LaDonna Collier v. Small Business Administration , 2024 MSPB 13 ( 2024 )


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  •                           UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    
    2024 MSPB 13
    Docket No. NY-1221-23-0093-W-1
    LaDonna Collier,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Small Business Administration,
    Agency.
    October 29, 2024
    LaDonna Collier , Staten Island, New York, pro se.
    Claudine Landry , Andrew D. Howell , Esquire, Bryan A. Upshur , Esquire,
    and Trevonne V. Walford , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
    Henry J. Kerner, Member*
    *Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of
    this appeal.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    ¶1        The appellant petitions for review of the initial decision that dismissed her
    individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the following
    reasons, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the initial decision, except as
    expressly MODIFIED to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis as to why
    the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that her disclosures evidenced an
    abuse of authority. In so doing, we overrule one aspect of the Board’s decision in
    Mc Corcle v. Department of Agriculture, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24 (2005).
    2
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2         The appellant asserted that, in reprisal for disclosures alleging, among other
    things, that various employees failed to follow internal procedures to accurately
    detect and report instances of fraudulent activity, the agency subjected her to
    several personnel actions, including terminating her employment and creating a
    hostile work environment.      Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tabs 1, 5, 10, 29.         The
    administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on finding that,
    although the appellant exhausted her remedies with the Office of Special Counsel
    (OSC), she did not nonfrivolously allege that she reasonably believed that any of
    her disclosures were protected under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) as a violation of law,
    rule, or regulation, an abuse of authority, or gross mismanagement. IAF, Tab 35,
    Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 6-7, 9-39, 42. The administrative judge also found
    that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that any activity she engaged in
    was protected. ID at 29-30, 33, 37, 39.
    ¶3         The appellant has petitioned for review, the agency has filed a response, and
    the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review File, Tabs 1, 4, 5.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶4         The appellant has not established any basis for granting her petition for
    review. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
     (setting forth the criteria for granting a petition
    for review). Therefore, we deny the petition for review and affirm the initial
    decision. 1   Nevertheless, we modify the initial decision to clarify the Board’s
    analysis in determining whether an appellant has nonfrivolously alleged an abuse
    of authority.
    ¶5         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
    exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC and made nonfrivolous
    allegations that (1) she made a disclosure described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)
    1
    Because we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant did not
    nonfrivolously allege that she disclosed gross mismanagement, an abuse of authority, or
    violations of law, rule, or regulation, it is unnecessary to address her claims concerning
    alleged personnel actions and contributing factor.
    3
    or engaged in protected activity described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
    (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
    in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined under
    
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a). Williams v. Department of Defense, 
    2023 MSPB 23
    , ¶ 8. The
    disclosures described under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)(A) include, among other
    things, an “abuse of authority.”     Section 2302 does not define an abuse of
    authority. However, the Board has long held that an “abuse of authority” occurs
    when there is an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or
    employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal
    gain or advantage to the Federal official, employee, or some preferred other
    persons. See Wheeler v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
    88 M.S.P.R. 236
    , ¶ 13
    (2001).   That definition is based on OSC’s definition of the term in prior
    regulations, as well as a presumption that Congress was aware of OSC’s
    definition when it enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act but did not express
    an intention to give the term a different meaning. See D’Elia v. Department of
    the Treasury, 
    60 M.S.P.R. 226
    , 232 (1993), overruled on other grounds by
    Thomas v. Department of the Treasury, 
    77 M.S.P.R. 224
     (1998), overruled on
    other grounds by Ganski v. Department of the Interior, 
    86 M.S.P.R. 32
     (2000).
    ¶6        In the initial decision, the administrative judge included a statement from
    the Board’s decision in Mc Corcle, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24, that an appellant’s own
    personal complaints about how she was treated by the agency do not qualify as
    nonfrivolous disclosures of an abuse of authority. ID at 9. The Board stated that,
    “[t]aken as whole, the appellant’s rambling allegations of abuses of authority are
    fundamentally his own personal complaints and grievances about how he was
    treated by the agency . . . and therefore do [not] constitute . . . a nonfrivolous
    allegation of a protected disclosure.” 2 Mc Corcle, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24.
    2
    Mc Corcle also held that “mere debatable disagreements with the agency’s policy
    decisions” do not constitute nonfrivolous allegations of a protected disclosure.
    
