Cori A. Wilson v. Department of Justice ( 2016 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    CORI A. WILSON,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        DA-0752-14-0640-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: July 26, 2016
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    James R. Hefflin, Newport Beach, California, for the appellant.
    Steven R. Simon, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed her appeal of an alleged constructive demotion on the basis of
    adjudicatory efficiency.    Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
    when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial
    decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
    judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
    not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
    the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
    or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
    available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
    section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ). After fully considering the filings in this
    appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section
    1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition
    for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, we AFFIRM the
    initial decision.   Specifically, we modify the basis for the disposition of the
    appeal to DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and add additional analysis
    appropriate to that disposition.
    ¶2         The appellant filed an appeal challenging an alleged constructive demotion
    that occurred in 2000. The appellant previously had filed a Board appeal in 2002
    in which she challenged the same alleged adverse action. While that appeal was
    pending, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the appellant waived
    her right to appeal the alleged constructive demotion. Wilson v. Department of
    Justice, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-02-0584-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0584 IAF),
    Tab 16. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal pursuant to the settlement
    agreement. 0584 IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision.
    ¶3         Because it appeared that the appellant was attempting to appeal an action
    that had been settled in the earlier appeal, the administrative judge twice ordered
    the appellant to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. Wilson v.
    Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-14-0640-I-1, Initial Appeal
    File (0640 IAF), Tab 2 at 2-3, Tab 19. The appellant did not submit a pleading
    responsive to the administrative judge’s orders. Instead, the appellant, through
    counsel, filed multiple “objections” to the orders. 0640 IAF, Tabs 5, 20, 23, 25.
    The appellant asserted that she was not aware of any prior appeal or settlement
    3
    agreement that would preclude this appeal: “These same facts and issues were
    litigated by the agency in two separate forums before during and after a purported
    settlement agreement which the appellant is still not clear that the board is
    making reference too.” 0640 IAF, Tab 23 at 1 (grammar and punctuation as in
    original). The appellant was put on notice of precisely which prior appeal and
    settlement agreement was at issue, 0640 IAF, Tab 19 at 2-3, Tab 21 at 4, and she
    was served with copies of both the prior appeal and the settlement agreement,
    0640 IAF, Tab 11 at 11-13, 30-31. Thus, the appellant had sufficient information
    to explain why the issues in the earlier appeal were not identical and the waiver
    of appeal rights in the settlement agreement did not preclude this appeal, but she
    continued to demand that the administrative judge identify the prior appeal and
    settlement agreement that formed the basis for the potential dismissal of this
    appeal. 0640 IAF, Tabs 5, 20, 23, 25.
    ¶4        Based on the written record, the administrative judge found that the alleged
    constructive demotion in this appeal was identical to the alleged reduction in
    grade and pay in the prior appeal, and that the matter was resolved by a
    settlement agreement reached in the prior appeal.      0640 IAF, Tab 26, Initial
    Decision (ID) at 3.      She therefore dismissed the appeal on the basis of
    adjudicatory efficiency. 
    Id.
    ¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review in which she asserts that the
    appeal was wrongly decided, but does not identify any errors of fact or law that
    might warrant reversal of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
    Tab 1. The agency responded in opposition to the petition for review, PFR File,
    Tab 3, and the appellant replied to the agency’s response, PFR File, Tab 4.
    ¶6        In her reply to the agency’s response, the appellant states that the
    constructive demotion was not resolved by the earlier settlement agreement, but
    she does not address the portion of the agreement providing for dismissal of “the
    above captioned case,” or her initial appeal form in which she appealed her
    “constructive reduction in pay and grade,” which, read together, lead to the
    4
    opposite conclusion. 0640 IAF, Tab 11 at 12, 30; PFR File, Tab 4 at 1. We find
    that the administrative judge correctly determined that the settlement agreement
    did resolve the appellant’s constructive demotion claim.       0584 IAF, Tab 15.
    Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found that the settlement agreement
    encompassed the matter raised in this appeal. See Lee v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    111 M.S.P.R. 551
    , ¶ 7 (2009), aff’d, 367 F. App’x 137 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    ¶7          We must now determine whether the waiver of appeal rights contained in
    the agreement is enforceable. 
    Id., ¶ 8
    . Although the administrative judge did not
    provide the appellant with notice of her burdens and elements of proof concerning
    the enforceability of the waiver clause, her error was not prejudicial because the
    appellant addressed this issue, albeit in a cursory way, in one of her pleadings
    below.    0640 IAF, Tab 25 at 1; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
    
    22 M.S.P.R. 281
    , 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not
    prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an
    initial decision).
    ¶8          The waiver clause at issue is a general waiver of all rights as to any and all
    issues the appellant may have had arising out of the facts and issues of her
    appeal.   0640 IAF, Tab 11 at 30.      The Board has found that similarly broad
    language constitutes an enforceable waiver of Board appeal rights.             Lee,
    
    111 M.S.P.R. 551
    , ¶ 7. The appellant’s bare allegation of fraud does not persuade
    us that we should disregard the plain language of the agreement.
    ¶9          The appellant also reiterates her arguments below that the agency has
    “wrought fraud” upon the Board and that the agency should be sanctioned and the
    agency’s representative disqualified. PFR File, Tab 4 at 2-4. We have reviewed
    the appellant’s assertions and find them unpersuasive.
    ¶10         Finally, the agency argues in its response to the appellant’s petition for
    review that this appeal is frivolous and the Board should assess damages against
    the appellant and her counsel in the same manner as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    5
    the Federal Circuit did in Asberry v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    692 F.2d 1378
    , 1380-81
    (Fed. Cir. 1982). PFR File, Tab 3 at 4. We decline to do so.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS 2
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the
    court at the following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
    after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
    that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and
    that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
    Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our
    website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.            Additional information is
    available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance
    is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained
    within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    2
    In the initial decision, the administrative judge provided the appellant with mixed-case
    appeal rights. Based on the disposition of this case, such review rights are not
    appropriate. Caros v. Department of Homeland Security, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 231
    , ¶ 22
    (2015). The proper appeal rights are provided here.
    6
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any
    attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                            ______________________________
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 7/26/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021