Westview v. Lockhart & Greener MT v. Cunningham ( 2023 )

10/31/2023
DA 22-0358
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2023 MT 201WESTVIEW MOBILE HOME PARK, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DAVID LOCKHART AND DOREEN LOCKHART,
Defendants and Appellants.
--------------------------------------------------------
GREENER MONTANA PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, LLC, TRAVIS MARTINEZ,
Individually and KRISTYN MARTINEZ, Individually,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
HYDI CUNNINGHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-22-545
Honorable Shane Vannatta, Presiding Judge
District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV-22-187
Honorable Howard F. Recht, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants David and Doreen Lockhart:
David J. Lockhart, Doreen Lockhart, Self-represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellant Hydi Cunningham:
S. Chase Rosario, Malcom & Piers PLLC, Lewistown, Montana
Amy E. Hall, Montana Legal Services Association, Helena, Montana
For Appellee Westview Mobile Home Park, LLC:
Eric R. Henkel, W. Bridger Christian, Christian, Samson & Baskett, PLLC,
Missoula, Montana
For Appellees Greener Montana Property Management, LLC, Travis Martinez, and
Kristyn Martinez:
Katherine C. Holliday, Carmody Holliday Legal Services, PLLC,
Missoula, Montana
For Amici:
James A. Bowditch, Thomas J. Leonard, Boone Karlberg P.C.,
Missoula, Montana (for Montana Association of Realtors®)
Robert Farris-Olsen, Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola, PLLP,
Helena, Montana (for Montana Homeownership Network d/b/a/
Neighborworks Montana and the National Consumer Law Center)
Submitted on Briefs: August 23, 2023
Decided: October 31, 2023
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
2
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This matter involves consolidated appeals regarding the interpretation of the
Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act from mobile home owners who have
been evicted from their lots. David Lockhart and Doreen Lockhart (the Lockharts) appeal
from the June 1, 2022 Order issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County,
which upheld the April 27, 2022 Order for Possession issued by the Missoula County
Justice Court. The Lockharts were ordered to vacate and remove all personal property
from a mobile home lot owned by Westview Mobile Home Park, LLC (Westview). Hydi
Cunningham (Cunningham) appeals from the July 29, 2022 Opinion and Order and the
August 30, 2022 Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Summary Judgment and
Denying Motion to Stay issued by the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County.
These orders followed the Ravalli County Justice Court’s May 10, 2022 Judgment and
Order for Possession of Property and Writ of Assistance. Cunningham was ordered to
vacate the mobile home lot she had been renting from Greener Montana Property
Management, LLC (Greener Montana).
¶2 We address the following restated issue on appeal:
Whether the Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act allows a lot-only
landlord to terminate a homeowner tenant’s month-to-month lease when the
parties’ written lease allows no-cause termination upon 30 days’ notice.
¶3 We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 This consolidated case involves two evictions of mobile home owners from mobile
home lots which they rented. In 2007, the Montana Legislature enacted the Montana
3
Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act (MRMHLRA or the Act), which is codified in
Title 70, chapter 33, MCA. 2007 Mont. Laws ch. 267, §§ 7-51. The provisions of the Act
govern the present disputes, and we are called to interpret the meaning of the Act as it
relates to no-cause terminations.
¶5 The Lockharts are the owners of a mobile home. In 2015, they entered into a “month
to month” lot rental agreement with Westview to rent a mobile home lot at 4736 Graham
Street in Missoula. The rental agreement asserted it was governed by the Montana
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977 and provided that “Tenant’s occupancy will
be from month to month, and the tenancy may be terminated by either Landlord or Tenant,
upon providing a written thirty (30) day notice of termination.” On January 10, 2022,
Westview served the Lockharts with a Notice of Lease Termination, informing them their
lease was terminated effective February 13, 2022. The Lockharts did not vacate the mobile
home lot, so Westview filed a complaint for possession in the Missoula County Justice
Court. The justice court ultimately determined Westview was not required to have cause
to terminate the Lockharts’ lease, ordered Westview was entitled to immediate possession
of the mobile home lot, and gave the Lockharts 30 days to “remove all personal
possessions, including but not limited to the mobile home, from said mobile home lot.”1
1
While Westview’s complaint for possession asserted the Lockharts had breached the lease in
various ways, such as parking incorrectly and failing to upkeep the lot, the justice court hearing
proceeded on whether the Lockharts could be evicted, without cause, based upon Westview giving
them 30 days’ notice. The factual issues regarding a for-cause eviction of the Lockharts were not
litigated before either lower court in this matter and we do not address them here.
4
On appeal, the Missoula County District Court affirmed the justice court’s order, providing
another 30 days for the Lockharts to vacate and remove all personal property from the lot.
¶6 Cunningham also owns a mobile home. In 2008, she purchased the mobile home,
which was already located on the subject lot at 2629 (aka 2633) Dorothy Drive in Victor,
and began residing there while renting the lot. In 2015, Cunningham and Greener Montana
entered into a lot rental agreement for a term of one month, from December 1, 2015, to
January 1, 2016, which would “automatically renew from month to month on the same
terms and conditions as herein, and so on until terminated by either party giving to the other
at least 30 days written notice prior to the expiration of the current term.” On January 12,
2022, Greener Montana served Cunningham with a “30-Day Notice to Quit and Terminate
the Rental Agreement,” which required Cunningham to surrender possession of the lot to
Greener Montana by March 1, 2022. Cunningham did not vacate the lot, and Greener
Montana filed an action for possession in the Ravalli County Justice Court. The justice
court issued an order granting possession to Greener Montana on May 10, 2022, and gave
Cunningham 72 hours to vacate the premises. On appeal, the Ravalli County District Court
reviewed the MRMHLRA as it related to no-cause termination, determined Greener
Montana’s termination of Cunningham’s month to month lease without cause was valid,
and gave Cunningham 30 days to “vacate the premises and remove her mobile home.”
