Danny Lee v. Social Security Administration ( 2024 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    DANNY LEE,                                      DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                  SF-3443-22-0586-I-1
    v.
    SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DATE: March 26, 2024
    ADMINISTRATION,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Danny Lee , Poway, California, pro se.
    Jamie L. Barnhill , Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
    FINAL ORDER
    The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed his appeal challenging his nonselection for lack of jurisdiction and
    dismissed his challenge to his 2018 resignation as involuntary on the grounds of
    adjudicatory efficiency.    On petition for review, the appellant argues that the
    administrative judge failed to address a number of his claims in the initial
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    decision; reargues that his 2018 resignation decision was involuntary and that
    agency officials engaged in wrongdoing in connection with his resignation; and
    that he has filed numerous complaints with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
    and the agency’s Office of the Inspector General but his complaints have been
    ignored. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
    circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
    the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
    or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
    judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
    were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
    and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
    evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).             After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
    find that the appellant’s involuntary resignation claim is barred by the doctrine of
    collateral estoppel instead of on the grounds of adjudicatory efficiency , we
    AFFIRM the initial decision.
    In the initial decision, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant
    had not alleged that the Board had jurisdiction over his appeal challenging his
    nonselection for a position as a claim under the Uniformed Services Employment
    and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335
    ) (USERRA) or the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of
    1998 (VEOA), but he did not provide a specific explanation for how the appellant
    could establish jurisdiction over his USERRA and VEOA claims in the orders on
    jurisdiction or in the initial decision.   Lee v. Social Security Administration,
    3
    MSPB Docket No. SF-3443-22-0586-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 2 at 2-5,
    Tab 7 at 2-3, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-7.
    To establish Board jurisdiction over a USERRA appeal under 
    38 U.S.C. § 4311
    (a), an appellant must allege that:         (1) he performed duty or has an
    obligation to perform duty in a unformed service of the United States; (2) the
    agency denied his initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or
    any benefit of employment; and (3) the denial was due to the performance of duty
    or obligation to perform duty in the unformed service. Williams v. Department of
    the Treasury, 
    110 M.S.P.R. 191
    , ¶ 8 (2008). To establish Board jurisdiction over
    an appeal brought under VEOA, an appellant must, among other things, show that
    he exhausted his administrative remedy with the Department of Labor (DOL) by
    filing a complaint with DOL containing a summary of the allegations that form
    the basis of the complaint.         Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
    
    117 M.S.P.R. 491
    , ¶ 8 (2012).       As the administrative judge observed, on his
    initial appeal form the appellant checked the box indicating that he is not entitled
    to veterans’ preference, did not check the box indicating that he filed a complaint
    with DOL, and he has not otherwise alleged that he is a preference-eligible or
    presented any argument that implicates Board jurisdiction over his nonselection
    under USERRA or VEOA. ID at 2-3; IAF, Tab 1 at 1. Accordingly, we agree
    that the appellant has not established a regulatory or statutory right to appeal his
    nonselection to the Board on these bases.
    Addressing    a   potential   suitability   claim,   the   administrative   judge
    acknowledged that the appellant checked the box on the appeal form alleging a
    negative suitability determination but nevertheless concluded that the appellant
    “did not seek to invoke the Board’s jurisdiction” over this claim because his
    pleadings did not include any further mention of it. ID at 6-7. However, there is
    no indication in the record that the appellant did not intend to pursue this claim,
    so we will address it now. Regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM) in 2008 state that a “suitability action,” as defined in those
    4
    regulations, may be appealed to the Board. 2 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.501
    (a). Suitability
    determinations examine whether “a person’s character or conduct . . . may have
    an impact on the integrity or efficiency of the service.” 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.101
    . If an
    individual is deemed unsuitable for service based on one or more of the factors
    enumerated in 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.202
    (b), the acting agency may take a suitability
    action, which is defined as a removal, debarment, cancellation of eligibility, or
    cancellation of reinstatement eligibility. 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.203
    . Nevertheless, as
    the   administrative judge      observed,    under 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.203
    (b), “[a]
    non-selection, or cancellation of eligibility for a specific position . . . is not a
    suitability action even if it is based on reasons set forth in § 731.202.” ID at 7
    n.2 (citing Sapla v. Department of the Navy, 
    118 M.S.P.R. 551
    , ¶ 12 (2012).
    There is no evidence in the record indicating that OPM or any agency official
    took a suitability action against the appellant in connection with his nonselection
    for the identified position. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant failed to
    establish Board jurisdiction over his appeal as a suitability action.
    Finally, in the initial decision the administrative judge considered the
    appellant’s allegations that his 2018 resignation was involuntary, but dismissed
    that claim for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds of adjudicatory efficiency,
    reasoning that the appellant had filed a prior Board appeal challenging his
    resignation as involuntary, that appeal resulted in an initial decision finding that
    the Board lacked jurisdiction over his claim, and a petition for review of the
    initial decision in that prior case was then pending before the Board. ID at 10-11;
    see Lee v. Social Security Administration , MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-18-0753-
    2
    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 
    Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1086
    (f)(9), 
    129 Stat. 726
    , 1010 (2015), amended 
    5 U.S.C. § 7512
     to state that
    chapter 75 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code “does not apply to . . . a suitability action taken
    by [OPM] under regulations prescribed by [OPM], subject to the rules prescribed by the
    President under [Title 5] for the administration of the competitive service.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7512
    (F). See Odoh v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    2022 MSPB 5
    , ¶ 16. Neither
    party addressed this issue below. Given our finding that the appellant’s nonselection
    was not a suitability action, we do not consider the effect, if any, of section 7512(F) on
    this appeal.
    5
    I-1, Initial Decision (Aug. 9, 2019) (0753 ID); Initial Appeal File (0753 IAF),
    Tab 27; Lee v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-18-
    0753-I-1, Petition for Review (0753 PFR) File, Tab 1.
    When an appellant files an appeal that is identical to claims raised in an
    earlier appeal after the initial decision in an earlier appeal was issued, but before
    the full Board has acted on the appellant’s petition for review, it is appropriate to
    dismiss the subsequent appeal on the grounds of adjudicatory efficiency. Zgonc
    v. Department of Defense, 
    103 M.S.P.R. 666
    , ¶ 6 (2006), aff’d, 
    230 F. App’x 967
    (Fed. Cir. 2007).     By contrast, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is
    appropriate when (1) the issue is identical to that involved in the prior action;
    (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination on the
    issue in the prior action was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party
    against whom issue preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
    the issue in the prior action, either as a party to the earlier action or as one whose
    interests were otherwise fully represented in that action.          Kavaliauskas v.
    Department of the Treasury, 
    120 M.S.P.R. 509
    , ¶ 5 (2014); McNeil v. Department
    of Defense, 
    100 M.S.P.R. 146
    , ¶ 15 (2005).             Collateral estoppel is only
    appropriate when there is a final judgment in the previous litigation.         Zgonc,
    
