Sonia Wriglesworth v. Department of the Army ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
SONIA I. WRIGLESWORTH, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-0752-15-0860-I-2
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: January 9, 2024
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Dennis L. Friedman , Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.
Timothy D. Johnson , Esquire, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly
MODIFIED to vacate the portion of the initial decision finding that the agency
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action
in the absence of any whistleblower disclosures, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
The agency removed the appellant from her GS-15 Family Programs
Director position with the Family Programs Directorate (FPD) of the U.S. Army
Reserve Command based on a charge of Conduct Unbecoming a Federal
Employee and Supervisor. Wriglesworth v. Department of the Army, MSPB
Docket No. DC-0752-15-0860-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 78, 80-88,
126-33. The agency asserted that the appellant (a) as a direct result of her
negative leadership, created a toxic work environment; (b) engaged in leadership
intimidation, humiliation, and/or fear of reprisal; (c) failed to provide proper
direction, support, and training to employees and discouraged employee
teamwork, which gave the appearance of ensuring that the employees failed at
tasks; (d) acted in a way that resulted in a perception of favoritism; (e) engaged in
the improper use of contractor staff, i.e., gave the appearance that she had a
personal services contract; (f) tasked employees and set deadlines that resulted in
uncompensated work time; and (g) delayed filling a critical vacancy and/or
attempted to circumvent the hiring process, which gave the appearance of having
committed a prohibited personnel practice. Id. at 126-33.
3
After a hearing, the administrative judge affirmed the removal action.
Wriglesworth v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0860-
I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 100. After setting
forth a detailed description of the evidence in the case, ID at 2-63, the
administrative judge found that the agency proved by preponderant evidence
specifications (a)-(c) and (e)-(f), but did not prove specifications (d) and (g), ID
at 64-77. The administrative judge further found that the agency proved a nexus
between its action and the efficiency of the service, and that the appellant did not
prove reprisal for whistleblowing activity, retaliation for equal employment
opportunity (EEO) activity, or harmful error. ID at 77-94. Finally, the
administrative judge found that the agency properly considered the relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed a reasonable penalty, i.e.,
removal. ID at 95-99.
The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision,
the agency has filed a timely response, and the appellant has filed a timely reply
to the agency’s response. 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 7, 9, 13.
ANALYSIS
The agency has proven its charge.
The appellant attacks the credibility of numerous witnesses, asserting that
they were untruthful regarding certain portions of their testimony. PFR File,
Tab 7 at 26-38. Some of the appellant’s allegations in this regard apply to
2
The appellant includes with her petition for review sworn statements she made on
January 7, 2014, and May 1, 2014, correspondence with the agency from 2012, and an
undated rebuttal of the agency’s charges that appears to include testimony from the
Board hearing. PFR File, Tab 7 at 56-154. At least one of these documents was
submitted below. Compare PFR File, Tab 7 at 60-62, with IAF, Tab 14 at 41-43. It is
not, therefore, new. See Krawchuk v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 94 M.S.P.R. 641,
¶ 5 n.2 (2003); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b). To the extent that the other documents attached
to the petition for review are submitted for the first time on review, the appellant has
not shown that they were previously unavailable despite her due diligence. See
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Therefore, we have not considered them in our determination.
See Thompson v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 16 (2015).
4
specifications (d) and (g), which were not sustained. PFR File, Tab 7 at 26-29,
39-41; ID at 66-69, 74-77. Thus, these allegations do not warrant a different
result from the initial decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force ,
22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding that an adjudicatory error that is not
prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an
initial decision). Aside from her assertions that several statements made by the
agency’s witnesses at the hearing were untruthful based on other evidence in the
record that the administrative judge did not address, the appellant has not shown
how any alleged untruthful statements she has identified would affect the
outcome in this case. In any event, even assuming that the administrative judge
did not mention some of the testimony or evidence addressed in this section of the
appellant’s petition for review, an administrative judge’s failure to mention all of
the evidence does not mean that he did not consider it in reaching his decision.
See Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services , 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132
(1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
The appellant further asserts that the administrative judge relied only upon
the demeanor of the witnesses in finding the agency’s witnesses more credible
than her witnesses, and did not address the other factors set forth in Hillen v.
Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), and resolve disputed
issues of fact. PFR File, Tab 7 at 43-45. 3 We disagree.
3
The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge abused his discretion by
denying her motions to compel discovery and her request for two witnesses who knew
about “the facts supporting [her] claims and defenses.” PFR File, Tab 7 at 53-55. The
appellant does not dispute that she did not timely file her motion to compel, but instead
asserts, as she did below, that she should not be penalized because she unilaterally
granted the agency additional time to respond to her discovery requests, which she
contends constituted good cause for a waiver of the motion to compel deadline. Id.The administrative judge correctly found that the parties did not seek and obtain from
him an extension of the discovery deadlines and had no authority to unilaterally alter
the Board’s orders and regulations; he therefore found that the deadlines remained
unchanged. IAF, Tab 20 at 2-3, Tab 27 at 1-2, Tab 31. The appellant has shown no
abuse of discretion in these rulings. See Pumphrey v. Department of Defense,
122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 15 (2015); Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶ 7
(2000), aff’d, 278 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Wagner v. Environmental Protection
5
To resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge must identify the
factual questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question,
state which version he believes, and explain in detail why he found the chosen
version more credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity
and capacity to observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character;
(3) any prior inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of
bias; (5) the contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or
its consistency with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the
witness’s version of events; and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R.
at 458. The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and may overturn such
determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Sabio
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 38 (2017).
