Shockley v. Cascade County , 382 Mont. 209 ( 2016 )

February 16 2016
DA 15-0361
Case Number: DA 15-0361
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 34
J.G. SHOCKLEY,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
CASCADE COUNTY, JASON CARROLL,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 2,
Respondents and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DV-10-534C
Honorable Kenneth R. Neill, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Peter Michael Meloy, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
D. Patrick McKittrick, Timothy J. McKittrick, Attorneys at Law, Great
Falls, Montana
Carey Ann Shannon, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 6, 2016
Decided: February 16, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Following a successful petition under Article II, section 9 of the Montana
Constitution for disclosure of certain documents, J.G. Shockley (Shockley) filed a motion
for attorney fees and costs under § 2-3-221, MCA. The District Court granted Shockley
his costs but denied his request for attorney fees. Shockley appeals the denial of his
motion for an award of attorney fees, and requests that this Court impose upon district
courts clear guidelines for denying motions for attorney fees in right to know cases. We
decline to articulate such guidelines, and we affirm the District Court.
ISSUE
¶2 We address the following issue on appeal:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion by declining to award Shockley attorney
fees under § 2-3-221, MCA?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 This is the second time this matter has come before us. In Shockley v. Cascade
County (Shockley I), 2014 MT 281, 376 Mont. 493, 336 P.3d 375, we held that Shockley
had standing under Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution to assert a claim
against Cascade County for disclosure of certain documents. Shockley was seeking
disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into by Jason Carroll (Carroll), a Cascade
County detention officer, Carroll’s employer, Cascade County (the County), and
Carroll’s collective bargaining unit, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2
(the Union). Shockley I, ¶ 3. Early in the litigation, the County admitted it had no
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objection to disclosure of the settlement agreement. Then on July 25, 2013, the District
Court entered Carroll’s default. From July 2013 onward, the only barrier to disclosure of
the settlement agreement was the resistance of the Union. In opposing disclosure, the
Union relied on the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement, to which it was
a party.
¶4 Following our decision in Shockley I, the District Court balanced the public’s right
to know against the individual privacy interests at stake, granted Shockley’s motion, and
ordered the County to disclose the settlement agreement. As the prevailing party,
Shockley then filed a motion under § 2-3-221, MCA, for an award of costs and attorney
fees. In his motion for fees, Shockley requested only the fees incurred after Carroll’s
default was entered and the County conceded that it had no objection to release of the
settlement agreement. Thus, his fee request was directed solely against the Union. The
Union opposed Shockley’s motion. The District Court awarded Shockley his costs but
denied his request for attorney fees. Shockley appeals the denial of his request for
attorney fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to award or deny
attorney fees. Billings High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Billings Gazette, 2006 MT 329, ¶ 23, 335
Mont. 94, 149 P.3d 565 (citing Pengra v. State, 2000 MT 291, ¶¶ 24, 27, 302 Mont. 276,
14 P.3d 499).
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DISCUSSION
¶6 Did the District Court abuse its discretion by declining to award Shockley
attorney fees under § 2-3-221, MCA?
¶7 After successfully petitioning under Article II, section 9 for disclosure of the
settlement agreement, Shockley sought an award of attorney costs and fees under
§ 2-3-221, MCA. Section 2-3-221, MCA, provides that “[a] person alleging a
deprivation of rights who prevails in an action brought in district court to enforce the
person’s rights under Article II, section 9, of the Montana constitution may be awarded
costs and reasonable attorney fees.” An award of attorney fees for prevailing parties in
suits brought under Article II, section 9 is discretionary. Yellowstone Cnty. v. Billings
Gazette, 2006 MT 218, ¶ 30, 333 Mont. 390, 143 P.3d 135.
¶8 Although we have declined to articulate firm guidelines for a district court’s denial
of a request for attorney fees under § 2-3-221, MCA, “it is well-established that outright
denial of a motion for attorney fees without rationale, is ‘not an exercise of discretion, but
is an abuse of that discretion.’” Yellowstone Cnty., ¶ 30 (citing Matter of Investigative
Records, 265 Mont. 379, 383, 877 P.2d 470, 472 (1994)). In his brief in support of his
motion for attorney fees, Shockley contended that a defendant’s acting reasonably and in
good faith has not been held to be a sufficient defense to a request for attorney fees and
costs in right to know cases. See e.g. Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman
Police Dep’t, 260 Mont. 218, 232, 859 P.2d 435, 443-44 (1993); The Associated Press v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 393, 804 P.2d 376, 380 (1991). Nevertheless, the
District Court determined that “the unique procedural history of this case takes this
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matter beyond mere reasonableness and good faith on the part of the Union.” The
District Court granted Shockley his costs but denied his request for attorney fees, on the
grounds that the “extraordinary development of case law evolving as the case was in
progress [makes it] hard to find any justice in assessing attorney’s fees against the
Union.”
