Darin A Jones v. Department of the Navy ( 2024 )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
DARIN ANDREW JONES, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, DC-1221-20-0630-W-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: October 25, 2024
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Darin Andrew Jones , Potomac, Maryland, pro se.
Nikki Greenberg , Washington Naval Yard, District of Columbia,
for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Member*
*Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of
this appeal.
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to address alternative
findings relating to contributing factor and exhaustion of remedies, and to
supplement the analysis of the knowledge/timing test, we AFFIRM the initial
decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The appellant filed this IRA appeal alleging that, in reprisal for his
whistleblowing and protected activity, the agency rescinded a tentative job offer
for the position of Supervisory Contract Specialist on January 13, 2020. Initial
Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 3, 5. The appellant’s alleged disclosures included
assertions to the agency on January 10, 2020, that its Human Resources (HR)
department had violated proper HR procedures when it failed to timely
communicate with him regarding onboarding for new employees after the
tentative job offer, his submission to the agency on November 27, 2019, in
response to its request, of a Standard Form (SF) 50 showing his termination
during his probationary period from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and his claim, while employed at the FBI in 2012, that the FBI had violated
procurement laws. Id. at 5, 10, 20-23, 26, 31; IAF, Tab 5 at 5. The appellant also
3
asserted that he had engaged in protected activity relating to his 2012 termination
from the FBI, including the filing of a Board appeal of that action. IAF, Tab 1
at 5, 26, 31.
¶3 After issuing a jurisdictional order and receiving responses from the parties,
e.g., IAF, Tabs 3, 5, 9-10, 12, 20-23, the administrative judge dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing.
IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 12-13.
¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the
agency has filed a response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for
Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3, 5. The appellant asserts that the administrative
judge improperly weighed evidence, erred in finding that he failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure, failed to consider his “discovery
evidence,” failed to adjudicate a novel claim that he raised, and exhibited
favoritism toward the agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-12, Tab 5 at 4-18.
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure
regarding his January 10, 2020 email to HR.
¶5 The administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
regarding his January 10, 2020 email to HR. ID at 9. The administrative judge
also concluded that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that this email
contributed to the agency’s rescission of his tentative job offer. ID at 8. We
agree with the former finding, but vacate the latter finding.
¶6 A protected disclosure is one that an appellant reasonably believes
evidences any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety. Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R.
365, ¶ 5 n.3 (2013). The proper test for determining whether an appellant had a
4
reasonable belief that his disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested
observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable
by the appellant could reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced any of the
conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id., ¶ 5.
¶7 Although the appellant characterized his email as having disclosed that the
agency was violating “acceptable and proper HR procedure,” the email merely
conveyed the appellant’s belief that he was not being treated fairly by the agency
and that the agency had no reason to withdraw his tentative job offer. 2 IAF,
Tab 5 at 6, 17. Indeed, instead of disclosing HR improprieties, the email stated as
follows: “How is [the agency’s lack of communication] acceptable and proper
HR procedure?” Id. at 17. Thus, we find that the email amounted to a vague
query as to whether the agency had treated the appellant fairly or complied with
unidentified HR best practices, and therefore did not constitute a protected
disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army,
101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13 (2006) (explaining that disclosures must be specific and
detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing regarding broad or imprecise
matters); see also Gryder v. Department of Transportation , 100 M.S.P.R. 564,
¶ 13 (2005) (finding that the appellant’s statement of his personal disagreement
with the agency’s decision not to rehire him did not amount to a protected
disclosure).
2
In Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020),
the court explained that the Board’s jurisdictional determination in an IRA appeal “must
be determined based on whether the employee alleged sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” However, we need not
consider allegations “in a vacuum.” Id. at 1369 n.5. Here, therefore, we look beyond
the appellant’s characterization of his email to consider the document itself. IAF, Tab 5
at 17. In any event, we find that even the appellant’s characterization of his email fell
short of a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure. See Salerno v. Department
of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 7-9 (2016) (finding that the appellant failed to
make a nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably believed he had disclosed a violation
of law when he made vague allegations of wrongdoing and referenced broad statutory
provisions).
5
¶8 The administrative judge also concluded that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that his January 10, 2020 email had contributed to the
rescission of his job offer, crediting the agency’s argument that it had initiated
the withdrawal of the offer before the appellant sent the above email and relying
on supporting documentary evidence provided by the agency, i.e., email
correspondence dated December 23, 2019, and January 9, 2020. ID at 8. The
Board may not, however, deny an appellant the right to a hearing by “crediting
the agency’s interpretation of the evidence as to . . . whether the disclosures were
a contributing factor to an adverse action.” Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Because the administrative judge
incorrectly relied on evidence submitted by the agency and credited its
interpretations of that evidence, we modify the initial decision accordingly.
