Dennis W Trujillo v. Office of Personnel Management ( 2024 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
    DENNIS W. TRUJILLO,                             DOCKET NUMBER
    Appellant,                        DE-0845-20-0355-I-1
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: November 14, 2024
    MANAGEMENT,
    Agency.
    THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
    Dennis W. Trujillo , Denver, Colorado, pro se.
    Michael Shipley , Washington, D.C., for the agency.
    BEFORE
    Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
    Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
    Henry J. Kerner, Member
    FINAL ORDER
    The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
    affirmed a final decision of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), found
    that the appellant was overpaid by $47,619 in retirement annuity benefits, denied
    the appellant’s request for a waiver of the debt, and denied an adjustment to the
    1
    A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
    significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
    but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
    required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
    precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
    as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.117
    (c).
    2
    repayment schedule. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
    following circumstances:     the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
    material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
    or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
    administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
    decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
    discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
    material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
    diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
    Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    ).             After fully
    considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
    established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to
    find that the appellant was without fault in the overpayment, but we still find that
    the appellant is not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment. We VACATE the
    portion of the initial decision finding that the appellant is not entitled to an
    adjustment of the repayment schedule because the Board lacks jurisdiction to
    consider an adjustment in this case.      Except as so expressly MODIFIED, we
    AFFIRM the initial decision.
    BACKGROUND
    The appellant applied for workers’ compensation benefits from the Office
    of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) and disability retirement benefits
    through the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). Initial Appeal File
    (IAF), Tab 6 at 51-54. In his application for FERS benefits, the appellant stated
    that his claim for OWCP benefits was pending, and he acknowledged that he
    could not receive benefits from FERS and OWCP at the same time. 
    Id. at 54
    . He
    also checked a box authorizing OPM to collect any overpayment if he was found
    to have received dual compensation from both FERS and OWCP.               
    Id.
     On or
    3
    about July 12, 2018, OPM notified the appellant that it authorized interim FERS
    annuity payments. 
    Id. at 8, 45-46
    ; IAF, Tab 32 at 4. Eight days later, on July 20,
    2018, the appellant mailed a letter to OPM requesting that it stop FERS payments
    because he was electing to receive OWCP payments instead.                IAF, Tab 6
    at 47-48. OPM did not immediately stop the payments, and the appellant received
    both FERS annuity payments and OWCP benefits for the time period between
    January 1, 2018, and April 30, 2019, resulting in an overpayment of $47,619. 
    Id. at 20-21
    .
    After OPM notified him of the overpayment, the appellant requested a
    waiver. 
    Id. at 14-18
    . OPM issued a final decision denying the appellant’s request
    for a waiver because he should have known to set aside the erroneous payments
    and finding that he was not entitled to an adjustment of the repayment schedule
    because he failed to demonstrate financial hardship. 
    Id. at 8-11
    . OPM advised
    the appellant that, if he did not elect to enter into the installment repayment
    agreement or file an appeal with the Board, the total balance would become due.
    IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12.     The appellant did not remit a lump sum or enter the
    repayment agreement, but he elected to file a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1. The
    administrative judge affirmed OPM’s reconsideration decision.        IAF, Tab 37,
    Initial Decision (ID). The appellant has filed a petition for review, and OPM has
    filed a response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-4.
    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
    On review, the appellant has not challenged the existence or amount of an
    overpayment. PFR File, Tab 1. The appellant argues that he is entitled to a
    waiver or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to an adjustment of the repayment
    schedule because of financial hardship.      
    Id. at 4-5
    .   He also challenges the
    administrative judge’s discovery rulings and requests that his doctor be permitted
    to testify about his state of mind at the time of the overpayment. 
    Id.
    4
    The appellant is not entitled to a waiver.
    Recovery of an overpayment may be waived if the appellant is “without
    fault” for the overpayment and “recovery would be against equity and good
    conscience.” 
    5 C.F.R. § 845.301
    . The prompt notification exception creates an
    automatic finding of no fault for individuals who contact OPM within 60 days of
    the receipt of an overpayment to question the correctness of the payment. IAF,
    Tab 5 at 12; see Boyd v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    851 F.3d 1309
    ,
    1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying the prompt notification exception).
    The administrative judge’s finding that the appellant delayed contacting
    OPM by 6 months after the overpayment is erroneous. 2 ID at 2. OPM notified
    the appellant on or around July 12, 2018, that it authorized interim payments.
    IAF, Tab 6 at 8, 45-46, Tab 32 at 4. On July 20, 2018, the appellant mailed a
    letter to OPM requesting to stop FERS payments because he was electing to
    instead receive OWCP payments. IAF, Tab 6 at 47-48. Because the appellant
    contacted OPM within 60 days of receiving notification of approval and the
    commencement of benefits, we find that the prompt notification exception applies
    and he is not at fault for the overpayment.
    We next consider whether it would be against equity and good conscience
    to require the appellant to repay the benefits.      OPM’s guidelines state, “an
    individual who accepted a payment which he/she suspected or knew to be
    erroneous but who is found without fault under the Prompt Notification Exception
    . . . is obliged to set the overpaid money aside pending recovery by OPM.” IAF,
    Tab 5 at 15 (emphasis in original). This is known as the set-aside rule. Absent
    exceptional circumstances, recovery by OPM in these cases is not against equity
    and good conscience, and financial hardship is not an exceptional circumstance.
    James v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    72 M.S.P.R. 211
    , 217 (1996). On
    review, the appellant reasserts his argument that he did not know of the
    2
    To the extent that the administrative judge found that the erroneous 6-month delay
    diminished the appellant’s credibility, we vacate that finding. ID at 2 n.2.
    5
    overpayment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The appellant alleges that he was receiving
    various benefits around the same time and was unaware of the source of the
    payments that were being deposited into his account.        
    Id.
     We agree with the
    administrative judge’s finding that the appellant knew or should have known that
    he was receiving an overpayment based on his July 20, 2018 letter to OPM, as
    well as his acknowledgment in his application for FERS benefits that he was not
    entitled to receive FERS and OWCP benefits at the same time. ID at 4-5 & n.6.
    Because the set-aside rule required the appellant to preserve the money for
    repayment, we find that recovery is not against equity and good conscience. 
    Id.
    Nevertheless, we are mindful that it was OPM that helped create this situation.
    Specifically, instead of promptly processing the appellant’s request to cease
    payments, OPM continued to pay the appellant for approximately 9 months and
    now must use government resources to recover the substantial overpayment that
    resulted from its lack of action.
    The Board lacks jurisdiction to address the appellant’s possible entitlement to an
    adjustment of the repayment schedule.
    In Fearon v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    107 M.S.P.R. 122
    , ¶¶ 14-15
    (2007), the Board held that it lacks jurisdiction to address an appellant’s possible
    entitlement to an adjustment of the repayment schedule when there is no
    repayment schedule in effect at the time the debt is to be collected. The Board
    explained that its authority is limited to OPM actions or orders that affect the
    appellant’s “rights or interests” under the Civil Service Retirement System
    (CSRS). 3 
    Id.
     It concluded that because the appellant was no longer receiving an
    annuity, OPM’s attempts to recover the overpayment by other means, either by
    persuading her to enter into a voluntary repayment agreement or by referring the
    matter to the Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice, did not
    affect her “rights or interests” under the CSRS. 
    Id.
     The Board has recognized an
    3
    Because the “rights or interests” language of 
    5 U.S.C. § 8347
    (d)(1), under CSRS, is
    identical to the language in 
    5 U.S.C. § 8461
    (e)(1), under FERS, we find that the
    reasoning in Fearon is applicable to cases arising under FERS.
    6
    exception to this general rule and has found jurisdiction when an appellant is
    receiving a recurring payment from another source from which the debt can be
    offset, such as OWCP benefits. See Martin v. Office of Personnel Management,
    
