Beverly Stancil v. Department of the Interior ( 2024 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    BEVERLY JACKSON STANCIL,                        DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                         DC-0752-17-0153-I-1
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                     DATE: January 30, 2024
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Beverly Jackson Stancil , Cheverly, Maryland, pro se.
    Pegah Yazdy Gorman and Jennifer Koduru , Washington, D.C., for the
    agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
    one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
    findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
    interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
    the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
    involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
    the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
    the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
    of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).
    After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
    has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
    review.   Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.          Except as expressly
    MODIFIED       to   supplement   the   administrative   judge’s   analysis   of   the
    whistleblower reprisal claim under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) and to consider the
    affirmative defense of reprisal for disclosing information to the agency’s Office
    of Inspector General (OIG) under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C), we AFFIRM the
    initial decision.
    BACKGROUND
    Effective November 21, 2016, the agency removed the appellant from her
    Program Assistant (Special Assistant) position in the agency’s Office of
    Partnerships, Youth and Community Engagement, National Capital Region,
    National Park Service, based on a charge of failure to follow her supervisor’s
    instructions. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 2 at 2, Tab 8 at 111-18. The agency
    based its charge on three specifications alleging that the appellant failed to attend
    a meeting scheduled for her return from a 14-day suspension on June 20, 2016, a
    standing biweekly update meeting on June 21, 2016, and a webinar meeting on
    June 30, 2016, as instructed by her supervisor. IAF, Tab 8 at 112-13. In deciding
    to remove the appellant, the agency considered, among other things, her prior
    discipline, consisting of the following:        a letter of reprimand issued on
    November 20, 2015, for four instances of failing to follow her supervisor’s
    directions to attend meetings; and a 14-day suspension from June 5–18, 2016, for
    3
    five instances of failing to follow her supervisor’s instructions to attend meetings.
    IAF, Tab 7 at 21-22, 37-42, Tab 8 at 111, 114. The appellant’s supervisor was
    the proposing official for the 14-day suspension and removal, and the Regional
    Director was the deciding official for the suspension and removal. IAF, Tab 7
    at 28, 37, 49, Tab 8 at 111. The appellant appealed her removal to the Board, and
    she requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. She raised the affirmative defenses of a
    violation of her due process rights and reprisal for whistleblowing and for
    disclosing information to OIG. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 14 at 3-7.
    After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
    affirming the removal action.     IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 15. 2
    Specifically, she found that the agency proved all three specifications of its
    charge.   ID at 2-7.   She further found that the appellant failed to prove her
    affirmative defenses of a violation of her due process rights or whistleblower
    reprisal under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8). ID at 7-12. In addition, the administrative
    judge found that the agency proved nexus and that the agency did not abuse its
    discretion in its penalty selection. ID at 12-15.
    The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
    File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    The agency proved its charge by preponderant evidence.
    Generally, in an adverse action appeal, the agency must prove its charge by
    a preponderance of the evidence. 3 
    5 U.S.C. § 7701
    (c)(1)(B). To prove a charge
    of failure to follow supervisory instructions, an agency must establish that an
    employee was given proper instructions and that she failed to follow them,
    without regard to whether the failure was intentional or unintentional. Hamilton
    2
    We assume that the administrative judge was referring to the agency’s removal action
    when she found that the agency’s demotion action must be affirmed. ID at 15.
    3
    A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
    person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
    contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.4
    (q).
    4
    v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    71 M.S.P.R. 547
    , 555-56 (1996). Here, the record contains
    strong evidence showing that the appellant was given clear instructions from her
    supervisor to attend the meetings and the webinar in question. IAF, Tab 7 at 65,
    81-88, 116-22. We find that the appellant’s immediate supervisor acted properly
    by directing the appellant to attend the meetings and the webinar concerning her
    work plan and assignments. IAF, Tab 7 at 65, 81 -88, 119; Hearing Transcript
    (HT) at 11, 19-24 (testimony of the supervisor). The administrative judge found
    that the supervisor credibly testified that the purpose of the individual biweekly
    update meetings was to provide employees with guidance and to track their
    projects, and that she sent the appellant an email scheduling a meeting to discuss
    her projects upon her return from serving her suspension. ID at 4, 6; HT at 11,
    19-21 (testimony of the supervisor).    To the extent the appellant disputes the
    administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility findings, we find that she has
    failed to present a sufficiently sound reason to disturb them. PFR File, Tab 1
    at 11; see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 
    288 F.3d 1288
    , 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
    (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
    determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
    demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and that the Board may overturn
    such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so) .
    Moreover, it is undisputed that the appellant failed to follow her supervisor’s
    instructions to attend the meetings and the webinar.
    In her petition for review, the appellant argues that she did not attend the
    meetings in question because of her supervisor’s creating a hostile work
    environment, harassing tactics, and escalating rage, and because it was the
    agency’s policy to report harassment to the Regional Director, who was the
    deciding official in this case.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8.     We find that these
    arguments are unavailing. Employees do not have an unfettered right to disregard
    supervisory instructions.   Howarth v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    77 M.S.P.R. 1
    , 7
    (1997). Rather, an employee must first comply with an order and then, if she
    5
    disagrees with the order, register her complaint or grievance later, except in
    certain limited circumstances, such as when obedience would cause her
    irreparable harm.     Larson v. Department of the Army, 
    91 M.S.P.R. 511
    , ¶ 21
    (2002). An employee’s subjective and unsupported apprehension of danger does
    not justify her refusal to perform her duties. 
    Id.
     Here, there is no evidence to
    suggest that attending the scheduled meetings or webinar would have caused the
    appellant irreparable harm. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the administrative
    judge’s finding that the agency proved all three specifications of its charge by
    preponderant evidence. 4 ID at 7.
    The appellant argues that the agency failed to produce pertinent evidence in
    this appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3, 5, 7, 9-11. Because the appellant did not file
    a motion to compel, she is precluded from raising this discovery issue for the first
    time on review, and we deny her request for the Board to direct the agency to
    produce additional evidence. 
    Id. at 2-3, 5, 10
    ; see Szejner v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 
    99 M.S.P.R. 275
    , ¶ 5 (2005), aff’d, 
    167 F. App’x 217
     (Fed. Cir.
    2006).     Although the appellant asserts that the administrative judge failed to
    provide discovery instructions, PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, the record reflects
    otherwise, IAF, Tab 3 at 3-4. Moreover, we cannot investigate the appellant’s
    claims of harassment and a hostile work environment, as she requests on review,
    because the Board lacks investigative authority.        PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see
    
