in the
    fall of 2015 yielded similar results.
    ¶6     At a pre-application, on-site meeting with DeBuff and their consultants, DNRC
    approved DeBuff’s proposal to conduct a subsequent four-well aquifer test, agreeing that
    the September 2014 test would be suitable to assess aquifer properties, while the following
    test would be used to further assess the impacts of pumping. In November 2015, an 88-hour
    pump test was conducted to evaluate pumping productivity of the aquifer, with an average
    pumping rate of 1,491 gallons per minute, resulting in a cone of depression of 2,700 feet.
    This pump test also analyzed the drawdown of five separate wells. From this test, Weight
    concluded that, since the nearest property line was 2,900 feet away, the cone of depression
    was unlikely to extend beyond DeBuff’s property line. Though the proposed testing had
    been initially approved by DNRC, in a December 2015 variance letter the agency expressed
    concern that any analysis with as many as five pumping wells would make it difficult to
    provide the necessary controls to properly evaluate aquifer properties.
    4
    ¶7     In February 2016, DeBuff submitted a renewed application for a beneficial water
    use permit to DNRC’s Lewistown Water Resource Regional Office. As initially filed,
    DeBuff proposed an appropriation of 3.63 cubic feet per second and a volume of 552.69
    acre-feet for the purpose of irrigating 267 acres of DeBuff’s property. In August 2018,
    Douglas Mann, who, along with Atilla Folnagy, processed the application for DNRC,
    delivered a deficiency letter to DeBuff pursuant to § 85-2-302(5), MCA, stating concerns
    about the impact the project would have on Elk Creek, situated south of DeBuff’s property.
    DNRC believed Elk Creek was connected to and supplied by a northern water source,
    Timber Creek. Weight and DeBuff responded to the deficiency letter, indicating that Elk
    Creek was not connected to any northern source and was ephemeral, and that the northern
    source identified by DNRC ran dry on DeBuff’s property. Weight also stated for the first
    time that evapotranspiration analysis would be appropriate in this situation and that he
    would conduct such analysis in the event that the application was deemed correct and
    complete by DNRC.1, 2
    ¶8     In January 2017, DNRC issued a report addressing the additional information
    supplied by DeBuff and Weight.          The report stated the proposed evapotranspiration
    1
    Evapotranspiration is a process resulting in the loss of water from the soil both by evaporation
    and by transpiration from the plants growing thereon. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
    432 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 11th ed. 2012). As used in water proceedings, evapotranspiration
    measures the water that would potentially be captured by avoiding the losses from these natural
    processes when water is instead applied to a beneficial use.
    2
    In his response to DNRC, Weight referenced and incorporated the geologic map that would
    become an issue herein, and referenced it multiple other times while corresponding with DeBuff
    and DNRC. DNRC also regularly referenced the geologic map in its correspondence.
    5
    analysis may not be reliable because it would address conditions unrelated to pumping, and
    that Weight’s conceptual model depicting the aquifer as confined was questionable because
    it was based on limited well logs.
    ¶9     DNRC determined the application to be correct and complete and issued a technical
    report in March 2017. The technical report, which incorporated an aquifer test report and
    depletion report prepared by DNRC staff hydrologists, examined water availability from
    two vantage points: ground water and surface water. The report determined groundwater
    to be both physically and legally available. However, the report determined that surface
    water was physically and legally available only during certain months, rather than annually.
    Monthly watershed yield, which impacts water availability, was estimated by DNRC at
    this time using the Thornthwaite program, a software analysis tool, despite DNRC
    acknowledging that portions of the program’s conclusions were “very unlikely.”
    ¶10    In April 2017, DeBuff submitted additional information regarding surface level
    depletion of the southern “Bunkhouse” well that indicated the aquifer thinned or pinched
    out, and was discontinuous. At a meeting of the parties in June 2017, Weight presented a
    conceptual model that illustrated the pinching out of the source aquifer. In order to satisfy
    DNRC’s concern that the conceptual model was not supported by enough field data, the
    model was supported not only by the prior pump test and well log data that DNRC had
    questioned as insufficient, but by additional well log information gathered in July 2016.
