Rolando Gallegos v. Department of Homeland Security ( 2024 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    ROLANDO GALLEGOS,                               DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                          DA-3443-20-0145-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: July 22, 2024
    SECURITY,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Rolando Gallegos , Laredo, Texas, pro se.
    Ara Cantu , Esquire, Laredo, Texas, for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
    Henry J. Kerner, Member*
    *Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.
    FINAL ORDER
    The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal concerning the grade level at which
    he was appointed.     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
    following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
    or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
    administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
    decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
    discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
    material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).             After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED as
    to the basis for determining that the Board does not have jurisdiction over an
    employment practice and to find that the appellant was not subjected to a
    suitability action, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
    BACKGROUND
    Prior to this appeal, the appellant was a Federal employee from 1988 until
    1991. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7. In 2015, he applied for a competitive
    service “Writer/Editor” vacancy with the agency’s Customs and Border
    Protection, which was posted at the GS-12 level. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-9, 26, Tab 3
    at 6.   The agency extended him a tentative offer for the vacancy, which he
    accepted.    IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 8-9, 26.         However, the agency subsequently
    determined that the appellant’s selection was in error because he was “outside the
    area of consideration” for the vacancy. 
    Id. at 5, 18, 27-28
    . Further, in making
    the offer at the GS-12 level, the agency had assumed the appellant had previously
    served in a position at the GS-12 level, which was also in error. 
    Id. at 21, 26-28
    .
    After realizing its mistakes, the agency offered to reinstate the appellant to the
    Federal service in the position of Writer/Editor at his prior GS-9 level, and he
    was so reinstated, effective January 9, 2017.           
    Id. at 5, 7, 24, 28
    .      The
    3
    determination as to the level of this offer was based on his “time-in-grade,” in
    other words, the fact that his prior service was at the GS-9 level. 
    Id. at 5
    .
    The appellant subsequently filed this appeal, alleging, among other things,
    that the agency and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) applied an
    employment practice to his appointment that violated a basic requirement of
    
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    . IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 5 at 4. He essentially contested the
    agency’s decision to appoint him at the GS-9, instead of the GS-12, level. IAF,
    Tab 5 at 4.
    The     administrative   judge   subsequently   issued   an   initial   decision,
    dismissing the appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision
    (ID) at 1.    The administrative judge first found that the appellant failed to
    establish any of the exceptions to the general principle that an agency’s failure to
    select an applicant for a vacant position is not appealable to the Board. ID at 5.
    The administrative judge further found that the offer at a lower GS level was not
    an adverse action and was not an appealable withdrawal of a tentative offer
    because the appointment to the GS 12 vacancy never actually occurred. ID at 9-
    11.   Finally, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
    demonstrate any OPM involvement sufficient to establish jurisdiction over any
    alleged employment practices. ID at 6-9.
    The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that he was appointed
    to the GS-12 vacancy, the decision to offer him reinstatement at a lower GS level
    was a suitability action, and he was subject to an employment practice. Petition
    for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-9. The agency has responded to his petition for
    review. PFR File, Tab 3.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    The administrative judge found that the appellant did not allege jurisdiction
    under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
    1994, the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, or whistleblower
    4
    reprisal statutes. ID at 5. The administrative judge also found that the appellant
    had not suffered an appealable adverse action. ID at 9-10. The parties do not
    challenge these findings on review, and we decline to disturb them.
    The administrative judge correctly held that the appellant did not establish
    jurisdiction over his employment practices claim.
    An applicant for employment who believes that an employment practice
    applied to him violates a basic requirement in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
     is entitled to
    appeal to the Board.    Sauser v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 6 (2010); 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a).        The Board has jurisdiction under
    § 300.104(a) when the following two conditions are met: (1) the appeal concerns
    an employment practice that OPM is involved in administering; and (2) the
    appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation that the employment practice violated
    one of the “basic requirements” for employment practices set forth in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    . Sauser, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 6.