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24. That holding must now be read in conjunction with the
    applicable statute as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
    4
    ¶7        To the extent that Mc Corcle and any other Board decisions have held that a
    disclosure of an alleged abuse of authority is not protected simply because it
    involves personal complaints or grievances about how the agency treated an
    appellant, without assessing whether it meets the definition of “abuse of
    authority” set forth above, they are overruled.     The interpretation of a statute
    begins with the language of the statute itself. Semenov v. Department of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    2023 MSPB 16
    , ¶ 16. There are no exceptions in the applicable statute
    for disclosures of abuses of authority that are personal complaints or grievances
    about treatment by an agency, nor does the Board’s definition include such an
    exception. This is consistent with the principle that the definition of “abuse of
    authority” does not contain a de minimis standard or threshold, unlike disclosures
    involving the other types of wrongdoing set forth at 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)(A)(ii).
    Wheeler, 
    88 M.S.P.R. 236
    , ¶ 13.      The key question in determining whether a
    nonfrivolous allegation of an abuse of authority has been made is whether there is
    an allegation of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official
    or employee that adversely affected the rights of “any person,” including an
    appellant, or that resulted in personal gain or advantage to the Federal official,
    employee, or some other preferred person. D’Elia, 60 M.S.P.R. at 232.
    ¶8        Moreover, the statement at issue in Mc Corcle was supported by a citation
    to Willis v. Department of Agriculture, 
    141 F.3d 1139
     (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Mc Corcle, 
    98 M.S.P.R. 363
    , ¶ 24. The Senate report on the proposed legislation
    that later was enacted as the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
    expressed concerns over decisions, including Willis, that narrowed the scope of
    the definition of a protected disclosure. S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 4-6 (2012). The
    of 2012. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a)(2)(D) (stating that “disclosure” means a formal or
    informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication
    concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the
    employee or applicant providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure
    evidences any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross
    waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
    health or safety); Webb v. Department of the Interior, 
    122 M.S.P.R. 248
    , ¶ 8 (2015).
    5
    report concluded that the strong national interest in protecting good-faith
    whistleblowing     required   broad   protection   of   whistleblower   disclosures,
    notwithstanding any concern that management of the Federal workforce could be
    “unduly burdened if employees [could] successfully claim whistleblower status in
    ordinary employment disputes.” Id. at 6. The committee concluded that the focus
    of the whistleblower analysis, therefore, should be on whether the employee
    reasonably believed that she disclosed a category of wrongdoing under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8), rather than whether her disclosure of information met the statutory
    definition of “disclosure.” Id. at 6-7.
    ¶9          Although the initial decision in this case cited Mc Corcle for the principle
    that has now been overruled, the administrative judge nevertheless correctly
    addressed the issue of whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of an
    abuse of authority by applying the definition of abuse of authority to the
    allegations in this case. The administrative judge found that the appellant did not
    nonfrivolously allege that the actions in question were arbitrary or capricious, nor
    did the appellant nonfrivolously allege that the actions affected the rights of any
    person or resulted in personal gain to anyone. ID at 11-15, 21-39. As explained
    above, the appellant has shown no error in these findings.
    ¶10         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision’s dismissal of this appeal for
    lack of jurisdiction.
    ORDER
    ¶11         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
    appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    ).
    6
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
    You may obtain review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By
    statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
    review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b).
    Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
    Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
    appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
    statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
    jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
    immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
    filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
    limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    3
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    7
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
    discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.      
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. 420
     (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
    receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
    8
    race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
    entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
    requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues . 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    9
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
    section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
    2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
    review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
    of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 4 The court of appeals must receive your
    petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    4
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132
     Stat. 1510.
    10
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Gina K. Grippando
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NY-1221-23-0093-W-1

Citation Numbers: 2024 MSPB 13

Filed Date: 10/29/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2024