¶7 The Lockharts and Cunningham each appealed. We consolidated the appeals as
both call on this Court to interpret the scope of the Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot
Rental Act as it relates to the no-cause terminations of month-to-month lot rental
agreements of mobile home owners.
5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 The interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law, which we review
de novo. Hines v. Topher Realty, LLC, 2018 MT 44, ¶ 12, 390 Mont. 352, 413 P.3d 813(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Whether the Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act allows a lot-only
landlord to terminate a homeowner tenant’s month-to-month lease when the
parties’ written lease allows no-cause termination upon 30 days’ notice.
¶10 This Court has not previously had cause to interpret the termination provisions of
the MRMHLRA, which was enacted by the Legislature in 2007, and this case is a matter
of first impression. The Lockharts and Cunningham assert the Act prohibits no-cause
termination of mobile home lot rent agreements. Westview and Greener Montana
(occasionally “the landlords”), meanwhile, contend the prohibition of no-cause termination
in mobile home lot rent agreements would lead to absurd results and that the Act
specifically contemplates month-to-month tenancies which may be terminated without
cause.
¶11 “In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and
declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”
Section 1-2-101, MCA. “Statutory interpretation, the goal of which is to give effect to the
legislature’s intent, begins with the text of the statute.” Giacomelli v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
2009 MT 418, ¶ 18, 354 Mont. 15, 221 P.3d 666. “We must, to the extent possible, effect
6
the manifest intent of the Legislature in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
language of its enactments in context, without resort to other means of construction.”
Babcock v. Casey’s Mgmt., LLC, 2021 MT 215, ¶ 6, 405 Mont. 237, 494 P.3d 322. We do
this “by first attempting to construe the subject term or provision in accordance with the
plain meaning of its express language, in context of the statute as a whole, and in
furtherance of the manifest purpose of the statutory provision and the larger statutory
scheme in which it is included.” Babcock, ¶ 6.
¶12 As this case concerns the interpretation and application of a statute, the
MRMHLRA, we begin with the relevant text. The Act “applies to landlord-tenant
relationships in which the landlord is renting a lot to the tenant for placement of the tenant’s
mobile home,” § 70-33-104(1), MCA, but does not apply to the “combined rental of the lot
and mobile home, when the landlord owns both,” because that situation is “covered by the
Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977.” Section 70-33-104(3), MCA.
Westview and Greener Montana assert the contentions of the Lockharts and Cunningham
regarding no-cause terminations are completely undercut by language included in
§ 70-33-201, MCA:
Unless the rental agreement provides otherwise:
(a) the tenant shall pay as rent the rental value for the use and
occupancy of the lot as determined by the landlord;
(b) rent is payable at the landlord’s address or using electronic funds
transfer to an account designated for the payment of rent by the landlord;
(c) periodic rent is payable at the beginning of a term that is a month
or less and otherwise in equal monthly installments at the beginning of each
month;
7
(d) rent is uniformly apportionable from day to day;
(e) the tenancy is from month to month; and
(f) if either party terminates the rental agreement without cause prior
to the expiration date of the lease term, the aggrieved party is entitled to
monetary damages up to 1 month’s rent or an amount that is agreed on in the
rental agreement, which may not exceed 1 month’s rent. Landlords shall
follow 70-33-426(2) and are entitled to rent from defaulting tenants up to the
date a new tenancy starts or the date the rental agreement term expires.
Section 70-33-201(2), MCA. Specifically, the landlords contend this statute’s references
to month-to-month tenancies and monetary damages due to an aggrieved party following
a termination without cause in subsections (e) and (f) show the Legislature, rather than
prohibiting terminations without cause, actually provided for them.
¶13 The Lockharts and Cunningham, meanwhile, assert no-cause terminations such as
the ones at issue here are prohibited because they are not provided for in § 70-33-433,
MCA, which provides the “[g]rounds for termination of a rental agreement.” That statute
states, in full:
(1) If there is a noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or
with a provision of 70-33-321, the landlord may deliver a written notice to
the tenant pursuant to 70-33-106 specifying the acts or omissions constituting
the noncompliance and stating that the rental agreement will terminate upon
the date specified in the notice that may not be less than the minimum number
of days after receipt of the notice provided for in this section. The rental
agreement terminates as provided in the notice for one or more of the
following reasons and subject to the following conditions:
(a) nonpayment of rent, late charges, or common area maintenance
fees as established in the rental agreement, for which the notice period is 7
days;
8
(b) a violation of a rule other than provided for in subsection (1)(a)
that does not create an immediate threat to the health and safety of any other
tenant or the landlord or manager, for which the notice period is 14 days;
(c) a violation of a rule that creates an immediate threat to the health
and safety of any other tenant or the landlord or manager, for which the notice
period is 24 hours;
(d) late payment of rent, late charges, or common area maintenance
fees, as established in the rental agreement, three or more times within a
12-month period if written notice is given by the landlord after each failure
to pay, as required by subsection (1)(a), for which the notice period for
termination for the final late payment is 30 days;
(e) a violation of a rule that creates an immediate threat to the health
and safety of any other tenant or the landlord or manager whether or not
notice was given pursuant to subsection (1)(c) and the violation was
remedied as provided in subsection (3), for which the notice period is 14
days;
(f) two or more violations within a 6-month period of the same rule
for which notice has been given for each prior violation, as provided in
subsection (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c), for which the notice period for the final
violation is 30 days;
(g) two or more violations of 70-33-321(1) within a 6-month period,
for which the notice period for the final violation is 14 days;
(h) any violation of 70-33-321(3), for which the notice period is as
provided in 70-33-422(1);
(i) disorderly conduct that results in disruption of the rights of others
to the peaceful enjoyment and use of the premises, for which the notice
period is 7 days;
(j) any other noncompliance or violation not covered by subsections
(1)(a) through (1)(i) that endangers other tenants or mobile home park
personnel or the landlord or manager or causes substantial damage to the
premises, for which the notice period is 14 days;
(k) conviction of the mobile home owner or a tenant of the mobile
home owner of a violation of a federal or state law or local ordinance, when
the violation is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of other tenants
9
or the landlord or manager or the landlord’s documentation of a violation of
the provisions of Title 45, chapter 9, for which the notice period is 14 days;
(l) changes in the use of the land if the requirements of subsection (2)
are met, for which the notice period is 180 days;
(m) any legitimate business reason not covered elsewhere in this
subsection (1) if the landlord meets the following requirements:
(i) the termination does not violate a provision of this section
or any other state statute; and
(ii) the landlord has given the mobile home owner or tenant of
the mobile home owner a minimum of 90 days’ written notice of the
termination.
