A. Grafft v. State ( 2021 )

08/10/2021
OP 20-0569
Case Number: OP 20-0569
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2021 MT 201AARON MICHAEL GRAFFT,
Petitioner,
v.
MONTANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, STATE OF MONTANA,AND C3 1 0 2'21
SHERIFF T.J. McDERMOTT, Bowon Greonwcod
Clerk of :1;uprem., Court
State of Ivinntan,--3
Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-20-287
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Petitioner:
Joan H. Burbridge, Jacob Coolidge, Office of the State Public Defender,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Kirsten H. Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, D. James McCubbin, Jr.,
Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Colleen Elizabeth Ambrose, Department of Corrections, Helena, Montana
Decided: August 10, 2021
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court.
¶1 On November 27, 2020, Petitioner Aaron Michael Grafft, through counsel, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging he was unreasonably detained and illegally
incarcerated when the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, refused to release
him after he posted bail. In cornpliance with this Court's December 8, 2020 Order, the
Attorney General for the State of Montana has filed a response.
¶2 We observe that Grafft included the District Court and the State of Montana in the
caption. We amend the caption to also include the Sheriff for the Missoula County
Detention Facility(MCDF). Section 46-22-201(1)(c), MCA.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Both Grafft and the State provide detailed backgrounds, which we summarize here.
Grafft has two pending crirninal rnatters in the Missoula County District Court(DC-20-210
and DC-20-287). In DC-20-210, which we will refer to as the "first case," Grafft appeared
in Justice Court on May 6, 2020, after being charged with criminal possession ofdangerous
drugs. He was released on his own recognizance and told to appear at his arraignment on
May 18, 2020. On May 12, 2020, the District Court granted the State's Motion for Leave
to File an Information charging Grafft with felony possession of dangerous drugs and
continued Grafft's release on his own recognizance.
Grafft's cornplaint concerns his detention and want of bail in DC-20-287, his second
case. In this case, Grafft made an initial appearance in Justice Court on June 11, 2020, and
the court released him on his own recognizance and scheduled his arraignment for
June 22, 2020. The State charged Grafft with felony criminal possession of dangerous
drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia on June 15, 2020. The
District Court released Grafft on his own recognizance with eight conditions of release,
including that Grafft not use alcohol or drugs; participate in the Sober Accountability
Program (SAP); follow all conditions of probation; and appear at hearings, except for
omnibus hearings.
¶5 Grafft did not appear for his two initial appearance hearings—June 8 and June 15—
in his first case. The District Court issued an arrest warrant and set bail at $10,000. On
June 17, 2020, the Missoula Correctional Services (MCS)representative for SAP filed a
report of violation in Grafft's second case indicating Grafft tested positive for
methamphetarnine on June 16, 2020. Additional reports were filed indicating Grafft had
failed to appear for drug testing over the course of several days. On June 22, 2020, the
court issued an arrest warrant in Grafft's second case and set bail at $10,000. Grafft was
served with the warrants and arrested on June 24,2020. On June 29,2020, Grafft appeared
by video from MCDF, and the court released him on his own recognizance with the same
conditions of release. The District Court also scheduled the ornnibus hearing in both cases
for August 6, 2020.
Grafft failed to appear at the August 6, 2020 omnibus hearing.' The District Court
issued an arrest warrant in his second case and set bail at $25,000. After his arrest, Grafft
appeared by video from MCDF on August 20, 2020, and asked to be released on his own
I This hearing was originally set for July 30, 2020, but the District Court re-scheduled it due to its
law and rnotion calendar. We point out that Grafft was not required to attend an omnibus hearing,
according to his initial conditions of release. See also § 46-13-110(3), MCA.
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recognizance. The court requested pretrial supervision after learning that Grafft was not
on probation. The MCS representative for SAP informed the court that Grafft was being
monitored but that he absconded. The District Court directed Grafft's counsel to devise a
plan with "a little more stringent monitoring because apparently that's what he needs." The
court suggested that alcohol may be part of the problem.2 The District Court sought to
reach "a happy rnedium for keeping him compliant and on task and in court and out ofjail."
¶7 At the September 3, 2020 hearing, Grafft's attorney told the District Court that
Grafft was waiting on a bed date at a treatment center. Counsel asked that Grafft be
released on his own recognizance and for the court to "come up with any combination of
conditions that would allow" his release. The State opposed Grafft's release because he
had absconded previously from SAP. The State requested that Grafft rernain in custody
until a bed at the treatment center becarne available. The District Court ordered that Grafft
be detained until a bed opened at the treatment center.
