David James Stern v. Department of Defense ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    DAVID JAMES STERN, 1                             DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         DC-0752-13-5520-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                           DATE: July 10, 2015
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 2
    David Pardo, Esquire, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellant.
    Dorothy Campbell and Samuel Frank Lazzaro, Jr., Ft. Meade, Maryland,
    for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    affirmed the agency’s furlough action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
    1
    Pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.36
    (a)(1), this appeal was part of a consolidation. Defense
    Information Systems Agency v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-
    0622-I-1.
    2
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
    the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
    or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings
    during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent
    with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting
    error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal
    argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
    available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
    section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ). After fully considering the filings in this
    appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the
    petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
    petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM
    the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision.              
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2         On May 29, 2013, the agency issued a Notice of Proposed Furlough
    informing the appellant, an Electronics Engineer, that he would be furloughed for
    no more than 11 workdays due to “the extraordinary and serious budgetary
    challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) for the remainder of Fiscal
    Year (FY) 2013, the most serious of which is the sequester that began on
    March 1, 2013.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10-11. The proposal notice
    informed the appellant that he could respond orally and/or in writing to the
    agency’s deciding official or request to review the agency’s supporting material
    within 7 days of his receipt of the proposal letter.     
    Id. at 11
    .   The appellant
    emailed a response to the deciding official 1 day after the end of the 7-day reply
    period. IAF, Tab 8 at 20-24. By written notice dated June 24, 2013, the deciding
    official informed the appellant that he would be furloughed as outlined in the
    proposal notice. IAF, Tab 1 at 12-14. The decision letter did not address the
    3
    appellant’s written response to the proposal notice. 
    Id.
     The record includes a
    Standard Form 50 reflecting the appellant’s furlough, effective July 8, 2013, on
    discontinuous days between July 8, 2013, and September 30, 2013. 
    Id. at 7-9
    . In
    a memorandum dated August 14, 2013, the agency informed the appellant that it
    was reducing the length of the furlough to 6 days. IAF, Tab 25 at 9-10.
    ¶3        The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging the agency’s furlough action
    and he requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. He alleged, among other things, that the
    agency violated his due process rights and committed harmful procedural error.
    
    Id. at 5
    ; IAF, Tab 11 at 6-10, Tab 20 at 6-10. In a furlough procedures order, the
    administrative judge informed the appellant that his appeal had been consolidated
    with the appeal of a similarly situated employee. Defense Information Systems
    Agency v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0622-I-1,
    Consolidated Appeal File (CAF), Tab 1.
    ¶4        After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
    affirming the furlough action. CAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 13. She
    found that the agency’s furlough was a reasonable management solution to the
    shortage of funds caused by sequestration and that the agency implemented the
    furlough in a fair and even manner. ID at 2-8, 12-13. She further found that the
    appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses of a violation of due process or
    harmful procedural error. ID at 8-12.
    ¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the agency
    violated his due process rights because the agency’s deciding official did not
    consider his reply to the proposed furlough.     Petition for Review (PFR) File,
    Tab 1. The agency has filed a response in opposition. PFR File, Tab 3. The
    appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tab 4.
    4
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    The administrative judge properly found that the agency established that the
    appellant was furloughed for cause that promotes the efficiency of the service.
    ¶6        An agency satisfies the efficiency of the service standard in a furlough
    appeal by showing, in general, that the furlough was a reasonable management
    solution to the financial restrictions placed on it and that the agency applied its
    determination as to which employees to furlough in a fair and even manner.
    Chandler v. Department of the Treasury, 
    120 M.S.P.R. 163
    , ¶ 8 (2013).          The
    administrative judge found that the agency’s furlough was a reasonable
    management solution to the shortage of funds caused by sequestration and that the
    agency conducted the furlough in a fair and consistent manner. ID at 2-8, 12-13.
    Because the appellant does not contest these findings on review, and based on our
    review of the record, we decline to disturb them.      See Crosby v. U.S. Postal
    Service, 
    74 M.S.P.R. 98
    , 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
    administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
    drew appropriate references, and made reasoned conclusions).
    The administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to establish a
    due process violation.
    ¶7        In contesting the administrative judge’s determination that the agency did
    not violate the appellant’s right to due process, the appellant argues that the
    deciding official failed to consider his response to the proposal notice. PFR File,
    Tab 1 at 4-9, Tab 4 at 4-7.     The administrative judge found that the agency
    afforded the appellant due process because he received a predecisional
    opportunity to respond to the proposed furlough and remained entitled to a full
    post-furlough hearing before the Board. ID at 10-11. She further found that the
    7-day reply period allowed him a meaningful opportunity and a reasonable time
    to respond, and thus was constitutionally sufficient. ID at 11.
    ¶8        Here, 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7512
    (5) and 7513(a) create a legitimate claim of
    entitlement to retention in a pay status, and thus a property interest, that
    5
    conditions placement of an employee in a temporary status without duties and pay
    on such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.             Gajdos v.
    Department of the Army, 
    121 M.S.P.R. 361
    , ¶¶ 13-14 (2014). Having found that
    the appellant has a property interest at stake in this case, the question remains as
    to what process is due, and whether the procedure that the agency applied
    satisfied the mandates of due process. 
    Id., ¶ 14
    .
    ¶9         Due process is a flexible concept that calls for such procedural protections
    as the particular situation demands. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 
    520 U.S. 924
    ,
    930-32 (1997); Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security, 
    121 M.S.P.R. 262
    ,
    ¶¶ 16, 19 (2014); Gajdos, 
    121 M.S.P.R. 361
    , ¶ 18.        In this case, the agency
    provided the appellant with 7 days to respond orally and/or in writing to the
    deciding official before deciding on his furlough, and the record shows that this
    was a meaningful and adequate opportunity to respond. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. Thus,
    it is clear that the agency afforded the appellant pre-deprivation notice and a
    meaningful opportunity to respond, which is clearly sufficient.        See Gajdos,
    