    5 U.S.C. § 1204
    .
    4
    At the time that the appellant filed this appeal, 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(D) made it a
    prohibited personnel practice to take an action against an employee for “refusing to
    obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law.” Our reviewing court
    considered this provision and held that “law” only included statutes, and not rules and
    regulations. See Rainey v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 
    824 F.3d 1359
    , 1364-65
    (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, on June 14, 2017, the President signed the Follow the Rules
    Act into law. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-40, 131
     Stat. 861 (2017). The Act amends
    section 2302(b)(9)(D) to provide whistleblower protection for individuals who refuse to
    obey an order that would require the violation of a law, rule, or regulation.
    Nevertheless, the Board has determined that this expansion does not apply retroactively
    to cases pending at the time the Act was enacted. Fisher v. Department of the Interior,
    
    2023 MSPB 11
    , ¶ 19.
    6
    The appellant further alleges that the administrative judge improperly
    denied her requested witnesses. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. An administrative judge
    has wide discretion under 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.41
    (b)(8), (10), to exclude witnesses
    when it has not been shown that their testimony would be relevant, material, and
    nonrepetitious.    Franco v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    27 M.S.P.R. 322
    , 325 (1985).
    Here, the administrative judge disallowed the appellant’s requested witnesses in
    the Order and Summary of Telephonic Prehearing Conference and informed her
    that she may object to the rulings in the summary on the morning of the hearing.
    IAF, Tab 18 at 4-6. However, the appellant did not object to the administrative
    judge’s rulings on witnesses at the hearing. See Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    37 M.S.P.R. 579
    , 581 (1988) (finding that an appellant’s failure to timely object
    to rulings on witnesses precluded him from doing so on petition for review).
    Nevertheless, we find that the appellant’s description of the expected testimony
    of the disallowed witnesses fails to show that the administrative judge abused her
    discretion. IAF, Tab 14 at 8-12. In particular, the appellant has not shown that
    the   disallowed   witnesses   would   have   provided   relevant,   material,   and
    nonrepetitious testimony, considering that she had the opportunity to testify and
    to question her supervisor and the deciding official during the hearing.
    In addition, the appellant contends that the administrative judge did not
    allow her to fully answer questions during the status and prehearing conferences
    and the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. We have reviewed the hearing transcript
    and find that the limits placed on the appellant’s testimony were within the
    administrative judge’s broad discretion to regulate the course of the hearing under
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.41
    (b)(3), (6). See Miller v. Department of Defense, 
    85 M.S.P.R. 310
    , ¶ 8 (2000) (finding that an administrative judge has wide discretion to
    control the proceedings, including authority to exclude irrelevant or immaterial
    testimony). Further, the appellant has failed to explain how her substantive rights
    were harmed by any limits imposed by the administrative judge during the status
    or prehearing conferences.      See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
    7
    