(2) If a landlord plans to change the use of all or part of the premises from
mobile home lot rentals to some other use, each affected mobile home owner
must receive notice from the landlord as follows:
(a) The landlord shall give the mobile home owner and a tenant of the
mobile home owner at least 15 days’ written notice that the landlord will be
appearing before a unit of local government to request permits for a change
of use of the premises.
(b) After all required permits requesting a change of use have been
approved by the unit of local government, the landlord shall give the mobile
home owner and a tenant of the mobile home owner 6 months’ written notice
of termination of tenancy. If the change of use does not require local
government permits, the landlord shall give the written notice at least 6
months prior to the change of use. In the notice the landlord shall disclose
and describe in detail the nature of the change of use.
(c) Prior to entering a rental agreement during the 6-month notice
period referred to in subsection (2)(b), the landlord shall give each
prospective mobile home owner and any tenant of the mobile home owner
whose identity and address have been provided to the landlord written notice
that the landlord is requesting a change in use before a unit of local
government or that a change in use has been approved.
(3) Subject to the right to terminate in subsections (1)(d) through (1)(k), if
the noncompliance described in subsections (1)(a) through (1)(c) is
remediable by repairs, the payment of damages, or otherwise and the tenant
10
adequately remedies the noncompliance before the date specified in the
notice, the rental agreement does not terminate as a result of that
noncompliance.
(4) For purposes of calculating the total number of notices given within a
12-month period under subsection (1)(d), only one notice for each violation
per month may be included in the calculation.
Section 70-33-433, MCA.2
¶14 The Act contains separate provisions which each party asserts are controlling and
dispositive. In interpreting statutes, we do not merely read single sentences out of context.
Indeed, “[w]here there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” Section 1-2-101, MCA. We must, then,
harmonize the relevant provisions of the statute and avoid an absurd result.
¶15 The landlords correctly note that the Act both contemplates month-to-month
tenancies, § 70-33-201(2)(e), MCA, and provides for monetary damages when a rental
agreement is terminated without cause. Section 70-33-201(2)(f), MCA. Section 70-33-
201(2)(f), MCA, dealing with monetary damages for termination of a lease without cause
is a recent addition to the Act, added in 2021. 2021 Mont. Laws ch. 536, § 11. Where their
argument fails is in its contention these subsections allow for the no-cause termination of
the periodic tenancies at issue here.
2
The Dissent claims this statute’s exhaustive list of reasons for a landlord’s termination of a lease
is not actually exhaustive because it does not provide means for a tenant to terminate the lease.
Dissent, ¶ 31. Obviously, the section listing both the requirements for a landlord to terminate and
the notice period a landlord must give does not apply to a tenant.
11
¶16 Both the Lockharts and Cunningham had lot rental agreements which were
originally for a specified term before becoming month-to-month periodic tenancies. A
month-to-month tenancy is contemplated as the standard for a lot rental agreement in
Montana. Section 70-33-201(2)(e), MCA. When the initial terms at issue here expired
without any party giving notice of termination, the lot rental agreements automatically
renewed as month-to-month periodic tenancies. “A month-to-month lease, or any other
periodic tenancy, does not simply ‘expire,’ . . . it must be ‘terminated,’ and it is the act of
giving notice that triggers the termination of the lease.” Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53,
¶ 14, 4 P.3d 783 (emphasis in original). “Since the periodic tenancy is in fact a continuing
relationship, the general rule is that each successive period is treated as a continuation of
the original tenancy, unless the parties specifically provide for a different result.”
Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 1.5 cmt.c (1977).3 The periodic
tenancies here did not expire and renew themselves each month, but each new period was
simply an extension of the original period.
¶17 The MRMHLRA enumerates several grounds for termination of a mobile home lot
lease and provides for specific notice periods. Section 70-33-433, MCA. A landlord may
terminate the agreement for cause due to nonpayment of rent, late payments, violations of
park rules, disorderly conduct, and criminal violations. Section 70-33-433(1)(a-k), MCA.
The statute also provides specific grounds for termination other than for cause provided by
3
The Act provides that it is supplemented by the common law principles of law and equity, unless
superseded by provisions of the Act. Section 70-33-105, MCA.
