Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education , 368 N.C. 609 ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 557PA13
Filed 29 January 2016
TYKI SAKWAN IRVING
v.
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 750 S.E.2d 1 (2013), reversing an order
filed on 8 August 2012 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission and remanding
for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 February 2015.
Osborne Law Firm, P.C., by Curtis C. Osborne, for plaintiff-appellee.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Olga E. Vysotskaya de Brito and Amar
Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for defendant-appellant.
Law Office of Kevin J. Williams, PLLC, by Kevin J. Williams; and Perry Perry
& Perry, P.A., by Maria Singleton, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice,
amicus curiae.
JACKSON, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether plaintiff Tyki Sakwan Irving may bring an
action pursuant to the Tort Claims Act before the North Carolina Industrial
Commission (the Commission) to recover for alleged negligence by an employee of a
local board of education in the operation of an activity bus transporting students and
school staff to an extracurricular event. Because the waiver of governmental
IRVING V. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BD. OF EDUC.
Opinion of the Court
immunity provided in the relevant section of the Tort Claims Act does not apply to
the set of facts before us, we conclude that the Commission does not have jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s action.
In October 2007, plaintiff’s car was struck by a school activity bus transporting
student athletes and staff to a football game in Mecklenburg County. The bus was
driven by Randall Long, an employee of defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education. Plaintiff contends that as a result of Long’s negligence, she received
serious personal injuries, for which she now seeks compensation.
Plaintiff initiated this action on 29 September 2010 by filing a claim against
defendant with the Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act—specifically,
section 143-300.1. This statute establishes a limited waiver of local governmental
immunity by authorizing lawsuits against county and city boards of education for the
negligent operation of “school buses” and “school transportation service vehicles”
when certain criteria are met, and the statute confers jurisdiction upon the
Commission to hear these claims. N.C.G.S. § 143-300.1 (2013).
On 8 August 2012, the Commission granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claim because the claim did not fall within the parameters of section 143-
300.1.
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Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the
Commission and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Irving v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 750 S.E.2d 1,9 (2013). Defendant
filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court allowed on 19 August 2014.
In its appeal defendant argues that section 143-300.1 does not confer
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action to the Commission because this section applies only
to accidents involving “public school bus[es] or school transportation service
vehicle[s],” occurrences that do not include accidents involving school activity buses.
In response, plaintiff contends that school activity buses fall within the ambit of a
“public school bus or school transportation service vehicle.” We conclude that public
school buses, school transportation service vehicles, and school activity buses are
distinct categories of vehicles, and that school activity buses were not incorporated
into the waiver of immunity contemplated by the Tort Claims Act.
When considering a case on discretionary review from the Court of Appeals,
we review the decision for errors of law. N.C. R. App. P. 16(a). Questions of law
regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity are reviewed de
novo. White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360, 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2013); accord Craig
v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 335-37, 678 S.E.2d 351, 353-54
(2009).
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Opinion of the Court
“The State and its governmental units cannot be deprived of the sovereign
attributes of immunity except by a plain, unmistakable mandate of the [General
Assembly].” Orange County v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 296, 192 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1972).
In addition, “ State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the
sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.” Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports
Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983) (citations omitted). Here
“[defendant] is a county agency. As such, the immunity it possesses is more precisely
identified as governmental immunity, while sovereign immunity applies to the State
and its agencies.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 335 n.3, 678 S.E.2d at 353 n. 3 (2009). Although
this claim implicates sovereign immunity because the State is financially responsible
for the payment of judgments against local boards of education for claims brought
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 143-299.4, -300.1(c) (2013), the specific
question of the Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction over this claim is one of
governmental immunity because the named party is the local board of education.
Section 143-300.1 states in pertinent part:
(a) The North Carolina Industrial Commission shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine tort claims against
any county board of education or any city board of
education, which claims arise as a result of any alleged . . .
negligent act or omission of the driver . . . of a public school
bus or school transportation service vehicle when:
(1) The driver is an employee of the county or city
administrative unit of which that board is the
governing body, and the driver is paid or
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Opinion of the Court
authorized to be paid by that administrative
unit. . . .
and which driver was at the time of the alleged negligent
act or omission operating a public school bus or school
transportation service vehicle in accordance with G.S.
115C-242 in the course of his employment by or training
for that administrative unit or board . . . .
Id. § 143-300.1(a) (emphases added). In 1998 the General Assembly added the
language “in accordance with G.S. 115C-242” to the statute. See Current Operations
Appropriations and Capital Improvement Appropriations Act of 1998, ch. 212, sec.
9.17(b), 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws, 937, 975-76 (Reg. Sess. 1998). Section 115C-242, titled
“Use and operation of school buses,” is part of the statutory scheme regulating school
transportation, and it limits the permissible use of school buses to seven purposes.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-242 (2013). As a result, the waiver of immunity and jurisdictional
dictates of section 143-300.1 apply only when the bus at issue is being operated “in
accordance with” one of the purposes authorized in section 115C-242.
