Thomas E. Hopkins, III v. Department of Justice ( 2016 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    THOMAS E. HOPKINS, III,                         DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         DE-3443-16-0406-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: October 13, 2016
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *
    Thomas E. Hopkins, III, Fargo, North Dakota, pro se.
    Julia Lehning, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such
    as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material
    fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or
    regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
    *
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
    decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
    discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
    material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal     Regulations,   section 1201.115   (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).   After    fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
    which is now the Board’s final decision. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    ¶2        The appellant was selected for a GS-11 Human Resources Specialist
    position in Fargo, North Dakota.       Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 8.      On
    June 13, 2016, the agency sent him an email containing a “formal offer” and
    informed him that someone would be in touch with him concerning a background
    check.     
    Id.
       Less than 15 minutes later, the agency’s District Office Security
    Manager sent the appellant an email to begin the background investigation
    process. IAF, Tab 9 at 31-32. This email stated “Prior to your start date, your
    background must be completed.” 
    Id. at 32
    . In a follow-up email dated that same
    day, the Security Manager stated:
    I [realize] your desired start date is July 10th; however, the
    background investigation process to obtain a prehire waiver that is
    required for you to start prior to the actual investigation completion
    takes approximately four to six weeks. The actual background
    investigation takes four to six months to complete. . . . July 10,
    2016 is not a set in stone start date, it’s a desired date[;] please
    do not make plans to start on that date until you hear further
    from me.
    
    Id. at 36
    . Two weeks later, when the agency began to arrange the appellant’s
    release from his employing agency (the Department of Veterans Affairs in
    Beckley, West Virginia), the agency again informed the appellant “we cannot
    gain you to our agency until the background investigation is cleared.” 
    Id. at 64
    .
    3
    The appellant replied, “I understand about the investigation but I had to make a
    command decision on giving notice where I live.        . . .   I'll be in Fargo this
    weekend.”     
    Id. at 63
    .   The appellant then moved at his own expense from
    West Virginia to Fargo, and his employing agency obtained permission to back‑
    fill his position.
    ¶3         However, the early stages of the background check investigation revealed
    some information that was not resolved to the agency’s satisfaction and made it
    unwilling to sign a Pre-employment National Security Background Waiver. IAF,
    Tab 1 at 9. The agency therefore withdrew the offer of employment. 
    Id.
    ¶4         The appellant filed an appeal in which he asserted that he had been
    subjected to a suitability determination. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge
    issued an acknowledgment order in which he informed the appellant that the
    Board does not have jurisdiction over a nonselection, and he gave the appellant
    notice of the elements and burdens for proving jurisdiction over his nonselection
    as an employment practices appeal and a suitability determination. IAF, Tab 2.
    He also informed the appellant that the Board might have jurisdiction over a
    nonselection appeal in limited circumstances under the Whistleblower Protection
    Act (WPA), the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA), and the
    Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). 
    Id.
    In response, the appellant argued that the agency had made a firm offer that was
    binding and tantamount to an appointment that could not be rescinded without
    affording him due process.     IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5.     He also contended that the
    withdrawal was a violation of a basic requirement for employment practices and a
    suitability determination. 
    Id.
     The administrative judge dismissed the appeal on
    the written record upon finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
    allegation of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 5. The appellant
    petitions for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.
    ¶5         It is well-settled that the Board lacks jurisdiction over nonselections.
    Alvarez v. Department of Homeland Security, 
    112 M.S.P.R. 434
    , ¶ 6 (2009); Tines
    4
    v. Department of the Air Force, 
    56 M.S.P.R. 90
    , 93 (1992).                The Board has
    jurisdiction over suitability determinations, 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.501
    , but a “suitability
    action” is defined as a cancellation of eligibility, a removal, a cancellation of
    reinstatement eligibility, and a debarment. Alvarez, 
    112 M.S.P.R. 434
    , ¶ 7. A
    nonselection for a specific position is not a suitability action, even if it based on
    reasons similar to the criteria for making suitability determinations set forth
    at 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.202
    . Alvarez, 
    112 M.S.P.R. 434
    , ¶ 7; 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.203
    (b).
    Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s
    nonselection was not an appealable suitability action under 5 C.F.R. part 731. ID
    at 3-4.