    ¶11    In November 2017, DNRC issued a revised technical report that incorporated
    portions of DeBuff’s additional evidence and analysis. The revised technical report
    6
    conceded that DeBuff’s analysis correctly determined that the aquifer thinned or pinched
    out, and, consequently, a different net depletion method than used in the prior depletion
    report would need to be employed. However, DNRC stated that the pinching out did not
    mean that the aquifer was discontinuous. Instead, DNRC continued to rely on a prior
    determination it had made, based upon an analysis of shade contrasts in aerial photos, that
    the source aquifer was continuous to the southern springs. DNRC also conceded that
    DeBuff had demonstrated the drainage south of Living Springs was ephemeral, but that,
    instead, it now believed the southern springs to be the source for Elk Creek and related
    downstream water rights. The revised report expressed concern that, while depletion to
    Living Springs would be realized within the same month as the pumping occurred,
    depletion of the southern springs and to their respective reaches—which DNRC now
    characterized as the source aquifer for Elk Creek—would be more difficult to gauge, due
    to the greater distance to the southern springs, and was “assumed to be constant year-round
    depletion.” Lastly, the revised report conceded that the watershed analysis previously
    employed and relied on by DNRC—figures deriving from the Thornthwaite program—
    was “not appropriate for comparing legal availability of surface water” because it had
    determined that the Elk Creek drainage was not intermittent, rendering any figures that
    7
    relied upon the original analysis, including DeBuff’s evapotranspiration analysis, to be
    inaccurate.3, 4
    ¶12    On December 14, 2017, the parties met to discuss the revised technical report and
    DNRC’s new focus on the southern springs. Based on these discussions, Weight provided
    additional information for the purpose of demonstrating the source aquifer for the proposal
    was not connected to the southern springs. Even so, Weight additionally proposed a water
    budget analysis that would apply two of DeBuff’s existing water rights for mitigation
    purposes against the projected depletion by the new application. Weight also proposed
    incorporating an evapotranspiration analysis to balance out anticipated depletions to the
    southern springs. Thus, while continuing to maintain DeBuff’s proposed use would not
    draw from the source aquifer of the southern springs, DeBuff nonetheless offered
    mitigation against such depletion by dedication of two of their existing water rights.
    ¶13    The proposed water balance was evaluated by DNRC and, in a January 23, 2018
    memorandum, the Department reached a general conclusion that the application still did
    3
    “Technical reports,” “aquifer reports,” and “depletion reports” are part of DNRC’s agency
    nomenclature, but these names are not defined by statute or administrative rules. The reports are
    prepared by DNRC staff as part of the Department’s internal review process, and frequently are
    individual parts of an overall report.
    4
    Throughout the proceeding, DNRC staff used the Thornthwaite Method, applying its findings to
    both the watershed yield and evapotranspiration analysis. In contrast, Weight employed the
    Penman Method, which DNRC eventually conceded in the second technical report was the
    superior analytical approach. See Citizens for Ground Water Prot. v. Porter, 
    275 S.W.3d 329
    , 341
    (Mo. 2008) (stating that the Penman Method of evapotranspiration analysis “is generally accepted
    in the irrigation industry[,] as opposed to the Thornthwaite method . . . which is not generally
    accepted nor endorsed”).
    8
    not sufficiently mitigate depletion of the southern springs.      Unexpectantly, DNRC’s
    assessment of Weight’s evapotranspiration analysis concluded it would actually mitigate a
    greater loss than Weight had suggested, specifically, an estimated 230.8 acre-feet annually
    from the Living Springs wetland area. However, while DNRC did not identify problems
    with the use of evapotranspiration methodology, it nonetheless concluded a consumption
    volume of 137.5 acre-feet would still be left unmitigated. It therefore concluded that a
    downward adjustment to the volume requested in DeBuff’s application would be necessary
    before evapotranspiration methodology could be applied, and that other practical problems
    with the water budget offsets remained.
    ¶14    Consequently, in response to DNRC’s conclusions, and following further
    discussions between the parties, DeBuff decided to submit an amended application that
    would significantly reduce the size of his proposed use and cover DNRC’s depletion
    calculation. On March 5, 2018, DeBuff submitted an amended application, reducing the
    proposed flow rate from 3.63 to 2.38 cubic feet per second, the volume from 552.69 to
    216.4 acre-feet, and the irrigated area from 267 to 173.1 acres. The flow rate was later
    clarified by Pat Riley, another consultant for DeBuff, to be 2.43 cubic feet per second. This
    downsizing of the proposal placed the application’s estimated acre-feet use below the
    estimated total amount of water that would be saved under the evapotranspiration analysis,
    and thus satisfied DNRC’s estimate that 137.5 acre-feet would be unmitigated under the
    original application, reaching zero net depletion to downgradient surface water.
    9
    ¶15    On April 16, 2018, DNRC determined DeBuff’s amended application was correct
    and complete. On April 18, 2018, DNRC issued a third revised technical report. The third
    revision incorporated a revised aquifer test report and revised depletion report that
    referenced the 1987 Final Order when noting that “[n]o additional information has been
    provided to [DNRC] in this application regarding the estimated flows/volume emanating
    from the Southern Springs other than a single measurement during the previous application
    process (1987).” However, despite the parties’ lengthy application of evapotranspiration
    analysis throughout the process, following which DeBuff submitted the amended
    application premised thereon, DNRC neither analyzed evapotranspiration in the report nor
    explained why it suddenly abandoned the analysis. In response, on May 17, 2018, DeBuff,
    through Weight, sent a letter to DNRC pointing out the need for evapotranspiration
    analysis, and again providing a summary of its impact on the application. DNRC reviewed
    the letter, but declined to alter its conclusions.
