Eric Williams v. Department of the Air Force ( 2014 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    ERIC WILLIAMS,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                  AT-3443-06-0118-X-2
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: December 16, 2014
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Eric Williams, North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.
    Jonathan Lee Simpson, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the
    agency noncompliant with the Board’s October 26, 2012 Final Order in the
    underlying appeals, MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1 and MSPB Docket
    No. AT-3443-06-0118-C-2. For the reasons discussed below, we now find the
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    agency in compliance and DISMISS the petition for enforcement. This is the
    final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this compliance
    proceeding. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1)
    (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.183
    (c)(1)).
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE
    ¶2        On October 26, 2012, the Board issued a Final Order in MSPB Docket
    No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1        and   MSPB   Docket    No.   AT-3443-06-0118-C-2,
    requiring the agency to pay the appellant lost wages (with interest), benefits, and
    liquidated damages resulting from its willful violation of his Veterans
    Employment Opportunities Act rights. Williams v. Department of the Air Force,
    MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1, Nonprecedential Final Order at 4-5
    (Oct. 26, 2012) (B-1 Final Order). On January 3, 2013, the appellant petitioned
    for enforcement, contending that the agency failed to comply with this order.
    MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-C-3, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1.               The
    appellant noted that the agency had failed to pay or explain its position regarding
    the following issues: military leave, annual leave, sick leave, overtime pay, back
    pay (lost wages), retirement fund, liquidated damages, and the provision of a
    Standard Form (SF) 50. 2 See CF, Tab 10, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 2.
    The administrative judge granted the appellant’s petition for enforcement, found
    that the agency failed to provide proof of compliance on these issues and ordered
    it to do so within 20 days of its order. CID at 3-5. The administrative judge also
    ordered the agency to provide the name of the agency official responsible for
    compliance, pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    (a)(2) and 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.183
    (a)(5).
    CID at 5. The agency did neither.
    2
    The appellant originally contended that the agency failed to provide an SF-15, but
    later stated that he meant to challenge the failure to provide an SF-50. MSPB Docket
    No. AT-3443-06-0118-X-2, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 13 at 1.
    3
    ¶3         On July 8, 2014, the Board issued an order to show cause, instructing the
    agency to file evidence of compliance.        CRF, Tab 8.     The agency and the
    individual the Board selected as the responsible agency official (in the absence of
    any designation by the agency) filed responses on July 29 and 31, 2014,
    respectively. CRF, Tabs 11-12. The appellant filed his response on August 5,
    2014. CRF, Tab 13. On September 9, 2014, the Board issued an order requiring
    the agency to submit additional information. CRF, Tab 15. Both parties filed
    timely responses.     CRF, Tabs 17-19.     As explained below, we now find the
    agency compliant on all issues, decline to impose sanctions, and change the
    designation of the responsible agency official in accordance with the agency’s
    request.
    Standard
    ¶4         When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it
    orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would
    have been in, had the wrongful personnel action not occurred.              House v.
    Department of the Army, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 530
    , ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the
    burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. An agency’s assertions of
    compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported
    by documentary evidence. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 319
    , ¶ 5 (2011). The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by
    making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued
    noncompliance.” Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 325
    , ¶
    5 (2010).
    Back Pay/Lost Wages
    ¶5         The Board’s previous orders found the appellant entitled to lost wages, with
    interest, from November 14, 2005 (the date of his unlawful nonselection), to
    March 11, 2009 (the date he declined the agency’s offer to place him in the
    position at issue).    MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-06-0118-B-1, Remand File,
    4
    Tab 20, Initial Decision (B-1 ID) at 3-4, 6; Williams v. Department of the Air
    Force, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 245
    , ¶ 17 (2011); B-1 Final Order at 3-4.         The agency
    submitted evidence that it paid the appellant a gross amount of $107,921.99 in
    lost wages for this period, less deductions, and including $13,420.47 in interest.