Therefore, in order for the Commission to possess jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claim, the government vehicle involved must, inter alia, constitute “a public school
bus or school transportation service vehicle.” Because the vehicle at issue here is a
school activity bus, to resolve this matter, we first must address whether a school
activity bus is considered a “school bus” or a “school transportation service vehicle”
pursuant to section 143-300.1.
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Opinion of the Court
Since 1955 the General Assembly has authorized local boards of education to
own and operate school buses, as well as provide other transportation for students,
“in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the State Board of Education
[(State Board)]” and subject to other specific statutory limits. Id. §§ 115C-239 to -262
(2013). Activity buses and transportation service vehicles are among the other
significant classes of regulated school transportation vehicles operated by local
boards. In accordance with its statutory authority, the State Board has adopted rules
and policies directing the operation of all three of these categories of vehicles within
the school transportation system.
The General Assembly has defined a “school bus” as
a vehicle whose primary purpose is to transport school
students over an established route to and from school for
the regularly scheduled school day, that is equipped with
alternately flashing red lights on the front and rear and a
mechanical stop signal, that is painted primarily yellow
below the roofline, and that bears the plainly visible words
“School Bus” on the front and rear. The term includes a
public, private, or parochial vehicle that meets this
description.
Id. § 20-4.01(27)(d4) (2013). The ownership and operation of school buses in
particular are subject to a considerable amount of regulation both by statute and the
State Board. See, e.g., id. § 115C-240(c) (appearance and equipment); id. §§ 115C-
240(e)-(f), -249 (funding for purchase and maintenance); id. §§ 115C-241, -244, -246
(allocation and routes); id. §§ 115C-242, -243, -254 (permissible uses); Sch. Support
Div., Transp. Servs., N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, NC Bus Fleet:
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Opinion of the Court
North Carolina School Transportation Fleet Manual 5 (June 2015) [hereinafter
Manual] (N.C. State Bd. of Educ. Policy EEO-H-005) (requirements related to
purchase, maintenance, and operation of public school transportation vehicles),
http://www.ncbussafety.org/Manuals/NCBusFleet%20Manual04June2015.pdf.
As noted previously, section 115C-242 directs that “[p]ublic school buses may
be used for the following purposes only,” and nearly all of those authorized uses relate
directly to a school’s provision of instruction to students. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-242(1)
(limiting use to “transportation of pupils enrolled in and employees in the operation
of the school to which [the] bus is assigned” and “transportation to and from such
school for the regularly organized school day”); id. § 115C-242(3) (authorizing
operation of school buses one day before the opening of the regular school term to
transport pupils to and from school for registration and for the distribution of
textbooks); id. § 115C-242(5) (permitting use and operation for transportation of
pupils and instructional personnel as local boards of education “deem[ ] necessary to
serve the instructional programs of the schools,” including “transportation of children
with disabilities and children enrolled in . . . special vocational or occupational
programs” within the state). Those sanctioned uses in section 115C-242 that do not
relate directly to instruction of students allow for the use of school buses for the
community at large and do not involve schools or students at all. See id. § 115C-
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242(6) (use for “emergency management purposes in any state of disaster”); id. §
115C-242(7) (use by senior citizen groups).
Other legal constraints are imposed upon the operation of school buses. By
statute, the maximum speed for a school bus is forty-five miles per hour. Id. § 20-
218(b) (2013). In addition, the State Board has adopted uniform, statewide
specifications for the appearance, color, and lettering of school buses, and has made
certain safety equipment mandatory for school buses only.1
In contrast, the General Assembly has defined a “school activity bus” as
a vehicle, generally painted a different color from a school
bus, whose primary purpose is to transport school students
and others to or from a place for participation in an event
other than regular classroom work. The term includes a
public, private, or parochial vehicle that meets this
description.
Id. § 20-4.01(27)(d3) (2013). Further, section 115C-247 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, which specifically addresses the purchase and use of activity buses as part
of the school transportation statutory scheme, provides:
The several local boards of education in the State are
hereby authorized and empowered to take title to school
buses purchased with local or community funds for the
purpose of transporting pupils to and from athletic events
1 The State Board’s policy states that “[e]ach school bus (not activity bus) shall be
equipped with” lights in specific configurations, stop signals, and other safety features
unique to school buses. See Sch. Support Div., Transp. Servs., N.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Instruction, North Carolina School Bus and Activity Bus Specifications Type C -
Conventional Bus 23 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.ncbussafety.org/documents/buses/TypeCSpecs2011.pdf.
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Opinion of the Court
and for other local school activity purposes, and commonly
referred to as activity buses.
Each local board of education that operates activity
buses shall adopt a policy relative to the proper use of the
vehicles. The policy shall permit the use of these buses for
travel to athletic events during the regular season and
playoffs and for travel to other school-sponsored activities.
The provisions of G.S. 115C-42 shall be fully
applicable to the ownership and operation of such activity
buses.