    ¶16    On August 14, 2018, Scott Irvin, manager of the Lewistown Water Resources
    Regional Office, issued the Preliminary Determination (PD) denying DeBuff’s amended
    application. Irvin based his decision on DNRC’s determination that DeBuff had failed to
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the “surface water [was] legally available
    from the Southern Springs discharge point and downgradient in the Elk Creek drainage,
    nor [had] they proven adverse effects would not result to water users in that drainage.”
    ¶17    The PD acknowledged Weight’s opinion about the nature of the aquifer, but credited
    DNRC’s view that, despite pinching out, the aquifer was hydraulically connected to the
    10
    southern springs. The PD relied heavily upon the opinion of DNRC staff that, because
    there was “no mapped bedrock feature (e.g. no flow boundary) that would prevent
    depletions to the Southern Springs[,]” depletions of surface water at Living Springs would
    “ultimately manifest to the Southern Springs . . . and further downstream to the Elk Creek
    drainage[.]” Notably, and consistent with DNRC’s revised technical report, the PD did not
    discuss evapotranspiration analysis and its effect on the application—either as conducted
    by Weight or by DNRC hydrologists—nor did it explain why it was failing to do so after
    the analysis had played a significant role during the administrative process. The PD
    referenced and incorporated facts from the 1987 Final Order, noting DNRC’s hydraulic
    connection analysis’s consistency with that done in 1987.
    ¶18   Objecting to the PD, DeBuff requested a show cause hearing, which was conducted
    on November 1, 2018. DeBuff was given the opportunity therein to show cause why the
    application should be approved. DNRC presented no case. DeBuff provided, among other
    documents, a copy of the 1987 Final Order, as well as flow measurements from two of the
    southern springs taken in the summer of 2018. DeBuff offered the testimony of Weight
    and Riley, and also examined Folnagy and Mann. While being examined by counsel for
    DeBuff, Folnagy acknowledged the evapotranspiration analysis conducted by Weight but
    explained he determined not to discuss it in his reports because he did not believe DeBuff
    had demonstrated an appropriate basis for evapotranspiration analysis to be considered.
    Mann testified there was no continuous flow between the Living Springs and the southern
    springs, making watershed analysis inapplicable.
    11
    ¶19    On January 28, 2019, the Hearing Examiner issued a Final Order on behalf of DNRC
    that upheld the PD’s denial of DeBuff’s amended application. The Final Order adopted
    substantial portions of the PD and made additional findings regarding legal availability and
    adverse effect. The Hearing Officer affirmed the Department’s determination that DeBuff
    had failed to prove legal availability and lack of adverse effect on senior appropriators by
    a preponderance of the evidence. The Final Order did not address either the water balance
    proposal DeBuff had submitted in consultation with DNRC, or the evapotranspiration
    analysis offered by DeBuff to mitigate DNRC’s concern about depletion.
    ¶20    In February 2019, DeBuff filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Water Court.
    After briefing, the Water Court heard oral argument on August 22, 2019. On November 21,
    2019, the Water Court entered judgment in favor of DeBuff, reversing DNRC’s Final Order
    and remanding with instructions to enter a modified Preliminary Determination consistent
    with the Water Court’s decision, which allowed DeBuff’s amended application to proceed
    to the notice stage of the process, and opportunity for objections by affected water users,
    as more fully discussed herein.
    ¶21    The Water Court held, first, that DNRC improperly relied on a map that was not
    properly made a part of the record, resulting in an erroneous determination by DNRC that
    the source aquifer was hydrologically connected to the southern springs. Second, the Water
    Court concluded DNRC’s reliance on facts gleaned from the 1987 Final Order was
    improper, resulting in a decision that was procedurally flawed. Third, the Water Court
    concluded the Final Order’s rejection of the watershed yield analysis was arbitrary and
    12
    capricious.    Fourth, the Water Court held DNRC’s failure to consider the record
    evapotranspiration evidence was arbitrary and capricious.              Finally, the Water Court
    determined DNRC failed to independently evaluate evidence related to use of water rights
    by senior appropriators as included within the Final Order’s determination regarding lack
    of adverse effect to surface water rights in Elk Creek, concluding this was arbitrary and
    capricious and an abuse of discretion. DNRC appeals.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶22    We apply the same standard as the lower court. Qwest Corp. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub.