    CRF, Tab 11 at 5, 9, 58. The agency’s calculations included the promotions the
    administrative judge found the appellant would have earned. 
    Id. at 6
    ; see B-1 ID
    at 4-6. The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations. Accordingly, we
    find the agency in compliance with respect to lost wages and interest thereon.
    Annual and Sick Leave
    ¶6        The agency stated that it paid the appellant a lump sum of $12,758.16 for
    annual leave he accrued and credited his retirement records to reflect that he
    earned 248 hours of sick leave. CRF, Tab 17 at 4. The agency explained its
    annual and sick leave calculations in a prior submission. CRF, Tab 11 at 5-6.
    The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations nor its statement that it
    paid him and updated his records. Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance
    as to the appellant’s annual and sick leave.
    Liquidated Damages
    ¶7        The agency stated that it paid the appellant a lump sum of $65,749.91 as
    liquidated damages from April 15, 2008 (the date of agency’s willful violation of
    the Board’s order to reconstruct the selection process), to March 11, 2009 (the
    date the appellant declined placement in the position). CRF, Tab 11 at 6; B-1
    Final Order at 4. The appellant did not dispute the agency’s calculations or its
    statement that it had paid him this amount. Accordingly, we find the agency in
    compliance regarding the liquidated damages.
    Military Leave
    ¶8        The appellant asserted that the agency owes him military leave pay for the
    time he served on active duty between 2005 and 2009. CRF, Tab 19 at 1-2. He
    stated that, in each year, he would have taken military leave rather than another
    5
    type of leave. CRF, Tab 18 at 1. The agency contended that the appellant should
    not be paid for military leave because he did not actually use such leave, and
    employees are not compensated for unused military leave. CRF, Tab 17 at 5.
    ¶9          Military leave is intended to permit an employee to serve his military duty
    without loss of pay or time at his civilian position, up to 15 work days per
    calendar year. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 6323
    (a)(1). The appellant has not pointed to any
    actual loss of pay or time due to his military service between November 14, 2005,
    and March 11, 2009; nor could he, as he did not actually work at the agency
    during that time period, and his lost wages and benefits entitlements are based on
    a reconstruction of events. 3 The agency reconstructed the relevant time period
    without charging him military leave or annual leave in lieu of military leave and
    paid him for his unused annual leave. If he were now paid for military leave, he
    would receive a windfall because he, in effect, would receive double payment.
    Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance on this issue.
    Retirement Fund (Thrift Savings Plan)
    ¶10         The agency stated that it worked with the appellant to process his Thrift
    Savings Plan (TSP) elections and catch-up contributions and deposited the
    required amounts.     CRF, Tab 11 at 5.        The appellant did not dispute these
    statements. Accordingly, we find the agency in compliance with respect to the
    appellant’s TSP account.
    Overtime Pay and Awards
    ¶11         The appellant contended that the agency failed to pay him overtime or
    awards during the back pay (lost wages) period. CRF, Tab 13 at 1-2. The agency
    3
    In an earlier submission, the appellant asserted that he was entitled to military leave
    pay because the agency withheld his military pay from his lost wages award. CRF,
    Tab 14 at 1. The documents he submitted do not support this claim; however, it is
    unclear what part, if any, of the interim earnings withholding derives from his military
    pay. See 
    id. at 3-4
    . The appellant therefore has not made “specific, nonconclusory, and
    supported assertions” sufficient to rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance. See
    Brown, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 325
    , ¶ 5.
    6
    submitted evidence that employees in the position to which the appellant should
    have been appointed did not routinely work overtime; indeed, during the period at
    issue, only two employees worked overtime, and each on only one occasion.
    CRF, Tab 17 at 4-5. The agency asserted that it was therefore extremely unlikely
    that the appellant would have worked overtime.       
    Id.
       The appellant did not
    challenge this assertion but contended that he should have received a notable
    achievement award because some employees in the position at issue received such
    awards. CRF, Tab 19 at 2; see CRF, Tab 17 at 5.
