Veronica Marquand v. Department of Defense ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
VERONICA MARQUAND, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, PH-0752-14-0636-B-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: December 14, 2023
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Veronica Marquand , Hamden, Connecticut, pro se.
Norman Thompson , Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.
Mark E. Stopa , Esquire, and Adam Janeczek , Esquire, East Hartford,
Connecticut, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
which sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the remand initial
decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
¶2 On September 27, 2010, the agency appointed the appellant to a GS-12
Contract Price/Cost Analyst position with the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA), Sikorsky Aircraft, in Stratford, Connecticut. Marquand v.
Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, Initial Appeal
File (IAF), Tab 57 at 56. This position falls within the DCMA’s Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce. IAF, Tab 58 at 8. Effective
March 28, 2014, the agency removed the appellant for failing to meet a condition
of employment, namely, achieving Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act (DAWIA) Level II Certification within 40 months of her entrance on duty.
Id. at 25-36, 50-54.
¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal, contesting the merits of her removal and
raising affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error and violation of due
process. IAF, Tabs 1, 14. She waived her right to a hearing. IAF, Tab 42. The
administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the appellant’s removal.
IAF, Tab 65, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 52. She found that the agency proved its
3
charge, the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses, and the appellant’s
removal promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 4-52.
¶4 The appellant filed a petition for review, Petition for Review File, Tab 7,
which the Board granted, Marquand v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No.
PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, Remand Order (July 7, 2016). The Board agreed with the
administrative judge that the agency proved its charge and affirmed that portion
of the initial decision as modified. Remand Order, ¶ 1 n.2, ¶¶ 15-3. However, the
Board disagreed with one of the administrative judge’s discovery rulings, so it
remanded the appeal for further adjudication, to include permitting the appellant
additional discovery about the agency’s treatment of other employees who failed
to meet a condition of employment. Remand Order, ¶¶ 31-41.
¶5 After further proceedings on remand, the administrative judge issued a new
initial decision again sustaining the appellant’s removal. Marquand v.
Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, Remand
Appeal File (RAF), Tab 52, Remand Initial Decision (RID). She found that the
agency did not unjustifiably treat the appellant any differently than any similarly
situated employees and that removal was a reasonable penalty. RID at 7-11. The
administrative judge further found that the appellant failed to prove a due process
violation in connection with the comparator evidence submitted on remand. RID
at 11-13.
¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision
and a supplemental petition for review. Marquand v. Department of Defense,
MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, Remand Petition for Review (RPFR)
File, Tabs 6, 10. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for
review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. RPFR File,
Tabs 12-13.
4
ANALYSIS
The appellant’s motion for leave to submit additional briefing is denied.
¶7 After the close of the record on review, the appellant requested “leave to
reference and apply” precedent that has been issued by the Board and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit during the pendency of the petition for
review. RPFR File, Tab 28. We have considered the appellant’s pleading, but we
find that the decisions that she cites would be immaterial to the outcome of this
appeal. We therefore deny the appellant’s motion. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k).
Notwithstanding this ruling, in arriving at our decision, to the extent that there
have been relevant developments in the case law after the remand initial decision
was issued, we have considered them in arriving at our decision.
The scope of the issues before the Board on remand was limited to the issues
discussed in the Remand Order.
¶8 On review, the appellant asserts that she is renewing all of the arguments
she has made throughout her appeal. RPFR File, Tab 6 at 4. Pursuant to the
Board’s Remand Order, however, the issues before the Board on remand were
limited to the penalty analysis and a related due process issue. Remand Order,
¶ 40. We therefore do not address the appellant’s arguments regarding issues that
are beyond the scope of the Board’s Remand Order. See Zelenka v. Office of
Personnel Management, 110 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 15 n.3 (2008) (declining to address
the appellant’s arguments because they exceeded the scope of the issues to be
addressed on remand), rev’d on other grounds, 361 F. App’x 138 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
The agency did not violate the appellant’s right to due process.
¶9 On review, the appellant argues that the agency violated her due process
rights when the deciding official considered aggravating penalty factors that were
not contained in the proposal notice. RPFR File, Tab 6 at 5-7. For a tenured
public employee facing removal from her position, minimum due process requires
prior notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Board of Education v.
5
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). An agency violates an employee’s due
process rights when the deciding official relies upon new and material ex parte
information as a basis for his decision. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d
1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Ward, the court held that, if an
employee has not been given “notice of any aggravating factors supporting an
enhanced penalty,” an ex parte communication with the deciding official
regarding such factors may constitute a due process violation. Ward, 634 F.3d
at 1280. Consistent with Ward, the Board has held that, when a deciding official
considers aggravating factors that were not included in the proposal notice, the
appellant is no longer on notice of portions of the evidence relied upon by the
agency in imposing the penalty, resulting in a possible violation of her right to
due process. See Lopes v. Department of the Navy, 116 M.S.P.R. 470, ¶ 8 (2011).