12
the tenant’s behavior. Subsection (1)(l) provides that a landlord can terminate the rental
agreement when it wants to change the use of the land, and provides for a 180-day notice
period. Subsection (1)(m) provides that a landlord can terminate the rental agreement for
a “legitimate business reason,” and provides for a 90-day notice period. The language of
the termination statute is somewhat ambiguous, however, in that it begins with an
introductory clause stating that “[i]f there is a noncompliance by the tenant” with the rental
agreement a landlord must give a tenant an eviction notice as specified by the Act, before
listing 11 situations which involve noncompliance—nonpayment of rent, violation of park
rules, disorderly conduct, etc.—and 2 situations which plainly do not involve
noncompliance by a tenant—the landlord deciding to change the use of the land or the
landlord putting forth a “legitimate business reason”—each of which provide notice
periods longer than 30 days. Because the statute is subject to two reasonable
interpretations—either (1) no-cause terminations are not allowed, or (2) there must be a
noncompliance by a tenant before a landlord is allowed to change the use of his or her land
or evict a tenant for a “legitimate business reason”—we consult the legislative history. See
City of Missoula v. Pope, 2021 MT 4, ¶ 16, 402 Mont. 416, 478 P.3d 815. The Dissent
criticizes the Court for determining the Act could be ambiguous regarding the change of
land and/or legitimate business reasons for termination, asserts such is “clearly not a
reasonable reading” of the provision, and handwaves it away. Dissent, ¶ 29. The text of
the statute is the text of the statute, and it says what it says. The Dissent’s position is
inconsistent. If, as the Dissent interprets the statute, the legislative language used allows
no-cause evictions of homeowners by potentially unscrupulous landlords, the statutory
13
language would then also restrict the change of land or legitimate business reason to first
be premised on a noncompliance by a tenant. The Dissent’s dismissal of those provisions
as not reasonable (and presumably therefore not enforceable) would be a results-based
reading of the text, as that is not what the text actually says. This potential ambiguity and
the dispute it raises demonstrates the need to consult the legislative history. See Pope, ¶ 16.
¶18 A review of the hearing testimony on HB 456, which would later be codified as the
MRMHLRA, clearly indicates the drafter’s intent to move the provisions relating to mobile
homes from the Landlord and Tenant Act to its own section of the Montana Code. The
bill’s sponsor, Walter McNutt, who noted he owned a mobile home park, testified to both
the House and Senate committees that the bill’s intent was to make no substantive changes
to the law as it related to mobile home owners and landlords, but to make the law easier to
find by taking it out of the Landlord and Tenant Act and giving it its own section. The
grounds for termination statute, which is substantively identical to that now found in
§ 70-33-433, MCA, was, at the time, found in § 70-24-436, MCA (2005), and provided
identical grounds to terminate the rental agreement of “a tenant who rents space in a mobile
home park but does not rent the mobile home[.]” Section 70-24-436(1), MCA (2005). This
section was first enacted by HB 245 in 1993. 1993 Mont. Laws ch. 470, § 2. At that time,
the Legislature set forth its explicit reasons for adopting a grounds for termination statute
unique to mobile home owners who rented lots from landlords:
WHEREAS, Montana residents currently face a housing crisis that includes
a lack of affordable housing and a lack of available mobile home park spaces;
and
14
WHEREAS, mobile homes are not “mobile” without substantial moving
costs and the potential for substantial damage to the mobile homes; and
WHEREAS, under 70-24-441 landlords of mobile home parks may, without
supplying a reason, evict tenants who rent space in mobile home parks; and
WHEREAS, if evicted unfairly, mobile home owners who rent space in
mobile home parks may be forced to sell their mobile homes at a fraction of
their costs and within an unreasonable amount of time (30 days pursuant to
70-24-441) in order to comply with the eviction.
THEREFORE, the Legislature of the State of Montana finds it necessary to
define justifiable and reasonable grounds on which landlords may evict
mobile home owners who rent space in mobile home parks.
1993 Mont. Laws ch. 470, Preamble. Since the adoption of the Montana Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977, that act had provided (and still does):
(1) The landlord or the tenant may terminate a week-to-week tenancy by a
written notice given to the other at least 7 days before the termination date
specified in the notice.
(2) The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by
giving to the other at any time during the tenancy at least 30 days’ notice in
writing prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination of the
tenancy.
Section 70-24-441, MCA. After adopting a grounds for termination statute unique to
mobile home owners who rented lots, the Legislature made clear that no-cause evictions of
such mobile home owners were banned by explicitly noting the no-cause termination
provision of the Landlord and Tenant Act did “not apply to a tenant who rents space for a
mobile home in a mobile home park but does not rent the mobile home.” Section 70-24-
441(4), MCA (2001). This provision banning no-cause evictions was still in place when
Representative McNutt testified the bill was not making any substantive changes to the law
regarding mobile home owner landlord-tenant relations, and was deleted from the Landlord
15
and Tenant Act upon the passage of the MRMHLRA.4 2007 Mont. Laws ch. 267, § 6. The
legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature specifically sought to ban
no-cause evictions of mobile home owners who rented lots by enacting the grounds for
termination statute in 1993, strengthened those protections in 2001, and did not intend for
them to vanish by enacting the Act in 2007.
¶19 The landlords’ interpretation of the Act, and their assertion it allows for no-cause
terminations of rental agreements with 30-day notices, would render § 70-33-433(1)(l-m),
MCA, superfluous. If the Act did indeed provide for no-cause termination, a landlord could
simply terminate any and all of its leases without cause and with 30 days’ notice to avoid
the lengthier notice requirements involved when changing land use or asserting a
“legitimate business reason.” In addition, there would be no purpose to requiring lengthier
4
Despite asserting the “lack of ambiguity in the Act forecloses consideration of [the legislative]
history[,]” the Dissent asserts the legislative history demonstrates the legislature intended to take
away protections the Montana Legislature explicitly provided to tenants who owned their mobile
home and rented lot space. Dissent, ¶ 29 n.1. Such an assertion is not plausible upon listening to
the actual hearing. The entire presentation by Representative McNutt was focused on how no
substantive changes were being made to the law as it existed. Doing away with a unique tenant
protection applicable to a unique class of tenants—mobile home owners who rent lot space—
which the Legislature repeatedly recognized as important over the preceding decade-plus is a
pretty substantive change. As previously noted, after adopting a grounds for termination statute
unique to mobile home owners who rented lots, the Legislature made clear for years prior to the
passage of the MRMHLRA that no-cause evictions of such mobile home owners were banned by
explicitly noting the no-cause termination provision of the Landlord and Tenant Act did not apply
to a tenant who rents space for a mobile home in a mobile home park but does not rent the mobile
home, the provision banning no-cause evictions was still in place when Representative McNutt
testified the bill was not making any substantive changes to the law regarding mobile home owner
landlord-tenant relations, and was only deleted from the Landlord and Tenant Act upon the passage
of the MRMHLRA because all provisions regarding tenant-owned mobile homes were deleted
from the Landlord and Tenant Act once the MRMHLRA passed. In light of this, we reject the
Dissent’s claim the legislative history “demonstrates the opposite legislative intent” (meaning the
Legislature specifically meant to do away with that protection).
