State v. . Anderson ( 1889 )

Merrimon, C. J.

— after stating the case: The statute (The Code, §§3119, 3120) prescribes, among other things, that “if any person shall entice, persuade and procure any servant by indenture, or any servant who shall have contracted in writing, or orally, to serve his employer, to unlawfully leave the service of his master or employer, &c., * * * the offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding six months.” We think that the Court below held properly that what the defendant did was not a violation of the above recited statutory provision.

It will be observed that it makes it a misdemeanor to entice, persuade and procure one of two classes of servants “to unlawfully leave the service of his master or employer.” First, one who is such by indenture; secondly, “one who shall have contracted in writing, or orally, to serve his employer.” It does not, in terms, or by just implication/ extend to or embrace servants who become such by relations otherwise created. The two classes thus specified embrace the great body of servants employed, and it seems that the purpose of the statute is to protect masters and employers against officious and sinister intermeddlers, whatever their motives, with them. Such servants would feel more at liberty to be persuaded and procured to quit their masters’ employ. As to servants, not so numerous, becoming such otherwise than as so provided, the master or employer would, ordinarily, be helped to retain control of them by the person from whom he hired them, or, in case of his unlawful interference with them, he would have his civil remedy against him.

The servant of the prosecutor, who is charged in the indictment to have been “ enticed, persuaded and procured” by the defendant to leave his service, was not such by indenture, nor was he such by any contract on his part with the prosecutor. The defendant himself hired his son, a minor under his control, such servant to the prosecutor, and, as we have seen, what he did does not come-within the inhibition of the statute cited.

But if the statute were more comprehensive than it is, the defendant did not “ entice, persuade and procure ” the prosecutor’s servant to quit his service as contemplated by the statute. He, openly and defiantly, claiming and exercising authority and control as father of the servant, a minor, commanded him to quit the prosecutor’s service, and, acting upon such command, he did so. • He did not “ entice, persuade and procure.” If the prosecutor had employed — contracted with — the minor son of the defendant without the latter’s sanction, the latter would, in that case, have had the right as father to command and require his son — the servant — to quit such service and go home, because his rights would have been paramount to that of the prosecutor, nor would this be a violation of the statute. But if the minor had so contracted, and a person, other than the father, had “enticed, persuaded and procured” such servant to quit his employer’s service, such person would be guilty of a violation of the statute. State v. Harwood, — decided at this term.

There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Affirmed.