    Serv. Regulation, 
    2007 MT 350
    , ¶ 15, 
    340 Mont. 309
    , 
    174 P.3d 496
     (citing Montana Power
    Co. v. Public Service Com’n, 
    2001 MT 102
    , ¶ 18, 
    305 Mont. 260
    , 
    26 P.3d 91
    ). The
    Montana Administrative Procedures Act outlines the correct standard of review for judicial
    review of administrative decisions in contested cases in § 2-4-704, MCA.5                    Under
    § 2-4-704(2), MCA, a reviewing court may either affirm or remand a case for further
    proceedings, but it may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
    of the evidence on questions of fact in either affirming or remanding a case for further
    proceedings. Section 2-4-704(2), MCA. A reviewing court may reverse or modify the
    agency decision if substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because the decision
    5
    A contested case is “a proceeding before an agency in which a determination of legal rights,
    duties, or privileges of a party is required by law to be made after the opportunity for hearing.”
    Section 2-4-102(4), MCA. DNRC’s Final Order followed a hearing and effected DeBuff’s
    opportunity to obtain a water permit as well as the rights of senior appropriators. Therefore, it is
    within the definition of contested case and subject to the statutory review articulated in § 2-4-704,
    MCA.
    13
    violates constitutional or statutory provisions, is based upon unlawful procedure, is clearly
    erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record, is arbitrary or capricious,
    or may be properly characterized as an abuse of discretion. Section 2-4-704(2)(a), MCA.
    ¶23    “A three-part test is used to determine whether agency findings are clearly
    erroneous: (1) the record is reviewed to determine if the findings are supported by
    substantial evidence; (2) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, it will be
    determined whether the agency misapprehended the effect of the evidence; and (3) if
    substantial evidence exists and the effect of the evidence has not been misapprehended, the
    reviewing court may still decide that a finding is clearly erroneous if a review of the record
    leaves the court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Schmidt
    v. Cook, 
    2005 MT 53
    , ¶ 21, 
    326 Mont. 202
    , 
    108 P.3d 511
     (citation omitted).
    ¶24    An evaluation of a petition for judicial review calls for the Court to review the entire
    administrative record. KB Enters., LLC v. Mont. Human Rights Comm’n, 
    2019 MT 131
    ,
    ¶ 6, 
    396 Mont. 134
    , 
    443 P.3d 498
     (citing Bollinger v. Billings Clinic, 
    2019 MT 42
    , ¶ 26,
    
    394 Mont. 338
    , 
    434 P.3d 885
    ). In areas that require scientific expertise or are highly
    technical in nature, we will defer to the expertise of an agency. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
    Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
    2019 MT 213
    , ¶ 20, 
    397 Mont. 161
    , 
    451 P.3d 493
    . However,
    while we acknowledge that this Court is “not comprised of hydrologists, geologists, or
    engineers, and that protecting the quality of Montana’s water requires significant technical
    and scientific expertise beyond the grasp of the Court[,]” we have been entrusted with an
    inherent power to review administrative decisions and interpret the law, regardless of the
    14
    subject of an appeal. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., ¶ 20. As such, we will not afford unfettered
    deference to agency decisions without a thorough and careful review of the administrative
    record    and   defer   only    to   “consistent,   rational,   and    well-supported     agency
    decision-making.” Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., ¶ 26. This requires that an agency “‘cogently
    explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.’” Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr.,
    ¶ 97 (quoting Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. United States EPA, 
    788 F.3d 1134
    , 1142
    (9th Cir. 2015)). Further, we will consider whether an agency decision was based on a
    consideration of all relevant factors. Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
    
    2008 MT 407
    , ¶ 21, 
    347 Mont. 197
    , 
    197 P.3d 482
    .
    DISCUSSION
    Overview
    ¶25      DNRC is tasked with “coordinat[ing] the development and use of the water
    resources of the [S]tate so as to effect full utilization, conservation, and protection of its
    water resources.” Section 85-1-101(3), MCA.6 As such, DNRC is the agency charged
    with issuing water use permits and promulgating “suitable rules for the administration” of
    the Montana Water Use Act. Section 85-1-201, MCA. Except for limited exceptions not
    applicable here, “a person may not appropriate water or commence construction of
    diversion, impoundment, withdrawal, or related distribution works unless the person
    applies for and receives a permit[.]” Section 85-2-302(1), MCA. The application must be
    6
    We cite to the 2019 version of the statutes as there are no relevant substantive changes between
    the 2015 and 2019 versions.
    15
    on the form prescribed by DNRC. Section 85-2-302(3), MCA. To be approved, the
    applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the application satisfies all
    requirements listed in § 85-2-311, MCA (-311 criteria).
