Terri Smith v. Department of Transportation ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
TERRI SMITH, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-0752-19-0045-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DATE: June 13, 2024
TRANSPORTATION,
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Randolph Bennett , St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for the appellant.
Darin B. Tuggle , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Member*
*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained her removal for excessive absences and dismissed her restoration claim
for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED in
¶¶ 19-20, below, with respect to the appellant’s restoration claim, we AFFIRM
the initial decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant was a GS-13 Support Services Specialist for the agency’s
Office of Inspector General. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 38. On
March 10, 2015, the appellant injured her back and neck at work and began a long
absence from the workplace. Id. at 48. The Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs (OWCP) ruled the injury compensable, and the appellant began
receiving wage loss compensation benefits. Id. She never returned to duty.
¶3 In July 2016, the appellant attempted to return to duty and engaged in the
reasonable accommodation process with the agency, but ultimately, her treating
physician declined to give her a medical release. Hearing Recording (HR),
Track 1 at 5:30 (testimony of the Supervisory Human Resource Specialist),
Track 3 at 11:30 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant remained on the
wage loss benefit rolls until February 2018, when an OWCP district office
notified her that her benefits were being terminated because she no longer had
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any residuals or disability due to her accepted work related conditions. IAF,
Tab 9 at 48-49; see 20 C.F.R. § 10.503. The appellant both sought review of the
district office’s decision under 20 C.F.R. § 10.616 and notified the agency that
she intended to return to duty. IAF, Tab 2 at 3, Tab 5 at 47.
¶4 On February 8, 2018, the appellant contacted the Supervisory Human
Resource Specialist in charge of her case at her employing agency. IAF, Tab 2
at 3. The agency’s Office of General Counsel and Federal Aviation
Administration (which handles workers compensation matters throughout the
agency) advised the Supervisory Human Resource Specialist that the appellant
should be placed on the agency’s reemployment priority list. HR, Track 1
at 22:05 (testimony of the Supervisory Human Resource Specialist); see generally
5 C.F.R. part 330, subpart B (regulations governing reemployment priority in the
competitive service). The Supervisory Human Resource Specialist informed the
appellant that her former position had already been filled, there was nothing
available for her at the moment, and she would need to apply for placement on the
reemployment priority list. IAF, Tab 3 at 3. The appellant remained on the
reemployment priority list at least until May 2018. IAF, Tab 15 at 11-12, 16-17.
¶5 Meanwhile, on June 11, 2018, an OWCP hearing representative granted the
appellant’s petition and reversed the February 1, 2018 district office decision that
terminated her benefits. IAF, Tab 5 at 47-52. The hearing representative decided
that there was insufficient evidence to support the district office’s decision, and
the appellant was returned to the wage loss compensation rolls retroactively. Id.
at 51-52.
¶6 At some point, the agency determined that it had erred in placing the
appellant on the reemployment priority list, and so, on June 21, 2018, it sent her a
letter inquiring whether she intended to return to duty in her Support Services
Specialist position and warning her that her failure to return could result in
removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 46; HR, Track 1 at 22:25 (testimony of the Supervisory
Human Resource Specialist). On July 3, 2018, the appellant responded that she
4
would return to duty “as soon as [she was] cleared by the treating physician,” but
she gave no indication of when such clearance could be expected to occur. IAF,
Tab 5 at 45. On August 6, 2018, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal
based on a charge of excessive absences. Id. at 43-44. After the appellant
responded, the agency issued a decision removing her effective September 14,
2018. Id. at 39-42.
¶7 The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging the removal decision and
arguing that the agency violated her restoration rights. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6. She
raised affirmative defenses of disability discrimination, retaliation for equal
employment opportunity (EEO) activity, and whistleblower reprisal. Id. at 5-6.