¶10 Nevertheless, not all ex parte communications rise to the level of due
process violations; rather, only ex parte communications that introduce new and
material information to the deciding official will violate the due process
guarantee of notice. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1279; Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77; Solis v.
Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 8 (2012). Ultimately, the inquiry is
whether the ex parte communication is so substantial and so likely to cause
prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation
of property under such circumstances. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1279; Stone, 179 F.3d
at 1377; Solis, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 8.
¶11 In analyzing the penalty factors set forth in Douglas v. Veterans
Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the deciding official referred to
“the need for employees similarly situated to meet the condition of employment.”
IAF, Tab 57 at 35. In its Remand Order, the Board directed the administrative
judge to address the appellant’s due process claim related to these “similarly
situated” but unidentified employees. Remand Order, ¶ 39. The Board found that
further discovery regarding potential comparators might yield relevant evidence
6
regarding that claim. Id. On remand, the agency submitted a declaration from the
deciding official, in which he stated that he “did not consider any other specific
employee but considered that allowing an employee not to meet a condition of
employment in the manner that occurred here would prospectively cause other
employees to believe they did not have to meet the condition of employment.”
RAF, Tab 45 at 65. In light of this unrebutted evidence, the administrative judge
found that the appellant did not prove a due process violation. RID at 13 (citing
Norris v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 675 F.3d 1349, 1353-54 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (finding no due process violation when the deciding official testified
that the information in question played no role in her consideration of the
Douglas factors or her ultimate decision to remove the appellant)). We agree
with the administrative judge’s analysis.
The appellant is not entitled to additional discovery.
¶12 On remand, the chief issue in terms of penalty was whether the agency
treated the appellant more harshly than it treated other similarly situated
employees. Remand Order, ¶ 40. As directed by the Board, the administrative
judge permitted the appellant’s discovery request for the disciplinary records of
all DCMA AT&L employees who were charged with the same or similar offenses
for the 5-year period preceding her removal. Remand Order, ¶ 40; RAF, Tab 2
at 2. The agency provided the appellant this information, but only from July 8,
2012, onward (approximately 21 months prior to the appellant’s removal). The
agency explained that employee disciplinary records predating July 8, 2012, had
been destroyed pursuant to its records retention schedule. RAF, Tab 22 at 18-20.
The appellant filed a motion to compel, but the administrative judge denied it,
finding that the agency had already provided all of the responsive information
within its possession. 2 RAF, Tab 21 at 4, Tab 23, Tab 26 at 2-3.
2
The appellant’s motion extended to other information that the agency destroyed
pursuant to its records retention schedule, and the administrative judge denied those
portions of the appellant’s motion for the same reason. RAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tabs 23, 26.
7
¶13 On review, the appellant argues that, by denying her motion to compel, the
administrative judge effectively limited discovery about comparators to a 2-year
period, rather than the 5-year period specified by the Board. RPFR File, Tab 6
at 17-19. However, we agree with the administrative judge’s decision not to
order the agency to produce information that was no longer in its possession. 3
RAF, Tabs 23, 26. As the administrative judge explained, pursuant to the DCMA
records retention schedule, employee disciplinary records are not permanent
records and must be destroyed between 4 and 7 years after they are created. RAF,
Tab 22 at 53, 108, Tab 26 at 2-3. Furthermore, the agency submitted unrebutted
evidence to show that the records in question were actually destroyed after
4 years. RAF, Tab 22 at 132-34; cf. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 27 M.S.P.R.
442, 445 n.3 (“The agency has not specifically alleged that records beyond three
years have been destroyed pursuant to its record retention guidelines.”).
¶14 We see nothing improper with the agency’s records retention schedule and
no indication that the agency destroyed the records knowing that they would be
subject to discovery in the instant appeal. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d
1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of
evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed “with a culpable state of
mind” and that it was “relevant to the party’s claim or defense”). Therefore, to
the extent that the appellant is seeking an adverse inference or other sanction
against the agency, we find that no sanction is warranted.
¶15 The appellant also appears to contest the Board’s prior ruling that she
should be able to discover the disciplinary records of similarly situated DCMA
3
On November 27, 2018, the appellant filed a motion requesting leave to issue
subpoenas to obtain evidence that she claims was “wrongly denied” during discovery.
RPFR File, Tab 18 at 4. In support of her motion, the appellant argues that the
requested subpoenas are necessary because the administrative judge abused her
discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to compel. For the reasons discussed
above, however, we find that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion
regarding discovery. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s motion.
8
AT&L employees; she argues that the Board should have expanded the scope of
discovery to the entire Department of Defense acquisition workforce. RPFR File,
Tab 6 at 17-19. However, the Board will not reconsider issues that have already
been decided in an appeal unless there is new and material evidence, controlling
authority has made a contrary decision of law, or the prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. O’Connell v. Department of the
Navy, 73 M.S.P.R. 235, 240 (1997). We find that none of these circumstances are
present here, and we therefore decline to revisit the Board’s previous ruling on
the scope of discovery. This is particularly so in light of the Board’s intervening
decision in Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 13, in which it held
that the universe of potential comparators may, depending on the circumstances,
be limited to other employees in the same work unit as the appellant. 4
The administrative judge correctly found that removal is a reasonable penalty.