    22 M.S.P.R. 281
    , 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not
    prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversing an initial
    decision).
    We modify the initial decision to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis
    of the appellant’s affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8).
    The appellant’s allegations of whistleblower reprisal must be analyzed
    under the burden-shifting standard set forth in 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e). 5 Alarid v.
    Department of the Army, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 600
    , ¶ 12 (2015); 
    5 C.F.R. § 1209.2
    (e).
    Under this standard, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that
    (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    engaged in protected activity described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
    (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
    in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
    
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a). 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e)(1); Alarid, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 600
    , ¶¶ 12-13;
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1209.2
    (e)(1). If the appellant makes such a showing, then the burden
    of persuasion shifts to the agency to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
    it would have taken the same action in the absence of such disclosure or activity.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e)(2); Alarid, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 600
    , ¶ 14; 
    5 C.F.R. § 1209.2
    (e)(2).
    We begin by considering whether the appellant engaged in protected
    whistleblowing by making a disclosure of information protected by 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8). A protected disclosure described in section 2302(b)(8) generally
    means a disclosure of information that an appellant reasonably believes evidences
    (1) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; (2) gross mismanagement; (3) a
    gross waste of funds; (4) an abuse of authority; or (5) a substantial and specific
    danger to public health or safety. Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
    5
    We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal.
    To the extent that we cite herein to case law applying versions of law subsequently
    amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 or other
    legislation, we find that the statutory amendments do not affect the material holdings
    relied upon in this decision and do not affect the outcome of the appeal.
    8
    
    121 M.S.P.R. 221
    , ¶ 22 (2014). An appellant is not required to prove the alleged
    misconduct actually occurred. 
    Id., ¶ 28
    . Rather, an appellant need only prove
    that a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and
    readily ascertainable by her could reasonably conclude that the disclosed actions
    of the Government evidence one of the categories of wrongdoing identified in
    
