Eric Williams v. Department of Defense ( 2022 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    ERIC WILLIAMS,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                  DC-3330-18-0427-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: August 26, 2022
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Eric Williams, North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.
    Katherine Largo Yourth, Esquire, Richmond, Virginia, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Member
    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment
    Opportunities Act (VEOA) of 1998. On petition for review, the appellant argues
    that he is entitled to corrective action because he proved that the agency violated
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    his veterans’ preference rights, under 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 3311
    (2) and 3319, 2 
    5 C.F.R. § 302.302
    (d), and another provision that appears to be from the Office of
    Personnel Management (OPM) Delegated Examining Operations Handbook
    (DEOH), 3 by rating him ineligible based only on his occupational assessme nt; by
    rating him ineligible, regardless, because his response to Question #1 of the
    assessment showed that he rated himself as minimally qualified ; by failing to
    place him in the highest category; and by selecting a nonveteran over him without
    following the passover procedures. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 5, 9-
    12. He also argues that the administrative judge was biased because he ruled for
    the agency, declined his request for a hearing, failed to issue a close of record
    order, and denied him an opportunity to respond to the agency’s evidence before
    issuing the initial decision. 
    Id. at 6-10
    .
    ¶2         Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
    circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fac t;
    the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
    or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
    judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
    were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
    and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
    evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    2
    The appellant argues that the agency violated the passover procedures identifi ed in
    
    5 U.S.C. § 3318
    , which apply to the traditional rating and ranking process. Here, the
    agency utilized category rating in making a selection for the position at issue. Initial
    Appeal File, Tab 5 at 49. Section 3319 sets forth the process for utilizing category
    rating, including the procedures for placing preference-eligible candidates in categories
    in accordance with their veterans’ preference and passing over preference -eligible
    candidates. 
    5 U.S.C. § 3319
    (a), (b), (c)(7). We therefore construe the appellant’s
    argument as raising a section 3319 claim.
    3
    See Office of Personnel Management, Delegated Examining Operations Handbook,
    chapter 5, section B at 105 (May 2007), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
    oversight/hiring-information/competitive-hiring/deo_handbook.pdf (last visited Aug.
    19, 2022).
    3
    diligence, was not available when the record closed.      Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).           After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
    address the appellant’s claims that the administrative judge committed rever sible
    procedural errors and to consider in more detail his arguments that were not
    addressed below, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
    ¶3        The administrative judge did not address whether the agency allowed the
    appellant to credit all of his experience when completing the assessment. Under
    
    5 U.S.C. § 3311
    , a preference eligible is entitled to have a broad range of prior
    experience considered, including relevant military experience and experience
    gained “in religious, civic, welfare, service, and organizational activities.”   No
    aspect of the application materials restricted the appellant from considering that
    type of experience in assessing whether he met the specialized experience
    requirement for the position and in selecting the most appropriate response to
    Question #2 of the assessment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 21, 47-48; see
    
    5 U.S.C. § 3311
    ; cf. Kirkendall v. Department of the Army, 
    573 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1324-25 (2009) (finding that the agency violated the veterans’ preference rights
    afforded to the preference-eligible applicant under 
    5 U.S.C. § 3311
     by failing to
    consider his relevant military experience in determining his eligibility). Rather,
    the announcement apprised applicants that such experience would be credited.
    IAF, Tab 5 at 47-48. To the extent that the appellant did not consider those
    experiences in selecting an answer to Question #2, that error is attributable to
    him, not the agency.
    ¶4        Further, the appellant’s claim that the DEOH required the agency to
    consider his application attachments in determining his eligibility is without
    merit. PFR File, Tab 2 at 11-12; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 4. The
    DEOH is not a statute or regulation and therefore cannot support a claim for
    4
    corrective action under VEOA. Cf. Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
    