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notice periods at all if the month-to-month tenancies at issue here, and contemplated as the
standard by the Act, § 70-33-201(2)(e), MCA, were not periodic tenancies but continually
expired and renewed themselves each month. The 90-day and 180-day notice periods
provided for in subsections (l) and (m) would never be relevant in such a situation as the
30-day lease could simply not be renewed, eviscerating the Legislature’s goal for mobile
home owners to not face being “forced to sell their mobile homes at a fraction of their costs
and within an unreasonable amount of time,” but rather to have sufficient time to find a
new lot, if they are able, when there is a legitimate reason for their ouster through no fault
of their own. Such a result would be absurd and not in keeping with the Legislature’s
concern for keeping and maintaining a stock of affordable housing by providing for
different and greater protections for mobile home owners through the Act, rather than
merely having mobile home rental agreements be governed by the already-existing
Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. It would also be absurd to force a landlord
to wait for a noncompliance from a tenant before being allowed to change the use of the
land they own or to evict a tenant for a “legitimate business reason.” The Legislature’s
stated intent, seeking to make no substantive changes to the law as it existed, cannot, and
does not, allow for such bizarre results.
¶20 Harmonizing the statute, then, leads to the straightforward conclusion that no-cause
terminations of mobile home lot rental agreements are banned by the statute, which
specifically lists both reasons for terminating an agreement and the notice periods required.
Section 70-33-433, MCA. While the Act now provides for a penalty if a no-cause
termination occurs, § 70-33-201(2)(f), MCA, we cannot find this subsection somehow
17
allows for a no-cause termination in the face of the lengthy list of enumerated reasons and
notice periods found in § 70-33-433, MCA, none of which concern a no-cause termination
with a 30-day notice period. “A landlord and a tenant may include in a rental agreement
terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or other rule or law.” Section 70-33-
201(1), MCA. While rental agreements may include terms and conditions not specifically
addressed by the MRMHLRA, a “rental agreement may not require a party to . . . waive
or forego rights or remedies under [Title 70, chapter 33, MCA.]” Section 70-33-202(1)(a),
MCA. The rental agreements’ terms regarding termination, which asserted the landlords
could terminate the lease with a 30-day notice, would require the Lockharts and
Cunningham to forego their rights against no-cause termination under the Act and are
therefore unenforceable.
¶21 This conclusion is in harmony with the unique nature of mobile homes as compared
to other rented dwellings. The United States Supreme Court has previously commented on
the incongruity between the term “mobile home” and the actual mobility of those homes:
The term “mobile home” is somewhat misleading. Mobile homes are largely
immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a
significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself. They are generally
placed permanently in parks; once in place, only about 1 in every 100 mobile
homes is ever moved. A mobile home owner typically rents a plot of land,
called a “pad,” from the owner of a mobile home park. The park owner
provides private roads within the park, common facilities such as washing
machines or a swimming pool, and often utilities. The mobile home owner
often invests in site-specific improvements such as a driveway, steps,
walkways, porches, or landscaping. When the mobile home owner wishes to
move, the mobile home is usually sold in place, and the purchaser continues
to rent the pad on which the mobile home is located.
18
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992) (internal citation
omitted). Unlike an apartment dweller, who must move their personal property when
evicted from a building they do not own, a mobile home owner must also make
arrangements to move their not-so-mobile home, which they do own, and which can be
very expensive and comes with no guarantee of finding a new lot for the home. See W.
Plaza, LLC v. Tison, 364 P.3d 76, 82 (Wash. 2015) (noting that eviction can be more
devastating for a mobile home lot tenant than for a traditional residential tenant because
the tenant of a mobile home lot must not only move all of his or her personal possessions,
but must also expend thousands of dollars to move his or her mobile home, as well as find
a mover and a new lot for the home). Indeed, many states have a termination for cause
requirement specific to mobile home lot leases. One such requirement is found in Utah,
which its supreme court found “prevents a park owner from terminating residents’ leases
at whim and forcing them to undergo great expense uprooting their homes, along with their
footings, skirting, decks, and landscaping, and attempting to secure another lease
elsewhere.” Coleman, ¶ 19. Like the Utah Supreme Court, we agree that mobile home
owners who rent the lot their home resides on are due protection from “sudden,
unjustifiable eviction[.]” Coleman, ¶ 19. Mobile home owners in Montana are protected
from such evictions by the MRMHLRA’s ban on no-cause evictions.
¶22 We also disagree with the landlords that prohibiting no-cause evictions would
somehow grant the Lockharts and Cunningham a perpetual lease or life estates in the
landlords’ property. Neither the Lockharts nor Cunningham are automatically allowed to
reside in their mobile home in perpetuity, as they could be evicted so long as there is cause.