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8). Shannon, 
    121 M.S.P.R. 221
    , ¶¶ 22, 28.
    Here, the administrative judge did not discuss the appellant’s alleged
    disclosures that she described in her prehearing submission. IAF, Tab 14 at 3-7;
    ID at 7-11.     We modify the initial decision as follows to supplement the
    administrative judge’s analysis of the whistleblower reprisal claim. The appellant
    alleged that she was under abusive supervision for the 11 years preceding her
    removal. IAF, Tab 14 at 3. Most of the appellant’s claims of harassment and a
    hostile work environment concern her supervisor, who started supervising the
    appellant when she was reassigned from a different office in January 2012. IAF,
    Tab 14 at 4-7, Tab 15 at 25; HT at 7 (testimony of the supervisor).                 In her
    pleadings before the administrative judge, the appellant claimed retaliation for
    reporting harassment and a hostile work environment to the OIG in August 2015
    and February 2016, and to agency officials on several occasions. 6 IAF, Tab 1
    at 5, Tab 14 at 3-7.      In particular, the appellant asserted that she made the
    following disclosures:       she began reporting harassment and a hostile work
    environment in 2006; she requested an independent investigation of her
    absent-without-leave status, leave restrictions, and reassignment from the Special
    Assistant position to the Program Assistant position; 7 in August 2015, she told the
    6
    The appellant does not allege that her claims of harassment or a hostile work
    environment are based on a protected status under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964, as amended, or other basis described in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(1).
    7
    The appellant alleged that she was “illegally demoted” when she was reassigned to a
    different office in January 2012 and when her position title was changed from “Special
    Assistant” to “Program Assistant.” IAF, Tab 14 at 3. The appellant does not allege,
    and the record does not reflect, that these actions resulted in a reduction in grade or pay.
    PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; IAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tab 14 at 3, Tab 15 at 13, 25. Thus, they do
    not constitute independently appealable demotions under chapter 75. The appellant’s
    9
    deciding official that she had filed an OIG complaint; in September or October
    2015, she told her supervisor that they needed to inform the deciding official of a
    conflict that they had had during a meeting; she asked her supervisor to schedule
    meetings in the presence of the deciding official and told her that they needed to
    bring their conflicts to higher-level leadership; on February 12, 2016, during her
    oral reply to the proposed 14-day suspension, she disclosed the continued
    harassment and hostile work environment, her efforts to comply with agency
    policy requiring employees to report harassment to the deciding official, as the
    Regional Director, and her insistence to her supervisor that they had to involve
    the deciding official in their conflicts; she began forwarding all emails sent from
    her supervisor to the deciding official and to other agency officials; in May 2016,
    she met with an equal employment opportunity (EEO) official regarding her
    complaint of a hostile work environment; in September 2016, she emailed the
    deciding official and other agency officials about receiving an envelope from her
    supervisor (containing the notice of proposed removal), and she requested an
    independent investigation of all actions taken against her since January 1, 2016;
    on September 29, 2016, during her oral reply to the proposed removal, she
    reiterated her claim of a hostile work environment and asserted that she was being
    punished for her disciplinary actions and that she did not receive guidance
    regarding her harassment and hostile work environment claims; and she emailed
    the deciding official, her supervisor, and other agency officials about scheduling
    a meeting with the Director of the National Park Service. IAF, Tab 14 at 3-6.
    The appellant did not specify, nor does the record reveal, what she
    disclosed to OIG beyond a claim of a hostile work environment or harassment.
    However, the record shows that, during an agency investigation, the appellant
    alleged that her supervisor took the following actions against her: subjected her
    dispute on review regarding her position title does not concern a material fact. PFR
    File, Tab 1 at 5-6. Thus, any error by the administrative judge in finding the appellant’s
    position title undisputed is not harmful to her substantive rights. ID at 2; see Panter,
    22 M.S.P.R. at 282.
    10
    to a hostile work environment and bullying; screamed and hollered at her;
    invaded her personal space; claimed that she made coworkers uncomfortable;
    claimed that she made too much noise; accused her of incompetence; demeaned
    her professionalism; assigned her piecemealed work; changed her work
    assignments; told her that she was the boss; and created double standards. 8 IAF,
    Tab 8 at 46-47. The appellant further alleged during the investigation that the
    agency changed her position from Special Assistant to Program Assistant, she felt
    that she was “mal-assigned,” and she wanted to be reassigned out of her office.
    Id. at 47. The agency concluded in its December 2013 investigative report that
    only her claims regarding noise complaints, piecemeal work, and her desire for a
    reassignment were substantiated. Id. at 48-51. The record further shows that,
    after receiving a memorandum in March 2015 from her supervisor requiring
    medical documentation for sick leave, the appellant requested an independent
    investigation of the memorandum, her Program Assistant position, and her
    applications for various vacancies. Id. at 34-42. In an email dated May 26, 2016,
    the deciding official informed the appellant that he had asked an EEO official to
    evaluate her claim of a hostile workplace. IAF, Tab 7 at 89. After meeting with
    the EEO official, the appellant forwarded to him emails sent by her supervisor
    concerning scheduled meetings. Id. at 90-105. In an email dated September 8,
    2016, the appellant again requested an independent investigation of all actions
    taken against her since January 1, 2016. IAF, Tab 8 at 19.
    The appellant reasserts on review that she made protected disclosures
    regarding harassment and a hostile work environment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10.
    For the following reasons, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that
    the appellant failed to prove that she made a protected disclosure. ID at 10-11.
    Based on our review of the record, we find that the appellant has failed to meet
    8
    The former Regional Director called for this investigation. IAF, Tab 8 at 43. To the
    extent the administrative judge erroneously found that the deciding official asked for
    this investigation, we find that any such error has not harmed the appellant’s
    substantive rights. ID at 10; see Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282.
    11
    her burden of proving that a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude that
    the information she disclosed evinced wrongdoing described in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8). Taken as a whole, the appellant’s alleged disclosures of harassment
    and a hostile work environment are fundamentally her own personal complaints
    and disagreements about how she was treated by the agency, and they are not
    protected whistleblowing. See Lachance v. White, 
    174 F.3d 1378
    , 1380-81 (Fed.
    Cir. 1999) (observing that an employee’s purely subjective perspective is not
    sufficient to prove that a disclosure is protected); see also Carr v. Department of
    Defense, 
    61 M.S.P.R. 172
    , 180-81 (1994) (finding that the appellant’s letter,
    which alleged that the agency had subjected him to “unwarranted stress” and
    “unjustifiable harassment,” did not constitute a protected disclosure).
    In particular, an abuse of authority occurs when there is an arbitrary or
    capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee that adversely
    affects the rights of any person or results in personal gain or advantage to herself
    or to other preferred persons. Herman v. Department of Justice, 
    115 M.S.P.R. 386
    , ¶ 11 (2011). Although we acknowledge that harassing or intimidating other
    employees may constitute an abuse of authority in certain situations, such as
    when a supervisor uses her influence to denigrate other staff members in an
    abusive manner and to threaten the careers of staff members with whom she
    disagrees, 
    id.,
     we find here that a disinterested observer could not reasonably
    conclude that the described events rose to the level of an abuse of authority, see
    Mc Corcle v. Department of Agriculture, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24 (2005) (finding
    that the appellant’s allegations that agency officials were arbitrary and capricious,
    discriminatory, conspiratorial, and manipulative did not constitute nonfrivolous
    allegations of an abuse of authority). Further, we find that the appellant has not
    proven that a disinterested observer could reasonably believe that the alleged
    agency actions constituted gross mismanagement, which is a management action
    or inaction that creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the
    agency’s ability to accomplish its mission.        Embree v. Department of the
    12
    Treasury, 
    70 M.S.P.R. 79
    , 85 (1996) (observing that gross mismanagement does
    not include management decisions that are merely debatable or action or inaction
    constituting simple negligence or wrongdoing).       In addition, we find that the
    appellant has not shown that a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude
    that the information disclosed evinced any violation of any law, rule, or
    regulation, including any agency policy on harassment, a hostile work
    environment, or whistleblowing. She has not provided any evidence to support
    her claim that there was a policy requiring all harassment accusations to be
    reported to the deciding official, as the Regional Director. IAF, Tab 14 at 4, 6.
    We modify the initial decision to consider the appellant’s affirmative defense of
    reprisal for disclosing information to OIG under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C).
    The administrative judge failed to analyze the appellant’s claim of
    retaliation for reporting wrongdoing to OIG as an affirmative defense of reprisal
    for engaging in protected activity under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C). ID at 7-11;
    IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 14 at 3.       We modify the initial decision, as follows, to
    consider such an affirmative defense.       An affirmative defense of reprisal for
    engaging in protected activity under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C) must be analyzed
    under the burden-shifting standard set forth in 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e). See Alarid,
    
