Planned Parenthood v. State ( 2023 )

n ORIGINAL 05/30/2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
Case Number: DA 23-0272
DA 23-0272
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MONTANA
and PAUL FREDERICK HENKE, M.D., on
FILr-
behalf of themselves and their patients, MAY 3 0 2023
Bovven Gr-, envv,r, o0
Plaintiffs and Appellees, Clerk of Surtrerne Court
State or Montana
v.
ORDER
STATE OF MONTANA and AUSTIN
KNUDSEN, Attorney General of the State of
Montana, in his official capacity, and his agents
and successors,
Defendants and Appellants.
The State of Montana has filed a notice of appeal from the First Judicial District
Court's February 21, 2023, Opinion and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment in
that Court's Cause No. DDV-2013-407. The appeal is from an order certified as final by the
District Court pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
The District Court's summary judgment order granted judgment to Plaintiffs and
Appellees Planned Parenthood of Montana and Paul Frederick Henke declaring
unconstitutional Montana's Parental Consent for Abortion Act of 2013, 2013 Mont. Laws
307 (Consent Act). In the same order, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgrnent on the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, 2011 Mont. Laws 307 (Notice
Act), and set a trial on the privacy and equal protection claims pertaining to that Act. On the
parties' motions for certification, the District Court certified as final its ruling on the Consent
Act. The court did not certify that portion of its order denying Plaintiffs summary judgment
with respect to the Notice Act.
Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 4(4)(b), we have reviewed the District Court's certification
order for compliance with M. R. App. P. 6(6). That rule allows a court to direct entry of
final judgment on an otherwise interlocutory order "only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay, pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 54(b)." The rule further requires
the court, "in accordance with existing case law, [to] articulate in its certification order the
factors upon which it relied in granting certification[.]" As set forth in Roy v. Neibauer,
188 Mont. 81, 87, 610 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1980), the factors this Court normally considers
regarding a Rule 54(b) certification include: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and
unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be
inooted by fiiture developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing
court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence
of a claim or counterclaim which could result in a set-off against the judgment sought to be
made final; and (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, triviality of computing claims, expense, and the
like. "[A]11 or some of the above factors may bear upon the propriety of the order granting a
Rule 54(b) certification" in a particular case. Roy, 188 Mont. at 87, 610 P.2d at 1189.
We require a certifying district court to "marshall [sic] and articulate the factors upon
which it relied in granting certification so that prompt and effective review can be
facilitated." Kohler v. Croonenberghs, 2003 MT 260, ¶ 16, 317 Mont. 413, 417, 77 P.3d 531(citing Roy, 188 Mont. at 87, 610 P.2d at 1189). In certifying its partial summary judgment
order, the District Court thoroughly considered the competing factors present in the case to
determine if it is in the interest of sound judicial administration and public policy to certify
the judgment as final. With respect to the Consent Act, it concluded that there was no just
reason for delay, and the judgment should be certified for immediate appeal. The court
discussed each factor and explained its rationale for concluding that an immediate appeal of
the Consent Act bears little risk that appellate review will be reduced to an advisory opinion,
cause unwarranted duplication, or be frustrated by the ongoing litigation in the District Court
related to the Notice Act. The court fiirther stated,
Certification partially accommodates the long delay in this case and vindicates
the public policy in timely disposition of constitutional qUestions. In short, this
Court concludes that this is indeed the "infrequent harsh case" where there is
2
no just reason for delay and that it is in the interest of sound judicial
administration and public policy to certify the Court's order enjoining the
Consent Act for immediate appeal.
The court explained further why its denial of partial summary judgment on the Notice Act
did not warrant certification for immediate appeal.
Upon review, we conclude that the court's certification order complies with the
requirements of Rule 6(6) and our case law interpreting certification orders under Rule 54(b).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this appeal may proceed.
The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record.
DATED this <3 0 day of May, 2023.
Justices
3