Larry D. Williams v. United States Postal Service ( 2016 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    LARRY D. WILLIAMS,                              DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        CH-3443-15-0630-I-1
    v.
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: June 17, 2016
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Larry D. Williams, Huntsville, Alabama, pro se.
    Jessica L. Lietaer, Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such
    as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material
    fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or
    regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
    2
    administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
    decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
    discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
    material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
    which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
    ¶2        While working for the U.S. Postal Service (Postal Service), the appellant
    initiated, in August 2002, a payroll deduction of $50 per month to buy back 2 his
    military service time to be credited toward his Federal retirement under the Civil
    Service Retirement System (CSRS). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. After he
    had made payments for 10 years, the agency informed him that the original total
    amount, $6,093.51, had been miscalculated and increased the total amount he had
    to pay by $2,905. 
    Id. The appellant
    filed an appeal, alleging that he should not
    have to pay the increase in the total. 
    Id. The administrative
    judge informed the
    appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his appeal and ordered
    him to file evidence and argument to prove that the action is within the Board’s
    jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 2 at 2. The appellant did not respond.
    ¶3        The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
    arguing that military buyback is administered by the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM). IAF, Tab 6. The agency contends that the Initial Estimated
    2
    The payment process that the appellant began in 2001 is commonly called military
    buyback. Military buyback refers to the process by which former active duty military
    members who have post-1956 years of military service not credited toward military
    retirement can buy that time so that it counts toward Federal retirement under the
    Federal Employees’ Retirement System or the Civil Service Retirement System. Initial
    Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6.
    3
    Earnings during military service appears to have come from the Defense Finance
    and Accounting Service through OPM and that, to the extent that the purported
    increase in the appellant’s total payments required to buy back his military time is
    an action that falls within any agency’s jurisdiction, the appropriate agency is
    OPM, not the Postal Service. 
    Id. at 6.
    ¶4         The administrative judge agreed that the appropriate agency to address the
    appellant’s concerns is OPM. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID). She found that
    the appellant failed to show that he asked OPM to decide the correctness of the
    increase in the total amount due for him to buy back his post-1956 military
    service. ID at 2. She found that the Board generally lacks jurisdiction over an
    appeal of a retirement matter when OPM has not issued a final decision on the
    matter.   
    Id. She also
    found that the appellant did not allege that the Postal
    Service subjected him to an appealable adverse action. ID at 3. Accordingly, she
    dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 3 
    Id. ¶5 In
    his petition for review, the appellant submits, for the first time, a copy of
    an email that he sent to U.S. Senator Grassley’s office. Petition for Review File,
    Tab 1. In that email, the appellant states that he disagrees with the Postal Service
    about the $2,905 that he allegedly owes and that the Postal Service calculated the
    amount that he owed in 2002 as $6,093. 
    Id. ¶6 Under
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence submitted
    for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was
    unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence.
    Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). The appellant has
    3
    The appellant became aware of the increase in his buyback total payment on
    March 20, 2015, and filed his appeal on August 19, 2015, more than 30 days later. See
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.22 (an appeal must be filed with the Board no later than 30 days after
    the effective date of the action being appealed). Thus, the appeal appeared to be
    untimely filed. The administrative judge issued an order on timeliness. IAF, Tab 3.
    The appellant did not respond. However, the administrative judge did not reach the
    timeliness issue because she dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    4
    made no such showing. Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the evidence
    is material.    Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980)
    (finding that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence
    absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different
    from that of the initial decision). As with the documentary evidence that he
    submitted below, the appellant has not drawn any particular connection between
    the evidence that he furnished on review and any basis for the Board to find that
    it has jurisdiction over allegations of Postal Service error in calculating a buyback
    amount. See Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 
    759 F.2d 9
    , 10 (Fed.
    Cir. 1985) (determining that the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters
    over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation).          The
    appellant has failed to show that the Postal Service has taken an action that is
    within the Board’s jurisdiction, and he has failed to meet his burden of proving by
    preponderant evidence that his appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R.
    § 1201.56(a)(2)(i).
    ¶7         The record is unclear whether the Postal Service calculated the appellant’s
    buyback amount. The record establishes that the appellant elected, before his
    retirement, to pay a deposit for his post-1956 military service by submitting to his
    employing agency a completed Standard Form (SF) 2803, Application to Make
    Deposit or Redeposit. However, which entity calculated the amount due from the
    appellant is not established in the record. IAF, Tab 1 at 8. The Postal Service
    asserts that OPM administers issues pertaining to applications to make a deposit
    or redeposit.   IAF, Tab 6 at 5.    The document in question, though, does not
    calculate the appellant’s buyback amount. The record does show, however, that
    the Postal Service informed the appellant of the amount that he had to pay to buy
    back his military service. IAF, Tab 1 at 11.
    ¶8         The Board’s case law offers some support to the agency’s assertion that
    OPM administers matters concerning applications to make a deposit or redeposit.
    See Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 9 M.S.P.R. 122 (1981) (OPM
    5
    denying on reconsideration an appellant’s SF 2803, Application to Make Deposit
    or Redeposit to the Civil Service             Retirement    System).      Under these
    circumstances, we find that the administrative judge’s suggestion in the initial
    decision that the appellant first must seek a decision from OPM regarding the
    calculation of the proper amount that he owes to buy back his military time was
    warranted. As the appellant has not received a final decision from OPM, the
    administrative judge did not err in finding that the Board does not have
    jurisdiction   on    that   basis.   See,   e.g.,   Morin   v.   Office   of   Personnel
    Management, 107 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 8 (2007), aff’d, 287 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir.
    2008) (finding that, generally, the Board has jurisdiction over OPM’s
    determinations affecting an appellant’s rights or interests under the CSRS only
    after OPM has issued a reconsideration decision).
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the
    court at the following address:
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20439
    The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days
    after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
    2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held
    that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and
    that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.
    Office of Personnel Management, 
    931 F.2d 1544
    (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
    court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in
    6
    title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec.
    27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United States
    Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.            Additional
    information is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.            Of
    particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,”
    which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
    at   http://www.mspb.gov/probono       for     information   regarding   pro   bono
    representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
    Circuit.   The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
    provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
    in a given case.
    FOR THE BOARD:                               ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.