    122 M.S.P.R. 600
    , ¶¶ 12-15 (applying this standard to an affirmative defense of
    reprisal under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(B)); see also Elder v. Department of the Air
    Force, 
    124 M.S.P.R. 12
    , ¶¶ 15, 39 (2016) (applying this standard to an
    affirmative defense of reprisal under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i)). Under this
    standard, an appellant first must prove by preponderant evidence that she engaged
    in protected activity that was a contributing factor in the personnel action at
    issue.     Elder, 
    124 M.S.P.R. 12
    , ¶ 39.      If she does so, then the burden of
    persuasion shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
    would have taken the same personnel action absent her protected activity. 
    Id.
    Under the law in effect at the time of the appellant’s removal, an employee
    engaged in protected activity under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C) when she
    13
    cooperated with or disclosed information to an agency’s OIG or the Office of
    Special Counsel (OSC), in accordance with applicable provisions of law . 9 Under
    the broadly worded provision of section 2302(b)(9)(C), such disclosures of
    information are protected regardless of their content, as long as they are made in
    accordance with applicable provisions of law.             Fisher v. Department of the
    Interior, 
    2023 MSPB 11
    , ¶ 8. Here, it is undisputed that the appellant filed an
    OIG complaint before she was removed. HT at 26 (testimony of the supervisor),
    103-04 (testimony of the deciding official), 167 (testimony of the appellant).
    Further, the deciding official testified that the appellant had told him throughout
    the process of effecting her 14-day suspension and removal that she would be
    filing an OIG complaint.         HT at 103-04, 110.        Therefore, we find that the
    appellant has proven a prima facie case of reprisal for engaging in protected
    activity under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C).          See Alarid, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 600
    , ¶ 13
    (explaining that, under the knowledge/timing test, an appellant can prove that her
    protected activity was a contributing factor in the challenged action by showing
    that the deciding official knew of the protected activity and took the personnel
    action within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that
    the protected activity was a contributing factor in the action).
    Next, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence 10 that it would have removed the appellant in the absence of her
    protected activity of filing an OIG complaint. In determining whether the agency
    has met this burden, the Board generally will consider the following factors:
    (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence
    9
    Section 1097(c)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,
    
    Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131
     Stat. 1283 (2017) amended 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(C) to further
    protect disclosures “to any other component responsible for internal investigation or
    review.” This additional provision appears immaterial to this appeal. In any event, this
    amendment does not apply retroactively and, thus, does not apply to this appeal.
    Edwards v. Department of Labor, 
    2022 M.S.P.R. 9
    , ¶¶ 29-33.
    10
    Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
    mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established; it is
    a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1209.4
    (e).
    14
    and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials involved
    in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
    employees who did not engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise
    similarly situated.   
    Id.,
     ¶ 14 (citing Carr v. Social Security Administration,
    
    185 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Board does not view these factors as
    discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear and convincing
    evidence; rather, the Board weighs these factors together to determine whether
    the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. 
    Id.
     The Board must consider all
    pertinent record evidence in making this determination, and it must not exclude or
    ignore countervailing evidence by only looking at the evidence that supports the
    agency’s position. 
    Id.
    Regarding the first Carr factor, we find that the strength of the agency’s
    evidence in support of its removal action is strong. For the reasons discussed
    above, the administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved all three
    specifications of its charge.   Although we have sustained the agency’s charge
    based on the preponderance of the evidence standard, we find that the agency’s
    evidence is also sufficient to meet the higher clear and convincing evidence
    standard. Moreover, the record shows that the appellant continued to engage in
    the same type of misconduct despite the agency’s use of progressive discipline to
    alert her that this type of misconduct would not be tolerated.          IAF, Tab 8
    at 111-14.
    Regarding the second Carr factor, we find that the deciding official had a
    substantial motive to retaliate. Because the appellant’s supervisor testified that
    she was not aware that the appellant had filed an OIG complaint until a week
    before the hearing in this appeal, we find that she did not have a motive to
    retaliate.   HT at 26, 37, 47-48 (testimony of the supervisor).       T he deciding
    official testified that the appellant told him that she would be filing an OIG
    complaint, but that this information did not impact his decision to remove her.
    HT at 103-04 (testimony of the deciding official). Although the record does not
    15
    reveal exactly what the appellant disclosed to OIG, she testified that she filed an
    OIG complaint in August 2015, and she alleges that she reported wrongdoing to
    OIG in February 2016. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 14 at 3; HT at 167 (testimony of the
    appellant). Thus, we can assume that she raised the same or similar claims of
    harassment and a hostile work environment that she raised before the agency in
    her March 2015 request for an independent investigation and in her February
    2016 oral reply to the proposed 14-day suspension.           IAF, Tab 7 at 37, Tab 8
    at 34-42; HT at 88-89, 110-13, 118-19 (testimony of the deciding official). We
    find that the deciding official had a motive to retaliate because the appellant’s
    claims suggest that he was aware and tolerant of her supervisor’s alleged
    harassment and creation of a hostile work environment. Thus, the appellant’s
    OIG complaint reflected on the deciding official’s capacity as a manager with
    supervisory authority over her and her supervisor, which is sufficient to establish
    a substantial retaliatory motive. 11    Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
    
