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. The employee waited to file a discrimination complaint until after she was
terminated on January 31, 1992. Hash,

268 Mont. at 328

. After the Equal
Employment Office found no discrimination in her termination, the employee filed her
allegations of discrimination with the Human Rights Commission on June 5, 1992. Hash,

268 Mont. at 328-29

. The Human Rights Commission informed the
employee that it had no authority over the matter because the allowable time to file her
complaint had expired. Hash,

.
5
¶9    We held that the discriminatory act giving rise to the employee’s claim, and thus
triggering the 180-day time limit on filing, was U.S. West’s notification to the employee
of its decision to eliminate her position; this notice was when the employee “discovered
the alleged discriminatory practice.”3 Hash,

886 P.2d at 444

. The
employee argued that the date her claim should start to accrue should have been when she
was terminated because she “hoped and believed, up to the time of termination, that she
would be given another U.S. West position.” Hash,

886 P.2d at 444

.
This Court concluded that the employee’s “hopes and beliefs [could not] contradict the fact
that she discovered the alleged discriminatory act(s) on June 19, 1991,” when she was
notified that her position was set to be terminated. Because the employee was time-barred
from bringing a complaint to the Human Rights Commission, she was also time-barred
from subsequently bringing her discrimination claim to the district court. Hash,

268 Mont. at 331

886 P.2d at 445

.
¶10 In Skites, an employee alleged that her employer, Blue Cross, discriminated against
her based on a physical disability. Skites, ¶ 3. In her complaint filed with the Human
Rights Bureau, she alleged that Blue Cross failed to accommodate her disability on
January 2, 1996, and that “the date the most recent or continuing discrimination took place
was April 15, 1996.” Skites, ¶ 3. After the Human Rights Bureau and the Human Rights
3
When we considered the statutory limitation in Hash, the language that is now found in
§ 49-2-501(4)(a), MCA, was contained in § 49-2-501(2)(a), MCA. The Legislature amended the
statute in 1997, moving the applicable language to subsection (4)(a).
6
Commission dismissed the employee’s complaint for failure to timely file it “within 180
days of the alleged discriminatory act as required by statute[,]” the employee filed a
complaint with the district court. Skites, ¶¶ 4-5. Blue Cross asserted that because the
employee’s complaint to the Human Rights Commission was untimely, her complaint in
district court also was time-barred. Skites, ¶ 5.
¶11 This Court reaffirmed its decision from Hash that “timely filing before the [Human
Rights Commission] is a prerequisite to filing a complaint alleging employment
discrimination in district court.” Skites, ¶ 10. We concluded that the employee was
time-barred in the district court because she filed her complaint with the Human Rights
Bureau 225 days after April 15, 1996—“the date stated in her complaint as the date of the
most recent or continuing act of employment discrimination by Blue Cross.” Skites, ¶ 11.
The employee argued that she did not properly word her complaint; it should have stated
that the discriminatory acts began on April 15, 1996. Skites, ¶ 13. We kept our
consideration of the employee’s timeliness to the dates found in her complaint, reasoning
that allowing a complainant to change these dates would prevent the Human Rights
Commission and district courts “from being able to determine whether a[] . . . complaint
was timely filed.” Skites, ¶ 15. Because the employee was time-barred from bringing her
complaint to the Human Rights Commission, she subsequently was barred from bringing
it before the district court. Skites, ¶ 20.
¶12 The District Court used the foregoing precedent to conclude that the 180-day period
for Zolnikov to file her complaint started when she discovered the alleged discriminatory
7
practice on December 12, 2018, not when she was “injured or damaged under general claim
accrual [principles].” Relying on Hash, the court decided that Zolnikov’s claim for
discrimination began to accrue when she was informed of the NBME’s denial of her appeal
for accommodations. The court found that Zolnikov’s complaint supported this conclusion
because it alleged that the “[d]ate of the most recent or continuing discrimination” was
December 12, 2018. See Skites, ¶ 15.
¶13 On appeal, the parties do not dispute the facts. They argue only what date should
trigger the start of the statutory time limit on Zolnikov’s complaint to the Human Rights
Bureau. Our precedent supports the conclusion that Zolnikov’s claim started to accrue
when she was notified of the NBME’s denial of her appeal for accommodations on
December 12, 2018. Similar to our reasoning in Hash, that Zolnikov might have “hoped”
or “believed” the NBME would change its view and decide to provide her with
accommodations when she arrived on the day of her test does not change that the alleged
discriminatory act occurred, and she discovered it, on December 12, 2018. See Hash,