N.C.G.S. § 115C-247. Section 115C-42, titled “Liability insurance and immunity,”
allows local boards of education to waive their immunity from tort claims by
purchasing liability insurance. Id. § 115C-42 (2013). By statute, the maximum speed
for a school activity bus is fifty-five miles per hour—ten miles per hour higher than
for a school bus. Id. § 20-218(b). The State Board also allows more flexibility in the
lettering shown on the exterior of activity buses and permits “[a]ctivity bus colors [to]
vary.”2
Although the term “school transportation service vehicle” has not been defined
by statute, the State Board has defined these vehicles as “the service vehicles
required for maintenance of [school buses for basic to-and-from-school transportation]
and delivery of fuel to those buses.”3 The State Board’s policy describes these service
vehicles as a category of “local vehicles” which “are typically not directly involved in
2 Id. at 32, 34.
3 Manual at 8.
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the to/from school transportation for grades K-12” and prohibits State funds from
being spent on servicing, maintenance, and fuel for such vehicles. Manual at 9. In
addition, the policy places activity buses in this same category. Id. (listing activity
buses among the examples shown as types of local vehicles).
When we review a statute that operates to waive governmental immunity, the
statute must not only be strictly construed, Guthrie, 307 N.C. at 537-38, 299 S.E.2d
at 627, but also be given its plain meaning and enforced as written, so long as its
language is clear and unambiguous, Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham,
350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1999). We note that the term “activity bus”
has never appeared in section 143-300.1, but is treated as a separate category of
vehicle in other statutes and regulations.4 Therefore, we must conclude that the
General Assembly and the State Board have defined and managed school buses,
activity buses, and school transportation service vehicles as distinct categories of
vehicles. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that school buses and
activity buses, both of which share the clear purpose of transporting passengers, are
patently distinguishable from school transportation service vehicles, which are to be
used for the maintenance and repair of school buses. Consequently, we conclude that
4 For example, section 115C-255 refers individually to “school bus drivers, school
transportation service vehicle drivers and school activity bus drivers,” indicating that the
General Assembly recognized a distinction among them all. N.C.G.S. § 115C-255.
Numerous other provisions refer to activity buses separately. See, e.g., Manual at 5, 6, 9,
13, 18, 31; see also N.C.G.S. § 20-4.01(27)(d3); id. §§ 115C-247, -248.
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Opinion of the Court
an activity bus does not fall within the category of a “school transportation service
vehicle.”
Even though school buses and school activity buses are immediately and
plainly distinguishable by statutory definition, their differing treatment by the
legislature in other relevant respects further indicates that a school activity bus is
not a mere subset of a school bus. As compared with school buses, which are subject
to significant regulation such that the State has remained a functional part-owner of
them, the ownership and operation of activity buses are the exclusive province of local
school boards. See N.C.G.S. § 115C-247. Every use of a school bus that the General
Assembly has authorized that involves schools and the transport of students is for a
purpose that is fundamentally curricular in nature.
The role of an activity bus within the school transportation system is governed
by a separate statute in Chapter 115C, which indicates that activity buses are to be
used for students’ extracurricular transport needs, specifically, “for the purpose of
transporting pupils to and from athletic events and for other local school activity
purposes.” Id. Perhaps most importantly, the General Assembly explicitly provided
in this statute the method by which local school boards waive immunity for tort
claims arising from the negligent operation of activity buses. Section 115C-247 states
that section 115C-42—which authorizes local boards of education to waive their
immunity from tort claims by purchasing liability insurance—“shall be fully
applicable to the ownership and operation of such activity school buses.” Id. The
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Opinion of the Court
General Assembly enacted sections 115C-247 and 143-300.1 the same year—which
supports our conclusion that activity buses were contemplated to be used for school
transportation services—yet the method of waiving immunity for the operation of
activity buses is markedly different than that employed for a waiver for the operation
of a school bus. Compare N.C.G.S. § 115C-247 (waiving immunity for operation of
activity buses by purchasing liability insurance) with id. § 143-300.1 id. § 143-300.1
(bringing negligent acts by drivers of “school buses and school transportation service
vehicles” under the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided in the State Tort
Claims Act). Therefore, we conclude that activity buses constitute an independent
category of school transportation vehicles. Although certain regulations apply
equally to both school buses and activity buses, when the legislature has sought to
couple the two, it has done so expressly. See, e.g., id. § 115C-249.1(a)(2) (defining a
“school bus” for purposes of that section as a “school bus” or a “school activity bus”).
The legislature has taken no such action with respect to section 143-300.1 or its
subject matter. Activity buses plainly are excluded from section 143-300.1, therefore
they are not a category of vehicle covered by this statute.
Because section 143-300.1 confers jurisdiction upon the Commission only when
“a public school bus or school transportation service vehicle” is at issue, and we have
concluded that the school activity bus in this case does not meet this requirement,
the Commission does not have jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, we hold that the
Commission properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
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Opinion of the Court
REVERSED.
Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
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