    120 M.S.P.R. 285
    , ¶ 33 (2013) (finding a retaliatory motive when the appellant’s
    disclosures reflected on the agency officials’ capacity as managers and
    employees).
    Regarding the third Carr factor, our reviewing court has held that “the
    absence of any evidence relating to Carr factor three can effectively remove that
    factor from the analysis.”     Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 
    680 F.3d 1353
    ,
    1374 (2012).    Here, the agency did not produce any evidence relevant to this
    factor. Thus, the third Carr factor cannot weigh in favor of the agency. Smith v.
    General Services Administration, 
    930 F.3d 1359
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Siler v.
    Environmental Protection Agency, 
    908 F.3d 1291
    , 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    Nevertheless, we find that the deciding official’s substantial motive to retaliate
    and the absence of any evidence concerning Carr factor three are outweighed by
    the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its removal action, especially
    11
    The deciding official testified that he was the appellant’s third-level supervisor. HT
    at 88 (testimony of the deciding official).
    16
    the appellant’s history of engaging in the same misconduct. We find that the
    deciding official’s principal motivation for removing the appellant was her
    unwillingness to change her behavior despite receiving progressive discipline. In
    particular, the deciding official testified that he had hoped the use of progressive
    discipline would change the appellant’s behavior and cause her to recognize that
    she needed to follow her supervisor’s directions to attend meetings. HT at 96
    (testimony of the deciding official). He further testified that he thought that the
    appellant’s continued failure to follow her supervisor’s instructions was flagrant
    and that he felt there was no other choice but to remove her.          HT at 96-97
    (testimony of the deciding official).    Therefore, we find that the agency has
    proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action
    in the absence of the appellant’s protected activity. See Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1326
    (noting that the whistleblower protection statutes are not meant to protect
    employees from their own misconduct).
    The appellant has failed to prove her affirmative defense of a violation of her due
    process rights.
    The appellant reasserts her affirmative defense of a violation of her due
    process rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9, 11-12. She claims that, when the agency
    decided and implemented her immediate removal, she did not receive prior notice
    of a final decision and she was not allowed to appeal the final decision (within
    the agency) or to have union representation.     Id. at 8; IAF, Tab 14 at 7. The
    record shows that the agency provided the appellant with minimum due process
    consisting of notice of her proposed removal and an opportunity to respond in
    person and in writing to the proposed removal before the deciding official. IAF,
    Tab 7 at 49-54, Tab 8 at 111-12; see Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,
    