    ¶26    The -311 criteria are an outline of six broad areas that must be addressed by the
    applicant: physical availability, legal availability, adverse effect, adequate diversion,
    beneficial use, and possessory interest. Section 85-2-311, MCA. To satisfy physical
    availability, the applicant must supply evidence establishing the ground and surface water
    the applicant is seeking to appropriate is physically available at the proposed point of
    diversion.   Section 85-2-311(1)(a)(i), MCA; Admin. R. M. 36.12.1702, 36.12.1703
    (requiring various tests and analyses including streamflow analysis and aquifer testing). 7
    Regarding legal availability, the applicant must identify physical water availability and
    existing legal demands on the source and provide an analysis demonstrating that the
    proposed appropriation does not and will not exceed the difference between the available
    water and the existing legal demands. Section 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii), MCA; Admin. R. M.
    36.12.1704, 36.12.1705.     Under adverse effect, the applicant must show that senior
    appropriators will not be adversely affected, either qualitatively or quantitatively, by the
    proposed usage.     Section 85-2-311(1)(b), (f), MCA; Admin. R. M. 36.12.1706(2)
    (“applicant’s plan may include the use of mitigation or aquifer recharge [] as a means of
    offsetting any adverse effect”). The applicant is tasked with proving adequate diversion,
    7
    All citations to the Administrative Rules of Montana will be to the rules in effect as of
    February 11, 2016, the date the application was filed.
    16
    meaning that the requested water can be properly conveyed from the point of diversion to
    the place of use. Section 85-2-311(1)(c), MCA; Admin. R. M. 36.12.1707 (noting that this
    requires analysis of proposed flow rates and volume capacity and efficiency of the
    diversion, among other factors). The appropriation must be shown to be a beneficial use,
    which     for    present    purposes      includes    agricultural     operations.        Sections
    85-2-102(5)(a), -311(1)(d), MCA. Finally, applicants must prove they have a possessory
    interest in the place of use or the written consent of the person with the possessory interest
    in the property where the water is to be put to beneficial use. Section 85-2-311(1)(e), MCA.
    Application Process
    ¶27     The first step taken by DNRC when it receives a water appropriation application is
    to evaluate whether the application is “correct and complete.” Section 85-2-302(2), MCA.8
    Once deemed correct and complete, the application is analyzed by DNRC to determine
    whether the -311 criteria are satisfied. Admin. R. M. 36.12.1601(2). Unless waived, within
    120 days DNRC “shall make a written preliminary determination as to whether or not the
    application     satisfies   the   applicable    criteria   for    issuance     of    a   permit[.]”
    Section 85-2-307(2)(a)(ii), MCA.
    8
    The term “correct and complete” is a term of art that means “that the information required to be
    submitted conforms to the standard of substantial credible information and that all of the necessary
    parts of the form requiring the information have been filled in with the required information for
    [DNRC] to begin evaluating the information.” Section 85-2-102(9), MCA; see Admin. R. M.
    36.12.1601. A determination that an application is correct and complete “does not mean that the
    permit will be granted; the applicant still must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the -311 criteria are met.” Flathead Lakers Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 
    2020 MT 132
    , ¶ 18, 
    400 Mont. 170
    , 
    464 P.3d 396
     (citing Admin. R. M. 36.12.1601(4)).
    17
    ¶28       From there, the process depends on whether DNRC issues a preliminary
    determination to deny or a preliminary determination to grant the application. If DNRC
    issues a preliminary determination to deny, it “shall hold a [show cause] hearing pursuant
    to [§] 2-4-604[, MCA,] . . . for the applicant to show cause by a preponderance of the
    evidence as to why the permit or change in appropriation should not be denied.” Section
    85-2-310(1)(a), MCA; see § 2-4-604, MCA. A hearing examiner conducts the hearing and
    thereafter issues an order on behalf of DNRC, based on the evidence presented at the
    hearing. Section 2-4-604(1)(a), MCA; Admin. R. M. 36.12.203. Following entry of this
    final order, an applicant whose application remains denied may petition to the Water Court
    for judicial review. Section 2-4-702, MCA. Upon review, the Water Court may either
    affirm or reverse DNRC’s order pursuant to § 2-4-701, et seq., MCA.
    ¶29       When a preliminary determination to grant is made, whether by DNRC
    administratively, after a hearing before an examiner, or after review by the Water Court,
    DNRC then prepares a notice containing all pertinent facts of the application, including a
    summary of the preliminary determination and any conditions, which is delivered to all
    parties    whose   water rights may be       affected   by   the proposed     application.