After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the
removal. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID). She found that
the agency proved its charge, ID at 2-10, that the appellant failed to prove any of
her affirmative defenses, ID at 11-14, and that the penalty was reasonable, ID
at 16-18. The administrative judge further found that the Board lacks jurisdiction
over the appeal as a restoration claim under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304. ID at 14-16.
¶8 The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the initial decision.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response.
ANALYSIS
Newly submitted evidence
¶9 The appellant attached three documents to her petition for review: a
February 1, 2018 OWCP decision to terminate her wage loss compensation
benefits; a July 11, 2017 medical report; and a July 11, 2017 work capacity
evaluation. Id. at 7-20. The appellant states that she submitted these documents
below but the administrative judge failed to consider them. Id. at 3. After a
careful review of the record, we find that the appellant did not, in fact, submit
these documents for the record below. The Board will not consider evidence
submitted for the first time on petition for review when it previously was
5
available but a party elected to not submit it to the administrative judge. Fox v.
U.S. Postal Service, 81 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶¶ 4-5 (1999). Furthermore, none of these
documents appear to be material to the outcome of the appeal. The Board will not
grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of
sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision.
Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). We therefore
decline to consider the evidence that the appellant has submitted for the first time
with her petition for review.
Discovery
¶10 On petition for review, the appellant argues that she requested that the
agency produce all emails regarding her, including “emails asking for justification
for keeping her from returning to duty[,] and those emails were not submitted to
her.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, the appellant’s failure to file a motion to
compel discovery below precludes her from raising this issue for the first time on
review. See Szejner v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 275, ¶ 5
(2005), aff’d, 167 F. App’x 217 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Removal
¶11 To prove a charge of excessive absences, an agency must establish that:
(1) the employee was absent for compelling reasons beyond her control so that
agency approval or disapproval of leave was immaterial because the employee
could not be on the job; (2) the absences continued beyond a reasonable time, and
the agency warned the employee that an adverse action could be taken unless the
employee became available for duty on a regular full-time or part-time basis; and
(3) the position needed to be filled by an employee available for duty on a regular
full-time or part-time basis. Fox v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529,
¶ 31 (2014). In this case, the administrative judge found that the agency proved
all three elements of the charge. ID at 8-9.
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¶12 The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s analysis based on the
agency’s actions in February 2018, when it placed her on the reemployment
priority list instead of returning her to duty in her Support Services Specialist
position. She argues that the agency cannot prevent an employee from returning
to duty and then later remove her for excessive absences. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
We construe this as a challenge to the first element of the charge, and we agree
with the appellant that the agency erred in placing her on the reemployment
priority list. The administrative judge found so too, and the agency itself
admitted as much. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 18 at 5. It is appropriate under certain
circumstances to place individuals with compensable injuries on a reemployment
priority list, but this is limited to situations in which the individual has been
separated from her former position. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 330.203(b)(2), 353.301(b).
Because the appellant had not been separated from her Support Services
Specialist position in February 2018, we find that the agency should have
attempted to return her to duty in that position, just as it did in July 2016,
including engaging in the interactive process with her as appropriate. 2 However,
we find that the agency’s error was of no consequence because the appellant
would not have been able to return to duty in her former position in February
2018 even if the agency had allowed her to do so. We find it more likely that the
appellant would ultimately have declined to return to work in February 2018, just
as she did in July 2016 and July 2018, when she also expressed her intention to
return but declined the agency’s offers for want of a medical release from her
treating physician. IAF, Tab 5 at 45; HR, Track 1 at 5:30 (testimony of the
Supervisory Human Resource Specialist), Track 3 at 11:30 (testimony of the
2
Although the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s disability
discrimination analysis on review, we observe that that the agency’s failure to engage in
the interactive process in February 2018 did not itself constitute disability
discrimination. The appellant has not shown that there was any accommodation
available at the time that would have allowed her to perform the duties of her Support
Services Specialist position or any other vacant funded position. See Clemens v.
Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17 (2014).
