James Cuyler v. Office of Personnel Management ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
JAMES M. CUYLER, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, AT-844E-19-0403-I-1
v.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: July 2, 2024
MANAGEMENT,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
James M. Cuyler , Riverview, Florida, pro se.
Shawna Wheatley , Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Member*
*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the reconsideration decision by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) denying the appellant’s application for a Federal Employees’ Retirement
System (FERS) disability retirement annuity. Generally, we grant petitions such
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains
erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed.
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
The appellant is a Health Technician (Optometry) with the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 81. In early 2018, he
applied for a disability retirement annuity under FERS, asserting bilateral chronic
foot pain, ankle pain, severe/major depression, migraines, memory loss, and
traumatic brain injury. Id. at 32. He further asserted that he became disabled in
December 2012. Id.OPM denied his application for disability retirement in January 2019.
Id. at 28. According to OPM, the appellant’s medical documentation contained
insufficient evidence to determine the appellant’s specific work restrictions or
that he was unable to work. Id. at 29. The appellant requested reconsideration of
OPM’s initial decision. Id. at 17-20. He asserted that he was not attaching
additional information and argued that the medical documentation previously
provided was sufficient to establish his disability. Id. OPM subsequently
3
requested additional documents and information from the appellant, such as
documentation of medical treatment in closer proximity to his disability
application, reflecting work restrictions, or referencing any accommodation
requests the appellant had made to the agency. Id. at 23-25. The appellant
responded, again asserting that he would not be sending additional evidence, and
accused OPM of violating criminal laws in requesting more documentation from
him. Id. at 21-22. He finally asserted that he reserved the right to seek criminal
charges against the OPM director and suggested there was a conspiracy to deny a
valid application for disability retirement. Id. at 22.
On March 20, 2019, OPM issued a final decision affirming its initial
decision denying the appellant’s application for a FERS disability retirement
annuity. Id. at 6-14. The appellant appealed this decision to the Board.
IAF, Tab 1. The agency did not timely file its response to the appellant’s appeal.
IAF, Tab 2 at 6, Tab 3. Two days after it was due, the agency requested an
extension. IAF, Tab 3. The administrative judge extended the deadline by
30 days. IAF, Tab 4. The agency eventually submitted the file, 6 days beyond
the granted 30-day extension. IAF, Tab 6. The appellant filed a motion for
sanctions against the agency, based on failure to timely submit its response even
after the extension. IAF, Tab 8 at 1-2. The administrative judge interpreted it as
a motion to strike the agency’s response from the record as untimely and denied
the motion, finding that the evidence did not reflect that the appellant was
prejudiced by the agency’s 6-day delay. IAF, Tab 11 at 1. The appellant
additionally submitted a request for the administrative judge to disqualify himself
based on bias and prejudice for allowing the agency not to follow orders,
untimely submit documents, and miss the originally scheduled and then the
rescheduled pre-hearing phone conference, and because the administrative judge
denied the appellant’s motion for sanctions. IAF, Tab 12 at 1.
Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
affirming OPM’s reconsideration decision, which denied the appellant’s
4
application for FERS disability retirement. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID)
at 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant’s medical evidence only
demonstrated the bilateral chronic foot pain, depression, and memory loss, but
that it included no evidence of ankle pain, migraines, or traumatic brain injury.
ID at 6. The administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to prove
that his documented conditions were disabling. ID at 7-10. The administrative
judge denied the appellant’s request that he recuse himself, finding that the
appellant’s claims of bias were based on mere disagreement with the
administrative judge’s rulings. ID at 1-2 n.1.
The appellant filed a petition for review and attached various documents
which are in the record below. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1; IAF, Tab 1
at 8-14, 20-35. OPM has not responded to the petition for review.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant failed to meet his
burden of proving entitlement to disability retirement.
An individual bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence his
entitlement to disability retirement. 2 Henderson v. Office of Personnel
Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 8 (2008); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To
qualify for disability retirement benefits under FERS, an individual must meet the
following requirements: (1) the individual must have completed at least
18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) the individual, while employed in a
position subject to FERS, must have become disabled because of a medical
condition resulting in a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or if
there is no such deficiency, the disabling medical condition must be incompatible
with either useful and efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the
disabling medical condition must be expected to continue for at least 1 year from
the date the disability retirement benefits application is filed; (4) accommodation
2
Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
5
of the disabling medical condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and
(5) the individual must not have declined a reasonable offer of reassignment to a
vacant position. Henderson, 109 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 8; 5 C.F.R. § 844.103(a); see