    Section 85-2-307(2)(d), MCA.      Notice is also published in a newspaper of general
    circulation in the area of the source aquifer. Section 85-2-307(2)(b), MCA. Objections to
    the application may be filed by persons whose “property, water rights, or interests . . .
    would be adversely affected by the proposed appropriation.” Section 85-2-308(3), MCA.
    18
    ¶30    Upon the filing of valid objections, DNRC conducts a contested case hearing
    pursuant to § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA, on the objections. Section 85-2-309(1), MCA. The
    hearing is an opportunity for the objector(s), applicant, and DNRC to present evidence to
    the hearing examiner as to whether the permit should be granted or denied.
    Section 2-4-612(1), MCA. The hearing examiner then issues a final decision, which is
    ultimately again reviewable by the Water Court. Section 2-4-701, et seq., MCA.
    ¶31    Here, the Water Court reversed the preliminary determination and remanded the
    matter for “publication and notice of this decision,” whereupon “potentially affected
    parties—including downstream water right owners—will be afforded an opportunity to
    submit objections demonstrating why they may be adversely affected by [DeBuff’s]
    proposed appropriation.”
    ¶32    We now turn to the rulings of the Water Court.
    1. DNRC reliance on information not in the Administrative Record
    ¶33    The Water Court found error in DNRC’s reliance on a geologic map and the 1987
    Final Order, reasoning that because these articles of evidence were not part of the record,
    the decision of DNRC was reached by unlawful procedure. An agency’s order must be
    vacated if founded on unlawful procedure that violates a party’s due process interests.
    Frasceli, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue Liquor Div., 
    235 Mont. 152
    , 156, 
    766 P.2d 850
    , 852
    (1988).
    ¶34    When determining legal availability, DNRC is to make its decision “based on the
    records of the [D]epartment and other evidence provided to the [D]epartment.”
    19
    Section 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii), MCA. In construing statutes, “[i]t is axiomatic that the proper
    interpretation” first be determined according to the plain language. Bean v. State Bd. of
    Labor Appeals, 
    270 Mont. 253
    , 257, 
    891 P.2d 516
    , 519 (1995). Drawing from the clear
    wording of the statute, when determining legal availability of a source aquifer, DNRC may
    consider not only the evidence provided to it during the application process but also
    information within its records. Balancing this ability to review information beyond that
    presented by the parties is the requirement of due process, which mandates that applicants
    be put on notice that particular evidence may be used against them. See Bowman Transp.,
    Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
    419 U.S. 281
    , 288 n.4, 
    95 S. Ct. 438
    , 443 n.4 (1974)
    (“the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an
    opportunity to offer a contrary presentation”) (citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
    Utilities Comm’n, 
    301 U.S. 292
    , 
    57 S. Ct. 724
     (1937); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co.,
    
    265 U.S. 274
    , 
    44 S. Ct. 565
     (1924)).
    ¶35    Regarding DNRC’s use of the geologic map, the Water Court took issue with
    DNRC’s rejection of Weight’s conceptual model that concluded the aquifer was
    discontinuous, in favor of the position taken by DNRC staff that the aquifer was continuous
    based on the geologic map, without finding any fault with Weight’s conclusions.
    Specifically, the Water Court reasoned that because the geologic map was not in the
    administrative record, any evidence drawn from it was inadmissible. Since DNRC relied
    heavily on the map in rejecting the utility of Weight’s conclusions, the Water Court
    concluded no substantial evidence supported DNRC findings.
    20
    ¶36    However, the geologic map was cited and endorsed by DeBuff and Weight
    throughout the process, and was well known to them. Any concern regarding the status of
    the map for purposes of the PD is alleviated by the fact that DeBuff was put on extensive
    actual notice it may be utilized and, rather than objecting to it, elected instead to incorporate
    it within DeBuff’s own memoranda and reports. Therefore, without regard to the strength
    of DNRC’s determinations premised upon the map, we conclude the Water Court erred by
    ruling that DNRC erred by using the map. Due process was provided to DeBuff and DNRC
    was permitted to consider the geologic map pursuant to § 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii), MCA.
