Alesya Paschal v. Department of the Army ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
ALESYA M. PASCHAL, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, AT-0752-16-0740-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: February 5, 2024
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Vicki Fuller , Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, for the appellant.
Kathryn R. Shelton , Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, for the agency.
Daniel Dougherty , Colorado Spring, Colorado, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained her indefinite suspension based upon the agency’s suspension of her
access to classified information and networked information technology systems.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
The appellant is employed as a General Engineer. Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 8 at 21. Effective April 4, 2016, the appellant was suspended for 30
days based upon sustained charges of discourtesy towards a supervisory official,
lack of candor (inaccurate statements), and discourtesy towards a management
official. 2 IAF, Tab 18 at 29. On April 11, 2016, the agency informed the
appellant that it suspended her access to classified information and networked
information technology systems because of the 30-day suspension. Id. at 27.
Subsequently, on May 3, 2016, the agency proposed to indefinitely suspend the
appellant because her access to classified information was a condition of her
General Engineer position, the agency suspended such access, and she was
therefore unable to satisfy a requirement of her position. Id. at 13. The appellant
presented oral and written replies to the proposed indefinite suspension. IAF,
Tab 12 at 5, 13-20. The agency imposed the indefinite suspension, effective
2
The Board sustained the 30-day suspension. Paschal v. Department of Defense, MSPB
Docket No. AT-0752-16-0498-I-1, Final Order (Feb. 5, 2024).
3
July 10, 2016. IAF, Tab 9 at 66. The decision letter stated that the “indefinite
suspension will continue until the Central Adjudication Facility’s [CAF’s] final
determination regarding the suspension/revocation of [her] security clearance”
and “the agency is on notice that the security matter is resolved.” Id.The appellant filed the instant Board appeal challenging the indefinite
suspension and requesting a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After holding the requested
hearing, Hearing Transcript (HT), the administrative judge issued an initial
decision that sustained the indefinite suspension, IAF, Tab 33, Initial Decision
(ID). In pertinent part, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
position required a security clearance, and her access to classified information
was suspended pending a final determination regarding her clearance. ID at 5.
He further found that the agency provided her with due process, did not commit
harmful error, and imposed a valid condition subsequent in the indefinite
suspension decision letter. 3 ID at 5-9.
The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has responded in
opposition to her petition, and she has replied. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tabs 1-2, 4.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
An indefinite suspension lasting more than 14 days is an adverse action
appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2); Palafox v.
Department of the Navy, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8 (2016). An agency may
indefinitely suspend an appellant when her access to classified information has
been suspended and she needs such access to perform her job. 4 Palafox,
124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8. In such a case, the Board lacks the authority to review the
merits of the decision to suspend the employee’s access. Id. Instead, the Board
will only review whether (1) the appellant’s position required access to classified
3
The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that the decision
letter contained a valid condition subsequent, ID at 9, and we discern no error with the
administrative judge’s decision in this regard.
4
information, (2) her access to classified information was suspended, and (3) she
was provided with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. 5 Id.The Board also will consider whether the agency provided the appellant with
minimum due process in taking the indefinite suspension action and whether the
agency provided the procedural protections required under its own
regulations. Id.The appellant asserts on review that the agency committed harmful error
because, among other things, the deciding official refused to consider certain
documents that she submitted in her reply. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 9, 11. Harmful
error under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) cannot be presumed; an agency error is
harmful only where the record shows that the procedural error was likely to have
4
Although not raised by the appellant on review, the administrative judge appeared to
use the terms “security clearance” and “access to classified information”
interchangeably in the initial decision. The Board has noted that the term “security
clearance” refers to a determination that a person is eligible for access to classified
information. Rogers v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 2 n.1 (2015). The
issuance of a security clearance is distinct from the determination to grant access to
classified information, which is made solely on the basis of the individual’s need for
classified information in order to perform official duties. Id. Although clearance
determinations are within the purview of an authorized adjudicatory agency, such as the
CAF, access to classified information is granted by local command to cleared
individuals on a need-to-know basis. Id. In this matter, the deciding official testified
that when the agency locally suspended the appellant’s access to classified information,
the matter was “automatically referred” to the CAF, and her security clearance was
suspended indefinitely until the CAF adjudicated it. HT at 15 (testimony of the
deciding official). The administrative judge’s error in this regard is not prejudicial to
the appellant’s substantive rights and provides no basis for reversal of the initial
decision, Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984), because
the same analytical framework is utilized regardless of whether the adverse action is
based on the suspension of access to classified information or the denial, revocation, or
suspension of a security clearance. Compare Palafox, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8, with
Rogers, 122 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 5.
5
The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) states that an employee against whom an action is
proposed is entitled to (1) at least 30 days’ advance written notice stating the specific
reasons for the proposed action, (2) a reasonable time to answer orally and in writing
and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of the answer,
(3) the opportunity to be represented, and (4) a written decision and the specific reasons
that the action was taken at the earliest practicable date.