19
That cause could be due to their behavior, the landlords deciding to change the use of the
land, or for a “legitimate business reason.” It simply cannot be for no reason at all, as the
landlords wish. Though the Dissent claims this to be a “sweeping change in the law,”
Dissent, ¶ 34, that is simply not so. An actual sweeping change in the law would be the
Legislature eliminating the ban on no-cause evictions when enacting the MRMHLRA, a
ban which specifically existed in the Landlord and Tenant Act and was only deleted once
the MRMHLRA passed with the intent to make “no substantive changes” to the law. Both
the text of the statute (listing the requirements for a landlord to terminate) and the
legislative history (making it obvious the Legislature did not intend to remove the existing
ban on no-cause evictions of mobile home owners who rented lots) foreclose this
interpretation of the Act. “Hundreds and perhaps thousands of Montanans” will not wake
up tomorrow with the loss of a contractual right, Dissent, ¶ 37, but with their existing
statutory-based tenant protections intact.
¶23 As such, the lower courts here erred in their interpretation of the Montana
Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act. The Act does not allow for no-cause termination
of a periodic tenancy such as the Lockharts’ or Cunningham’s. This Opinion’s discussion
is regarding such periodic tenancies, and we need not address the Act’s effect upon a term-
of-years lease. See Coleman, ¶ 14 n.3.
CONCLUSION
¶24 The Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act does not allow a lot-only
landlord to terminate a homeowner tenant’s month-to-month lease without cause. The no-
cause termination of both leases at issue in this case were therefore illegal and invalid.
20
¶25 Reversed.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
¶26 In my view, the Court’s statutory analysis is flawed and its interpretation of the
Montana Residential Mobile Home Lot Rental Act (MRMHLRA or the Act) is incorrect.
The Court’s conclusion that the Legislature has completely “banned” all no-cause
terminations, see Opinion, ¶ 20 (“no-cause terminations of mobile home lot rental
agreements are banned by the statute”), is contrary to the statute’s plain language. None
of the many Montana courts that have applied the statute have so held, because a ban is not
contained within the text of the Act itself. See § 1-2-101, MCA (“In the construction of a
statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted. . . .”). More than banning
no-cause terminations, the Court also bans periodic tenancies. The Court’s decision runs
counter to common law and constitutional contract principles, and its adoption of
Appellants’ position that § 70-33-433, MCA, provides the exclusive grounds to terminate
a tenancy, leads to absurd results: a complete ban on no-cause lease terminations, including
those upon notice at the expiration of their agreed-upon terms, would likewise prohibit a
21
tenant from terminating a lease without cause and upon notice, in the event she wanted to
move. Consistent with the absence of any language banning no-cause terminations, the
Act explicitly authorizes landlords to bring an action for possession “after expiration of the
term of the rental agreement or other termination of the rental agreement.” Section
70-33-429(1), MCA.
¶27 I would first note as a backdrop to this discussion that the Court’s interpretation of
the Act appears to be premised upon the incorrect assumption that the Act only applies to
mobile home tenancies subject to the Act that are month-to-month in term. While that may
be understandable, given that month-to-month tenancies are at issue here, it is vital to a
proper interpretation of the Act to recognize that the Legislature did not carve out
month-to-month tenancies for separate treatment under the Act. The Act is applicable to
all terms, including those for longer lease terms, and therefore our interpretation of the Act
must also contemplate its application to all terms.
¶28 The Court’s holding is premised upon its determination that a month-to-month
lease, or any periodic tenancy, does not “expire” at the end of its term upon the giving of
required notice, but rather must be affirmatively “terminated” in the same manner as a
for-cause, mid-term, lease termination. See Opinion, ¶ 16 (“A month-to-month lease, or
any periodic tenancy, does not simply ‘expire,’ . . . it must be ‘terminated,’” citing the
Utah case of Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ¶ 14, 4 P.3d 783). Under the common law,
a periodic tenancy is defined as a “period to period” lease “created to endure until one of
the parties has given the required notice to terminate the tenancy at the end of a period.”
Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 1.5 (1977). It has been recognized
22
in Montana for many years. See Boucher v. St. George, 88 Mont. 162, 168, 293 P. 315,
316 (1930). Fitting squarely within that definition, the “month to month” lease agreements
at issue in these cases provide: “[t]his Rental Agreement shall automatically renew from
month to month on the same terms and conditions as herein, and so on until terminated by
either party giving to the other at least 30 days written notice prior to the expiration of the
current term.” Notice, therefore, is the means of ending such a tenancy at its expiration of
term, as even Coleman recognized (“it is the act of giving notice that triggers the
termination of the lease.”). The same is true for other periodic tenancies, such as
year-to-year. However, under the Court’s interpretation of the Act, all periodic tenancies
in the mobile home context are eliminated because the giving of proper notice is no longer
sufficient to bring the lease to an end upon expiration of the term. Compliant tenants would
thus remain on the landlord’s property indefinitely—and could not even voluntarily leave
without cause—unless either the tenant or the landlord could establish a basis to terminate
the agreement for cause, such as proving a “legitimate business reason” to end the
contractual relationship under § 70-33-433, MCA. As Appellee Westview argues, under
this interpretation, “month-to-month tenancies cease to exist, lease terms never expire, and
tenancies last indefinitely unless and until they can be terminated for cause.” This
interpretation could effectively force landlords and tenants to remain in contracts against
their will, unless taking on the burden of further action, a clear infringement upon the right
to freely contract. More immediately, the text does not support this interpretation. “Our
function as an appellate court is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent by
23
looking at the plain meaning of the words in the statute.” State v. Booth, 2012 MT 40,
¶ 11, 364 Mont. 190, 272 P.3d 89.
