Kiera N. Johnson v. Social Security Administration ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    KIERA N. JOHNSON,                               DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        PH-315H-15-0123-I-1
    v.
    SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DATE: September 1, 2015
    ADMINISTRATION,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Kiera N. Johnson, Tampa, Florida, pro se.
    Ellen Rothschild, Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally,
    we grant petitions such as this one only when:          the initial decision contains
    erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
    the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
    the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
    abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
    new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
    petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5
    of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).
    After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following
    points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any
    basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we
    DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the
    Board’s final decision. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    ¶2        The agency appointed the appellant to the career-conditional position of
    Social Insurance Specialist, effective May 18, 2014. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
    Tab 5 at 45. The position was subject to a 1-year probationary period. 
    Id. at 45, 48, 50
    .   Within that year, on November 14, 2014, the agency terminated the
    appellant’s appointment, citing unacceptable conduct. 
    Id. at 32-35
    .
    ¶3        The appellant filed an appeal of her probationary termination. IAF, Tab 1.
    Her filing referenced 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8), (9), as well as the Uniformed
    Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified
    at 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333
    ) (USERRA). 
    Id. at 5
    . However, she did not provide
    specific allegations, such as an explanation as to how the agency may have
    violated those provisions of law.
    ¶4        Twice, the administrative judge issued orders directing the appellant to
    meet her jurisdictional burden of proof. IAF, Tab 2 at 1-5, Tab 6 at 1-6. The
    appellant failed to respond to either order.      Therefore, based on the limited
    information in her initial pleading and the agency’s file, the administrative judge
    3
    dismissed the appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction. 2 IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision
    (ID). The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
    File, Tab 1. 3 The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.
    ¶5           In her petition, the appellant submits arguments and documentation that
    were not included in the record below, asserting that “documents supporting [her]
    initial appeal were not properly uploaded.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 5-15, 20-44.
    We find that the administrative judge properly dismissed the appeal for lack of
    Board jurisdiction.
    ¶6           The Board has jurisdiction over an individual right of action (IRA) appeal if
    the appellant exhausts her administrative remedies before the Office of Special
    Counsel (OSC) and makes nonfrivolous allegation that: (1) she made a disclosure
    described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described
    under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or
    protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail
    to take a personnel action as defined by 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a). 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 1214
    (a)(3), 1221(e)(1); Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    242 F.3d 1367
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).               Although the appellant cited 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8), (9) below, she presented no arguments or evidence as to the same in
    order to meet the aforementioned jurisdictional burden. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
    ¶7           For the first time on review, the appellant has presented evidence
    suggesting that she reported misconduct of coworkers to management, as well as
    allegations that this reporting may have contributed to her termination. PFR File,
    Tab 1 at 5-15, 20-44. However, even if we considered the new evidence and
    2
    The appellant did not request a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
    3
    The appellant labeled her pleading as a request to reopen an appeal dismissed without
    prejudice. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. However, the initial decision did not dismiss the
    appeal without prejudice. ID at 1, 4. Therefore, the appellant’s pleading has been
    construed as a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1.
    4
    arguments of purported reprisal for protected activity, 4 the appellant failed to
    prove, or even allege, that she exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC.
    Accordingly, to the extent that the appellant intended to bring an IRA appeal, she
    failed to meet her jurisdictional burden.
    ¶8         Next, the Board has jurisdiction over a USERRA claim if an appellant
    alleges that:    (1) she served in the military; (2) she was denied initial
    employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or a benefit of
    employment; and (3) the denial was due to her service in the military. Beck v.
    Department of the Navy, 
    120 M.S.P.R. 504
    , ¶ 8 (2014). Although the appellant
    cited USERRA below, she again failed to present any arguments or evidence as to
    the same. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. She has indicated that she has prior military service
    and she disputed the agency’s decision to terminate her employment, generally.
    See IAF, Tab 1; PFR File, Tab 1. However, she presented no support for her
    allegation, below or on review, that the agency’s decision to terminate her
    employment was due to her military service. Therefore, to the extent that the
    appellant intended to bring a USERRA claim, she again failed to meet her
    jurisdictional burden.
    ¶9         Finally, we note that the agency submitted evidence that the appellant was a
    probationary employee with less than 1 year of competitive service at the time of
    her termination, IAF, Tab 5 at 45, and the appellant failed to present any
    argument or evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the record demonstrates that she
    was not an “employee” with statutory Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C.
    4
    Under 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    , the Board generally will not consider evidence or
    argument submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that
    it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence.
    Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    3 M.S.P.R. 211
    , 214 (1980); see Banks v. Department
    of the Air Force, 
    4 M.S.P.R. 268
    , 271 (1980). However, the issue of the Board’s
    jurisdiction is always before it, and may be raised by either party or sua sponte by the
    Board any time during a Board proceeding. Zajac v. Department of Agriculture,
    
    112 M.S.P.R. 160
    , ¶ 8 (2009).
    5
    chapter 75. See 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7511
    (a)(1), 7513(d); Walker v. Department of the
    Army, 
    119 M.S.P.R. 391
    , ¶ 5 (2013). In addition, the appellant has presented no
    argument or evidence that her termination was in any way related to marital status
    discrimination, partisan political reasons, or preappointment reasons. Therefore,
    she does not have regulatory Board appeal rights under 
    5 C.F.R. § 315.805
    . See
    Walker, 
    119 M.S.P.R. 391
    , ¶ 5.      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has
    presented no other basis for establishing jurisdiction over her probationary
    termination. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the initial decision dismissing the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your
    claims of prohibited personnel practices under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8),
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge
    the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you
    may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The
    court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the
    date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If
    you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request
    review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
    6
    Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not
    both.    Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be
    precluded from seeking review in any other court.
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States     Code,    at   our   website,    http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm.
    Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants," which is
    contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective         websites,     which          can     be      accessed         through
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your appeal to
    the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono          for    information   regarding   pro     bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit.     The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    7
    FOR THE BOARD:     ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 9/1/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/1/2015