    117 M.S.P.R. 491
    , ¶ 9 (2012) (finding that, to the extent the appellant alleged that
    the agency violated OPM’s VetGuide, he failed to nonfrivolously allege a
    violation of statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference). Because the
    appellant rated himself not minimally qualified in his assessment, he was not
    entitled to be considered for the next phases of the selection process, such as
    being placed in a category in accordance with his veterans’ preference. IAF, Tab
    6, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6; IAF, Tab 5 at 10-12, 18, 20-21, 47-48; see
    Harellson v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 534
    , 539 (2010) (observing that
    no authority requires that a preference eligible be considered at every stage of the
    selection process); Dale v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    102 M.S.P.R. 646
    ,
    ¶ 13 (2006) (explaining that VEOA does not provide that veterans will be
    considered for positions for which they are not qualified).
    ¶5        In addition, we agree with the administrative judge that a hearing was
    unnecessary, as the parties did not dispute the dispositive factual issues—that the
    appellant indicated in his online assessment that he lacked the specialized
    experience and/or education for the position at the advertised levels and that his
    application was automatically removed from consideration as a result. ID at 5;
    see Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 502
    , ¶ 10 (2010) (explaining
    that the Board may decide the merits without a hearing when there is no genuine
    dispute of material fact and one party must prevail as a matter of law ). However,
    as correctly argued by the appellant, the administrative judge erred by failing to
    advise him that she would not be holding his requested hearing, set a date on
    which the record would close, or allow the parties to submit further argument and
    evidence on the merits of the appeal before the close of the record. 4 See Jarrard,
    4
    The appellant cites to Schucker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
    401 F.3d 1347
     (Fed. Cir. 2005), as support for his contention that the administrative judge
    committed reversible error in denying him an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence .
    PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-10. In Schucker, the Federal Circuit found that the Board had a
    longstanding policy of finding that an administrative judge has committed error by
    5
    
    113 M.S.P.R. 502
    , ¶ 11. Because of that error, we have considered all of the
    appellant’s submissions from below and on review, including his May 7, 2018
    response that he submitted to the administrative judge after the initial decision’s
    issuance. PFR File, Tabs 2, 4; IAF, Tabs 1, 4, 8. Accordingly, the appellant has
    not shown how, under these circumstances, the administrative judge’s procedural
    errors prejudiced his substantive rights; therefore, those errors do not provide a
    basis for review. See Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 
    106 M.S.P.R. 210
    ,
    ¶ 13 (2007) (finding no reversible error because the appellant did not show that
    the cancellation of his requested hearing prejudiced his substantive rights under
    VEOA); see generally Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 
    6 M.S.P.R. 124
    , 127
    (1981) (finding that an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no legal
    consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive
    rights).
    ¶6         Finally, in making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative
    judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
    accompanies     administrative   adjudicators.       Oliver   v.   Department      of
    Transportation, 
    1 M.S.P.R. 382
    , 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct
    during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his
    comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
    make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 
    287 F.3d 1358
    , 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    ,
    555 (1994)).   The appellant’s claims, which do not relate to any extrajudicial
    conduct by the administrative judge, neither overcome that presumption, nor
    establish a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.
    closing the record without allowing the parties an opportunity to submit rebuttal
    evidence. 
    401 F.3d at 1355-57
    . Although Schucker did not involve a VEOA appeal,
    the Board’s approach in VEOA appeals is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding
    in that case.
    6
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter.      
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    .     You may obtain
    review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By statute, the nature of
    your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
    forum with which to file. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b). Although we offer the following
    summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
    provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your s ituation and
    the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
    regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
    this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
    claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
    within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
    chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    5
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    7
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
    discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.      
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. ____
     , 
    137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017)
    .                 If you have a
    representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
    you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
    after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
    8
    discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
    condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
    to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    9
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
    2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
    (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appea ls of
    competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
    review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    6
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdicti on expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Cour t of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
    
    132 Stat. 1510
    .
    10
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DC-3330-18-0427-I-1

Filed Date: 8/26/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2023