George Edward Page v. Department of Health and Human Services ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    GEORGE EDWARD PAGE,                             DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                          DC-1221-15-0408-W-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                        DATE: September 28, 2015
    HUMAN SERVICES,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    George Edward Page, Berlin, Maryland, pro se.
    Christina Patton Black, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed his challenge of the agency’s denial of a differential pay increase for
    lack of jurisdiction as an otherwise appealable action or as an individual right of
    action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when:
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial
    decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the
    erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
    judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
    were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
    and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
    evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).          After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and
    authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
    section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
    petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s
    final decision. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b).
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2        The appellant is a Maintenance Mechanic with the agency’s National
    Institute of Health. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. On February 5, 2015,
    he filed an IRA appeal, which challenged the agency’s denial of his request for an
    environmental differential pay increase due to his potential exposure to
    microorganisms. See 
    id. at 6
    ; IAF, Tab 2. The appellant also alleged that the
    agency’s actions were taken in reprisal for his protected whistleblowing activity
    and stated that he had filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
    on February 4, 2015. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
    ¶3        The administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant that, to
    establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, he had to demonstrate, among
    other things, that he had exhausted his whistleblowing claims before OSC and
    either that OSC had notified him that it was terminating its investigation of his
    allegations or 120 calendar days had passed since he first sought corrective
    3
    action. IAF, Tab 3 at 3. She ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument
    within 15 days to establish Board jurisdiction over his appeal.      
    Id.
       She also
    instructed the appellant to file a copy of the letter he filed with OSC delineating
    his whistleblowing allegations.   
    Id. at 2
    .   The agency also filed a motion to
    dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appellant did not establish that he exhausted
    his administrative remedies with OSC.         IAF, Tab 7.   The appellant did not
    respond to either the administrative judge’s order or the agency’s motion
    to dismiss.
    ¶4         Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
    dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.     IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 8, Initial
    Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction
    over an alleged denial of a differential pay increase as an otherwise appealable
    action. ID at 3. She also found that, to the extent the appellant was attempting to
    file an IRA appeal, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because
    120 days had not passed since he stated that he filed his complaint with OSC. 
    Id.
    ¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review. 2 Petition for Review (PFR)
    File, Tab 1.   The agency has filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s
    petition. 3 PFR File, Tab 3.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    ¶6         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
    given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.        Maddox v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    759 F.2d 9
    , 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).      The administrative judge
    properly found that the Board does not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s
    2
    On March 14, 2015, the appellant electronically filed an initial appeal with the
    Board’s Washington Regional Office, which the Board construed as a petition for
    review of the initial decision in this case. PFR File, Tabs 1-2.
    3
    The agency’s response was due on April 11, 2015. PFR File, Tab 2. Because
    April 11, 2015, fell on a Saturday, the agency’s response that was filed on Monday,
    April 13, 2015, is timely. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.23
    .
    4
    alleged denial of a differential pay increase as an otherwise appealable action. 4
    ID at 3 (citing 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.3
    ); see Fair v. Department of Transportation,
    
    4 M.S.P.R. 493
    , 495-96 (1981) (finding that the loss of premium pay such as a
    shift differential is not an appealable adverse action).
    ¶7         To the extent the appellant is attempting to file an IRA appeal, under
    
    5 U.S.C. § 1214
    (a)(3), an employee is required to exhaust his administrative
    remedies with OSC before seeking corrective action from the Board in such an
    appeal.   Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 135
    , ¶ 8
    (2011). An appellant filing an IRA appeal has not exhausted his OSC remedy
    unless he has filed a complaint with OSC and either OSC has notified him that it
    was terminating its investigation of his allegations or 120 calendar days have
    passed since he first sought corrective action. Simnitt v. Department of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 313
    , ¶ 8 (2010).         To establish Board jurisdiction, the
    appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC, not just present nonfrivolous
    allegations of exhaustion.    Mason, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 135
    , ¶ 9.        He may meet this
    burden by providing his OSC complaint, any amendments to the complaint,
    OSC’s correspondence discussing the claims, and his responses to OSC’s
    correspondence discussing the claims. See Baldwin v. Department of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 469
    , ¶ 8 (2010).
    ¶8         It is undisputed that, as of the date the initial decision was issued, 120 days
    had not elapsed since the appellant stated that he filed his OSC complaint, and he
    had not alleged that he had been notified that OSC had terminated its
    investigation into his allegations. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Thus, the administrative judge
    properly found that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s potential
    IRA appeal. ID at 3. The appellant has not addressed the issue of exhaustion
    4
    In the absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear
    the appellant’s claim that the agency’s actions breached the terms of a collective
    bargaining agreement.      IAF, Tab 1 at 6; see Smith v. Department of Defense,
    
    106 M.S.P.R. 228
    , ¶ 13 (2007).
    5
    either below or on review. Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant
    has failed to prove that he exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC and,
    thus, the Board lacks jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
    days after the date of this order.       See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.
    Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court
    has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory
    deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed.
    See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your
    claims     of   prohibited   personnel   practices   under   
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8),
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge
    the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you
    may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The
    court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the
    date of this order. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If
    you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request
    review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not
    both.    Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be
    precluded from seeking review in any other court.
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    ) (as rev. eff.
    6
    Dec. 27, 2012).       You may read this law as well as other sections of the
    United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.
    Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective         websites,    which     can       be      accessed         through
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono for      information     regarding    pro     bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 9/28/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2015