Class D Application of Big Foot ( 2022 )

04/05/2022
DA 21-0249
Case Number: DA 21-0249
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 67IN THE MATTER OF the Class D Application
of Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC
Application for Class D Garbage Service
between all points and places within Flathead County.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. DDV-2018-318
Honorable Ed McLean, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Clark Robert Hensley, Ann Hill, NorthWestern Energy, Helena, Montana
(for NorthWestern Energy)
Jacqueline Papez, Jack Connors, Doney Crowley P.C., Helena, Montana
(for Evergreen Disposal, Inc.)
For Appellees:
Francesca diStefano, Bryan, diStefano & Mattingley, PLLP, Kalispell,
Montana (for Big Foot Dumpsters)
Zachary Rogala, Lucas Hamilton, Public Service Commission, Helena,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 9, 2022
Decided: April 5, 2022
Filed:
c ir-641.—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 NorthWestern Energy (NorthWestern) and Evergreen Disposal, Inc., (Evergreen)
appeal the Order on Motion to Dismiss entered by the First Judicial District Court granting
Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC’s (Big Foot) motion to dismiss the action as moot
after Big Foot withdrew its application for a garbage hauling certificate from the Montana
Public Service Commission (PSC). We consider:
Did the District Court err by concluding 1) the case is moot and 2) no exceptions to
the mootness doctrine apply?
¶2 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 This is the second time this matter is before us. It involves Big Foot’s application
for a Class D carrier certificate of public convenience or necessity to haul garbage in
Flathead County. Big Foot filed its application with the PSC in January 2018. Evergreen
and Allied Waste Services of North America, LLC (Allied) filed protests to Big Foot’s
application pursuant to § 69-12-321, MCA, and a contested case proceeding was
commenced under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. In March 2018, the PSC
served its own discovery requests upon Allied and Evergreen. In April 2018, Evergreen
and Allied commenced an action in the District Court seeking relief from the PSC’s
discovery requests and alleging other due process violations. Big Foot intervened.
¶4 The District Court issued a writ of prohibition barring the PSC from propounding
discovery in the matter and a writ of mandate disqualifying the Commissioners and
requiring appointment of an independent hearing examiner to conduct the case. Big Foot
and the PSC appealed to this Court. The PSC did not challenge the writ of prohibition,
2
conceding a “procedural reset” was necessary given the “procedural morass” the case had
become, and withdrawing its discovery requests. Allied Waste Servs. of N. Am., LLC v.
Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 2019 MT 199, ¶ 14, 397 Mont. 85, 447 P.3d 463.
We affirmed the writ of prohibition, reversed the writ of mandate, and remanded for further
proceedings. Allied Waste Servs., ¶ 22.
¶5 On remand, the PSC scheduled the application for a three-day hearing in
mid-January 2020. Noting the holding of Allied Waste Services, the PSC acknowledged it
was prohibited from issuing further discovery requests, but stated it “retain[ed] the power
to investigate issues and examine witnesses during the evidentiary hearing.” In response,
Evergreen filed a second petition for review in the District Court, which entered a
temporary restraining order staying the PSC proceeding on Big Foot’s application pending
its review. On January 9, 2020, Big Foot indicated it was withdrawing its application for
a Class D license. On the same day, NorthWestern filed a motion to intervene to seek a
declaration regarding the PSC’s authority in contested case proceedings.
¶6 Big Foot requested an order from the District Court allowing the withdrawal of its
application,1 and sought dismissal of the action, arguing its withdrawal had mooted all
issues in the case and terminated both the PSC matter and the proceeding before the District
Court. Evergreen initially agreed to dismissal, but changed its position upon learning that
Big Foot’s principal had made a public representation of his intention to re-file the Class
D license application at some future point. The District Court granted dismissal, reasoning
1
Big Foot was unable to formally withdraw its application unilaterally because of the District
Court’s stay of the PSC proceeding, which prohibited any further action in the matter.
3
Evergreen and NorthWestern were “not challenging the [PSC’s] discovery procedures in
the abstract: they are challenging specific actions taken in a contested case,” that absent
Big Foot’s application, the PSC’s actions no longer harmed them, and that, should Big Foot
file a new application, Evergreen would have “the right to protect its rights and challenge
any wrongful actions taken by the [PSC] with regard to that new petition.” The District
Court thus dissolved the temporary restraining order for the purpose of allowing Big Foot
to withdraw its Class D application and dismissed the proceeding.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 “Mootness, as an issue of justiciability, presents a question of law, which we review
for correctness.” Wilkie v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2021 MT 221, ¶ 6, 405 Mont.
259, 494 P.3d 892 (citing Heringer v. Barnegat Dev. Grp., LLC, 2021 MT 100, ¶ 13, 404
Mont. 89, 485 P.3d 731; Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111, ¶ 20, 365 Mont. 92, 278 P.3d
455).