¶8 Despite the court's order, Grafft attempted to post bond of $25,000 for his earlier
failure to appear on September 18, 2020. The District Court refused to release Grafft and
on September 23, 2020, Grafft requested a hearing. At the September 24, 2020 hearing,
counsel for Grafft contended the District Court's refusal to accept bond on
September 18, 2020, violated his constitutional right to bail. We include portions of the
transcript relevant to Grafft's petition for habeas corpus relief.
District Court: But you have been unable to put a plan together that will
protect the community and preclude him from committing new offenses and
2 Counsel for Grafft contends that Grafft does not have a problem with alcohol. As part of the
relief requested, counsel asks that any continuous alcohol monitoring be stricken.
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reappear. When you want to do that, we will have a hearing on it. Simply
giving money to a bondsman is not going to deal with the issues that are
presented in this or most of the complex cases that we have to deal with.
Counsel: This is a possession case, to be clear, Judge. This is not a complex
case.
District Court: Well, it deals with his addiction issues and his inability to deal
with the addiction issues and no plan--
Counsel: So to establish the record, it's your stance that regardless of the
bond he posts, that you will not release him?
District Court: You have to analyze the 12 factors and the chemical addiction
issues in this case so the Court can be assured that he will reappear and won't
commit new offenses.
Counsel: So is the Court unwilling to issue conditions, and subsequently
unwilling to release him even if he posts bond?
District Court: If you present an analysis and a plan based on those 12 factors
set forth in the statute, the Court will set a hearing and hear both sides. It
rnay be that the State will agree.
Counsel: To be clear, I'm not--I'm referencing his constitutional rights, not
any kind of statutory structure. His constitutional right to bail would
supersede any kind of statutory scheme requiring complex analysis of
factors. He is guaranteed a right to bail under the Montana constitution. And
he has been unable to be released, which violates his constitutional rights,
which is independent of any statutory scheme in the Montana Code
Annotated.
During this hearing, the State offered that it did not oppose Grafft's release if he posted
bond and abided by conditions of release. Grafft's counsel represented he would continue
to pursue Grafft's application to a treatment program, but stated, "[w]hether or not that is
adequate to the [c]ourt, it doesn't give license to have in-depth and indeterminate
conditions to invalidate his constitutional right to bail." The District Court asked if MCS
could monitor Grafft. The MCS representative reminded the court that Grafft had
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previously absconded and that they did not have an alcohol monitor. Thereafter, the court
ordered that Grafft be released to MCS when they had an alcohol monitor or a GPS unit to
monitor Grafft.
¶9 The District Court held another hearing on September 30, 2020. Grafft was still in
custody. The MCS representative explained her understanding that MCDF would contact
her when Grafft posted bond. The District Court stated that it had ordered Grafft's release
on September 24, 2020. The District Court then directed Grafft's counsel to contact a
bondsman to post bail. Grafft posted the $25,000 bond on October 2, 2020, whereby the
District Court ordered his release that day.
¶10 Grafft has now filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending that the
District Court's refusal to release Grafft after he posted bond was unconstitutional and
violated §§ 46-9-102(1), and 46-9-301(4), MCA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1111 Montana's case law is clear when it comes to issues concerning bail. Bail is a matter
within the discretion ofthe trial court. State v. London, 131 Mont. 410, 425, 310 P.2d 571,
580 (1957). "Since the matter is one within the discretion of the court we should not be
inclined to disturb its ruling unless a clear abuse of such discretion appears."
London, 131 Mont. at 425, 310 P.2d at 580.3 "When a person is imprisoned or detained in
custody on any criminal charge for want of bail, the person is entitled to a writ of habeas
3 Both published cases in the annotations for § 46-9-102(1), MCA,dealt with capital murder cases.
The statutes at the time were § 2350 of Montana's 1889 Penal Code, as in State ex rel. Murray v.
District Ct., 35 Mont. 504, 506, 90 P.3d 513, 514 (1907), and R.C.M. § 94-8303 (1947).
