Dennis Ryno v. Department of the Army ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DENNIS R. RYNO, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, CH-0752-14-0500-I-5
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: February 27, 2024
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Dennis R. Ryno , Waynesville, Missouri, pro se.
Stephen O. Barlow , Ft. Eustis, Virginia, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
find that the appellant did not make any protected disclosures or engage in any
protected activity under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
(WPEA), and to VACATE the initial decision as to the administrative judge’s
application of collateral estoppel and her determination that the agency proved it
would have removed the appellant absent an alleged protected disclosure, we
AFFIRM the initial decision.
¶2 The appellant began his career with the agency in 1978, most recently
working as a GS-14 Supervisory Safety and Occupational Health Specialist at
Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri. Ryno v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket
No. CH-0752-14-0500-I-5, Appeal File (I-5 AF), Tab 140, Initial Decision (ID)
at 1-2; Ryno v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-14-0500-
I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 24 at 21. In November 2013, the agency
proposed the appellant’s removal based on allegations concerning the appellant’s
conduct toward a woman (complainant) with whom he had a personal relationship
who also worked for the agency at Fort Leonard Wood. The appellant had been
criminally charged with stalking the complainant and ultimately entered into a
plea agreement in a Missouri court, wherein he pled guilty to a single charge of
harassment. The proposed removal included two charges: conduct unbecoming
and failure to follow instructions, with 41 and 32 specifications, respectively.
IAF, Tab 24 at 596-615. After the appellant responded to the proposal, the
deciding official upheld the appellant’s removal, effective March 2014, sustaining
3
all of the conduct unbecoming specifications, but only specifications 9, 10, and
13 of the failure to follow instructions charge.
¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal, and while the appeal was pending, he
withdrew his hearing request and the agency withdrew specifications 3-9 of its
conduct unbecoming charge. 2 ID at 1, 23; I-5 AF, Tab 86 at 1. The
administrative judge issued a decision on the written record, sustaining
specifications 2, 10, 15-16, 18-20, 22-23, 25-38, and 40 of the conduct
unbecoming charge and specifications 9, 10, and 13 of the failure to follow
instructions charge. ID at 43-45. She further determined that the agency proved
the requisite nexus and that the appellant failed to prove each of his affirmative
defenses, including claims of due process violations, harmful procedural error,
and whistleblower retaliation. Finally, she found that the agency met its burden
of proving the reasonableness of its chosen penalty, and she affirmed the
appellant’s removal. ID at 67.
¶4 In a fairly cursory argument on review, referencing a much larger argument
he presented below, the appellant suggests that the administrative judge erred in
her application of collateral estoppel in sustaining some of the conduct
unbecoming specifications. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 36-37
(referencing I-5 AF, Tab 113 at 4-26, Tab 127 at 257). To the extent he is
arguing that the administrative judge applied an incorrect standard, as explained
below, we agree. Therefore, we vacate her decision to sustain specifications 23,
25-28, 30-32, and 34-37 of the conduct unbecoming charge, which was based on
her finding that the appellant was collaterally estopped from challenging the
underlying facts.
¶5 In making her collateral estoppel determination, the administrative judge
applied the Board’s standards. ID at 32-33. However, in determining the
preclusive effect of a criminal conviction, the Board will apply the corresponding
2
The initial decision erroneously states that the agency also withdrew specifications
1 and 2. Compare ID at 21 n.13, with ID at 23, and I-5 AF, Tab 86 at 1.
4
jurisdiction’s collateral estoppel standards. Mosby v. Housing and Urban
Development, 114 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 5 (2010). In other words, because the
appellant was subject to Missouri criminal charges in a Missouri state court, the
administrative judge should have applied the Missouri standards for collateral
estoppel. According to the appellant, his criminal case in Missouri was resolved
with a guilty plea and suspended imposition of sentence, and Missouri courts
have determined that such resolutions do not satisfy the aforementioned elements.
E.g., I-5 AF, Tab 113 at 8. We agree. See Director, Department of Public
Safety v. Bishop, 297 S.W.3d 96, 98-100 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a
police officer was not estopped in a disciplinary matter from disputing whether he
committed a crime to which he pled guilty and received a suspended sentence).
As further detailed below, we need not resolve whether the agency otherwise
proved these specifications. When more than one event or factual specification
supports a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the supporting
specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge. Burroughs v. Department of the
Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Because the remaining specifications
suffice to affirm the agency’s charge and the appellant’s removal, we decline to
make findings as to whether the agency proved those specifications the
administrative judge sustained as collaterally estopped.
