Mary A. Miller v. Department of the Interior ( 2015 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    MARY A. MILLER,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         SF-0752-11-0766-M-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                     DATE: December 31, 2015
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL ∗
    Edward H. Passman, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.
    Mike Gieryic, Anchorage, Alaska, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman
    Mark A. Robbins, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    ¶1         The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded this matter to
    the Board with instructions to instate the administrative judge’s initial decision as
    the final decision of the Board. Cobert v. Miller, 
    800 F.3d 1340
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir.
    2015). As instructed by the court, we hereby VACATE the Board’s December 6,
    ∗
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
    2
    2013 Opinion and Order, and we INSTATE the administrative judge’s January 6,
    2012 initial decision as the final decision of the Board in this matter.
    ¶2         The    agency       removed     the     appellant    for    failure   to   accept     a
    management-directed reassignment to a new position. Miller v. Department of
    the Interior, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-11-0766-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
    Tab 1 at 4, 7, Tab 3, Subtabs 4e, 4h, 4m. She filed an appeal with the Board
    seeking reversal of the removal on several grounds, including the affirmative
    defenses of discrimination based on race, sex, and physical disability, and
    retaliation for protected equal employment opportunity activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
    The administrative judge found that the agency proved by preponderant evidence
    that its decision to reassign the appellant was based upon legitimate management
    reasons and that it gave adequate notice to the appellant. IAF, Tab 16, Initial
    Decision (ID) at 12, 19-20. The administrative judge found that there was no
    dispute that the appellant declined the management-directed reassignment.
    ID at 20. The administrative judge further found that the appellant was qualified
    to perform the duties of the new position. ID at 20-21. The administrative judge
    found that the appellant failed to meet her burden of proof on each of her
    affirmative defenses and that the penalty was reasonable and promoted the
    efficiency of the service. ID at 22-30.
    ¶3         The appellant filed a petition for review with the Board, and the Board
    vacated the initial decision, reversed the appellant’s removal, and ordered the
    agency to reinstate her to her former position.             Miller v. Department of the
    Interior, 
    2013 MSPB 27
    , ¶¶ 1, 4, 10-11. The Board subsequently reopened the
    case, vacated its earlier decision, and issued a new Opinion and Order that still
    vacated the initial decision and reversed the removal action.                    Miller v.
    Department of the Interior, 119 M.S.P.R. 438, ¶¶ 1-2 (2013). In pertinent part,
    the Board found that the burden-shifting analytical framework applied by the
    administrative    judge      based   on     earlier   precedent   was   cumbersome        and
    unnecessary.     
    Id., ¶ 8.
       The Director of the Office of Personnel Management
    3
    petitioned the Board for reconsideration. Miller v. Department of the Interior,
    120 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 1 (2013).      The Board denied the Director’s petition and
    affirmed its prior decision as modified, further clarifying that, although it was
    abandoning the burden-shifting approach, it was in no way departing from any of
    the jurisprudential principles otherwise governing its review of an adverse action
    based on a refusal to accept a geographic reassignment. 
    Id., ¶¶ 1,
    12.
    ¶4         Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d), the Director petitioned for review with the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which granted the petition and
    reversed the Board’s decision.     
    Cobert, 800 F.3d at 1342
    , 1351.        The court
    concluded that the administrative judge properly utilized the analytical
    framework for deciding an appeal of a removal action based upon refusal to
    accept a reassignment, a framework that had been set forth in Ketterer v.
    Department of Agriculture, 2 M.S.P.R. 294, 298-99 (1980), and adopted by the
    court in Frey v. Department of Labor, 
    359 F.3d 1355
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004), as
    the law of the circuit. 
    Cobert, 800 F.3d at 1344
    , 1349, 1351. The court further
    found no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s credibility determinations and
    findings of fact underlying her conclusions that the agency had made out a prima
    facie case that the decision to reassign the appellant was supported by legitimate
    management reasons and that the appellant had failed to rebut that prima facie
    case. 
    Id. at 1351.
    The court, therefore, reversed the Board’s decision. 
    Id. The court
    remanded the case to the Board with instructions to instate the
    administrative judge’s initial decision as the final decision of the Board. 
    Id. ¶5 Accordingly,
    as instructed by the court, we hereby vacate the Board’s
    December 6, 2013 Opinion and Order, and we instate the administrative judge’s
    January 6, 2012 initial decision as the final decision of the Board in this matter.
    See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.
    4
    NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
    YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
    You have the right to request further review of this final decision.
    Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review
    You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination
    claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Title 5 of
    the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)).          If you
    submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a
    signature upon delivery, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, NE
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after
    your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your
    representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no
    later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to
    file, be very careful to file on time.
    Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action
    If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your
    discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your
    discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate U.S. district court.
    See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with the district court
    no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If you have a
    representative in this case, and your representative receives this order before you
    5
    do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after
    receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to file on
    time.   If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color,
    religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to
    representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of
    prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f);
    29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    FOR THE BOARD:                           ______________________________
    William D. Spencer
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Filed Date: 12/31/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021