Corey D. Stoglin v. Department of the Air Force , 2015 MSPB 43 ( 2015 )


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  •                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    
    2015 MSPB 43
    Docket No. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1
    Corey D. Stoglin,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Department of the Air Force,
    Agency.
    July 9, 2015
    Corey D. Stoglin, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se.
    Eugene R. Ingrao, Sr., Arlington, Virginia, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    OPINION AND ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
    which dismissed his claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and
    Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified at 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333
    )
    (USERRA) for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted.      For the reasons set forth below, we
    DENY the petition for review for failure to meet the Board’s criteria for review.
    See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    .     We VACATE our previous finding in Stoglin v.
    Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1, Remand
    Order (Sept. 23, 2014) (Remand Order), that we have jurisdiction over the
    appellant’s USERRA claim, and we VACATE the remand initial decision to the
    2
    extent that the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to state a claim
    upon which relief could be granted. We DISMISS the appellant’s USERRA claim
    for lack of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2         The appellant filed an appeal with the Board, under both USERRA and the
    Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), regarding his
    nonselection for the GS-12 position of Equal Employment Manager with the
    Hawaii Air National Guard (Vacancy Announcement No. FS-406716-SK11).
    MSPB Docket No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF I-1), Tab 1,
    Tab 5 at 4-5. The administrative judge dismissed the appellant’s USERRA claim
    for lack of jurisdiction, without holding the hearing he requested, finding that he
    failed to nonfrivolously allege that his name was not referred for further
    consideration on the best qualified list because of his military service. IAF I-1,
    Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID I-1) at 4-5. She also dismissed his VEOA claim.
    ID I-1 at 5-7.
    ¶3         The appellant filed a petition for review, which the Board granted only as
    to his USERRA claim.         The Board found that the appellant’s conclusory
    assertions that the selectee was a nonveteran, and that the agency failed to select
    him because of his status as a traditional reservist as a result of an improper merit
    system it employs to give preference to active reservists, were sufficient to
    establish Board jurisdiction over his USERRA claim.         Remand Order at 8-10.
    Accordingly, the Board remanded the USERRA claim to the regional office for a
    hearing. 1 Remand Order at 10.
    1
    The Board dismissed the appellant’s VEOA claim as untimely filed, vacating the
    initial decision insofar as it dismissed the claim on other grounds. Remand Order
    at 3-8. We do not disturb our prior finding regarding the appellant’s VEOA claim.
    3
    ¶4         On remand, the administrative judge again dismissed the USERRA claim
    for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. MSPB Docket No. SF-3330-13-1464-
    B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 17, Remand Initial Decision (RID).               Based on
    arguments raised in an agency motion to dismiss, RF, Tab 11, to which the
    appellant responded, 
    id.,
     Tab 15, the administrative judge found that the Hawaii
    Air National Guard is a state agency and that, as such, the appellant must bring
    his USERRA claim before a state court, RID at 4-6. However, in light of the
    Board’s previous finding of jurisdiction, she found, in the alternative, that the
    appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2         RID at 6-7.
    Specifically, she found that a Board order against the Hawaii Air National Guard
    would be unenforceable and that, therefore, the appellant would not be able to
    receive any effective relief even if jurisdiction existed and he prevailed. 
    Id.
    ¶5         The appellant timely petitioned for review of the remand initial decision,
    stating only that he was “requesting a review of the initial decision in this case.”
    MSPB Docket No. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1, Petition for Review File (PFR File),
    Tab 1 at 3. He requested an extension of time to “submit a more detailed petition
    for review.” 
    Id.
     The Clerk of the Board granted the appellant an extension until
    March 27, 2015, to supplement his petition for review. PFR File, Tab 2. The
    appellant failed to timely 3 supplement his petition for review.
    2
    Because the Board lacks jurisdiction over the USERRA claim, we vacate the portion
    of the remand initial decision finding that the appellant failed to state a claim upon
    which relief could be granted. See RID at 6-7; see also White v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    114 M.S.P.R. 574
    , ¶ 11 (2010) (finding that dismissal for failure to state a claim is
    improper if an appellant fails to establish jurisdiction over his appeal because this
    disposition goes to the merits of the appeal, which the Board cannot reach if it lacks
    jurisdiction).
    3
    The appellant filed his supplement on March 30, 2015, acknowledging that it was
    submitted “after the close of the record.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 4. Once the record closes
    on review, the Board will not accept any additional evidence or argument unless it is
    new and material. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.114
    (k). The appellant has made no such showing.
    He requests to submit a decision by a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    4
    ANALYSIS
    The appellant’s petition for review fails to meet the criteria for review.