    The appellant on review argues that OPM was involved in the
    determination that he was not qualified for the position at the GS-12 level but was
    qualified at the GS-9 level. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-8. The administrative judge
    held that the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient OPM involvement in the
    agency’s use of time-in-grade requirements. ID at 8-9. The appellant disputes
    this finding. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-8. We disagree with the administrative judge,
    and modify the initial decision accordingly.
    OPM need not be immediately involved in the practice in question; rather,
    an agency’s misapplication of a valid OPM requirement may constitute an
    employment practice. Sauser, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 7. The record here is devoid
    of almost all of the agency’s hiring documents.      However, it appears that the
    agency determined that the appellant was unqualified for the position at the
    GS-12 level based on its application of OPM’s standards. For instance, OPM’s
    regulations set forth the rules for setting the pay rate for a reemployed individual
    with previous civilian service in the Federal Government.                5 C.F.R.
    5
    §§ 531.211(b), 531.212.      Moreover, OPM’s regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 300,
    subpart F, set forth the applicability and rules regarding time-in-grade restrictions
    for advancement.     Indeed, an agency memorandum regarding the appellant’s
    request for a desk audit after he was appointed cites to 
    5 C.F.R. § 335.103
    (c)(1)
    (vi), which states that merit promotion requirements apply when a former
    employee is reinstated at a higher level than previously held. IAF, Tab 1 at 28.
    Further, although not decided by the administrative judge, we determine
    that the appellant has established that his appeal concerns an employment
    practice.    ID at 9.      Specifically, as occurred here, “the application of
    time-in-grade restrictions is an employment practice.” 2 Dowd v. United States,
    
    713 F.2d 720
    , 724 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Accordingly, we modify the initial decision
    to find that the appellant has satisfied the first prong of the jurisdictional test.
    See Sauser, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 8 (finding the first prong satisfied when an
    agency applied OPM’s qualification standards to determine the appellant was
    unqualified for the GS 11 level).
    While we modify the initial decision to find that the appellant met the first
    prong of the jurisdictional test for an employment practices claim, the
    administrative judge’s error provides no basis for reversal of the initial decision.
    As discussed below, the appellant does not meet the second prong of the test.
    Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 
    22 M.S.P.R. 281
    , 282 (1984) (explaining
    that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights
    provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). As to the second prong of
    the jurisdictional test, the appellant argues that the offer of a position at the GS-9
    level, instead of the GS-12 level, violated the basic requirements of 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    .     PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.        His arguments specifically involve the
    2
    We also assume for purposes of our analysis, without deciding, that the agency’s
    determination of the area of consideration of the position is an employment practice.
    See Saya v. Department of the Air Force , 
    68 M.S.P.R. 493
    , 496-97 (1995) (assuming
    without deciding that a policy concerning the area of consideration for a position is an
    employment practice implementing 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    ).
    6
    assertion that he met the requisite qualifications of the job posting at the GS-12
    level.    
    Id.
       The administrative judge did not specifically address this issue.
    Accordingly, we do so now.
    Under the second prong, an appellant establishes jurisdiction over his
    appeal by making a nonfrivolous allegation that the employment practice violated
    one of the “basic requirements” for employment practices set forth in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    . Sauser, 
    113 M.S.P.R. 403
    , ¶ 6. These basic requirements include the
    requirement that a job analysis be used to identify important factors in evaluating
    candidates, and that the employment practice have a “rational relationship” to
    performance in the job. Id.; 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    (a), (b)(1). The appellant is not
    challenging the validity or applicability of the agency’s determination that he was
    not within the area of consideration for the GS-12 vacancy announcement and did
    not meet the time-in-grade requirements for a GS-12 position. 3 IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
    Rather, he is arguing that the agency and OPM should have found him qualified
    for the GS-12 Writer/Editor vacancy announcement because he met the
    “minimum requirements” and “qualifications” of the position. IAF, Tab 5 at 5;
    PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. The vacancy announcement lists the requirements and
    qualifications as certain writing and editing experience, ability to “pass a
    background investigation,” registration for the Selective Service, and residency in
    the United States. IAF, Tab 1 at 12-13. However, as explained above, the agency
    did not determine that the appellant was ineligible for the GS-12 vacancy, or that
    he was eligible only for a GS-9 reinstatement, based on these factors. Rather, its
    determination was based on the area of consideration and time-in-grade.