    103 M.S.P.R. 666
    , ¶ 6.
    At the time the administrative judge issued his initial decision, the
    appellant’s petition for review in his 0753 appeal was still pending before the
    Board. However, the Board now has issued its decision on the petition for review
    in that case, affirming the initial decision dismissing his appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction, so the administrative judge’s basis for dismissing the appeal is no
    longer valid.   See McNeil, 
    100 M.S.P.R. 146
    , ¶ 11; Lee v. Social Security
    Administration, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-18-0753-I-1, Final Order (Feb. 23,
    2024) (0753 Final Order); 0753 PFR File, Tab 9. Under such circumstances, it
    remains appropriate to dismiss the appellant’s claim challenging his 2018
    resignation as involuntary in the instant appeal based on the doctrine of collateral
    6
    estoppel, rather than on the basis of adjudicatory efficiency.                McNeil,
    
    100 M.S.P.R. 146
    , ¶ 11.
    The purpose of collateral estoppel is to “relieve the parties of the cost and
    vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing
    inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”         Peartree v. U.S.
    Postal Service, 
    66 M.S.P.R. 332
    , 336-37 (1995) (quoting Allen v. McCurry,
    
    449 U.S. 90
    , 94 (1980)). Collateral estoppel is appropriate when: (1) the issue is
    identical to that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in
    the prior action; (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action was
    necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party against whom the issue
    preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
    prior action. McNeil, 
    100 M.S.P.R. 146
    , ¶ 15 (2005).
    The Board’s jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal challenging his
    resignation as involuntary was actually litigated before the Board in his
    0753 appeal.   The “actually litigated” element is satisfied when the issue was
    properly raised by the pleadings, was submitted for determination, and was
    determined. Kavaliauskas, 
    120 M.S.P.R. 509
    , ¶ 6. In the initial decision in the
    prior case, the administrative judge found, after providing the parties with an
    opportunity to address the jurisdictional issue, that the appellant failed to meet his
    burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation that his resignation was involuntary
    based on the following arguments:       he was subjected to hostile or intolerable
    work conditions purportedly perpetrated by the agency; he was forced to resign
    because he was not provided with reasonable accommodations for his disability;
    he had no alternative but to resign from his position; the agency threatened a
    removal action it knew could not be substantiated; and his resignation was the
    product of agency-provided misinformation or deceptive or misleading statements
    by agency officials. 0753 ID at 1, 15-28.
    Additionally, these findings were necessary to the administrative judge’s
    determination in the prior initial decision that the Board lacks jurisdiction over
    7
    the appellant’s involuntary resignation appeal. After the appellant petitioned for
    review, the Board affirmed that decision.          0753 Final Order.      Finally, the
    appellant was represented by an attorney in his prior Board appeal and he had a
    full and fair opportunity to represent himself in his subsequent petition for review
    to the Board on that matter. See Fisher v. Department of Defense, 
    64 M.S.P.R. 509
    , 515 (1994) (determining that a party’s pro se status does not preclude the
    application of collateral estoppel). Thus, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
    appropriate here.    Because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the
    appellant from relitigating the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction over the
    voluntariness of his decision to resign, the Board does not have jurisdiction over
    his claim in the instant appeal challenging his 2018 resignation. Accordingly, we
    modify the initial decision to clarify the basis for the dismissal of the appellant’s
    involuntary resignation claim. 3
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter.      
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    .      You may obtain
    review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By statute, the nature of
    your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
    forum with which to file. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b). Although we offer the following
    summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
    3
    On review, the appellant appears to indicate that he has filed additional complaints
    with OSC and refers to an “attached email exhibit” purportedly related to his OSC
    complaint, but he failed to provide any attachments with his petition for review.
    Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6. To the extent the appellant may have filed a
    whistleblower reprisal complaint with OSC, he may file an individual right of action
    (IRA) appeal with the Board’s regional office in accordance with the Board’s
    regulations. See 
    5 C.F.R. §§ 1209.5
    , 1209.6. The appellant should carefully review the
    Board’s regulations to determine whether any IRA appeal he may file is timely. See
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1209.5
    .
    4
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    8
    provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
    the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
    regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
    this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
    claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
    within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
    chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    9
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
    discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.     
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. 420
     (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
    receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
    race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
    entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
    requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues . 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    10
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
    section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
    2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
    review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
    of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
    5
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 11
    petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    
    132 Stat. 1510
    .
    12
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
    Gina K. Grippando
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SF_3443-22-0586-I-1

Filed Date: 3/26/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2024