    121 M.S.P.R. 361
    , ¶¶ 14, 18; see also Cleveland Board of Education v.
    Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    , 546 (1985); Ronso v. Department of the Navy,
    
    122 M.S.P.R. 391
    , ¶ 13 (2015).
    ¶10        The appellant argues that the administrative judge erroneously failed to
    apply the appropriate Board law as established in Hodges v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    118 M.S.P.R. 591
     (2012). PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9, Tab 4 at 6. In Hodges, the
    Board held that the deciding official’s complete failure to consider the appellant’s
    written response to the notice of proposed reduction in grade before issuing a
    decision constituted a violation of minimum due process of law.            Hodges,
    
    118 M.S.P.R. 591
    , ¶ 6. However, Hodges is distinguishable because the appellant
    there timely filed his response to the proposal notice, 
    id., ¶ 5
    , whereas the
    appellant in this case submitted his response after the end of the 7-day reply
    period, see IAF, Tab 1 at 10-11, Tab 8 at 20-24; ID at 10.
    6
    ¶11        The appellant further asserts that “the issue of whether [he] was given
    sufficient time to provide a reply is distinct from whether that reply was
    considered.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. In this case, however, the appellant has not
    disputed that his response to the proposed furlough was untimely submitted or
    otherwise shown that the 7-day reply period was constitutionally insufficient. We
    agree with the administrative judge that the agency provided due process through
    its proposal notice and a 7-day reply period. See ID at 9-11; see, e.g., Stephen v.
    Department of the Air Force, 
    47 M.S.P.R. 672
    , 685-86 (1991) (finding that a
    5-day period to respond to a notice of proposed separation afforded the appellant
    minimum due process).       Further, our reviewing court has stated that “[a]n
    opportunity to present [a reply] is quite different from a presentation in fact.”
    Darnell v. Department of Transportation, 
    807 F.2d 943
    , 945 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
    (emphasis added). Finally, the appellant alleges that the agency has not proven
    that it was prejudiced by his delay, and that he has shown good cause for the
    delay. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4-5. We find that these considerations are immaterial
    to whether the opportunity to reply was constitutionally sufficient.
    The administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to establish
    harmful procedural error.
    ¶12        Although we find no due process violation, we still must determine whether
    the agency committed a harmful procedural error. See Stone v. Federal Deposit
    Insurance Corporation, 
    179 F.3d 1368
    , 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that,
    in addition to the right to due process, “[p]ublic employees are . . . entitled to
    whatever other procedural protections are afforded them by statute, regulation, or
    agency procedure”); Pumphrey v. Department of Defense, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 186
    , ¶ 9
    (2015). The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish that
    the agency committed a procedural error or that any such error was likely to have
    caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
    reached in the absence or cure of the error. ID at 11-12. The appellant has not
    7
    contested the administrative judge’s finding on review, and we discern no reason
    to disturb it. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
    the court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States   Code,     at   our    website,   http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional       information     is   available     at    the   court’s         website,
    www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se
    Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of
    Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono for        information     regarding     pro      bono
    8
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.