7
appellant). There is no evidence that the appellant had any such release in
February 2018, or that her condition was any better at that time than it was in July
2016 or July 2018. 3
¶13 The appellant asserts that, on February 1, 2018, she was “cleared to return
to duty.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, the document to which she refers was
not a release to return to duty; it was a notice of termination of her wage loss
compensation benefits. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-13. Nor was this document authored
by the appellant’s treating physician, and in any event, it was later determined to
be in error. IAF, Tab 5 at 47-52. This situation is similar to the one in July 2016,
when OWCP “released” the appellant to return to duty with limitations but the
appellant declined to return because her treating physician did not concur. HR,
Track 1 at 5:30 (testimony of the Supervisory Human Resource Specialist),
Track 3 at 11:30 (testimony of the appellant). There was no such concurrence in
February 2018 either. Considering the totality of the evidence, we find that the
agency’s error of not offering the appellant an immediate return to duty in her
position of record in February 2018 did not prevent it from proving the first
element of its charge, i.e., that the appellant was absent for compelling reasons
beyond her control and could not be on the job.
¶14 The appellant has not disputed the second element of the charge, i.e., that
her absence from work continued beyond a reasonable time. We agree with the
administrative judge that the appellant’s absence of more than 3 years easily
satisfies this requirement. ID at 9; see Cole v. Department of Veterans Affairs ,
77 M.S.P.R. 434, 440 (1998) (finding that the appellant’s total continuous
absence of more than 2 years continued beyond a reasonable time).
¶15 The appellant does, however, appear to dispute the third element of the
charge, i.e., that her position needed to be filled by an employee available for
3
The actual medical evidence in the record is very sparse. It consists of summaries
prepared by the Office of Inspector General and the OWCP hearing representative and a
March 11, 2018 update of the appellant’s accepted compensable medical conditions.
IAF, Tab 5 at 48-52, Tab 17 at 8-9, Tab 18 at 20-21.
8
duty on a regular basis. Specifically, she argues that her position “was held
vacant after the agency hired an additional GS-14.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We
find that this fact is immaterial. The administrative judge found that, after years
of dividing the appellant’s former duties among current staff on an ad hoc basis,
the agency hired a GS-14 Facilities Support Manager to absorb those duties and
reduce the burden on the individuals who had been performing them in the
interim. ID at 5-7. The fact that the appellant’s former GS-13 Support Services
Specialist position persisted as a vacant fulltime equivalent does not rebut the
agency’s showing that it needed someone to perform the duties formerly assigned
to that position and, in fact, the agency hired another individual for that purpose.
¶16 The appellant has not directly challenged the administrative judge’s
analyses of the nexus and penalty issues, and for the reasons explained in the
initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved
that removal was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. ID at 16-18.
Restoration
¶17 Upon an employee’s recovery from a compensable injury, she is entitled to
restoration rights under 5 C.F.R. part 353 that are dependent upon both the extent
of recovery and the time it takes for her to recover. Smith v. U.S. Postal Service,
81 M.S.P.R. 92, ¶ 6 (1999); 5 C.F.R. § 353.301. An employee’s Board appeal
rights also differ depending on the extent and the timing of her recovery. Smith,
81 M.S.P.R. 92, ¶ 7; 5 C.F.R. § 353.304. In this case, the administrative judge
analyzed the appellant’s claim both as a fully recovered employee and as a
partially recovered employee. ID at 14-16; see 5 C.F.R. § 353.302(a)-(b), (d).
She found, however, that the Board lacks jurisdiction over her claim because the
appellant did not meet the definition of “fully recovered” and the agency never
denied her request for restoration as a partially recovered employee. ID at 15-16.
¶18 On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to follow
the procedures of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(b) for returning to duty an individual fully
recovered after 1 year. PFR File Tab 1 at 5. Regardless of whether this is true,
9
we agree with the administrative judge that 5 U.S.C. § 353.301(b) did not apply to
the appellant’s situation because she was not “fully recovered” within the
meaning of the Office of Personnel Management’s regulations. ID at 15-16.
