Harold Anthony Coghlan v. Department of the Army ( 2016 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    HAROLD ANTHONY COGHLAN,                         DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                          AT-0752-16-0163-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: September 16, 2016
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Mark Wonders, Ozark, Alabama, for the appellant.
    Elizabeth A. Bidwill, Esquire, Fort Rucker, Alabama, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    sustained his indefinite suspension. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
    only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the
    initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or
    the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
    2
    judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
    not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
    the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
    or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
    available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
    section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
    appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
    section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
    petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s
    final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
    ¶2         The appellant is an Airspace System Inspection Pilot for the agency’s Air
    Traffic Services Command, in Fort Rucker, Alabama. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
    Tab 1 at 1, Tab 5 at 34-38.      The position requires that he maintain a secret
    security clearance. IAF, Tab 5 at 35, 37. In January 2015, the agency initiated an
    investigation into allegations that the appellant falsely documented work time or
    claimed the same time for both his civilian and reservist positions. IAF, Tab 20
    at 5-6.     After collecting pertinent evidence, including a statement from the
    appellant, the investigating official issued an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 report,
    which concluded that he had engaged in several associated improprieties.         
    Id. at 7-14.
    ¶3         Based on the AR 15-6 report, the agency suspended the appellant’s access
    to classified information and placed him on administrative leave. IAF, Tab 5
    at 31-33.    The agency also referred the matter to the Department of Defense
    Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DODCAF), which informed the appellant
    that it intended to revoke his security clearance. 
    Id. at 18-25.
    ¶4         In October 2015, the agency proposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension
    “based on [his] local suspension of access to classified and sensitive
    information.” 
    Id. at 14-15.
    After the appellant responded, the deciding official
    3
    sustained the action, effective November 23, 2015. 
    Id. at 10-13.
    This appeal
    followed. IAF, Tab 1.
    ¶5          The administrative judge held the requested hearing and affirmed the
    indefinite suspension. IAF, Tab 28, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant has filed
    a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has
    filed a response, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 4-5.
    ¶6          An agency may indefinitely suspend an employee when his access to
    classified information has been suspended and he needs such access to perform
    his job. Rogers v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 5 (2015). The
    Board lacks authority to review the merits of the decision to suspend access. 
    Id. Rather, in
    an appeal of an adverse action based on the denial, revocation, or
    suspension of a security clearance, the Board generally will review only whether:
    (1) the employee’s position required a security clearance; (2) the clearance was
    denied, revoked, or suspended; and (3) the employee was provided with the
    procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7313. Rogers, 122 M.S.P.R. 671,
    ¶ 5.
    ¶7          On review, the appellant does not dispute that his position requires a
    security clearance or that his clearance was suspended.          He does, however,
    reassert that the agency improperly denied him access to pertinent evidence,
    “including the AR 15-6 legal review and all supporting documents.” 2 PFR File,
    Tab 1 at 4-8. We disagree.
    2
    Both below and on review, the appellant appears to conflate the process for
    adjudicating his clearance and the process for adjudicating his indefinite suspension.
    E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 5; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. For example, the appellant asserts that
    the agency failed to respond to a number of information requests that postdate his
    suspension of access to classified materials but predate the proposal to indefinitely
    suspend him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. He also asserts that it was improper for
    DODCAF adjudicators to receive the full AR 15-6 report, while his copy contained
    redactions. 
    Id. at 8.
    We have considered these allegations only to the extent that they
    relate to the appellant’s indefinite suspension appeal. See Rogers, 122 M.S.P.R. 671,
    ¶ 5.
    4
    ¶8         In the context of an indefinite suspension stemming from the suspension of
    an employee’s security clearance, an agency is not obliged as a matter of
    constitutional due process to notify the employee of the specific reasons for the
    suspension    of   his   clearance.     Buelna    v.   Department     of   Homeland
    Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 25 (2014).       For purposes of due process, it is
    sufficient for an agency to inform the employee that his position required a
    security clearance and that he can no longer hold his position once he lost his
    clearance. 
    Id. Here, the
    agency provided the appellant with this information. 3
    IAF, Tab 5 at 14-15.
