Christopher R. Chin-Young v. Department of Transportation ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    CHRISTOPHER R. CHIN-YOUNG,                      DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         AT-0752-11-0699-I-2
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: September 1, 2015
    TRANSPORTATION,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Christopher R. Chin-Young, Alpharetta, Georgia, pro se.
    William P. Vines, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal of a reassignment. For the reasons
    discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, MODIFY the
    initial decision, and DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on different
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    grounds.    Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to correct the
    administrative judge’s analysis concerning exhaustion, we AFFIRM the initial
    decision.
    ¶2        On June 7, 2011, the appellant filed an appeal of an April 2009
    reassignment from one position to another position at the same grade and pay.
    Chin Young v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-11-
    0699-I-1, Initial Appeal File (I-1 IAF), Tab 1.         The administrative judge
    dismissed the appeal without prejudice on September 29, 2011, pending
    resolution of the appellant’s equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
    concerning the same matter. I-1 IAF, Tab 6.
    ¶3        When the EEO process finally concluded, the appellant timely refiled his
    appeal on January 14, 2014. Chin Young v. Department of Transportation, MSPB
    Docket No. AT-0752-11-0699-I-2, Initial Appeal File (I-2 IAF), Tab 1.            He
    asserted for the first time that his reassignment constituted reprisal for
    whistleblowing. I-2 IAF, Tab 3 at 1. The administrative judge issued an order
    apprising the appellant of the jurisdictional requirements in an individual right of
    action (IRA) appeal and ordering him to submit evidence and argument on the
    jurisdictional issue. I-2 IAF, Tab 4. After affording the parties the opportunity to
    respond, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of IRA
    jurisdiction without a hearing on the basis that the appellant did not prove that he
    exhausted his administrative remedies before the Office of Special Counsel
    (OSC). I-2 IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. He also found that the Board
    otherwise lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s reassignment. 
    Id.
    ¶4        The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
    exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
    allegations that: (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected
    disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
    decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.      Yunus v. Department of
    Veterans Affairs, 
    242 F.3d 1367
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To satisfy the exhaustion
    3
    requirement of 
    5 U.S.C. § 1214
    (a)(3), an appellant must inform OSC of the
    precise ground of his charge of whistleblowing, giving OSC a sufficient basis to
    pursue an investigation which might lead to corrective action.      Ward v. Merit
    Systems Protection Board, 
    981 F.2d 521
    , 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
    ¶5        The administrative judge correctly found that an appellant’s interactions
    with OSC’s Disclosure Unit do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.           See
    Clemente v. Department of Homeland Security, 
    101 M.S.P.R. 519
    , ¶ 13 (2006);
    ID at 3.      He was mistaken, however, in finding that the appellant’s
    communications in this case were with the Disclosure Unit.        ID at 3.   In his
    response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order, the appellant
    submitted a copy of his initial complaint to OSC. I-2 IAF, Tab 5 at 7-12. He also
    submitted a copy of a letter from an attorney in the Complaints Examining Unit
    setting forth OSC’s preliminary conclusions, 
    id. at 4-5
    , and a brief closure letter,
    
    id. at 6
    . Because the administrative judge’s findings of fact are contradicted by
    record evidence, we modify the initial decision.
    ¶6        However, we find that the record is sufficiently developed to permit us to
    resolve the initial jurisdictional issue without a remand. In his OSC complaint,
    the appellant alleged that he was displaced from his position and reassigned to
    make room for an unqualified individual who was a personal friend of the
    relevant manager. 
    Id. at 10
    . He did not claim that he made a protected disclosure
    or that that the agency took reprisal against him for protected whistleblowing.
    Similarly, in its correspondence, OSC characterizes the appellant’s allegations as
    potential violations of 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(4)-(b)(6). 
    Id. at 4-5
    . While OSC’s
    opinions and conclusions are not binding on the Board, 2 considering the content
    of the appellant’s OSC complaint, we agree with OSC’s conclusion that the
    appellant alleged that the agency committed prohibited personnel practices but
    did not allege reprisal for whistleblowing. Therefore, the appellant has not shown
    2
    Because an IRA appeal is a de novo action, OSC’s statements and findings cannot be
    dispositive. Smith v. Department of Agriculture, 
    64 M.S.P.R. 46
    , 55 (1994).
    4
    that he exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and the Board lacks
    IRA jurisdiction over this appeal.      See Finston v. Health Care Financing
    Administration, 
    83 M.S.P.R. 100
    , ¶¶ 9-10 (1999).
    ¶7        Similarly, because, as the administrative judge correctly found, the Board
    lacks jurisdiction over reassignments that do not involve a reduction in pay or
    grade, the appellant has not otherwise established jurisdiction over his
    reassignment.   See Lopez v. Department of the Navy, 
    108 M.S.P.R. 384
    , ¶ 18
    (2008).
    ¶8        Finally, the appellant has submitted a number of documents with his
    petition for review.   Most of these documents already are part of the record.
    Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-6, 11-29. Evidence that is already a
    part of the record is not new. Meier v. Department of the Interior, 
    3 M.S.P.R. 247
    , 256 (1980). Some of the documents that the appellant submits on review are
    not in the record below. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-10. However, with one exception,
    they all predate the close of the record below. Under 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    , the
    Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for
    review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed
    despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    3 M.S.P.R. 211
    , 214 (1980). The appellant has not made such a showing. In any event, none
    of the documents shed any light on the question of whether the appellant
    exhausted his administrative remedies.       Because they are neither new nor
    material, we have not relied upon them.        See Ellis v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    121 M.S.P.R. 570
    , ¶¶ 6-7 (2014).
    ¶9        Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    . You have the right to
    5
    request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Federal Circuit.
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has
    held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline
    and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See
    Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your
    claims    of   prohibited   personnel    practices   under   
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8),
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge
    the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you
    may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The
    court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the
    date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If
    you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request
    review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not
    both.    Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be
    precluded from seeking review in any other court.
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United
    States     Code,   at   our   website,     http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants," which is
    6
    contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective         websites,   which      can       be      accessed         through
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono for      information     regarding    pro     bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.