    119 M.S.P.R. 188
    , ¶ 9 n.4 (2013); Alexander v. Office of Personnel Management,
    
    114 M.S.P.R. 122
    , ¶¶ 11-12 (2010).
    Here, it is undisputed that the appellant is not receiving an annuity and
    there is no repayment schedule in effect at this time. IAF, Tab 11 at 3, Tab 32
    at 4. Though the appellant is receiving OWCP benefits, the record reflects that
    the overpayment is not being offset from the appellant’s OWCP benefits. IAF,
    Tab 11 at 3. As in Fearon, OPM has stated that the debt will be collected by the
    Department of the Treasury.          Id.; see Fearon, 
    107 M.S.P.R. 122
    , ¶ 4.
    Accordingly, we lack authority to adjudicate the appellant’s possible entitlement
    to an adjustment to the repayment schedule, and we vacate the initial decision
    regarding this finding.     See Miller v. Office of Personnel Management,
    
    123 M.S.P.R. 68
    , ¶ 13 (2015) (finding no jurisdiction to consider an adjustment
    of the repayment schedule when there was no repayment schedule in effect at the
    time of the action and there was no indication in the record that OPM was seeking
    to offset another of the appellant’s recurring payments to recover the
    overpayment).
    The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the appellant’s
    discovery requests.
    On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred by
    denying various discovery requests. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. An administrative
    judge has broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters, and the Board will not
    reverse an administrative judge’s rulings on discovery matters absent an abuse of
    discretion. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    123 M.S.P.R. 365
    , ¶ 16 (2016). The
    administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for discovery of “evidence
    regarding other cases in which financial hardship was granted or denied” as
    untimely without good cause and, in the alternative, because it is beyond the
    7
    scope of permissible discovery for the agency. IAF, Tab 28 at 2. The appellant
    did not object to the administrative judge’s denial and did not file a motion to
    compel as required by 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.73
    (c), (d)(3) (2020). The appellant does
    not state in his petition for review that his request was timely, and he does not
    explain why the requested information is relevant.               We find that the
    administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the appellant’s
    discovery request for this information.         Fisher v. Department of Defense,
    