    ¶9         Separate from constitutional due process, the Board will reverse an
    indefinite suspension based on the suspension of a security clearance if an
    appellant is able to prove a harmful procedural error. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262,
    ¶ 33; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1). To do so, an appellant must prove that the agency
    committed an error in the application of its procedures that is likely to have
    caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
    reached in the absence or cure of the error.            Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262,
    ¶ 33; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).
    ¶10        Pursuant to the statutory requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(e), an employee
    facing an adverse action must be notified of the specific reasons for a proposed
    adverse action. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 25. In the context of an indefinite
    suspension based on the suspension of a security clearance, section 7513 requires
    that the appellant be provided sufficient information to make an informed reply,
    including a statement of the reasons for the clearance suspension.         
    Id., ¶ 34.
          Further, a provision of the applicable collective bargaining agreement requires
    that an employee facing formal discipline “be given, upon request, copies of all
    3
    We recognize that the appellant invoked the phrase “due process” in his petition for
    review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. However, he did so in the context of alleging that he
    was denied the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. § 7513. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. It
    appears that he made no substantive due process argument. 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    will
    not address due process any further.
    5
    documentation pertaining to the offense in accordance with applicable law.” IAF,
    Tab 11 at 12.
    ¶11          In this case, the agency’s proposal to indefinitely suspend the appellant
    because of his clearance suspension did not include a statement of the reasons for
    that clearance suspension. IAF, Tab 5 at 14-15. When the appellant requested
    the documents supporting the proposed indefinite suspension, he reportedly
    received only two emails, neither of which discussed the reasons for the
    underlying clearance suspension.        IAF, Tab 5 at 32-33, Tab 25 at 12-13.
    Nevertheless, we agree with the administrative judge’s determination that he
    received adequate notice. ID at 6-11.
    ¶12          When the agency notified the appellant that it was suspending his access to
    classified and sensitive information, it cited the AR 15-6 investigation as the
    basis for doing so. IAF, Tab 5 at 31. Subsequently, when DODCAF informed the
    appellant that it intended to revoke his clearance, it included a “statement of
    reasons,” which detailed the allegations underlying the AR 15-6 investigation and
    report, as well as the associated security concerns. 4 
    Id. at 18,
    21-25. After that,
    in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the agency provided the
    appellant with a copy of the agency’s AR 15-6 report, with redactions for attorney
    work    product, attorney-client communications, and personal privacy.            
    Id. at 16-17.
    ¶13          The appellant received all of the aforementioned information in the months
    leading up to the agency’s proposal to indefinitely suspend him “based on [his]
    local suspension of access to classified and sensitive information.” 
    Id. at 14-15.
          Under these circumstances, it is evident that the appellant had sufficient
    information to make an informed reply to the proposed indefinite suspension,
    including the reasons for the clearance suspension. Therefore, the requirements
    4
    Prior to the agency’s proposal to indefinitely suspend the appellant, the appellant
    presented a substantive and detailed response to DODCAF concerning the allegations
    contained within the AR 15-6 report. IAF, Tab 7 at 15, 17-24.
    6
    of section 7513 were satisfied, and the agency did not commit harmful error by
    failing to provide additional documentation. See King v. Alston, 
    75 F.3d 657
    , 662
    (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that the agency provided an employee with sufficient
    information to make an informed reply when it notified him that his security
    clearance was being suspended because of “a potential medical condition” and
    then informed him that he was being indefinitely suspended from duty based on
    the suspension of his security clearance); Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 34 (finding
    that the notice suspending an appellant’s security clearance, coupled with the
    notice proposing his indefinite suspension, adequately informed him of the basis
    for the suspension of his security clearance, i.e., alleged fraudulent claims); cf.
    Cheney v. Department of Justice, 
    479 F.3d 1343
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding
    that an employee was not provided with the opportunity to make a meaningful
    response to the notice of proposed suspension when he had to guess at the reasons
    for his security clearance suspension). Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision
    sustaining the appellant’s indefinite suspension.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the
    court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
    after the date of this order.      See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court
    has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory
    deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed.
    7
    See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
    (Fed. Cir. 1991). If
    you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to court, you
    should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in title 5 of
    the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States     Code,    at   our     website,    http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional         information         is          available      at    the         court’s
    website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide
    for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the
    court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono            for     information   regarding   pro     bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit.    The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                                    ______________________________
    Jennifer Everling
    Acting Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.