¶29 The Act is not ambiguous, and the Court’s proposition that it is subject to alternative
readings is incorrect. The Court’s second proffered alternative, Opinion, ¶ 17, is clearly
not a reasonable reading of the provision, and the Court later declares this position to be
absurd and bizarre. See Opinion, ¶ 19. In any event, the Act is clear.1 Section
70-33-201(1), MCA, provides that landlords and tenants may include in a rental agreement
“terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or other rule or law.” The provision
recognizes, and defaults to, month-to-month terms among possible tenancies: “Unless the
rental agreement provides otherwise: . . . the tenancy is from month to month.” Section
70-33-201(2)(e), MCA. Then, the provision recognizes that a landlord or the tenant may
attempt to “terminate[] the rental agreement without cause prior to the expiration date of
1
To conclude that the Legislature intended to exclude mobile home tenancies from no-cause
terminations, the Court refers to legislative history regarding a prior version of the Act,
§ 70-24-441 (2003), which included language explicitly precluding mobile home tenancies from
notice terminations. Opinion, ¶ 18. However, that provision was repealed, 2007 Mt. Ch. 267, and
no such language exists in the current Code. If anything, this history demonstrates the opposite
legislative intent, but more importantly, the lack of ambiguity in the Act forecloses consideration
of this history. Even so, the Court reasons that it would “be absurd to force a landlord to wait for
noncompliance from a tenant before being allowed to change the use of the land they own or to
evict a tenant for a ‘legitimate business reason.’” Opinion, ¶ 19. I agree that the Court’s second
interpretation of § 70-33-433(1), MCA, is entirely absurd. Although the introductory language of
§ 70-33-433(1), MCA, is prefaced as applying to those situations in which “there is a
noncompliance by the tenant,” the minimum notice periods of the various subsections clearly
illustrate that the subsections of § 70-33-433(1)(l-m), MCA, are not constrained by a tenant’s
violation. Subsections (a-k) require at most 30 days’ notice prior to eviction, while (l-m) require,
at minimum, 180 and 90 days respectively. If subsections (l-m) were indeed contingent on the
tenant’s violation under subsections (a-k), then the landlord would always have a shorter notice
period available under subsections (a-k), thereby rendering the notice periods of (l-m)
superfluous. As the Court notes, we cannot interpret a statute so as to render any language
superfluous. Thus, the Court’s second interpretation is clearly invalid.
24
the lease term,” in which case the provision sanctions the party so acting by assessment of
monetary damages. Section 70-33-201(2)(f), MCA (emphasis added). This provision
necessarily recognizes that either party may voluntarily allow a lease to expire in
accordance with its term, upon notice and without cause, as opposed to “prior to” the
expiration date, and that such expiration is not sanctioned and is not improper. This
recognition is continued throughout the Act:
If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord’s consent after
expiration of the term of the rental agreement or other termination of the
rental agreement, the landlord may bring an action for possession.
Section 70-33-429(1), MCA (emphasis added). Here, the Act unambiguously recognizes
termination can occur in both ways: simple (no-cause) expiration of the term or
termination on other grounds, for cause. This statute is essentially rendered void by the
Court’s complete ban on no-cause terminations. Further:
If the tenant abandons the lot, the landlord shall make reasonable efforts to
rent the lot at fair rental. If the landlord rents the lot for a term beginning
before the expiration of the rental agreement, the rental agreement terminates
as of the date of the new tenancy.
Section 70-33-426(2), MCA (emphasis added). As the District Court correctly stated in
Greener Montana, “[n]owhere in the Act does it state that a rental agreement does not
terminate at the end of its term, nor does the Act forbid termination for no cause.” Rather
than banning the termination of a lease upon its expiration, as the Court concludes, the Act
specifically contemplates it.
¶30 The Court’s conclusion that no-cause expirations of leases are banned is obviously
inconsistent with the Act’s explicit use of that very concept. The Court’s analytical error
25
is rooted in departing from the text and relying upon foreign authority, Coleman. The
Coleman court derived its interpretation from Thompson on Real Property, which states:
“periodic tenancies never expire automatically, because they are continuous by definition.
Termination by either party requires giving proper notice to the other party.” 4 Thompson
on Real Property § 39.06(b)(2) (2023). The Coleman court concluded that the termination
of the periodic tenancy was improper because Utah’s statute did not allow for no-cause
termination. Coleman, ¶ 21. The problems here are two fold: 1) as noted above,
Montana’s Act does not provide, contrary to Thompson on Real Property,2 that periodic
tenancies “never expire,” but rather repeatedly recognizes them and their termination upon
term; and 2) Utah’s statute expressly provides that “[a] mobile home park or its agents may
not terminate a lease or rental agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this
chapter.” Section 57-16-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (emphasis added). Neither § 70-33-
433, MCA, nor any other section of the current Act, provides such a restriction upon the
right to allow a lease to expire upon its term.
¶31 The Court concludes that § 70-33-433, MCA, provides an exclusive list of avenues
to termination, stemming solely from the observation that the statute delineates a “lengthy
list of enumerated reasons and notice periods.” Similarly, Appellant Cunningham argues
that § 70-33-433, MCA, “prohibits any other ground or notice provision not listed.”
However, these conclusions are not supported by the text. Every basis for termination
listed in § 70-33-433, MCA, is for the purpose of terminating the lease “prior to” the
2
Montana’s Act can be reconciled with Thompson on Real Property if Thompson is read to permit
the expiration of tenancies at the end of the agreed term, upon proper notice.
26
expiration of its term, whether by a “noncompliance” breach by the tenant or by a proposed
change in use or legitimate business reason established by the landlord. In other words, all
of these listed reasons are for a statutory cause. Then, in what would be a glaring omission
if this was truly the “exclusive” means a lease could be terminated, there is no means
mentioned in the statute by which a tenant can terminate the lease. If we are to interpret
§ 70-33-433, MCA, as the exclusive means by which a lease may be terminated, then
tenants are incapable of terminating their periodic tenancy. They could be forced to
continue paying rent and living on the designated lot until either the landlord terminates
their lease in compliance with § 70-33-433, MCA, or the tenant chooses to breach the lease
and pay the consequences—a severe infringement on the right to contract. This is an absurd
result. Rather, this provision, addressing only statutory causes for termination, simply does
not address or encompass termination of the agreement upon the expiration of its term (and
upon notice), which is clearly recognized throughout the Act.