Under 5 C.F.R. § 353.102, an individual is “fully recovered” when her
compensation benefits have been terminated on the basis that she is able to fully
perform the duties of her former position or an equivalent one. OWCP’s
retroactive reinstatement of benefits in June 2018 precludes the appellant from
meeting the definition of “fully recovered,” and the Board therefore lacks
jurisdiction over her restoration claim as a fully recovered individual. See Zysk v.
U.S. Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 520, ¶ 6 (2008).
¶19 The appellant argues in the alternative that the agency failed to afford her
the restoration rights for a partially recovered employee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6;
see generally 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) (setting forth the restoration rights for
partially recovered individuals). To establish jurisdiction over such a claim, an
appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) she was absent from her
position due to a compensable injury; (2) she recovered sufficiently to return to
duty on a part-time basis, or to return to work in a position with less demanding
physical requirements than those previously required of her; (3) the agency
denied her request for restoration; and (4) the agency’s denial was arbitrary and
capricious. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 11 (2016);
5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b). In this regard, we disagree with the administrative
judge that the agency did not deny the appellant’s request for restoration. ID
at 15. Although the agency did not deny the appellant’s request for restoration in
2016, the record shows that it did deny her request in February 2018. IAF, Tab 2
at 26, Tab 3 at 3. Nevertheless, we find that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation regarding the second element of her claim, i.e., that she
recovered sufficiently to return to work in some capacity. 4 Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 353.102(defining “partially recovered” an as an injured employee who has recovered
4
The administrative judge did not make any explicit findings on this issue.
10
sufficiently to return to part-time or light duty or to another position with less
demanding physical requirements). As explained above, it is undisputed that the
appellant was unable to return to duty in July 2018, and there is no evidence to
support a finding that she would have been able to return in February 2018, even
if the agency had offered her work at that time. See Davis v. Department of
Justice, 61 M.S.P.R. 92, 98-99, aff’d, 43 F.3d 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table).
¶20 Because the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that she is
either fully or partially recovered, we find that she is not entitled to restoration
under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301, and that the Board lacks jurisdiction over her
restoration claim. 5 See Davis, 61 M.S.P.R. at 99.
Constructive suspension
¶21 Finally, the appellant appears to contest the agency’s action of placing her
in a leave without pay (LWOP) status between February and June 2018, during
the period that she was not receiving wage loss compensation benefits. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 4-6. Under certain circumstances, involuntary placement in an LWOP
status can amount to an appealable suspension under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 6 See
Martin v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 9 (2016); McHenry v. U.S.
Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 80, ¶ 8 (2014).
¶22 However, the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(a),
prohibits an employee who is awarded OWCP benefits from receiving any other
remuneration from the Federal Government. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared that this statute was enacted for the purpose of providing the exclusive
remedy for injured employees of the United States. See Johansen v. United
States, 343 U.S. 427, 439-41 (1952). As a result, we held in Hagan v.
5
The appellant does not argue that she was “physically disqualified,” as that term is
defined in 5 C.F.R. § 353.102, but even if she were, there is no evidence that she is
capable of performing the duties of any position.
6
As the administrative judge observed in the initial decision, there is no evidence that
the appellant had any paid leave available during the time that the agency carried her in
an LWOP status. ID at 9.
11
Department of the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 11 (2005) and Roja v. Department of
the Navy, 55 M.S.P.R. 618, 620 (1992) that an employee receiving OWCP is not
entitled to receive salary, pay, or remuneration of any type. Because the
appellant received retroactive wage loss benefits covering the entire period that
the agency carried her in LWOP status, the issue is moot. See Williams v. U.S.
Postal Service, 31 M.S.P.R. 604, 606 (1986).
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
7
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
13
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
14
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
8
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.