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corpus for the purpose ofgiving bail upon averring that fact in the person's petition, without
alleging that the person is illegally confined." Section 46-22-103, MCA.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Grafft requests the following relief: (1)that the condition ofrelease requiring Grafft
to wear a continuous alcohol rnonitoring device be struck; and (2) that the District Court
be rnade "to adhere to previously set conditions of release and grant orders releasing
crirninal defendants such as [Grafft] when bail is posted." Grafft contends that when he
posted bond of $25,000 on September 18, 2020, he should have been released and that
failing to do so violated §§ 46-9-102(1), and 46-9-301(4), MCA. He argues that bail may
only be set if bail is first "determined to be necessary," pursuant to § 46-9-301, MCA,and
that the State must submit proof of its necessity at the outset. Billings v. Layzell,
242 Mont. 145, 151-52, 789 P.2d 221, 225 (1990). Grafft asserts his constitutional rights
have been violated; specifically, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
seizures, the Eight Amendment prohibition against excessive bail clause, and his right to
due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶13 Grafft states that the District Court set conditions of release on June 15, 2020, and
that during Grafft's August 20, 2020 appearance, the District Court irnposed an additional
condition of pretrial supervision. Grafft contends that release conditions, drug testing,
pretrial supervision, and a $25,000 posting of bond were in place when the bondsman
appeared with the funds on September 18, 2020, and that he should have been released.
Grafft contends that "Montana law does not require a criminal defendant to submit a plan
to secure release after posting bond." Section 46-9-106(1), MCA. Grafft further contends
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that the court's requirement of alcohol rnonitoring is not supported by the record and is not
a reasonable condition. He alleges that the goal posts have been moved which is
inconsistent with due process. Grafft argues that the Due Process clause prohibits the
government frorn subjecting an individual to punishrnent prior to an adjudication of guilt.
State v. Spady, 2015 MT 218, ¶ 33, 380 Mont. 179, 354 P.3d 590.
¶14 Article II, Section 21, of Montana's Constitution reads that: "All persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the
presumption great." Section 46-9-102(1), MCA, provides that: "All persons shall be
bailable before conviction, except when death is a possible punishment for the offense
charged and the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person is guilty of the
offense charged."
That bail may not be excessive is a fundamental, constitutional principle.
U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Art. II, Sec. 22, Mont. Const. To insure that bail
is not excessive, the Montana courts are constrained in setting bail by the
eleven factors listed in § 46-9-301, MCA. Within these restrictions, the
amount of bail is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be
upheld if reasonable. State v. Lance[], 222 Mont. 92, 105, 721 P.2d 1258,
1267 [(1986)].
Layzell, 242 Mont. at 149, 789 P.2d at 223; see also London, 131 Mont. at 425,
310 P.2d at 580.
¶15 Courts have the statutory authority to irnpose conditions of release on bail.
Section 46-9-108(1), MCA,provides that "[t]he court may impose any condition that will
reasonably ensure the appearance ofthe defendant as required or that will ensure the safety
of any person or the community[.]" Section 46-9-311, MCA,provides that a "court before
which the proceeding is pending may increase or reduce the amount ofbail, substitute one
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bailfor another, alter the conditions ofthe bail, or revoke bail." (Emphasis added.) Thus,
while setting bail in non-capital cases is required, the bail statutes allow a court, in its
discretion, to change both the amount of bail and set conditions, in addition to setting bail.
¶16 We sumrnarize Grafft's goings-on from June 2020 through October 2020: at least
three releases by the District Court on his own recognizance; three arrest warrants; multiple
occasions in which Grafft failed to appear for hearings; Grafft's multiple and continuous
use of drugs; and numerous hearings to address Grafft's inability to comply with conditions
of release. Grafft cannot demonstrate that he was entitled to bail even after his first
violation, let alone after the multitude of violations present on this record. Finally, we
cannot conclude that imposition of alcohol monitoring was an abuse of discretion simply
based on the charges being for drug possession.
¶17 As a final note,"[A] petition for writ of habeas corpus is moot once the defendant
is no longer in custody[.]" Wier v. Lincoln Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 278 Mont. 473, 475,
925 P.2d 1172, 1173 (1996)(citation omitted). Grafft argues the bail issue is not rnoot
because ofthe District Court's "long-standing policy[]that crirninal defendants who have
posted bail must appear in front of him for additional conditions of release." However, as
the bail statutes clearly provide that courts have the authority and discretion to change bail
and to establish conditions, we decline to consider this argument further.
CONCLUSION
¶18 The purpose of habeas corpus relief is not served by allowing a court to ignore its
obligation to consider factors set forth in the bail statutes and exercise its discretion to
impose conditions of release tailored to ensure defendants appear for hearings and do not
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endanger themselves or the community. The District Court exercised its discretion to hold
Grafft even though he posted bail after being denied release on his own recognizance.
Grafft has not demonstrated any entitlement to relief, and his Petition is denied.
DATED this day of August, 2021.
Justice
We Concur:
Chief Justice
Justices
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