¶32 The Court’s interpretation not only bans no-cause terminations, but necessarily
eliminates true month-to-month tenancies, despite the Act’s recognition and establishment
of month-to-month tenancies as the default tenancy. Section 70-33-201(2)(e), MCA. Even
upon establishing a legitimate business reason, a landlord is required to provide a tenant
with 90 days’ notice. Section 70-33-433(1)(m)(ii), MCA. The 90-day notice requirement
effectively precludes the possibility of forming less than a minimum four-month tenancy
because the tenancy will always last an additional three months to provide the requisite
notice—if there is cause to do so.
27
¶33 The Court reasons that, if no-cause terminations were allowed upon 30 days’ notice,
“a landlord could simply terminate any and all of its leases without cause and 30 days’
notice to avoid the lengthier notice requirements” ascribed in § 70-33-433(1)(l-m), MCA,
thereby rendering those provisions “superfluous.” Opinion, ¶ 17. Recall that the Act does
not apply only to subject tenancies that are month-to-month in term, but to such leases of
all terms. This provision would thus be applicable to leases with longer terms and longer
notice periods than the 30-day notice provision applicable to month-to-month tenancies.
Under the common law, notice to end a periodic tenancy is proper if it occurs in accordance
with the contractual terms, and in the absence of such terms, “the common law require[s]
notice six months prior to the end of the period, if the period is from year to year, and notice
equal to the length of the period in other instances.” Restatement (Second) of Property,
Landlord & Tenant § 1.5 cmt. f (1977). Thus, for example, in the case of a year-to-year
periodic tenancy, the statute’s notice requirements would expressly shorten the notice
required under common law, and with such effect, are not superfluous. It should be
emphasized that the Act does not require the parties to enter month-to-month tenancies,
and landlords and tenants who are mutually interested in long-term relationships can
negotiate for a different term, such as year-to-year, and longer notice provisions. But, in
any event, this provision is not superfluous.
¶34 Regarding alteration of the common law, “enactment of a statute does not
necessarily result in field preemption of the common law, and ‘a statute is not presumed to
work any change in the rules of the common law beyond what is expressed in its provisions
or fairly implied in them in order to give them full operation.’” Phipps v. Old Republic
28
Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 2021 MT 152, ¶ 20, 404 Mont. 336, 489 P.3d 507 (citing Haker v. Sw.
R.R., 176 Mont. 364, 368-69, 578 P.2d 724, 727 (1978)). Enacting a complete ban on
month-to-month tenancies is a sweeping change in the law. In my view, it defies reason to
conclude the Legislature would have enacted a complete ban upon a standard lease
provision without saying so—and, of course, it did not, as it continued to recognize
expiration of leases upon term. The Legislature could have followed the lead of other states
who have enacted more comprehensive restrictions, such as Utah, but again, did not. We
have previously held that “[a] fundamental tenet of contract law is freedom of contract;
parties are free to mutually agree to terms governing their private conduct as long as those
terms do not conflict with public laws.” Newlon v. Teck Am., Inc., 2015 MT 317, ¶ 15, 381
Mont. 378, 360 P.3d 1134. That freedom to contract entails the freedom not to contract,
and accordingly, the freedom to end a contract subject to contractual liabilities. See
Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, ¶ 20, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250.
While the state surely has authority to limit contractual rights, the conclusion that the Act
impliedly incorporates a complete ban results in a clear restraint upon contractual freedom
on both parties including, as noted above, compelling them to continue contracting.
¶35 In response to this Dissent, the Court offers that tenants can terminate leases at the
expiration of term based upon the common law. That is exactly the point of this discussion:
interpreting the statute without consideration of the longstanding common law leads to
absurd results. The Court now states the common law permits a tenant to terminate a
tenancy at the expiration of the term, but not a landlord. However, the common law
provides the same termination right to landlords, unless the Legislature clearly alters that
29
right. But it has not. Rather, it explicitly recognizes a landlord’s right to bring an action
for possession either “after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or other
termination of the rental agreement.” Section 70-33-429(1), MCA.
¶36 The Legislature’s wording is not ambiguous; it simply does not go as far as
Appellants would prefer. The Act clearly fits together well: it authorizes month-to-month
mobile home tenancies, repeatedly recognizes the termination of leases upon expiration of
term or for cause, and provides differing timeframes for cause terminations in situations
involving noncompliant tenants and other statutory causes. It does not ban particular
tenancies or ban no-cause terminations based upon expiration of term. The Court has
imputed rules never stated by the Legislature, and which upend common law principles.
Critically, the Legislature repealed the prior provision of the Act that explicitly precluded
mobile home tenancies from notice terminations, but the Court has reinserted it.
¶37 The Court’s decision goes far beyond even a strained interpretation of the Act. The
Court has declared that all existing month-to-month tenancies are permanent, which cannot
end according to their own terms, but must continue until statutory cause for termination
is established. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of Montanans, landlords and tenants alike,
have voluntarily entered rental agreements that they understood, based upon the contract
language authorized by the Act, they could bring to an end at a time of their choosing, but
will wake up tomorrow with the loss of that contractual right. Such an infringement upon
30
the ability to act on contractual rights is a violation of their constitutional rights. The
Legislature did not provide for this result, and I cannot agree to it.3
¶38 I would affirm.
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice Dirk Sandefur joins in the dissenting Opinion of Justice Rice.
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
3
In technical terms, the Court’s decision turns all mobile home month-to-month tenancies into life
estates on condition, which continue indefinitely until the occurrence of a subsequent condition or
violation, here, satisfaction of legal cause. See Estate on condition, Black’s Law Dictionary
(7th ed. 1999).
31