Carissima M. Pettus v. Department of the Navy ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    CARISSIMA M. PETTUS,                            DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        DC-0353-13-0409-I-2
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: November 5, 2015
    Agency.
    THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Neil C. Bonney, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.
    Dominick G. Yacono, Esquire, and Julia Alexandra Fitzmaurice, Esquire,
    Norfolk, Virginia, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    REMAND ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed this restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction.          For the reasons
    discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
    Order.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    ¶2         The appellant, a GS-05 Police Officer at the agency’s Naval Weapons
    Station Yorktown, Virginia, sustained a work-related injury on November 30,
    2011, which the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) accepted
    on January 26, 2012. Pettus v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-
    0353-13-0409-I-1 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1, Tab 16 at 12.              Following
    surgery, the appellant worked in a limited duty position until August 28, 2012,
    when she experienced a recurrence of her injury, which was later accepted by the
    OWCP. IAF, Tab 8 at 49, 80. The appellant saw her orthopedic surgeon on
    November 26, 2012, and he determined that she had reached maximum medical
    improvement such that her restrictions were permanent.              
    Id. at 15-17
    .     On
    November     29,    2012,   the   appellant   provided    the   agency with      medical
    documentation from her orthopedic surgeon, 
    id.,
     and requested immediate
    restoration, 
    id. at 25
    .     The agency subsequently issued the appellant a notice
    stating that it was unable to accommodate the appellant in her Police Officer
    position. IAF, Tab 16 at 19-21. The appellant then filed this appeal. IAF, Tab 4.
    ¶3         In pertinent part, the administrative judge rejected the appellant’s claim for
    restoration as a physically disqualified individual under 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.301
    (c)
    because the appellant first requested restoration on November 29, 2012, 1 day
    before her entitlement to such restoration expired. Pettus v. Department of the
    Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0353-13-0409-I-2 (I-2 IAF), Tab 22, Initial
    Decision (ID) at 3-5. 2      Under those circumstances, the administrative judge
    determined that she could not find that the agency improperly failed to provide
    2
    The administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice and the appellant
    later refiled it in keeping with the administrative judge’s instructions. IAF, Tab 27; I-2
    IAF, Tab 1.
    3
    the appellant restoration rights under 
    5 U.S.C. § 353.301
    (c), because there was no
    longer any time left when she requested restoration to locate positions for her
    before the end of her 1-year entitlement to restoration under the regulation. ID at
    4.   Thus, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish
    jurisdiction over her restoration claim. ID at 9.
    ¶4         However, contrary to the administrative judge’s conclusion, we find that the
    appellant nonfrivolously alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the
    agency violated her restoration rights as a “physically disqualified” individual.
    The pertinent regulation provides that:
    An individual who is physically disqualified for the former position
    or equivalent because of a compensable injury, is entitled to be
    placed in another position for which qualified that will provide the
    employee with the same status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
    thereof, consistent with the circumstances in each case. This right is
    agencywide and applies for a period of 1 year from the date
    eligibility for compensation begins. After 1 year, the individual is
    entitled to the rights accorded individuals who fully or partially
    recover, as applicable.
    
    5 C.F.R. § 353.301
    (c).      Presuming     that      the   appellant’s   eligibility   for
    compensation began on the date of her initial compensable injury, November 30,
    2011, because the record reflects that she provided evidence establishing her
    physical disqualification within 1 year after this date, i.e., November 29, 2012,
    she was entitled to be placed in another position for which she qualified that
    provided her with the same status and pay, or the nearest approximation of that
    status and pay, consistent with the circumstances of her case.            E.g., Hall v.
    Department of the Navy, 
    94 M.S.P.R. 262
    , ¶ 24 (2003). Moreover, given that the
    appellant requested restoration just 3 days after her orthopedic surgeon found that
    she had reached her maximum medical improvement and that she provided the
    agency with medical evidence establishing her physical disqualification within
    the requisite 1 year after her eligibility for compensation began, we find that the
    appellant has exercised diligence in requesting restoration. See, e.g., Gerdes v.
    4
    Department of the Treasury, 
    89 M.S.P.R. 500
    , ¶ 13 (2001) (discussing that, aside
    from making a request for restoration within 1 year after eligibility for
    compensation begins, 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.301
    (c) contains no additional requirements
    for placing an agency on notice that restoration is sought).
    ¶5        Accordingly, we find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged facts
    that, if proven, would establish that she was a physically disqualified individual
    and that the agency violated the restoration rights to which she was entitled. She
    therefore is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing at which she must prove
    jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. 3 See Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection
    Board, 
    659 F.3d 1097
    , 1101-02 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
    ORDER
    For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND the appellant’s restoration
    claim to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
    Remand Order.
    FOR THE BOARD:                             ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    3
    Effective March 30, 2015, the Board amended its regulations concerning the burden of
    proof for establishing jurisdiction over restoration appeals filed under 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.304
    . 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.57
    (a)(4) (2015). The amended regulations do not apply to
    the instant appeal, however, because they apply only to appeals filed on or after
    Marc 30, 2015. 
    80 Fed. Reg. 4489
    , 4489 (Jan. 28, 2015).
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 11/5/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021