5 U.S.C. § 8451(a) (providing the statutory language on which 5 C.F.R.
§ 844.103(a) is based). The main dispute before us is whether the appellant met
his burden of proving the second element. 3
On review, the appellant essentially argues that because OPM admitted that
he has medical conditions, he has satisfied his burden of proving eligibility for
disability retirement. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. The administrative judge found that
the appellant had medical conditions. ID at 10. However, this satisfies only a
portion of the second element. The administrative judge further found that the
appellant failed to show a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, and
that the medical documentation did not demonstrate that his medical conditions
were incompatible with either useful and efficient service or retention in the
position. ID at 7-10. There are two ways to meet the statutory requirement that
the individual “be unable, because of disease or injury, to render useful and
efficient service in the employee’s position”; namely, by showing that the
medical condition (1) caused a deficiency in performance, attendance, or conduct
or (2) is incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in the
position. 5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Office of Personnel Management,
118 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 7 (2012). Under the first method, an individual can establish
entitlement by showing that the medical condition affects his ability to perform
specific work requirements, prevents him from being regular in attendance, or
3
The appellant additionally appears to raise a challenge based on the fourth and fifth
elements, citing to an agency certification of reassignment and accommodations efforts,
which states that “accommodation is not possible due to the severity of the medical
condition.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 6 at 37-38. The certification also states that
reassignment to a vacant position is not possible. IAF, Tab 6 at 38. The administrative
judge made no finding as to whether accommodation was possible, but concluded that
the appellant had not declined an offer of reassignment. ID at 7. We decline to revisit
those findings here because, as set forth below, we find that the appellant has failed to
meet his burden regarding the second element.
6
causes him to act inappropriately. Jackson, 118 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 8. Under the
second method, an individual can establish entitlement by showing that the
medical condition is inconsistent with working in general, working in a particular
line of work, or working in a particular type of setting. Id.The administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant failed to
prove his conditions caused deficiencies in performance, attendance, or conduct.
ID at 7. Here, the supervisor’s statement in connection with the appellant’s
application for FERS disability retirement noted that his performance, attendance,
and conduct were all satisfactory and acceptable. IAF, Tab 6 at 34-35.
Moreover, the agency rated the appellant’s performance for the performance
period covering October 2016 to September 2017 as fully successful in every
element. Id. at 48-52.
On review, the appellant reasserts his argument from below that his major
depressive disorder “is considered a safety issue for myself and others because I
am (an Eye Technician).” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; IAF, Tab 9 at 3 (emphasis
removed). The administrative judge did not specifically address the purported
safety issue. We conclude that the appellant failed to prove that his medical
condition caused a safety concern. He provided no specific information about
how safety might be impacted. The record reflects that the appellant’s job has
“moderate risk of discomforts which require special safety precautions.”
IAF, Tab 6 at 47. The appellant’s performance appraisal reflects an ability to
observe these safety precautions. Specifically, the agency stated on his
performance evaluation that he followed safety precautions and was “able to
identify and notify the appropriate personnel of any hazards that he sees.” Id.
at 51. Thus, the evidence does not support the appellant’s claim of an unspecified
safety issue.
The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to prove that
his condition was inconsistent with working in general, in a particular line of
work, or in a particular setting. ID at 7-10. The medical evidence presented by
7
the appellant demonstrates that he was diagnosed with various medical conditions
in 2015 and 2016. IAF, Tab 6 at 40-42. It also states possible symptoms, such as
“periodic anxiety” and “lapses in memory,” without providing any specifics as to
what might trigger these symptoms or how they might affect the appellant either
generally or in a specific setting. Id. The appellant’s testimony at the hearing
provided no further details or clarification as to how his medical conditions
affected his ability to work in any capacity. IAF, Tab 13, Hearing Compact Disc
(testimony of the appellant).
On review, the appellant cites Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management,
996 F.2d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1993), apparently in support of his position. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 7. In Bruner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
when an employing agency separates an individual for medical inability to
perform his position, it creates a presumption that the individual is disabled for
purposes of entitlement to a retirement annuity. Bruner, 996 F.2d at 294. The
holding in Bruner is inapplicable here, because the appellant continues to work
and his employing agency considers him able to do so. As such, we agree with
the administrative judge that the appellant has failed to meet his burden of
proving, by preponderant evidence, that he is unable, because of disease or injury,
to render useful and efficient service in his position.
In analyzing the appellant’s medical evidence, the administrative judge
found that the record revealed no evidence concerning the appellant’s assertion of
ankle pain. ID at 6. This was erroneous, as the appellant provided a July 27,
2016 letter from a healthcare provider stating that, in addition to the appellant’s
bilateral foot pain, he suffered from left ankle pain. IAF, Tab 6 at 40. The
appellant does not raise this issue on review. We find that this error was
harmless, as it does not alter our assessment of the appellant’s failure to meet his
burden of proof. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 22 M.S.P.R. 281,
282 (1984) (finding an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
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The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion.
The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s procedural rulings,
including his denial of the appellant’s motion for sanctions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
We decline to disturb these rulings.