    ¶37    DNRC also relied upon statements in the 1987 Final Order for its legal availability
    analysis, which the Water Court likewise held was a procedural error. The 1987 Final
    Order involved the same source aquifer, concerned the same senior appropriators, and was
    issued in regard to the same applicant, DeBuff. It seems obvious the 1987 Order would be
    included within the “records of the [D]epartment” under § 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii), MCA, and,
    because it was very closely related to the circumstances of the current application, was
    relevant and appropriate.       It also was subject to rebuttal, as anticipated by the
    then-dismissal of DeBuff’s claim without prejudice. Further, as a prior decision, the 1987
    Order could be considered a “judicially cognizable fact[,]” allowing for sua sponte notice
    and recognition of the facts therein. See Admin. R. M. 36.12.221(4) (requiring notice to
    parties that facts have been recognized “either before or during the hearing or by reference
    in the proposal for decision”). As evidenced by DeBuff’s inclusion of the 1987 Final Order
    as evidence in its presentation at the show cause hearing, DeBuff was on notice about its
    21
    inclusion and due process was provided. We therefore conclude DNRC’s reliance on the
    1987 Final Order was not improper.
    2. Source Aquifer Continuity
    ¶38    Our determination that DNRC properly relied upon both the geologic map and the
    1987 Final Order alters the review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
    agency’s aquifer continuity determination. With the inclusion of that evidence, we must
    conclude the Water Court erred by holding that DNRC’s determination was not supported
    by substantial evidence, especially in light of the requirement that “evidence is viewed in
    the light most favorable to the prevailing party when determining whether findings are
    supported by substantial credible evidence.” Blaine Cnty. v. Stricker, 
    2017 MT 80
    , ¶ 26,
    
    387 Mont. 202
    , 
    394 P.3d 159
     (citing Welu v. Twin Hearts Smiling Horses, Inc., 
    2016 MT 347
    , ¶ 12, 
    386 Mont. 98
    , 
    386 P.3d 937
    ). As the Water Court correctly acknowledged, the
    preponderance of the evidence standard is “relatively modest.” Hohenlohe v. State, 
    2010 MT 203
    , ¶ 33, 
    357 Mont. 438
    , 
    240 P.3d 628
    .
    ¶39    However, that is not to say there remains no doubt about DNRC’s finding and, as
    explained above, the standards of review permit a broader judicial inquiry. Upon initial
    review of DeBuff’s original 2016 application, DNRC took the position that the source
    aquifer was hydrologically connected to Living Springs. Seven months after issuing the
    first “correct and complete” letter, and upon receipt of Weight’s evidence and analysis of
    discontinuity, DNRC altered its position and, as noted by the Water Court, “shifted the
    focus [and] imposed a new burden on [DeBuff] to prove the source aquifer is not connected
    22
    to the southern springs.” DeBuff engaged in extensive pump testing upon the protocol that
    DNRC approved and showed that no drawdown occurred, effectively demonstrating, in the
    Water Court’s words, “the requisite lack of aquifer connection[.]” DNRC ultimately
    rejected this determination based upon the 1987 Final Order and its assessment of the
    geologic map, but did so without identifying deficiencies in Weight’s analysis or otherwise
    explaining why it was rejecting the analysis, other than to say it favored conclusions drawn
    from the map. While it remained DeBuff’s burden to disprove DNRC’s map analysis,
    rather than DNRC’s burden to disprove Weight’s analysis, the evidence produced by
    DeBuff was extensive, and required at a minimum an explanation by DNRC for its
    rejection of the evidence. See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., ¶ 97 (an agency must “cogently
    explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner”) (internal citation and
    quotation omitted)). While the procedural posture of this case does not require that we
    decide the factual issue of continuity in this appeal, suffice it to say, given the Department’s
    handling of the issue, that “a review of the record leaves the court” with serious questions
    that may be addressed during further proceedings. Schmidt, ¶ 21.
    3. Failure to Acknowledge Evapotranspiration Analysis
    ¶40    The Water Court took issue with DNRC’s failure to address the evapotranspiration
    analysis provided by DeBuff, and its rejection thereof. The court determined that, by not
    analyzing the evapotranspiration evidence in the Final Order, combined with DNRC’s
    determination that the water was physically available, “DNRC failed to cogently explain
    why [DeBuff] did not prove the amended application eliminated net depletion to water
    23
    available to downstream water rights.”       The Water Court characterized the lack of
    consideration as an arbitrary and capricious error of law.
    ¶41    A decision is arbitrary and capricious “if it appears, based on the existing record, to
    be random, unreasonable, or seemingly unmotivated.”             Cmty. Ass’n for N. Shore
    Conservation, Inc. v. Flathead Cnty., 
    2019 MT 147
    , ¶ 28, 
    396 Mont. 194
    , 
    445 P.3d 1195
    (citing Kiely Constr. LLC v. City of Red Lodge, 
    2002 MT 241
    , ¶ 69, 
    312 Mont. 52
    , 
    57 P.3d 836
    ). This can manifest through failure to consider all relevant factors or by basing a
    decision on clearly erroneous judgment. Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of
    Envtl. Quality, 
    2017 MT 222
    , ¶ 16, 
    388 Mont. 453
    , 
    401 P.3d 712
     (citation omitted).