The appellant’s submission of his SF-50 did not constitute a protected disclosure.
¶9 The administrative judge found that the appellant’s submission of the SF -50
documenting his termination did not constitute a protected disclosure, but also
concluded that the appellant failed to exhaust this disclosure with the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC). ID at 12. Again, although we agree with the former
finding, we disagree with the latter and modify the initial decision accordingly.
¶10 We discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
appellant’s submission of the SF-50 did not constitute a nonfrivolous allegation
of a disclosure pertaining to any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety. ID at 12; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)
(8); see also Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 5 n.3. Indeed, the appellant’s apparent
belief that the agency improperly required hm to submit the subject form does not
transform his submission of the document into a protected disclosure. See Doster
v. Department of the Army, 56 M.S.P.R. 251, 253-54 (1993) (concluding that the
Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal when the appellant’s filings contained a
6
litany of allegations of agency improprieties but failed to discernably allege any
disclosures regarding the same).
¶11 Although the administrative judge also concluded that the appellant failed
to show that he raised this purported disclosure with OSC, we disagree. IAF,
Tab 1 at 22-23; see, e.g., Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 12 (holding that an appellant
can demonstrate exhaustion by providing the OSC complaint). Accordingly, we
modify this aspect of the administrative judge’s alternative finding regarding
exhaustion.
The appellant failed to satisfy the contributing factor jurisdictional criterion
regarding his remaining alleged protected disclosures and activities.
¶12 The administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation that any of his remaining alleged protected disclosures or
activities, i.e., his 2011-2012 procurement-related FBI disclosures or his
post-termination litigation, contributed to the agency’s rescission of the tentative
job offer. 3 ID at 9-12. Although we agree with this determination, we modify
and supplement the administrative judge’s analysis of the knowledge/timing test.
¶13 An appellant’s protected disclosures or activities are a contributing factor in
a personnel action if, among other things, they in any way affect an agency’s
decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Dorney v. Department of the
Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). One way to establish contributing factor is
the knowledge/timing test. Wadhwa v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
3
The administrative judge did not analyze whether any of these claims amounted to a
nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure or protected activity. Because we
agree that the appellant failed to satisfy the contributing factor criterion, the absence of
such an analysis is not a material error. Nevertheless, under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C),
disclosures of information to an agency’s Inspector General are protected regardless of
content as long as such disclosures are made in accordance with applicable provisions
of law. Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 8. Thus, the appellant’s
assertion that he disclosed information to the Department of Justice Inspector General
constituted a nonfrivolous allegation of protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(C). To the extent his prior litigation sought to remedy whistleblower
reprisal, it too would constitute protected activity. See Bishop v. Department of
Agriculture, 2022 MSPB 28, ¶ 15 (explaining that complaints seeking to remedy
whistleblower reprisal are covered under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)).
7
110 M.S.P.R. 615, ¶ 12, aff’d, 353 F. App’x 435 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Under this
test, an appellant can prove the contributing factor element through evidence
showing that the official taking the action knew of the protected activity and the
action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could
conclude that the activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id.¶14 The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to satisfy the
knowledge component because he failed to allege that the official who rescinded
the job offer had any knowledge of his FBI-related disclosures or activities. ID
at 10. She reasoned that the appellant’s assertions regarding how the official may
have learned of the same, e.g., through an internet search, publicly available court
filings, or the Congressional Record, were “purely speculative.” Id. She also
relied on deposition testimony from the official indicating that she had not
researched the appellant on the internet and was unaware of his alleged FBI
whistleblowing. ID at 10 & n.7. The administrative judge further considered the
agency’s stated reason for rescinding the tentative job offer, i.e., that it had
learned that he had been terminated from his last Federal position, and found that
reason to be “certainly justifiable.” ID at 11.
¶15 As explained above, in resolving questions of jurisdiction, the Board may
not deny an appellant the right to a hearing by crediting the agency’s
interpretation of the evidence, nor may it weigh evidence to resolve the parties’
conflicting assertions. See Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1369; Ferdon v. U.S. Postal
Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). Thus, the administrative judge incorrectly
relied on the deposition transcript and the agency’s explanation for withdrawing
the appellant’s tentative job offer. 4 ID at 11. Accordingly, we modify the initial
decision’s analysis of the knowledge component of the knowledge/timing test, but
we find, as set forth below, that a different outcome is not warranted.