DISCUSSION
¶8 1. Did the District Court err by concluding that the case was mooted?
¶9 “The judicial power of the courts of Montana is limited to justiciable controversies.”
Wilkie, ¶ 7 (quoting Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of Early Childhood Educators v. Child
Start Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 22, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881). A justiciable controversy is
one that can be “disposed of and resolved in the courts,” as opposed to a controversy
invoking a “purely political, administrative, philosophical, or academic conclusion.”
Ramon v. Short, 2020 MT 69, ¶ 20, 399 Mont. 254, 460 P.3d 867 (citing Greater Missoula,
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¶ 22); Wilkie, ¶ 7 (quoting Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga, 2012 MT 75, ¶ 16, 364
Mont. 390, 276 P.3d 867).
¶10 Mootness is a concept of justiciability; when an issue presented at an action’s outset
ceases to exist or is no longer “live,” or if, due to a change in circumstances or some
intervening event, the court cannot grant effective relief, the issue is moot. Ramon, ¶ 20
(citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action Grp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2011 MT 198, ¶ 16,
361 Mont. 398, 260 P.3d 133). “The fundamental question to be answered in any review
of possible mootness is whether it is possible to grant some form of effective relief to the
appellant.” Wilkie, ¶ 8 (quoting Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) v. Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs, 2015 MT 112, ¶ 11, 379 Mont. 11, 347 P.3d 1244). If no relief is possible,
“[a]ny further ruling . . . would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion, ‘i.e., one
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts or upon an abstract
proposition.’” Wilkie, ¶ 8 (quoting Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Reg’l Airport Auth. Bd.,
2010 MT 26, ¶ 12, 355 Mont. 142, 226 P.3d 567).
¶11 The District Court concluded that Big Foot’s withdrawal of its application mooted
the case because Evergreen and NorthWestern “cannot maintain an action based on alleged
procedural deficiencies with an underlying application before the [PSC] once that
application no longer exists.” Appellants argue that, regardless of Big Foot’s withdrawal,
the PSC “maintains its position that it does not have to follow the courts’ directives” and
effective relief is thus still possible, namely, a writ prohibiting the PSC from calling and
questioning witnesses during hearings and an order requiring the PSC to otherwise “follow
the judiciary’s orders.”
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¶12 We note first that the record does not support the assertion the PSC has refused to
follow this Court’s orders. In a procedural order issued after Allied Waste Services, the
PSC acknowledged the decision and the affirmed prohibition upon issuance of discovery
in the pending proceeding, which was the scope of the writ. The PSC acknowledged it
could not issue discovery, but added that it retained the ability to “investigate issues and
examine witnesses” during the evidentiary hearing on Big Foot’s Class D application.
Appellants cite our discussion in Allied Waste Services that litigants before the PSC are
entitled to due process and “a fair and open hearing as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment,” Allied Waste Services, ¶ 17 (citing Mont. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
206 Mont. 359, 368-69, 671 P.2d 604, 609-10 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted), and
extrapolate therefrom that we prohibited the PSC from engaging in any further hearing
actions. However, the citation and language were provided simply as supportive authority
and reasoning for our decision to affirm the writ prohibiting issuance of discovery.
¶13 Now, given Big Foot’s withdrawal of its application, there will not be an evidentiary
hearing, or any further proceedings in the matter. Concerns that the PSC intended to
overstep its authority or otherwise infringe upon Evergreen’s rights to protest Big Foot’s
Class D application during a hearing are no longer “live.” See MAAS, ¶ 12; Wilkie, ¶ 8.
An opinion we would render on those issues here would constitute an advisory opinion
about “what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts [and] upon an abstract
proposition” regarding potential actions the PSC may take in a potential future case before
it. Wilkie, ¶ 8. Therefore, the District Court correctly determined the matter had been
mooted.
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¶14 2. Did the District Court err by failing to apply any exception to the mootness
doctrine?
¶15 Appellants argue the Court should conclude that an exception to the mootness
doctrine allows the case to continue. “Even when a case is no longer ‘live,’ . . . a court
may hear and decide the case in specific circumstances.” Wilkie, ¶ 9. This Court has
recognized three such circumstances as exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) voluntary
cessation, (2) capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) public interest. The
voluntary cessation exception allows a case to proceed that “would otherwise have been
rendered moot by a defendant’s voluntary cessation of the challenged action.” Wilkie, ¶ 9
(quoting MAAS, ¶ 15). This exception addresses situations where a defendant attempts to
moot a plaintiff’s meritorious claims in order to avoid a judgment on the merits. Wilkie,
¶ 9 (citations omitted). To that end, “[a] defendant’s voluntary cessation of conduct cannot
moot a case unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.’” Wilkie, ¶ 10 (quoting Havre Daily News, LLC v. City
of Havre, 2006 MT 215, ¶ 38, 333 Mont. 331, 142 P.3d 864).