    ¶6         A petition for review must state a party’s objections to the initial decision,
    including all of the party’s legal and factual arguments, and must be supported by
    specific    references    to    the    record    and     any    applicable     laws    or
    regulations. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.114
    (b). The appellant’s bare statement that he is
    “requesting a review of the initial decision” fails to satisfy these requirements
    and does not establish any basis for review under 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    .
    Therefore, his petition for review is DENIED.           See Rumsey v. Department of
    Justice, 
    120 M.S.P.R. 259
    , ¶ 11 (2013) (citing Weaver v. Department of the
    Navy, 
    2 M.S.P.R. 129
    , 133 (1980) (before the Board will undertake a complete
    review of the record, the petitioning party must explain why the challenged
    factual determination is incorrect, and identify the specific evidence in the record
    which demonstrates the error)).
    (EEOC) administrative judge, asserting that it was previously unavailable. PFR File,
    Tab 3 at 4. However, the decision was issued in January 2012, and, thus, is not new.
    Id. at 30; see, e.g., Confer v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    111 M.S.P.R. 419
    , ¶ 5
    (2009) (finding that a document submitted for the first time on review, which was dated
    before the close of record below, did not constitute new evidence). The decision is also
    immaterial because we are not required to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of what
    constitutes a civil service law, rule, or regulation, the interpretation of which falls
    squarely within the purview of the Board’s area of expertise.              See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (c)(2). Moreover, there is no evidence that the EEOC administrative judge’s
    recommended decision became the EEOC’s final decision.                   See 
    29 C.F.R. § 1614.110
    (a). The appellant also attaches a September 2014 Report of Assessment of
    the Alaska Air National Guard, completed by the National Guard Bureau, and a
    June 2014 Organizational Climate Survey completed by the Defense Equal Opportunity
    Management Institute. PFR File, Tab 3 at 31-253. He asserts that these documents
    relate to the duties and training requirements of the position for which he applied, but
    such information is irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction. Id. at 5. He also makes
    specific challenges to the remand initial decision, but provides no explanation as to why
    he failed to timely raise these arguments earlier and does not address the statutory and
    regulatory provisions at the heart of the jurisdictional issue in this appeal. Id. at 4-5.
    Based on the foregoing, we decline to consider the appellant’s supplement to his
    petition for review.
    5
    The Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s USERRA claim.
    ¶7         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
    given jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection
    Board, 
    759 F.2d 9
    , 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).      Moreover, the issue of the Board’s
    jurisdiction is always before the Board and may be raised at any time. Ney v.
    Department of Commerce, 
    115 M.S.P.R. 204
    , ¶ 7 (2010). Thus, notwithstanding
    our denial of the appellant’s petition for review, we have reconsidered our
    previous jurisdictional determination regarding the appellant’s USERRA claim.
    ¶8         As noted above, the appellant applied for employment with the Hawaii Air
    National Guard and the position for which he applied was advertised as a nondual
    status position. RF, Tab 13 at 4; IAF I-1, Tab 8 at 72-73, 79. The employment of
    such nondual status employees is authorized by 
    10 U.S.C. § 10217
    (a), and the
    incumbents are civilian employees.    
    10 U.S.C. § 10217
    (a).    Although they are
    employees of the Department of Defense, and thus considered federal employees
    for most purposes, National Guard civilian technicians are considered state
    employees    for   USERRA     purposes.      Title   38,   United   States   Code,
    section 4303(4)(B), which is part of the statutory section containing definitions
    applicable to USERRA, specifically states that, “[i]n the case of a National Guard
    technician employed under section 709 of title 32, the term ‘employer’ means the
    adjutant general of the State in which the technician is employed.” Likewise, the
    Department of Labor’s regulations implementing USERRA state that “[a]
    National Guard civilian technician is considered a State employee for USERRA
    purposes, although he or she is considered a Federal employee for most other
    purposes.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.306
    . The Department of Labor’s regulations go on
    to explain that, “[a]n action brought against a State Adjutant General, as an
    employer of a civilian National Guard technician, is considered an action against
    a State for purposes of determining which court has jurisdiction,” and that an
    action under USERRA against a state “may be brought in a State court of
    competent jurisdiction according to the laws of the State.”             20 C.F.R.
    6
    § 1002.305(b), (d). We therefore conclude that the appellant’s USERRA claim
    against the Hawaii Air National Guard is not properly before the Board and we
    dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
    ORDER
    ¶9            This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board regarding
    both the appellant’s USERRA claim and VEOA claim in this appeal. Title 5 of
    the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (c)).
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to
    the court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States     Code,    at   our     website,    http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.
    Additional         information         is      available        at   the     court’s
    website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide
    7
    for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the
    court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our
    website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:
    ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2015 MSPB 43

Filed Date: 7/9/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/9/2015