Here, in addition to relying on the witnesses’ demeanor, the administrative
judge noted that their testimony was consistent with each other, unbiased, and
consistent with prior written statements, and that the testimony of the appellant
and her witnesses was not plausible. ID at 64-65, 73. For example, the
administrative judge noted, with respect to one of the witnesses, that she was not
biased, had no motive to fabricate, and gave answers that were thoughtful,
straightforward, consistent with her written statements of record, and
corroborated in relevant part by the other credible witnesses. ID at 17 n.11,
43 n.55. The administrative judge’s analysis of the testimony of many of the
witnesses was followed by his analysis of their sworn or unsworn written
Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452-53 (1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Moreover, she has not shown that the administrative judge abused his discretion in
denying the witnesses upon finding that their testimony was either not relevant or
cumulative. IAF, Tab 38 at 13-14; see Jenkins v. Environmental Protection Agency ,
118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 26 (2012) (recognizing that an administrative judge has wide
discretion to exclude witnesses when it has not been shown that their testimony would
be relevant and nonrepetitious).
6
statements. ID at 17-34, 43-50, 53-63. Moreover, an administrative judge’s
failure to specifically discuss every Hillen factor does not mean that he failed to
consider them. See Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 122 M.S.P.R. 489,
¶ 14 (2015), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, the administrative
judge addressed factors other than demeanor and resolved disputed issues of fact,
and the appellant has not set forth sufficiently sound reasons for overturning the
administrative judge’s credibility determination, and has therefore not shown that
the administrative judge erred in sustaining the charge.
The appellant also contends that specification (a) is vague and unproven,
and makes many of the same allegations that she raised below regarding why she
believes she did not create a toxic work environment. PFR File, Tab 7 at 45-49.
In support of specification (a), the agency referenced the findings of an
investigation, conducted between September 2013 and June 2014, that determined
that the appellant was the primary cause of a negative, toxic climate within the
FPD. IAF, Tab 6 at 126-27. The report of the investigation set forth in great
detail the reasons why the appellant was the primary cause of the negative, toxic
climate. IAF, Tab 32 at 9-81. The agency afforded the appellant the opportunity
to review the documents it relied upon in taking the action. IAF, Tab 6 at 133.
Therefore, we disagree with the appellant’s suggestion that specification (a) was
vague. See McGriff v. Department of the Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 89, ¶ 32 (2012)
(rejecting the appellant’s assertion that the agency did not provide him with the
specific reasons for the action when the proposal notice referenced an
investigative report that the agency had provided to him), modified on other
grounds by Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security , 121 M.S.P.R. 262,
¶ 18 n.7 (2014). The appellant’s allegations as to why she believes the agency
did not prove specification (a) do not demonstrate error by the administrative
judge, who, as set forth above, relied upon the demeanor of the witnesses and
other corroborating evidence to find that “the overwhelming credible evidence in
this record supports a finding that the appellant engaged in the misconduct as
7
alleged.” ID at 64-66; see Sabio, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 38; Crosby v. U.S. Postal
Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.
Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
The appellant has not proven reprisal for whistleblowing or EEO activity.
The appellant further asserts that the deciding official knew of her
disclosures and that, for the reasons set forth in her closing brief, the agency did
not establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed her in
the absence of her disclosures. PFR File, Tab 7 at 51-52. The administrative
judge, however, found that the appellant did not prove by preponderant evidence
that she reasonably believed she made protected disclosures; he also found that
the agency, in any event, proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have removed her in the absence of the disclosures. ID at 80-88. The appellant
has shown no error in these findings. 4 Thus, her arguments on review that her
disclosures were a contributing factor in her removal do not establish error in the
initial decision. See Campbell v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674,
¶ 11 (2016) (requiring an appellant in an adverse action appeal to show by
preponderant evidence that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the
agency’s personnel action). Moreover, her reference to arguments raised in her
closing brief does not identify errors in the initial decision and is not a basis for
granting her petition for review. See Wyse v. Department of Transportation,
39 M.S.P.R. 85, 92 n.3 (1988) (holding that the Board will not consider an
attempt in a petition for review to incorporate by reference arguments made in a
closing brief because the brief does not allege error by the administrative judge);
4
In any event, the Board may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test
unless it has first made a finding that the appellant established a prima facie case. See
Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014), aff’d,
623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we vacate the administrative judge’s
findings concerning whether the agency met its clear and convincing burden.
8
5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b) (requiring a petition for review to state a party’s
objections to the initial decision, and indicating that it should not include
documents that were part of the record below).