¶9 We decline to reach the question of whether the District Court’s rationale for
denying fees satisfies abuse of discretion review. Instead, we conclude that an award of
attorney fees under any rationale is inappropriate in this case because the sole entity from
which such fees are sought—the Union—is not a public or governmental body. As we
have said before, “[w]e will affirm a district court decision if the right result was reached,
though for the wrong reason, and we do so here.” Hinebauch v. McRae, 2011 MT 270,
¶ 25, 362 Mont. 358, 264 P.3d 1098 (citing Wells Fargo Bank v. Talmage, 2007 MT 45,
¶ 23, 336 Mont. 125, 152 P.3d 1275).
¶10 Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution, entitled “Right to know,” ensures
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions,
except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of
public disclosure.” Review of a claim brought under the right to know is a three-step
process.
First, we consider whether the provision applies to the particular political
subdivision against whom enforcement is sought. Second, we determine
whether the documents in question are “documents of public bodies”
subject to public inspection. Finally, if the first two requirements are
satisfied, we decide whether a privacy interest is present, and if so, whether
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the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure.
Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 Mont. 131, 136, 906 P.2d 193, 196
(1995). The District Court conducted this analysis in determining whether to grant
Shockley’s petition for disclosure of the settlement agreement. But the requirements are
also relevant to a determination of whether to award attorney fees to a party who
prevailed in a right to know action.
¶11 We have in the past affirmed a district court’s denial of a motion for attorney fees
when the party that objected to disclosure on privacy grounds was not a public body. In
Pengra v. State, 2000 MT 291, 302 Mont. 276, 14 P.3d 499, we concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined the petitioner’s request for
attorney fees, and we noted that “[t]he State has not asserted a right of privacy-that right
has instead been asserted in this case by Pengra, a private party.” Pengra, ¶ 26. As in
Pengra, the party in this case asserting a right to privacy and against whom attorney fees
are being sought is not a public or governmental body. Rather, that party, the Union, is a
private collective bargaining group. As a private entity, the Union is not subject to
Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution. Bryan v. Yellowstone Cnty. Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 2002 MT 264, ¶ 25, 312 Mont. 257, 60 P.3d 381 (explaining that Article
II, section 9 applies to public bodies and governmental agencies and that a “public or
governmental body” is “a group of individuals organized for a governmental or public
purpose.”). For this reason the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Shockley’s motion for attorney fees.
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¶12 On a final note, we acknowledge we are resolving this case on grounds not
addressed by the parties on appeal. Although we generally do not address issues not
raised by the parties, Pinnow v. Mont. State Fund, 2007 MT 332, ¶ 15, 340 Mont. 217,
172 P.3d 1273 (citing In re Parenting of D.A.H., 2005 MT 68, ¶ 7, 326 Mont. 296, 109
P.3d 247), we have done so out of necessity before, see e.g. State v. Dickinson, 2008 MT
159, ¶¶ 20-24, 343 Mont. 301, 184 P.3d 305 (determining “that the question of whether
items would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to execution of a valid search
warrant is one we can answer sua sponte”); Pinnow, ¶¶ 15-17 (determining sua sponte
whether a district court judge “had authority to assume jurisdiction over this case”);
Knowlton v. Knowlton, 193 Mont. 448, 450, 632 P.2d 336, 337 (1981) (sua sponte setting
aside an order granting a modification of custody because “the parties and the trial court
failed to abide by” an applicable statute). We do so here because the parties and the
District Court failed to acknowledge that right to know fees are recoverable under
§ 2-3-221, MCA, only when the prevailing party is successful in enforcing his rights
under Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution, and only against a public body or
governmental agency. Were we to resolve this case premised on the rationale adopted by
the District Court, our Opinion would by implication suggest that under other
circumstances, right to know fees could be recovered against a non-public or
non-governmental entity. It is important for purposes of this and future cases to clearly
announce that this is not permitted under the law.
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CONCLUSION
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s May 13, 2015 Order
granting Shockley’s motion for costs but denying his motion for attorney fees.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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