886 P.2d at 444

. Because she failed to timely file her complaint with the
Human Rights Bureau, she also is barred from bringing her complaint to the District Court.
Skites, ¶ 20. Further, her complaint notified the Bureau that the date of the most recent or
continuing discrimination was December 12, 2018. See Skites, ¶ 15 (the date alleged as
the date of discrimination within the Bureau complaint is the date that determines the
timeliness of the complaint).
8
¶14 Zolnikov does not argue that she can prevail under our current precedent; she instead
asks this Court to overrule Hash and Skites for wrongly interpreting the MHRA. Zolnikov
argues that Hash and Skites contradict the plain language of § 49-2-501, MCA. She
contends that the plain language of § 49-2-501, MCA, creates an ambiguity regarding when
a claim should be brought because “occurred or was discovered” could mean “the ‘earlier
of’ or ‘either’ the date of discrimination or the date that discrimination was discovered.”
Zolnikov maintains that this Court “implicitly adopted the ‘earlier of’ standard” in Hash.
Zolnikov argues that this standard is at odds with the MHRA because the MHRA is meant
to protect individuals from discrimination and should therefore be “liberally interpreted.”
Zolnikov contends that the intent of the Legislature was to interpret “or” to mean “either,”
so that the statutory limitation can run from either the date the discrimination occurred or
was discovered.
¶15 Zolnikov next argues that we should overturn our precedent because she did not
have a discrimination claim to bring until December 14, 2018. Zolnikov maintains that the
statute of limitations should not begin to run for an MHRA claim “until the complaining
party is damaged.” She argues that she was not “aggrieved” until she took the test without
accommodations.
¶16 “[O]nce the Court has placed a construction on statutory language, the Court prefers
to ‘leav[e] it to the Legislature to amend the law should a change be deemed necessary.’”
ALPS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McLean & McLean, PLLP,

2018 MT 190

, ¶ 47,

392 Mont. 236

425 P.3d 651

 (Rice, J. dissenting) (quoting Estate of Woody v. Big Horn Cty., 2016

9 MT 180

, ¶ 20,

384 Mont. 185

376 P.3d 127

 (brackets in original embedded quotation)
(citation omitted)). “Unless it appears that our interpretation is manifestly wrong, we will
not overrule precedent regarding the construction of statutory language.”          State v.
Spagnolo,

2022 MT 228

, ¶ 8,

410 Mont. 457

520 P.3d 330

.
¶17    Zolnikov’s argument that the disjunctive “or” makes the statute ambiguous does not
persuade us that our decision in Hash was “manifestly wrong.” In Hash, we determined
that the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act and its discovery happened the same
day. We did not, as Zolnikov argues, “implicitly adopt[] the ‘earlier of’ standard” when
determining the trigger date for the statute of limitations in discrimination claims.
Zolnikov’s argument that the plain language of § 49-2-501, MCA, creates ambiguous
statutory time limits as demonstrated in Hash is not persuasive because we concluded in
Hash that the employee’s discovery of the alleged discrimination happened at the same
time the alleged discriminatory act occurred.
¶18    Zolnikov’s argument that the statute is ambiguous fails in light of our decision in
Powell v. Salvation Army,

287 Mont. 99

951 P.2d 1352

 (1997), addressing the limitations
period when the date of occurrence and discovery might not be the same. In Powell, we
reversed the district court’s M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of an employee’s case for
failure to file his complaint with the Human Rights Bureau within the statutory time limits.

. At the time of termination, the employee was told that
he was fired for “drinking on the job.” Powell,

287 Mont. at 101

951 P.2d at 1353

. The
employee alleged that he learned over a year later that he was terminated because of a
10
history of struggling with alcoholism. Powell,

287 Mont. at 101

951 P.2d at 1353

. The
employer argued that the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice both occurred and was
discovered by the employee the date of his termination. Powell,

287 Mont. at 104

951 P.2d at 1355

. We held that the district court should not have dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim because the employee “may well be able to demonstrate that his
cause of action did not accrue until sometime after his . . . termination and, therefore, that
he complied with the [statutory] period.” Powell,

.
¶19    Powell demonstrates a situation where the time limit to bring a claim might start
accruing later than when the alleged discriminatory act occurred because the plaintiff has
not yet “discovered” the discrimination that would form the basis of a claim. If the
employee could demonstrate he did not discover the reason that he was fired—history of
struggling with alcoholism—until much later, then the date that would trigger untimeliness
would be the date of discovery, not the date of his termination. Powell,

. Situations like Powell make it clear that there is no ambiguity in
§ 49-2-501, MCA, regarding the start date for the statutory time limit to bring a
discrimination claim.
¶20    We distinguished Hash in Powell because Hash was decided on a motion for
summary judgment after the parties had an opportunity to present evidence. Powell,