    The appellant is, at most, seeking an exception for himself to the agency’s
    application of the limitations related to the area of consideration and
    3
    Neither party has explained why the appellant was outside the “area of consideration”
    for the GS-12 position. E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at 13-14; PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.
    However, because the appellant has not alleged that this limitation did not apply to him
    or that the agency’s determination that he was outside the area of consideration was in
    error, we discern no basis to review it here.
    7
    time-in-grade for the GS-12 vacancy announcement. The Board lacks jurisdiction
    over such a claim. See Richardson v. Department of Defense, 
    78 M.S.P.R. 58
    , 61
    (1998) (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over an employment practices
    appeal in which an appellant failed to identify any basic requirement that was
    missing from the instrument that the agency used to evaluate her application, and
    instead, merely contested the agency’s handling and rating of her individual
    application); Banks v. Department of Agriculture, 
    59 M.S.P.R. 157
    , 160 (1993)
    (finding that an appellant’s allegations that an agency failed to fully consider his
    education and experience in making a selection for a position did not establish
    jurisdiction over an employment practices claim), aff’d per curiam, 
    26 F.3d 140
    (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table). Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge
    that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this claim, as modified above.
    The appellant’s remaining arguments on review do not establish jurisdiction.
    The appellant argues that the decision to offer reinstatement at the GS-9
    level instead of the position to which he applied at the GS-12 level is an
    appealable suitability action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The administrative judge
    did not address this argument.      We modify the initial decision to find the
    appellant’s argument unpersuasive. Because we find that the appellant did not
    establish jurisdiction over a suitability action, any error by the administrative
    judge in failing to address this claim does not require reversal.       See Panter,
    22 M.S.P.R. at 282.
    The Board has jurisdiction over a negative suitability determination that
    results in a suitability action, defined as a removal, cancellation of eligibility,
    cancellation of reinstatement eligibility, or debarment.    Ricci v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    953 F.3d 753
    , 756-57 (Fed. Cir. 2020); 
    5 C.F.R. §§ 731.203
    (a),
    731.501(a).   A nonselection for a particular position is not an appealable
    suitability action. Ricci, 953 F.3d at 757; 
    5 C.F.R. § 731.203
    (b). The agency’s
    decision to rescind its tentative offer of employment, and offer reinstatement at a
    lower GS level, is thus not a suitability action that can be appealed to the Board.
    8
    See Ricci, 953 F.3d at 757 (finding an agency’s decision to rescind a tentative
    offer of employment was not an appealable suitability action).
    The appellant also argues that he was formally appointed to the position
    because he accepted the tentative offer.          PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9.          The
    administrative judge held that the appointment at the GS-12 level never actually
    occurred.   ID at 12.      We agree.     To establish Board jurisdiction over the
    cancellation of a promotion or appointment, offer and acceptance alone is not
    sufficient. Instead, the appellant must show that the promotion or appointment
    was not revoked before the appellant actually performed in the position. Sapla v.
    Department of the Navy, 
    118 M.S.P.R. 551
    , ¶ 9 (2012). The appellant has not
    alleged that he served in the GS-12 position; instead, he has been employed in a
    GS-9 position with the agency. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Therefore, the appellant cannot
    establish Board jurisdiction over the decision not to appoint him.
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter.      
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    .      You may obtain
    review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By statute, the nature of
    your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
    forum with which to file. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b). Although we offer the following
    summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
    provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
    the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
    regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
    this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
    claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
    4
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    9
    within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
    chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    10
    (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
    discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.    
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. 420
     (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
    receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
    race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
    entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
    requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues . 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    11
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
    2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
    (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
    competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
    review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    5
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132
     Stat. 1510.
    12
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
    Gina K. Grippando
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DA-3443-20-0145-I-1

Filed Date: 7/22/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/23/2024