    ¶6          To the extent the appellant claimed below that the agency’s action violated
    a basic requirement for employment practices and is reviewable by the Board, we
    find that his allegation fails. IAF, Tab 4 at 4. An applicant for employment who
    believes that an employment practice applied to him by the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM) violates a basic requirement in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
     is entitled
    to appeal to the Board. Sauser v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    ,      ¶6   (2010);   
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a).    The    Board    has    jurisdiction
    under 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a) when two conditions are met: first, the appeal must
    concern an employment practice that OPM is involved in administering; and
    second, the appellant must make a nonfrivolous allegation that the employment
    practice violated one of the “basic requirements” for employment practices set
    forth in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    .          Sauser, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 6.          “Employment
    practices,”     as   defined   in     OPM’s   regulations,    “affect   the    recruitment,
    measurement, ranking, and selection” of applicants for positions in the
    competitive service. 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.101
    . The appellant’s concerns are about the
    agency’s actions after it selected him, not questions about how it arrived at its
    decision to select one candidate over another.         Thus, he has not identified an
    employment practice subject to review by the Board.
    5
    ¶7        Second, the appellant has not alleged that an employment practice was
    applied to him by OPM, as required by 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a), or that a valid
    employment practice administered by OPM was misapplied to him by the agency,
    as required by Dowd v. United States, 
    713 F.2d 720
    , 724 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Third,
    the appellant has not alleged that an employment practice applied to him violates
    one of the basic requirements contained in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    .         Finally, the
    alleged violations do not concern matters related to his status as an applicant for
    employment prior to his selection.      However, only “candidates” may bring
    employment practices appeals to the Board under 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a).
    National    Treasury     Employees      Union     v.    Office    of     Personnel
    Management, 
    118 M.S.P.R. 83
    , ¶ 9 (2012).        Therefore, the appellant has not
    raised a cognizable employment practices claim within the Board’s jurisdiction.
    ¶8        As the administrative judge correctly stated in his acknowledgment order,
    the Board has jurisdiction over nonselections in limited circumstances under the
    WPA, VEOA, and USERRA. Sapla v. Department of the Navy, 
    118 M.S.P.R. 551
    , ¶ 8 (2012); IAF, Tab 2. The appellant had the opportunity to raise a claim
    under one of these authorities but he did not do so, and we do not consider
    them further.
    ¶9        The appellant alleged below and reiterates on review that the agency’s firm
    offer could not be withdrawn without affording him due process. IAF, Tab 4 at 4;
    PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. He cites no legal authority for this proposition, and we are
    aware of none. He further contends that he made Permanent Change of Station
    (PCS) arrangements and that the offer was falsely portrayed as a tentative offer.
    IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5. We disagree. The firm offer email did not contain the word
    “tentative.” IAF, Tab 1 at 8. However, the vacancy announcement stated that the
    position required the successful completion of a background investigation, and
    the appellant received numerous emails, beginning only a few minutes after the
    firm offer email, from the agency indicating that he was required to complete a
    background investigation before he could come on board. IAF, Tab 9 at 24, 32,
    6
    36, 64. The appellant specifically stated that he understood. 
    Id. at 63
    . In order
    to be appointed to a position in the civil service, an authorized appointing official
    must formally and unequivocally act to appoint that individual. Lewis v. General
    Services Administration, 
    54 M.S.P.R. 120
    , 122 (1992). Although the appellant
    was selected for the position, the actual appointment was subject to the successful
    completion of a background investigation; because he did not meet this condition,
    his selection did not amount to an appointment.         Lewis, 54 M.S.P.R. at 123.
    Under the circumstances, the right to due process did not attach.
    ¶10         Moreover, by describing his relocation in terms of PCS arrangements, the
    appellant implied that there was some sort of official involvement or
    responsibility in his move to Fargo.     On the contrary, the appellant was well
    aware that the agency would not pay relocation expenses.               The vacancy
    announcement explicitly stated that relocation expenses would not be authorized.
    IAF, Tab 9 at 25.      Further, when the appellant received an automatically
    generated email from a “PCS Travel Portal” that had been sent in error, he
    contacted the agency because he did not expect that he would receive relocation
    expenses. Id. at 53. Even though the agency specifically instructed him that his
    proposed start date was not set in stone and that the preliminary background
    investigation process would take 4 to 6 weeks, id. at 36, he chose to relocate.
    The consequences of that decision are his responsibility.
    ¶11         In his petition for review, the appellant presents documents, some of which
    are a part of the record below, and some of which are not.          Evidence that is
    already a part of the record is not new.            Meier v. Department of the
    Interior, 
    3 M.S.P.R. 247
    , 256 (1980).      The new documents are mostly dated
    before the close of the record below. None of the new documents, however, are
    relevant to the issue of jurisdiction, and we have not relied on them.
    Additionally, the appellant’s arguments on review concerning the matters at issue
    in his background investigation are not relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.
    7
    ¶12         Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge correctly dismissed the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
    the court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
    after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
    that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and
    that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
    Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012).     You may read this law as well as other sections of the
    United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional        information         is         available      at    the         court’s
    website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide
    for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the
    court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono           for    information   regarding   pro     bono
    8
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit.   The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 10/13/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2016