Riggs v. Salmonsen ( 2021 )


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  •                                          /1, I A_ II
    1               ;
    08/10/2021
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA                                Case Number: OP 21-0369
    OP 21-0369
    ROBERT D. RIGGS,
    AUG 1 0 r21
    Bowen Greenwood
    Petitioner,                                               Clerk of Suprerna Court
    State of Montana
    v.
    ORDER
    JIM SALMONSEN, Warden,
    Montana State Prison,
    Respondent.
    Representing hirnself, Robert D. Riggs has filed a petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus, explaining that he has completed all required sex offender treatment programming
    (SOP)while incarcerated, yet the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) required hirn in its
    December 12, 2018 Case Disposition to "RE-TAKE SOP II PRIOR TO NEXT
    HEARING" that is scheduled for December 2024.(Emphasis in original). Riggs argues
    that the Board has unconstitutionally enhanced his prison term or sentence. Because of
    this "enhancement," Riggs asserts that his parole has been illegally denied. Riggs provides
    copies of various programs and SOP that he has completed.
    Riggs is serving a twenty-four-year term at Montana State Prison.                  The
    Gallatin County District Court irnposed a parole eligibility restriction of completion of all
    three phases of SOP in its 2002 written judgrnent. Riggs appealed his convictions, and he
    did not challenge the parole eligibility restriction. State v. Riggs, 
    2005 MT 124
    , 1111 1-6,
    
    327 Mont. 196
    , 
    113 P.3d 281
     (Riggs /). We affirmed. Riggs          1.
    Riggs has had three other proceedings before this Court.' Pertinent here is a recent
    appeal. In 2015, Riggs filed a civil action against various employees of the Montana State
    I Riggs v. State, 
    2011 MT 239
    , ¶¶ 6-8, 
    362 Mont. 140
    , 
    264 P.3d 693
     (Riggs II)(Affirming the
    District Court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief); Riggs v. Kirkegard,
    No. OP 12-0279, 
    2012 Mont. LEXIS 477
    , *2 Order (Aug. 7, 2012)(Riggs III)(Denying Riggs
    Prison after he received a disciplinary infraction for threatening and extortion. In 2017,
    Riggs appealed the Powell County District Court's denial of his motion for default
    judgment, motion to amend, and the granting of the Defendants' motion to dismiss.
    Riggs v. Fletcher, No. DA 17-0291, 2018 MT 106N, ¶ 2, 
    2018 Mont. LEXIS 141
    (Riggs IV). Riggs had a hearing, and the hearing officer found that Riggs was guilty of
    threatening another inmate and conspiracy to commit blackmail. Riggs IV, ¶ 4. "As a
    result of disciplinary action, Riggs received a higher custody classification, lost his prison
    job, and was transferred. He was removed from his court-ordered sex offender treatment
    group, was denied parole for failing to complete sex offender treatment group, and was
    placed in administrative segregation." Riggs IV, ¶ 4. We affirmed. Riggs IV, ¶¶ 2, 14.
    Because of the date of Riggs's offenses (the first on September 25, 1999, and the
    others from September 2000 through March 2001),the 1999 version of Montana's statutes
    applies. See McDermott v. McDonald,
    2001 MT 89
    , ¶ 8, 
    305 Mont. 166
    , 
    24 P.3d 200
    (the
    1985 version of the statutes applied to Petitioner McDonald). Section 46-23-201, MCA
    (1999), provides:
    (1) the board may release on nonmedical parole by appropriate order any
    person confined in a state prison,.. . when in its opinion there is reasonable
    probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the
    prisoner or to the community.
    (4) A parole may be ordered under this section only for the best interests of
    society and not as an award ofclemency or a reduction ofsentence or pardon.
    A prisoner may be placed on parole only when the board believes that the
    prisoner is able and willing tofulfill the obligations ofa law-abiding citizen.
    Section 46-23-201(1) and (4), MCA (1999). (Emphasis added).
    The Board has broad discretion in parole decisions. McDermott, ¶ 20. The Board
    considered all of Riggs's program completion, his past disciplinary infraction, and other
    factors. As Riggs correctly alludes, § 46-23-218, MCA,confers on the Board authority to
    adopt its own rules. This same statute existed in 1999. The current version ofthe Board's
    habeas corpus relief because the court had authority to impose a parole eligibility restriction).
    2
    administrative rules, applicable to Riggs, controls here. "Following the parole hearing,the
    hearing panel may . . . grant conditional parole to occur within a specified time period or
    upon completion of a contingency, including but not limited to completion of treatment or
    prerelease, completion of additional clear conduct, or completion of a specific amount of
    time on the sentence[1" Admin. R. M. 20.25.501(2)(c)(2016). The Board has authority
    to impose conditions at a parole hearing. "A sentence, or condition included in that
    sentence, is a limitation on liberty. A condition on parole is not." McDermott, ¶ 17
    (italics in original).    The Board imposed a condition on Riggs's parole, not an
    enhancement.
    Riggs's December 2018 Case Disposition shows the reasons for denying him parole.
    The Board indicated several needs for Riggs in the Disposition:(1)Sex offender treatment;
    (2)No early consideration;(3)"MORE CLEAR CONDUCT";and(4)"RE-TAKE SOP II
    PRIOR TO NEXT HEARING"(Emphasis in original). The Board has authority to require
    additional     or   the    same   treatment   and   more    clear     conduct    of   Riggs.
    Admin. R. M.20.25.501(2)(c) (2016). The Board also noted that its conclusions were
    based on the nature and severity ofthe offenses, multiple offenses, repeat sex offenses, and
    strong       objection    from    criminal    justice   authorities     and/or    citizenry.
    See Admin. R. M.20.25.505(2)(a) and (2)(p)(2016).
    Upon review, we conclude that the Board has authority to impose conditions for
    Riggs's parole. Riggs took a step backwards in 2015 with his disciplinary infraction,
    leading to his rernoval from SOP. Even though he may have completed SOP in 2018, the
    Board may require him to complete SOP II again based on its concerns.
    Riggs has not demonstrated illegal incarceration. Section 46-22-101(1), MCA. The
    Board has not unconstitutionally conditioned Rigg's sentence or prison term and did not
    unlawfully deny him parole.
    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Riggs's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
    DENIED and DISMISSED.
    3
    The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to
    Robert D. Riggs personally.
    DATED this     D    day of August, 2021.
    hief Justice
    /4e 6--(4
    '
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: OP 21-0369

Filed Date: 8/10/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/11/2021