McCaskill v. . Currie ( 1893 )

Avery, J.:

Where the verdict of a jury is either so inconsistent or so indefinite that the Court cannot determine upon the pleadings and findings what judgment should be rendered in favor of a given party, or which of the parties is entitled to judgment, it must be set aside and a new trial awarded. Allen v. Sallinger, 105 N. C., 333; Crews v. Crews, 64 N. C., 536. The same result must follow where findings of the jury are irreconcilably inconsistent with the admissions in the pleadings. Tankard v. Tankard, 79 N. C. 54.

A careful review of the cases in which this Court has given its approval to setting aside verdicts on account of inconsistent findings, disloses the fact that the rulings have invariably rested upou the ground that there were two responses to different issues in each case, one of w'hich would support a decree for the defendant, while the other would entitle the plaintiff to recover. So that the Court could not proceed to judgment because there was no principle of law which empowered the Judge to choose between two contestants, both of whom had been declared by the jury to be the prevailing party. Mitchell v. Brown, 88 N. C., 156; Bank v. Alexander, 84 N. C., 30; Morrison v. Watson, 95 N. C., 479; Turrentine v. Railroad, 92 N. C., 638; Porter v. Railroad, 97 N. C., 66; Allen v. Sallinger, supra; Puffer v. Lucas, 107 N. C., 322. But when the verdict points out who is the prevailing party, and determines distinctly the facts upon which the nature and measure of his redress depend, the Court is not precluded from pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the findings, because, upon two allegations in the complaint, in the nature of separate counts in a declaration or distinct grounds of action, issues have been framed and responses returned which are not in perfect harmony with each other, when it appears that upon either finding, considered separately, the same party (here the plaintiff) would be entitled to precisely the same judgment. In the case at bar, whether the defendant inserted the description of the 150-acre tract of land in the deed before it was signed, and by undue influence or false representation induced the grantor to execute it in that shape, or whether after execution he forged the portion of the deed embracing the calls of that tract, in -either event the Court would declare the deed fraudulent and void as a conveyance of the 150-acre tract, and adjudge that the plaintiff recover the possession, and costs in the action. Indeed, we can readily understand how the jury might have been misled so far as to intend by the response to the first issue to find that the defendant represented to Alexander Robinson that he was conveying only the eighty-acre tract, and afterwards altered the deed by inserting the description of the other tract.

If the Judge who presided in the Court below entertained any doubt about the weight of the evidence, and thought that the findings of the jury upon both issues, together with other circumstances, indicated that they were unduly biased in favor of the plaintiff, he might have set aside the verdict in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the order would not have been reviewable here. But we do not think that the verdict is so contradictory or inconsistent that the Court could not see what judgment should be entered. Mere informality will not vitiate a verdict if it appears that no injustice will result from an adjudication upon its substance or general purport. Hawkins v. House, 65 N. C., 614; McMahan v. Miller, 82 N. C., 317; Walker v. Mebane, 90 N. C., 259.

We have extended our examination of authorities upon the practice in cases of this kind to the text-writers and decisions of other Courts, and we have not found any case where two findings, which would support precisely the same judgment in favor of the same party, have been set aside on the ground of inconsistency in the verdict. Potter v. Hancock, 30 Conn., 518; Hilliard on New Trials, p. 148. The Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Hyatt v. Railroad, 6 Hun., 306, held that a verdict was inconsistent w'here the jury assessed punitive damages against a railway company on account of an assault on the plaintiff by its conductor, who was a co-defendant, but did not find a verdict against the conductor, because, ex necessitate, if the conductor was not in fault the company was not liable. The finding in favor of the conductor necessarily meant that the plaintiff was entitled to recover nothing against the corporation, while the assessment of damages against the company was a basis for a judgment for the amount against it. The verdict was set aside, because, in one aspect of it, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, while in another he was not. The test, therefore, is whether there are two phases of a verdict — the one entitling the one party and the other the adverse party to a judgment in his favor.

The judgment of the Court is reversed and the case remanded, to the end that judgment may be rendered upon the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Reversed.