¶16 When the agency’s charge is sustained, as in this case, the Board will
review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all
the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable limits
of reasonableness. Penland v. Department of the Interior, 115 M.S.P.R. 474, ¶ 7
(2010). In making this determination, the Board must give due weight to the
agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency,
recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s
responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been properly
exercised. Id. The Board will modify or mitigate a penalty only when it finds
that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty clearly
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Id. The deciding official need not show
that he considered all the mitigating factors, and the Board will independently
weigh the relevant factors only if the deciding official failed to demonstrate that
4
To the extent that the appellant argues that the administrative judge should have
certified some discovery issues for interlocutory review, RPFR File, Tab 6 at 24 n.14,
we find that the issue is now moot. See Herman v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R.
642, ¶ 11 n.3 (2013).
9
he considered any specific, relevant mitigating factors before deciding on a
penalty. Batara v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 5 (2016).
¶17 The Board has held that, in an adverse action resulting from an employee’s
failure to maintain a condition of employment, the most relevant Douglas factors
generally are (1) the nature of the offense; (2) its effect on an appellant’s
performance of the job; and (3) the availability and effect of alternative sanctions.
Penland, 115 M.S.P.R. 474, ¶ 8. Regarding the first two factors, the deciding
official considered that the appellant was required to achieve Level II
Certification in Contracting because she occupied an acquisition position and that
her failure to do so disqualified her from membership in the Acquisition Corps.
IAF, Tab 46 at 17-18. He also considered that the appellant’s failure to achieve
Level II Certification resulted in a lack of professional development that
diminished her ability to serve in an acquisition position. IAF, Tab 57 at 34.
¶18 As for the availability and effectiveness of alternative sanctions, the record
indicates that the deciding official did not seek a waiver of the deadline for
obtaining the required certification due to the appellant twice cancelling courses
she was scheduled to take and her lack of cooperation when the agency attempted
to ensure her compliance with the certification requirement. Id. at 33-34.
Further, the deciding official sought to place the appellant in a non-acquisition
position as an alternative to removal; however, no such positions were available
at Sikorsky. IAF, Tab 46 at 21, Tab 57 at 36.
¶19 As explained above, the parties in this case also filed extensive evidence
and argument concerning the consistency of the penalty with those previously
imposed on other employees for the same or similar offenses. In her initial
decision, the administrative judge considered evidence pertaining to 11 other
DCMA AT&L employees who failed to attain a required DAWIA certification,
but she found that none of them were similarly situated to the appellant for
purposes of the penalty analysis. RID at 9-10. She further found that, even if the
agency had treated the appellant more harshly than another similarly situated
10
employee, considering the Douglas factors as a whole, removal was still a
reasonable penalty. RID at 10 n.8.
¶20 On petition for review, the appellant argues that, regarding this Douglas
factor, the administrative judge incorrectly placed the burden of proof on her.
RPFR File, Tab 6 at 9-11. However, we find that, regardless of the language that
the administrative judge used to describe her analysis of this issue, the record is
fully developed, and the appellant’s substantive rights have not been prejudiced.
See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). The
record shows that, of the 11 DCMA AT&L employees who failed to attain a
required DAWIA certification, 3 of them were removed, 2 retired or resigned
before receiving a final decision on a proposed removal, 3 were downgraded to
vacant positions that did not require DAWIA Certification, and 3 received
proposed downgrades to such positions. RID at 9; RAF, Tab 22 at 133. We find
that this evidence shows that the agency’s treatment of the appellant was
consistent with its treatment of other employees who failed to attain a DAWIA
certification. Removal is the standard penalty in such cases when, as here, there
are no non-acquisition positions available to which the employee could be
demoted or reassigned.
¶21 For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge that the deciding
official properly considered the relevant Douglas factors and that removal did not
exceed the bounds of reasonableness. RID at 10-11; ID at 52.
The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased .
¶22 Finally, the appellant raises a claim of adjudicatory bias on review. RPFR
File, Tab 6 at 13-14, 23 n.3. She alleges that, throughout the appeal, the
administrative judge has “spoken on behalf of” and demonstrated a bias for the
agency, and has not acted reasonably. Id. at 13. In making a claim of bias or
prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption
of honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators. Oliver v.
Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). An administrative
11
judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new
adjudication only if her comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism
or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department
of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)); Smets v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R.
164, ¶ 15 (2011), aff’d, 498 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The appellant’s
allegations on review, which do not relate to any extrajudicial conduct by the
administrative judge, do not rise to this level.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
5
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
13
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
14
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
6
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.