    59 M.S.P.R. 165
    , 170-71 (1993) (finding the administrative judge did not err in
    denying the appellant’s request for discovery when the request was not timely
    made in accordance with the administrative judge’s order); Radziewicz v. U.S.
    Postal Service, 
    42 M.S.P.R. 692
    , 695-97 (1990) (finding an administrative judge
    did not err in denying discovery when the appellant failed to exercise due
    diligence in pursuing discovery by filing a motion to compel).
    The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge erred by not
    allowing discovery of “prior cases the OPM representative worked on” and a
    “special expense list.”   PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.        The administrative judge’s
    acknowledgment order provided basic discovery instructions to the appellant and
    referred him to the applicable regulations.      IAF, Tab 2 at 3-4.    There is no
    indication in the record that the appellant requested these documents before the
    deadline to initiate discovery expired.   IAF, Tab 28 at 2.       We find that the
    appellant’s failure to avail himself of the opportunity to engage in discovery is
    not attributable to the administrative judge.    See Clark v. U.S. Postal Service,
    
    123 M.S.P.R. 466
    , ¶ 16 (2016), aff’d per curium, 
    679 F. App’x 1006
     (Fed. Cir.
    2017), overruled on other grounds by Cronn v. U.S. Postal Service , 
    2022 MSPB 13
    , ¶ 20 n.11.
    Finally, the appellant requests that his doctor be permitted to testify
    regarding his mental state at the time of the overpayment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5.
    There is no evidence that the appellant made this request before the
    administrative judge. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 33 at 1. The Board will not consider
    8
    evidence submitted for the first time in the petition for review absent a showing
    that it was unavailable before the record closed despite the party’s due diligence.
    Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R 211, 214 (1980). The appellant has
    not alleged that his doctor’s testimony was not available prior to the close of the
    record, and we, therefore, deny the appellant’s request for his doctor to testify.
    Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    62 M.S.P.R. 76
    , 79-80 (1994) (finding the appellant
    did not exercise due diligence in attempting to obtain evidence before the
    administrative judge when he did not file a discovery request or a motion to
    compel discovery, and, therefore, he was not permitted to present the evidence for
    the first time in his petition for review).
    The appellant’s remaining arguments dispute the administrative judge’s
    findings regarding financial hardship and adjustment of the repayment schedule.
    Because we lack jurisdiction to adjust the repayment schedule, we need not
    address those arguments. Based on the foregoing, we vacate the findings in the
    initial decision relating to the appellant’s request for an adjustment to the
    repayment schedule and we affirm the initial decision as explicitly modified
    herein.
    NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
    The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
    Board’s final decision in this matter.        
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    .    You may obtain
    review of this final decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1). By statute, the nature of
    your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
    forum with which to file. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b). Although we offer the following
    summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
    provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
    the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
    4
    Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
    the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
    Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
    9
    regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
    this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
    claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
    within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
    chosen forum.
    Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
    below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
    about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
    should contact that forum for more information.
    (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
    judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
    within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(A).
    If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    10
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
    discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
    were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
    was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
    judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
    claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
    receive this decision.     
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
    Protection Board, 
    582 U.S. 420
     (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
    receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
    race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
    entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
    requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
    Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
    websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
    all other issues . 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). You must file any such request with the
    EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
    this decision. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7702
    (b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
    and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
    11
    with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
    this decision.
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
    address of the EEOC is:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    P.O. Box 77960
    Washington, D.C. 20013
    If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
    by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
    Office of Federal Operations
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    131 M Street, N.E.
    Suite 5SW12G
    Washington, D.C. 20507
    (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
    Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
    claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) or
    other protected activities listed in 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
    If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
    disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
    section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
    (9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
    with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
    competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
    5
    The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
    whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
    December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
    July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
    MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
    The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. 
    Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132
     Stat. 1510.
    12
    review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.           
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1)(B).
    If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
    following address:
    U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    717 Madison Place, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20439
    Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
    relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
    contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
    If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
    http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
    for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
    Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
    any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
    13
    Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
    respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
    http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
    FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
    Gina K. Grippando
    Clerk of the Board
    Washington, D.C.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: DE-0845-20-0355-I-1

Filed Date: 11/14/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2024