Administrative judges have broad discretion pursuant to 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.41(b), including the authority to rule on discovery motions, hold
prehearing conferences, convene hearings, and impose sanctions. See Guzman v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 12 (2010) (discussing the
discretion the Board has given to administrative judges). The imposition of
sanctions is a matter within the administrative judge’s sound discretion and,
absent a showing that such discretion has been abused, the administrative judge’s
determination will not be found to constitute reversible error . El v. Department
of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 16 (2015), aff’d per curiam, 663 F. App’x 921(Fed. Cir. 2016). The administrative judge here denied the appellant’s motion for
sanctions, finding that OPM’s 6-day delay in submitting the agency file did not
prejudice the appellant. IAF, Tab 11 at 1.
We discern no abuse of discretion in this ruling. The appellant has not
presented evidence that the delay prejudiced him. The documents contained in
the agency’s file are generally the same documents included in the appellant’s
prehearing submission. IAF, Tabs 6, 9. It is the appellant’s burden to prove
entitlement to disability retirement, and the administrative judge’s decision relied
on the appellant’s own medical documentation, which the administrative judge
found lacking. ID at 7-10. Accordingly, we find that the appellant has failed to
present evidence of prejudice. In addition, as the administrative judge observed,
the Board lacks authority to enter a “default judgment” as a sanction against
OPM, as such a ruling would, in effect, grant the appellant retirement benefits
when he is not legally entitled to them. ID at 1-2 n.1; Strickler v. Office of
Personnel Management, 51 M.S.P.R. 354, 358 (1991).
9
The appellant has failed to demonstrate bias or prejudice on the part of the
administrative judge.
The appellant asserts on review that the administrative judge was biased
and prejudiced against him in granting OPM’s request for an extension to file its
response, allowing it to untimely file required documents, denying his motion for
sanctions, allowing the agency to miss pre-hearing phone conferences and the
hearing, and “lying” about the appellant’s citation to two Federal regulations,
which the administrative judge stated did not apply to the matter at issue.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We disagree.
In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative judge, the
party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies
administrative adjudicators. Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
592, ¶ 19 (2016). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board
proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his comments or actions evidence
“a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” Id. (quoting Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Moreover, a party must show that
the bias constitutes extrajudicial conduct rather than conduct arising in the
administrative proceedings before him. Tyler v. U.S. Postal Service, 90 M.S.P.R.
545, ¶ 6 (2002). The fact that an administrative judge ruled against a party is
insufficient evidence to show bias. Id.Here, the appellant’s claim that the administrative judge is biased must fail
because it is based entirely on the administrative judge’s rulings regarding the
appellant’s allegations in his proceeding. See id., ¶ 7 (concluding there were
insufficient grounds to find bias when an administrative judge did not reject the
appellant’s material factual allegations, but rather, disposed of the claims on
purely legal grounds). The administrative judge’s exercise of his discretion to
accept the agency’s late submission and failure to appear for prehearing
10
conferences and the hearing does not demonstrate a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism against the appellant that makes fair judgment impossible. 4
Regarding the appellant’s assertion that the administrative judge “lied”
regarding the applicability of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940 and 416.1440, we agree with
the administrative judge, who found that the Federal regulations cited are
inapplicable to Board proceedings. ID at 1 n.1. The regulations cited by the
appellant involve disqualification of administrative law judges before the Social
Security Administration, and, thus, are inapplicable to the Board’s administrative
judges. The Board has similar procedures for requesting disqualification under
5 C.F.R. § 1201.42. However, as set forth above, the appellant has failed to
establish bias by the administrative judge; therefore, he did not present a basis for
disqualification. See Herman v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 642, ¶ 11
(2013) (finding that, because the appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity on the part of an
administrative judge, he also did not prove the administrative judge abused his
discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for recusal).
The appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of his due process.
The appellant asserts on review that the administrative judge violated his
due process rights when he “became an Advocate for the Agency” in the absence
of the agency’s representative at the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant
has a property interest in his disability retirement benefits. Tompkins v. Office of
Personnel Management, 72 M.S.P.R. 400, 407 (1996) (so finding in the case of an
employee covered by the Civil Service Retirement System). The due process
right includes the right to a hearing before the Board. See Cleveland Board of
4
As the hearing order noted, if the agency representative failed to appear, the hearing
would proceed as scheduled. IAF, Tab 7 at 1. The agency’s absence at the prehearing
conferences and the hearing presumably was beneficial to the appellant, as it allowed
him to testify without cross-examination and prevented the agency from making closing
arguments. See IAF, Tab 11 at 4 (informing the parties that the agency could
cross-examine the appellant and both parties could present closing arguments at the
hearing).
11
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-47 (1985) (recognizing that due
process includes the right of a tenured employee to an administrative hearing).
However, as we explained above, we find nothing improper in the administrative
judge’s conduct during the hearing. Thus, we are not persuaded that he
effectively deprived the appellant of his administrative hearing.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
13
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
14
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.