    ¶12        We disagree. Notable achievement and performance-based time off awards
    (which the agency states were given some employees), unlike overtime or night
    work, are highly variable and depend on the individual’s performance. Because
    the appellant never actually worked in the position at issue, or in any other
    position with the agency, it is purely speculative to assume he would have earned
    a notable achievement or time off award.     Moreover, even if we required the
    agency to grant him the average of the awards given to other employees, as is
    commonly done when calculating overtime, he would derive no monetary benefit.
    Notable achievement and time off awards are not cash awards, nor can they be
    converted to cash. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 451.104
    (f) (a time off award “shall not be
    converted to a cash payment under any circumstances”). We therefore find the
    agency in compliance on this issue.
    SF-50
    ¶13        The appellant stated that the agency failed to provide him an SF-50 showing
    that he resigned his employment on March 9, 2011. CRF, Tab 19 at 2. The
    agency’s submissions indicate that it generated such an SF-50, although it did not
    submit a copy to the Board.     See CRF, Tab 11 at 42.       Because there is no
    indication that the agency failed to create the appropriate paperwork, we find the
    agency compliant on this issue. The appellant should be able to obtain a copy of
    all of his SF-50s, including the resignation SF-50, through the agency’s Human
    7
    Resources office and/or from the Employee Personnel Page.            See Employee
    Personnel Page, https://www.nfc.usda.gov/epps/eplogin.aspx. If the appellant is
    unable to obtain the desired SF-50 from these sources and has reason to believe
    the agency, in fact, failed to create one, he may file another petition for
    enforcement on this issue.
    Sanctions
    ¶14        On July 8, 2014, we ordered the agency to show cause why we should not
    impose sanctions, including an order that the responsible agency official not
    receive pay, for the agency’s failure to submit any evidence of compliance as of
    that date. CRF, Tab 8 at 2. We noted that the agency had failed to respond, not
    only to the compliance initial decision, but to a subsequent order expressly
    requiring it to submit evidence of compliance. 
    Id.
    ¶15        In response to the show cause order, the agency submitted the evidence of
    compliance discussed above and asserted that it had been substantially compliant
    well before the show cause order but had neglected to provide the relevant
    information to the Board. CRF, Tab 11 at 4. As explained above, we agree that
    the agency is now in compliance on all issues. We therefore decline to impose
    sanctions against either the agency or the responsible agency official. See Martin
    v. Department of Justice, 
    99 M.S.P.R. 59
    , ¶ 16 (2005) (The Board has held that
    the purpose of sanctions under 
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    (e)(2)(A) is to obtain compliance
    and that, once compliance is achieved, sanctions are inappropriate), aff’d, 188 F.
    App’x   994   (Fed.   Cir.   2006);   see   also   Smith   v.   Department   of   the
    Army, 
    72 M.S.P.R. 676
    , 679 (1996) (same).
    Responsible Agency Official
    ¶16        In the absence of any designation of a responsible agency official (despite
    multiple orders to submit such person’s name to the Board), the Board identified
    John W. Snodgrass, Executive Director, Air Force Personnel Center, as the
    responsible agency official pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    (a)(2) and (e)(2)(A).
    8
    CRF, Tab 8 at 2. Mr. Snodgrass filed a submission stating that he was not the
    appropriate official, CRF, Tab 12, and the agency identified Anthony Baumann,
    Director of Contracting, Air Force Sustainment Command, a member of the
    Senior Executive Service, as the appropriate official, CRF, Tab 11 at 7.        We
    accept the agency’s designation and will amend our records to note that
    Mr. Baumann, not Mr. Snodgrass, is the responsible agency official in this matter.
    For the reasons discussed above, we decline to impose sanctions against
    Mr. Baumann.
    ¶17        This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
    compliance proceeding.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
    the court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    9
    States     Code,   at   our   website,   http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.
    Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.
    Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and
    Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,
    6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court
    appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of
    attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for
    Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems
    Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor
    warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                            ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 12/16/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021