4
To the extent that the administrative judge also relied on the deposition testimony of
other agency employees, ID at 10-11 & n.8, her reliance was similarly misplaced.
8
¶16 Absent consideration of the agency’s evidence and argument, the appellant
nonetheless failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that the acting official had
any knowledge of his FBI-related disclosures or activities. The appellant’s
assertions as to how this official may have learned of these disclosures or
activities are entirely speculative and, therefore, insufficient. As set forth in the
initial decision, the disclosures and activities occurred as much as 8 years before
the rescission of the job offer and concerned the appellant’s tenure at a
completely different agency. ID at 11; see Jones v. Department of the Treasury,
99 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶¶ 7-8 (2005) (finding insufficient the appellant’s speculation
that an agency official may have learned of a protected disclosure that she made
11 years prior while working at a separate agency facility). Thus, although we
modify the legal basis for the conclusion, we agree with the administrative judge
that the appellant failed to make nonfrivolous allegations sufficient to satisfy the
contributing factor criterion regarding the rescinding official’s knowledge of the
appellant’s FBI-related protected disclosures or activities.
¶17 An appellant may also satisfy the knowledge/timing test by proving that the
official taking the action had constructive knowledge of the protected disclosure,
even if the official lacked actual knowledge. Nasuti v. Department of State,
120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 7 (2014). An appellant may establish constructive
knowledge by showing that an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure
influenced the official accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id.¶18 Here, the appellant asserted that an agency attorney had “looked [him] up”
and discovered “protected activity regarding [his] 2012 termination (wrongful)
from the FBI” as well as “information and articles” about him. IAF, Tab 20
at 18; see PFR File, Tab 5 at 7-8, 11, 15. Because the administrative judge did
not consider these allegations, we supplement the analysis to consider this claim,
finding that a different outcome is not warranted. The appellant’s assertions that
the attorney must have researched him and thereafter influenced the rescinding
official again are entirely speculative. See Jones, 99 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶ 8.
9
Although the appellant argued otherwise, there is nothing inherently suspect or
improper about the agency having asserted attorney-client privilege during
discovery. See Grimes v. Department of the Navy, 99 M.S.P.R. 7, ¶ 6 (2005); see
also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.72(b) (stating that discovery covers relevant, nonprivileged
matters). Thus, we find that the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege that
any of his remaining alleged protected disclosures or activities contributed to the
rescission of his tentative job offer. 5
¶19 Finally, the appellant’s other arguments on review do not warrant a
different outcome. The appellant has not identified which factual disputes the
administrative judge allegedly improperly weighed or resolved, see Tines v.
Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992), and we have found that
the administrative judge’s improper consideration of certain agency evidence and
argument did not affect the outcome in this case. Other vague and general
disagreements with the initial decision, PFR File, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 5 at 14-15, do
not provide a basis to disturb the conclusion that the appellant did not make a
nonfrivolous allegation of protected disclosures or activity that was a contributing
factor in a personnel action. Any failure by the administrative judge to discuss
all of the evidence of record does not mean that it was not considered in reaching
the decision. See Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services ,
22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
Even assuming that the appellant exhausted before OSC his claim that the agency
perceived him as a whistleblower, given the absence of a nonfrivolous allegation
5
The Board has found that, if an appellant fails to prove contributing factor through the
knowledge/timing test, it shall consider other evidence, such as the strength or
weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the
whistleblowing was personally directed at the individuals taking the personnel action,
and whether those individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.
Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15. Here, the administrative judge implicitly considered
such evidence but found that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional criterion. ID at 11-12.
We have considered this evidence, as well as the appellant’s allegations regarding the
agency’s attorney, but agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege the contributing factor criterion based on this other evidence.
10
of actual or constructive knowledge of his disclosures or activity on the part of
the acting official, the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that the
agency perceived him as a whistleblower. Because the appellant did not file a
motion seeking the certification of an interlocutory appeal before the
administrative judge, see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.93(a), he is precluded from doing so on
review, see Banks v. Department of the Air Force , 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
Although the appellant claims that the administrative judge exhibited favoritism
toward the agency, he has not shown that the administrative judge’s comments or
actions evidence a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible. See Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶20 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision as modified, still dismissing the
appellant’s IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Boards final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review
of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your
claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
6
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
12
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
13
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
7
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
14
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.