Although the appellant similarly asserts that there is a causal connection
between her EEO activity and her removal because she mentioned that activity in
her response to the proposal notice, PFR File, Tab 7 at 52-53, she has shown no
error in the administrative judge’s determination that, although the proposing and
deciding officials knew of the protected activity, they were not motivated to
retaliate against her because, among other things, they were not identified as
discriminating officials and the evidence they relied upon to support their
findings came primarily from the sworn statements of employees who had no
knowledge of her EEO activity, ID at 78-79. Because we affirm the
administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show that any
prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we need
not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that retaliation was a
“but-for” cause of the agency’s decision. See Pridgen v. Office of Management
and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 30-31.
The appellant has not proven harmful error.
The appellant asserts that the investigative report upon which the proposing
and deciding officials relied was procedurally flawed because (1) the agency
withheld from the appellant a list of issues that the investigating officer was
charged with investigating, and (2) the investigation was a sham designed to
manufacture claims against her by employees with performance issues. PFR File,
Tab 7 at 10-16. Regarding the latter claim, the appellant contends that some
correspondence between the investigator and witnesses was conducted using
non-government email accounts and not included in the investigative report, and
that witnesses collaborated with each other. Id. at 13-15.
The administrative judge addressed these allegations of harmful error,
finding that the appellant failed to specifically identify any facts and/or
9
regulatory citations to support the bases for her claims. ID at 88. The
administrative judge found that a list of issues identifying the appellant as a target
of the investigation did not exist and logically would not have existed because it
would have contradicted the stated purpose of the investigation, which was to
determine whether a toxic environment existed and, if so, who or what caused the
toxic environment. ID at 90-91. The administrative judge also held that the
credible testimony of record showed that the relevant witnesses did not
communicate or collaborate with each other during the investigation as part of a
conspiracy to frame the appellant, but instead understandably commiserated with
each other regarding their working conditions and discussed the fact of the
investigation. ID at 92-93. Aside from reiterating the allegations she made
below, the appellant has shown no error in these findings by the administrative
judge. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106; Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.
The appellant also asserts that the agency violated her due process rights
and, alternatively, committed harmful error when it denied her the right to
“communicate with anyone during the period between the issuance of the
proposed removal and the decision to remove her” by removing her from the
workplace and placing her on administrative leave. PFR File, Tab 7 at 16-22.
She contends that the administrative judge erred in holding that this issue was
waived because it was not raised before the record closed below. Id. at 19 n.5.
The above claim was not identified by the administrative judge as an issue
in the case, and the appellant did not so identify it in her objections to the
summary of the prehearing conference. IAF, Tabs 38, 51. Therefore, the
administrative judge correctly held that the appellant was prohibited from raising
it for the first time in her closing brief. ID at 94; I-2 AF, Tab 5 at 12; see Crowe
v. Small Business Administration, 53 M.S.P.R. 631, 634-35 (1992) (holding that
an issue is not properly before the Board when it is not included in the
administrative judge’s memorandum summarizing the prehearing conference,
which states that no other issues will be considered, unless either party objects to
10
the exclusion of that issue in the summary). In any event, the administrative
judge held in the alternative that the appellant completely failed to introduce any
evidence, or even a citation to the record, supporting a finding that she was
prevented from communicating with anyone during the response period. ID at 94.
The appellant has shown no error in this alternative finding.
The agency established the reasonableness of the penalty.
The appellant further contends that the agency was precluded from relying
on a prior 14-day suspension in its consideration of the penalty of removal
because she was “precluded from challenging her 14-day suspension through the
agency’s Administrative Grievance Procedure” due to her filing of an EEO
complaint regarding that matter. PFR File, Tab 7 at 22-24.
The administrative judge found that the agency properly relied on the
14-day suspension because, under Bolling v. Department of the Air Force,
9 M.S.P.R. 335, 339-40 (1981), the suspension was not clearly erroneous, the
appellant was informed of the action in writing, the action was a matter of record,
and the agency permitted the appellant to dispute the charges before a higher
level of authority than the one that imposed the discipline, even though she chose
to file a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rather than
file a grievance. ID at 98-99. The appellant has not shown error in this
determination. The record reflects that the agency afforded the appellant the
opportunity to grieve the 14-day suspension. IAF, Tab 15 at 8-9. Because all of
the Bolling requirements have been met, her arguments do not warrant a different
result, and the administrative judge correctly held that the agency properly relied
on the 14-day suspension in its penalty determination. ID at 99; see Morgan v.
Department of Defense, 63 M.S.P.R. 58, 61 (1994) (holding that the filing of a
grievance is a challenge to the prior disciplinary action); Nickerson v. U.S. Postal
Service, 49 M.S.P.R. 451, 462 n.9 (1991) (affording the appellant an opportunity
to appeal the actions under the agency’s grievance procedures met the Bolling
requirement); Golden v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 10 M.S.P.R. 415, 417 (1982)
11
(applying Bolling when the agency afforded the appellant an opportunity to grieve
the prior disciplinary action but he did not do so). The appellant has shown no
error in the administrative judge’s other penalty-related findings.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and affirm the initial
decision.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
13
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
14
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.