¶6 We have considered the remaining arguments that the appellant raised on
petition for review pertaining to the charges, nexus, and the penalty, the
administrative judge’s evidentiary rulings, and his due process and harmful
procedural error defenses, but we find that none of them provide a basis to disturb
the initial decision. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106
(1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she
considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of
Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
5
¶7 As to the appellant’s claim that the agency removed him in retaliation for
his whistleblowing disclosures, when an appellant alleges reprisal for disclosures
made in the context of his own grievance under the governing collective
bargaining agreement, the disclosures are analyzed as protected activity falling
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), and not 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Mudd v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 6 (2013). This activity is reviewed
under the burden-shifting scheme set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e) if the grievance
falls within the confines of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), i.e., the grievance seeks
to remedy retaliation for making a protected disclosure. See Elder v. Department
of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 39 (2016) (explaining that a claim of reprisal
for activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) must be analyzed under
the burden-shifting standards set forth in section 1221(e)); Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R.
365, ¶ 7 (explaining in the context of an individual right of action appeal that the
Board has jurisdiction over an employee’s grievance seeking to remedy an alleged
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). A protected disclosure is a disclosure of
information that the appellant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any
law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 22 (2014). The proper test for assessing whether a protected
disclosure occurred is an objective one: could a disinterested observer with
knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the
employee reasonably conclude that the actions of the government evidence one of
the categories of wrongdoing identified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Shannon,
121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 22.
¶8 The administrative judge considered the alleged disclosures and found that
the appellant met his burden of proving that just one disclosure was protected. ID
at 53-58. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant made a
protected disclosure in his response to the proposed removal at issue in this
6
appeal by asserting that the proposing official had failed to provide him with
performance appraisals between 2010 and 2013. ID at 57-58. She further found
that the contributing factor element was satisfied. ID at 59-60. However, the
administrative judge found that the agency proved that it would have taken the
same action in the absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing. ID at 60-64.
¶9 Upon review of the record, we find that the appellant did not prove that he
made the protected disclosure referenced above, and we modify the initial
decision accordingly. Contrary to the administrative judge’s finding, the
appellant did not allege in his response to the proposed removal that the agency
improperly failed to appraise him during the four years he was on a detail
beginning after 2010. IAF, Tab 24 at 452; ID at 57. 3 In fact, in his pleadings
below, the appellant did not claim that he disclosed the failure to conduct
performance appraisals, but rather alleged that the lack of appraisals was a
personnel action following other disclosures. I-5 AF, Tab 100 at 11.
¶10 Further, to the extent the administrative judge found that the appellant did
not make protected disclosures in the course of his grievances, we modify those
findings. As discussed above, such disclosures are analyzed as protected activity
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), and not as protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). Nonetheless, any error was harmless. Panter v. Department of the
Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error
that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal
of an initial decision). The dispositive question remains the same as to the
appellant’s grievance activity, i.e., whether the appellant’s grievances reflect that
he previously made disclosures of information that he reasonably believed
evidenced wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 4 See Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R.
365, ¶ 7.
3
In the initial decision, the administrative judge cited to deposition testimony in
discussing this alleged disclosure and not to the written response to the proposal. ID
at 57. This testimony does not reflect that the appellant made a disclosure regarding the
lack of performance appraisals during the testimony. I-5 AF, Tab 130 at 272, 316.
7
¶11 The appellant reasserts disclosures he initially made in October 2005, and
again in January 2006, in both his response to a proposed suspension and the
grievance he filed after the agency effectuated that suspension. PFR File, Tab 3
at 28-29; e.g., I-5 AF, Tab 127 at 174-77, Tab 130 at 26-41. Generally speaking,
the disclosures consisted of some of the appellant’s defenses to that adverse
action, i.e., that it was tainted by a conflict of interest, the agency’s investigator
was improperly influenced, the agency improperly relied upon prior allegations,
and management had permitted his coworkers to gossip about him, thereby
creating a hostile work environment. E.g., I-5 AF, Tab 127 at 174-77, Tab 130
at 26-41. While we have reviewed the portions of the record the appellant cites
on review, we discern no basis for reaching a conclusion different from the
administrative judge. ID at 53-55. In essence, the response to the appellant’s
2005 discipline and follow-up grievance included an exhaustive list of defenses in
the form of agency improprieties. While he has directed us to those defenses, he
4
Grievances that do not seek to remedy whistleblower reprisal are covered by 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) and may also serve as the basis for an affirmative defense. See
Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016) (reflecting
that internal agency appeals in which an appellant did not seek to remedy reprisal for
whistleblowing fell under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), and should have been analyzed
under the standard in Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)). Nevertheless, the appellant and the attorney that represented him
throughout much of this appeal expressly chose to pursue just the whistleblower reprisal
claim and not a separate claim arising under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii). Compare IAF,
Tab 1 at 6 (appellant’s initial identification of affirmative defenses, which did not
include a claim of reprisal for grievance activity), with IAF, Tab 4 at 1 & n.1 (order
identifying the same affirmative defenses and providing the appellant the opportunity to
identify any others); Ryno v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-14-
0500-I-4, Appeal File, Tab 26 (prehearing summary identifying the same affirmative
defenses and warning that in the absence of any objection, the parties would be bound
to the same set of issues); I-5 AF, Tab 62 at 9 n.4 (prehearing summary indicating that
while the appellant was alleging whistleblower reprisal, he was not alleging that the
agency retaliated against him for filing equal employment opportunity complaints or
other protected activity), Tab 73 at 17 (appellant’s express declaration that he was “not
alleg[ing] that the agency retaliated against him because of ‘the exercise of any appeal,
complaint, or grievance right’”). Accordingly, we need not consider whether the
appellant could have met the burden of proof for claims arising under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii).