¶16 The salient point here is that Appellants want the case to proceed, thus requiring Big
Foot to continue litigating its withdrawn application, so that Appellants can challenge the
PSC’s actions. There is thus a disconnect between the ceased conduct that mooted the case
and the “allegedly wrongful behavior,” Wilkie, ¶ 10, which Appellants want to challenge,
that being the PSC’s assertion of authority to call and question witnesses at hearings.2
2
Evergreen and NorthWestern do not argue the District Court abused its discretion in allowing
Big Foot to withdraw its application, only whether the effect of that withdrawal renders the case
moot.
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Because the “challenged action” is distinct from any action taken by Big Foot, the
voluntary cessation exception does not apply.3 Wilkie, ¶ 9; MAAS, ¶ 15.
¶17 Under the wrongs “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, Havre
Daily News, ¶ 34 (citation omitted), the invoking party must show that “the challenged
conduct inherently is of limited duration, so as to evade review, and that there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action
again.” Havre Daily News, ¶ 34 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17, 118 S. Ct.
978, 988 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). There is no dispute that the PSC asserts
authority to call and question witnesses at its hearings and that it will continue to do so—
whether in any future case involving Big Foot and Evergreen or in the myriad of other
cases that are now pending or will pend before the Commission. Consequently, the
challenged conduct is not “inherently [] of limited duration so as to evade review”—rather,
it is continually ongoing, and Appellants will have various opportunities in the future to
seek judicial review of any preliminary orders, actions, or rulings and final judgments
issued by the PSC. See Havre Daily News, ¶ 34; §§ 2-4-701, 702, MCA; § 2-4-711, MCA.
¶18 The final exception to the mootness doctrine argued by Appellants is the public
interest exception, which applies when “(1) the case presents an issue of public importance;
(2) the issue is likely to recur; and (3) an answer to the issue will guide public officers in
the performance of their duties.” Ramon, ¶ 21 (citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action
Grp. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2011 MT 198, ¶ 14, 361 Mont. 398, 260 P.3d 133). An issue
3
Evergreen and NorthWestern’s argument that this matter is not moot because Big Foot
represented that it intends to file a new Class D application at a future point is unavailing for the
same reason.
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is of public importance where it “implicate[s] fundamental constitutional rights or where
the legal power of a public official is in question.” Ramon, ¶ 22 (citing Walker v. State,
2003 MT 134, ¶¶ 41-43, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872). Appellants argue this exception
applies, and the PSC, although disputing the case is one of public importance, concedes
the issue is likely to reoccur and that a decision will guide its future hearing procedures.
¶19 Appellants offer a plausible argument, but we conclude the case should not proceed
under the exception. The requisite “issue of public importance” raised here is the PSC’s
hearing procedures, not the substance of the application, which Big Foot would be required
to litigate—despite its unchallenged withdrawal—to sustain. Secondly, a portion of this
case, the challenge to the PSC’s issuance of discovery, has already been resolved.4 Then,
§ 69-12-206, MCA, authorizes the PSC to “administer oaths, examine witnesses, and
receive evidence” during any “investigation, inquiry, or hearing.” Whether the hearing
actions proposed here by the PSC exceed this authority or otherwise deprive litigants of
due process right to “a fair and open hearing,” Allied Waste Services, ¶ 17, is an issue
4
Notably, the Court resolved the issue primarily on procedural grounds, and did not address the
substantive question of the validity of the PSC’s claimed authority. We explained:
Petitioners sought the writ to prohibit the PSC from submitting discovery, for which there
was no adequate appellate remedy. The PSC withdrew its discovery requests prior to the
hearing on the writ and does not challenge the writ’s issuance on appeal. While the PSC
asserts, as an aside, that it has investigatory authority to propound discovery, that issue
has not been raised or briefed on appeal, and we do not address it [(citing Admin. R. M.
38.2.601, which provides “[t]he commission staff shall have the full rights and
responsibilities of parties under these rules.”)]. It is enough that the Procedural Order
entered in the case did not provide that the PSC would be propounding its own discovery,
and the PSC’s counsel, a designated hearing officer, entertained unlawful ex parte
communications with Big Foot’s counsel.
Allied Waste Servs., ¶ 17.
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presented without a record demonstrating how the PSC sought to exercise the authority.
No harm has yet occurred—no hearing was held, and the PSC neither called nor examined
witnesses. Without a record, a court would have to speculate about possible actions taken
by the PSC. Previously, when applying the public interest exception, the Court’s ruling
was informed by actions that had already occurred. See Ramon, ¶¶ 4-10, 26 (applying the
public interest exception when the plaintiff was detained in a county jail pursuant to a
48-hour civil immigration detainer even though he was not in the county’s custody during
litigation.). By delving into hypotheticals, courts risk issuing opinions that are overly
narrow or broad, or missing the relevant facts, in addition to being advisory in nature.
¶20 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
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