    However, the arbitrary and capricious standard “does not permit reversal ‘merely because
    the record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence which might support a different
    result.’” Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc., ¶ 16 (quoting Montana Wildlife Fed. v. Mont.
    Bd. of Oil & Gas Conserv., 
    2012 MT 128
    , ¶ 25, 
    365 Mont. 232
    , 
    280 P.3d 877
    ).
    ¶42    It gives us pause that DNRC ostensibly endorsed DeBuff’s evapotranspiration
    analysis, and evapotranspiration analysis in general, only to completely reverse its position
    in the PD and offer no explanation for doing so—even though DeBuff raised the issue in
    writing and asked for reconsideration after DNRC issued its third revised technical report.
    In its January 23, 2018 memorandum responding to Weight’s water budget proposal that
    incorporated analysis of evapotranspiration, DNRC expressed some concern over the
    mechanics of the water budget and evapotranspiration analysis, but did not reject them
    altogether and, indeed, provided its own analysis that an estimated 230.8 acre-feet would
    24
    become available by evapotranspiration savings at Living Springs—a clear endorsement
    of use of the methodology for this application. DNRC’s analysis was even more favorable
    to DeBuff than Weight’s and, following further consultation with DNRC, DeBuff
    submitted an amended application that significantly reduced the proposed use from 552.69
    to 216.4 acre-feet, bringing the proposal to zero net depletion, that is, to less than what was
    already being lost to evapotranspiration. However, DNRC then reversed its position
    regarding evapotranspiration in the PD, without explanation.
    ¶43    DNRC first argues that evapotranspiration analysis was not included in the amended
    application.     However, there is no avoiding the substantial importance that
    evapotranspiration had on the application—the amended application with significantly
    reduced volume was submitted because of it. Both DeBuff and DNRC actively conducted
    evapotranspiration analyses and, for purposes of a PD, DNRC may consider all information
    provided to it and must address any relevant evidence. Section 85-2-311(1)(a)(ii), MCA;
    Clark Fork Coal., ¶ 21. DNRC argues the absence of findings in the Final Order related
    to evapotranspiration analysis was harmless error because it had no impact on the outcome
    of the decision, citing the testimony of Folnagy at the show cause hearing that
    evapotranspiration analysis did not credibly demonstrate it would lead to the desired
    outcome in this circumstance. Given the significant role evapotranspiration analysis
    played in the proceeding, as well as DNRC’s obligation to “cogently explain why it has
    exercised its discretion in a given matter[,]” Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., ¶ 97, we cannot
    conclude the failure to address it was harmless, or that Folgany’s post hoc testimony was
    25
    sufficient to justify its rejection. Up until issuance of the PD, the parties engaged the
    process upon the premise that evapotranspiration analysis was a valid and key element of
    the proposal.
    ¶44    We conclude the Water Court correctly determined that the agency’s action was
    arbitrary and capricious. Review of the record in its entirety, including that discussed
    above regarding the continuity issue, leaves, at a minimum, an impression that as DeBuff
    worked to satisfy DNRC’s concerns, DNRC kept moving the goalposts, without an
    adequate explanation.
    4. Legal Availability and Adverse Effect
    ¶45    The Water Court’s reversal of DNRC’s findings, and our determinations herein,
    significantly impact the issues of legal availability and adverse effect. Without a sufficient
    basis for DNRC to reject the extensive evidence, some from DNRC itself, which
    demonstrated the amended application resulted in zero net depletion, including by
    evapotranspiration analysis and by mitigation provided by application of two of DeBuff’s
    existing water rights, the record would indicate, at this stage of the proceeding, that the
    proposed use does not reduce the amount of water available for senior appropriators,
    physically or legally. In Baker Ditch Co. v. Dist. Court, 
    251 Mont. 251
    , 256, 
    824 P.2d 260
    ,
    263 (1992), we noted that a subsequent appropriator has the right to the use of water if such
    use “cannot in any way be a detriment to a prior appropriator[.]” Consistent therewith,
    § 85-2-401(1), MCA, provides that “[p]riority of appropriation does not include the right
    to prevent changes by later appropriators in the condition of water occurrence, such as the
    26
    increase or decrease of streamflow or the lowering of a water table, artesian pressure, or
    water level, if the prior appropriator can reasonably exercise the water right under the
    changed conditions.” The record here clearly establishes that the amended application,
    including the evidence that DNRC rejected without a proper basis, satisfies the statutory
    criteria for a preliminary determination and may move forward to face objections, if any,
    by other appropriators in the process explained above and provided for in § 85-2-307,
    et. seq., MCA.
    ¶46   Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the Department for further
    proceedings consistent herewith.
    /S/ JIM RICE
    We concur:
    /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
    /S/ LAURIE McKINNON
    /S/ BETH BAKER
    /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
    27