8
has not directed us to anything that would establish that he had a reasonable
belief that such defenses revealed the type of wrongdoing described in section
2302(b)(8).
¶12 The appellant next reasserts a second set of disclosures that he made in
connection with a December 2010 grievance, concerning another suspension.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 29-30; e.g., I-5 AF, Tab 130 at 216, 224-25, Tabs 179-80.
Like those just discussed, the 2010 disclosures constituted some of the appellant’s
responses to his latest alleged misconduct. Generally speaking, he alleged that
his 2010 suspension was tainted by retaliation on the part of the proposing
official and a concerted effort by the proposing official to influence a witness by
encouraging her to complain about the appellant. E.g., I-5 AF, Tab 130
at 216, 224-25, Tabs 179-80. The administrative judge found that the appellant
failed to meet his burden for these disclosures. ID at 55-56.
¶13 We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion but, as discussed
above, modify the initial decision to clarify why the appellant failed to meet his
burden. The administrative judge effectively provided two alternative rationales
for why the appellant’s December 2010 disclosures were not protected—because
they were not the type of disclosure described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and
because they were made solely within the grievance process. Id. However, the
latter rationale improperly relied on standards that predate the WPEA, which
governs this appeal. 5 ID at 55 (citing Boechler v. Department of the Interior,
109 M.S.P.R. 542, ¶ 9 (2008) (describing standards that applied under
whistleblower statutes before those statutes were amended with the passage of the
WPEA), aff’d per curiam, 328 F. App’x 660 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The WPEA
expanded the grounds on which an appellant may raise an affirmative defense that
is subject to the burden shifting standards of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e) to include, inter
alia, reprisal for the protected activity of filing a grievance with regard to
5
Although the appellant’s disclosures predated the effective date of the WPEA, because
his removal occurred after the statute went into effect, it is applicable here. See
Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 51-52.
9
remedying a violation of section 2302(b)(8). Alarid v. Department of the Army,
122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015). Accordingly, whether or not the appellant’s
disclosures were made within the grievance process is not dispositive. Otherwise,
we discern no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s findings. 6
¶14 Finally, under the WPEA, the Board may not proceed to the clear and
convincing evidence test unless it has first made a finding that the appellant
established his prima facie case. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Clarke v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10, ¶ 21 (2014), aff’d per curiam,
623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Because we modified the initial decision to
find that the appellant failed to prove that he made protected disclosures or
engaged in protected activity, we vacate the administrative judge’s determination
that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
removed the appellant absent his protected disclosure. ID at 60-64. Therefore,
we decline to consider the appellant’s arguments regarding this determination.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 32-35.
¶15 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision, as modified above.
6
The appellant separately suggests that, even if his December 2010 disclosures were
not protected, he was a perceived whistleblower. PFR File, Tab 3 at 29-30; see King v.
Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 6 (2011) (recognizing that an individual
who is perceived as a whistleblower is still entitled to whistleblower protections, even
if she did not make protected disclosures). However, it appears that the appellant failed
to preserve this argument by raising it below. See Banks v. Department of the Air
Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (explaining that the Board generally will not
consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing
that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the
party’s due diligence). Moreover, even if he did preserve the argument, the evidence
the appellant cited is not supportive. The Board will focus its analysis on the agency’s
perceptions to determine whether an appellant was perceived as a whistleblower, i.e.,
whether the agency officials involved in the personnel actions at issue believed that the
appellant made or intended to make disclosures that evidenced the type of wrongdoing
listed under section 2302(b)(8). King, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8. The evidence cited here
simply shows the proposing official describing the appellant as having a history of
responding to accusations about his own misconduct with accusations about the
misconduct of others, including the proposing official. I-5 AF, Tab 127 at 858, Tab 130
at 305. It does not show that the proposing official perceived the appellant as a
whistleblower.
10
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
12
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
13
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
14
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.