    470 U.S. 532
    , 546 (1985). Although the appellant claims that she did not receive
    the notice of the proposed removal because she immediately returned a sealed
    envelope containing the notice to her supervisor, we find that the agency’s
    diligent and intelligent efforts of attempting to meet with her for the purpose of
    17
    providing notice and leaving a copy of the notice on her desk in a sealed envelope
    constitutes constitutionally sufficient notice. 12 PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 7
    at 76-77, Tab 8 at 19; HT at 158-62 (testimony of the appellant); see Pangarova
    v. Department of the Army, 
    42 M.S.P.R. 319
    , 324-26 (1989) (finding constructive
    delivery of the agency’s notice proposing a security clearance revocation when
    the appellant refused to accept the proposal notice without a union representative
    present and she was told what was in the letter and the date of her deadline for
    responding); see also Givens v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    49 M.S.P.R. 374
    , 378 (1991)
    (finding that an agency must make diligent and intelligent efforts—such as might
    reasonably be adopted by one desirous of actually informing the employee—to
    provide such minimum due process prior to the effective date of its action) .
    Further, the appellant testified and admits on review that she and her union
    representative met with the deciding official regarding the proposed removal and
    that she provided him with written documentation.          PFR File Tab 1 at 6; HT
    at 163-65 (testimony of the appellant). Therefore, we discern no reason to disturb
    the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove her
    affirmative defense of a violation of her due process rights. ID at 12.
    Moreover, we are not persuaded by the appellant’s argument that she did
    not receive due process because the agency did not produce an OIG report and
    because the agency minimized the importance of the OIG investigation.              PFR
    File, Tab 1 at 9.    As explained above, the appellant had the opportunity to
    conduct discovery below and she is precluded from raising a discovery issue for
    the first time on review. See Szejner, 
    99 M.S.P.R. 275
    , ¶ 5. Further, to the extent
    the appellant is disputing the deciding official’s testimony that OIG did not issue
    a report and chose not to investigate her complaint, the administrative judge did
    12
    The appellant challenges on review the administrative judge’s finding that it is
    undisputed that the agency issued a notice of proposed removal to her. PFR File, Tab 1
    at 6; ID at 2. Even assuming that the administrative judge mischaracterized that fact as
    undisputed, we find that the appellant’s substantive rights have not been harmed
    because we find that the agency met its notice obligations. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R.
    at 282.
    18
    not abuse her discretion by sustaining an objection to such testimony because it
    was speculative.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 9; HT at 132 (testimony of the deciding
    official).
    The agency proved nexus and the reasonableness of the penalty.
    The appellant does not dispute, and we find no reason to disturb, the
    administrative judge’s finding that the agency established the requisite nexus. ID
    at 13; see Archerda v. Department of Defense, 
    121 M.S.P.R. 314
    , ¶ 24 (2014)
    (finding that the agency proved nexus because the charge of failure to follow
    instructions directly related to the efficiency of the appellant’s service).
    When, as in the instant appeal, all of the agency’s charges have been
    sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if
    the agency considered all the relevant Douglas factors 13 and exercised
    management discretion within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.           Ellis v.
    Department of Defense, 
    114 M.S.P.R. 407
    , ¶ 11 (2010). The Board will modify
    or mitigate an agency-imposed penalty only if it finds that the agency failed to
    weigh the relevant factors or the penalty clearly exceeds the bounds of
    reasonableness. 
    Id.
     The appellant does not dispute, and we discern no basis to
    disturb, the administrative judge’s findings that the agency properly considered
    the relevant factors and that the penalty of removal is within the agency’s
    discretion. ID at 13-15; HT at 96-102 (testimony of the deciding official); IAF,
    Tab 8 at 113-16.
    The appellant argues on review that the agency improperly “stacked”
    disciplinary actions against her while the OIG investigation was ongoing. PFR
    File, Tab 1 at 7. It is unclear what the appellant is arguing. To the extent she is
    arguing that the agency improperly considered her prior disciplinary actions in
    deciding to impose her removal, we find that the agency properly relied on such
    13
    In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 
    5 M.S.P.R. 280
    , 305-06 (1981), the Board
    articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the
    appropriateness of an agency-imposed penalty for an employee’s misconduct.
    19
    actions in effecting her removal. See Bolling v. Department of the Air Force,
    
    9 M.S.P.R. 335
    , 339-40 (1981) (establishing the criteria for the Board’s review of
    an appellant’s past discipline on which an agency has relied in determining a
    penalty). We note that the Board held in Ibarra v. Department of the Air Force,
    
    11 M.S.P.R. 110
    , 113 (1982), that an agency, by continuing to issue the same
    order at various intervals, cannot thereby increase the severity of the penalty in a
    case when the agency may reasonably anticipate that the order will not be obeyed.
    However, we find that the instant appeal is distinguishable from Ibarra because
    the agency here imposed progressive discipline for the appellant’s continued
    failure to follow her supervisor’s instructions. 
    Id.
     (agreeing with the appellant’s
    contention that the agency failed to impose progressive discipline).
    The appellant’s additional argument of adjudicatory bias does not provide a basis
    for review.
    Finally, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge’s judgment was
    biased because it was based on the testimony of her supervisor and the deciding
    official.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 11.    The Board will not infer bias based on an
    administrative judge’s case-related rulings.      Vaughn v. Department of the
    Treasury, 
    119 M.S.P.R. 605
    , ¶ 18 (2013).       We find that the appellant’s broad
    allegation of bias is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the administrative
    judge’s honesty and integrity.       See Oliver v. Department of Transportation,
    
    1 M.S.P.R. 382
    , 386 (1980) (observing that, in making a claim of bias or
    prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption
    of honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators).
    Accordingly, we affirm the agency’s removal action.
    20
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 14
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter.      
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    .         You may obtain
    review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By statute, the nature of
    your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
    forum with which to file. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b). Although we offer the following
    summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
    provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
    the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
    regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
    this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
    claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
    within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
    chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the    court    at   the
    following address:
    14
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    21
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
    discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.     
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. 420
     (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
    receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
    race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
    entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
    22
    requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues . 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    23
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
    section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
    (9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
    with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
    competent jurisdiction. 15   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
    review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    15
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132
     Stat. 1510.
    24
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
    Gina K. Grippando
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DC-0752-17-0153-I-1

Filed Date: 1/30/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/31/2024