5
caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
reached in the absence or cure of the error. Stephen v. Department of the Air
Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681, 685 (1991); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r). The appellant
has not persuaded us that the deciding official committed any error, let alone
harmful procedural error.
In the decision letter, the deciding official acknowledged that the appellant
provided him with an 85-page submission, which he said “appear[ed] to be
selected provisions that [she] may or may not have cut and pasted” from other
documents. IAF, Tab 9 at 66. The deciding official explained that because the
submitted documents were “not the original documents and are not in their
original format,” he did not consider them as “credible documentary evidence.”
Id. The deciding official also stated that the documents themselves were not
relevant because they addressed events that occurred from before June 2012,
several years before the relevant events in this matter. Id. The appellant has not
persuaded us that the deciding official had any obligation to credit her submission
under these circumstances. Even if we assumed for the purposes of our analysis
that the deciding official somehow erred in this regard, the appellant has not
proven how the deciding official would have reached a different conclusion in the
absence or cure of the error.
The appellant also appears to challenge the deciding official’s failure to
consider alternatives to an indefinite suspension without pay. PFR File, Tab 1
at 9. However, she has not identified any statute or regulation that requires the
agency to continue her in a pay status during the pendency of the adjudication of
her access to classified information.
6
The appellant also asserts that the agency treated comparator employees
differently. 6 Id. at 5-11. It is unclear if the appellant’s claim arises in the context
of a claim of discrimination or retaliation for previous equal employment
opportunity (EEO) activity, or in the context of a claim that the agency or the
administrative judge improperly failed to consider the penalty factors set forth in
Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981), in particular,
the consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the
same or similar offenses. In either context, this argument is unavailing because
the Board does not consider claims of discrimination or retaliation or a challenge
to the Douglas penalty factors in an appeal of an indefinite suspension based
upon the suspension of access to classified materials. 7 Helms v. Department of
the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 447, ¶ 9 (2010), aff’d, 459 F. App’x 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
see Ryan v. Department of Homeland Security, 793 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“[D]ecisions . . . considering or mentioning a Douglas mitigation analysis
6
The appellant contends that the agency failed to provide her with certain information
regarding comparator employees and the administrative judge would not allow the
comparators to testify. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10; IAF, Tab 31 at 2. The administrative
judge has wide discretion under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8), (10) to exclude witnesses
where it has not been shown that their testimony would be relevant, material, and
nonrepetitious. Franco v. U.S. Postal Service, 27 M.S.P.R. 322, 325 (1985). Moreover,
the appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice because, for the reasons described
herein, the Board does not have the authority to consider her claims of disparate
treatment. See Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981) (stating
that a procedural error is of no legal consequence unless it is shown to have adversely
affected a party’s substantive rights).
7
In the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that the Board has declined to
consider the Douglas penalty factors in cases involving adverse actions based on
security clearance or eligibility determinations where an employee has not been
provided a substantive right to reassignment through statute or regulation. ID at 4
(citing Munoz v. Department of Homeland Security , 121 M.S.P.R. 483, ¶ 15 (2014)).
He further noted that the appellant identified no statute or regulation providing her with
a substantive right to reassignment to a position not requiring a security clearance or
access to classified information, and the deciding official testified that he was not aware
of any such requirement in agency regulations, but he nevertheless voluntarily sought to
find another position for the appellant that did not require access to classified
information. ID at 6, 8-9 & n.3. The appellant does not appear to specifically
challenge these findings on review, and we find no reason to disturb them.
7
have involved penalties for misconduct rather than loss of a required qualification
for a position.”).
The appellant also contends that the administrative judge should not have
dismissed her appeal because she is a whistleblower, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, but the
Board similarly lacks the authority to adjudicate such an affirmative defense in
this matter, see, e.g., Doe v. Department of Justice, 121 M.S.P.R. 596, ¶ 10 &
n.5 (2014).
The appellant further asserts that the administrative judge erred in applying
the factors for evaluating credibility as set forth in Hillen v. Department of the
Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453 (1987), and erred in concluding that the deciding official
was not biased against her because he had been involved in her prior EEO and
whistleblower reprisal complaints. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9. In Hillen,
35 M.S.P.R. at 458, the Board set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors for
administrative judges to consider in assessing witness credibility, including a
witness’ bias or lack of bias. The administrative judge, who heard testimony
from the deciding official, found no evidence of actual bias, ID at 7-8, and his
credibility determinations must be deemed to be at least implicitly based upon
witness demeanor, Little v. Department of Transportation, 112 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 4
(2009). Moreover, the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . The appellant’s
general allegations on review do not provide a reason for disturbing the
administrative judge’s finding that the deciding official was not biased against
her. See, e.g., Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The [administrative judge’s] findings about Mr. Purifoy’s
propensity for rehabilitation are necessarily intertwined with issues of credibility
8
and an analysis of his demeanor at trial, and they deserved deference from the
Board.”). Thus, this argument is without merit.
We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments on review, but a
different outcome is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
8
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board has updated the
notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board
cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
9
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
10
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
11
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
9
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
12
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.