Minor v. Minor ( 2013 )


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  •                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. 25A13
    FILED 13 JUNE 2013
    GROVER FRANKLIN MINOR and CAROLEEN W. MINOR
    v.
    SANDRA ANN MINOR
    Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel
    of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    737 S.E.2d 116
     (2012), affirming a
    judgment entered on 30 August 2011 and an order denying post-trial motions
    entered on 23 September 2011, all by Judge Jan H. Samet in District Court,
    Guilford County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 6 May 2013.
    Rossabi Black Slaughter, P.A., by Gavin J. Reardon and T. Keith Black, for
    plaintiff-appellees.
    Tuggle Duggins P.A., by Jeffrey S. Southerland, Denis E. Jacobson, and
    Brandy L. Mills, for defendant-appellant.
    EDMUNDS, Justice.
    Although defendant-appellant Sandra Minor (defendant) alleged in her
    counterclaim and at trial that she became the owner of an entire parcel of land
    through adverse possession, she argued on appeal that the trial court erred in
    failing to instruct the jury that it could find she adversely possessed some portion of
    the parcel. We conclude that the trial court’s instructions were consistent both with
    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant’s pleading and with her evidence that she adversely possessed the entire
    tract. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
    Plaintiff-appellees Grover and Caroleen Minor (plaintiffs) are the parents of
    defendant’s former husband, Tyson Minor (Tyson). Plaintiffs have held title to the
    disputed property, 23.72 acres located at 7949 Valley Falls Road, Greensboro, North
    Carolina, since 19 April 1972.     Approximately eight acres of the property are
    improved land surrounding and including a small cabin or house. The rest of the
    parcel is steep and heavily wooded in some parts and swampy in others.
    Defendant married Tyson in 1980 and they began living on the property
    around 1984. They made several improvements to the site, including building a
    bridge over a ravine, adding heat, power, and running water to the house, and
    erecting an arbor. Defendant testified that plaintiffs neither gave permission for
    these improvements nor made any monetary contribution toward the work.
    Defendant and Tyson separated in 2001.             Tyson moved away from the
    property, while defendant continued living there alone. Plaintiffs did not question
    defendant’s presence on and use of the property while she and Tyson were
    separated, but when Tyson began divorce proceedings in 2008, plaintiffs demanded
    defendant vacate the property. She refused. In 2010, plaintiffs filed a complaint for
    summary ejectment against defendant and on 16 March 2010, obtained a judgment
    in their favor.   On 25 March 2010, defendant appealed the summary ejectment
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    judgment, then on 23 April 2010, filed an answer and counterclaim to, inter alia,
    quiet title by way of adverse possession.
    Plaintiffs’ complaint referred to the property at issue as 7949 Valley Falls
    Road in Greensboro. In her answer and counterclaim, defendant also described the
    contested area as the “7949 Valley Falls Road property” and averred that she has
    lived continuously on “the Property” “since on or before the mid-1980s.” A pretrial
    order was filed on 20 July 2011, noting that the parties might include in their
    exhibits a survey of the property and a “Guilford County Tax Map reflecting
    location and boundaries of the Property.” This order also contained a stipulation
    signed by counsel for both sides that the sole issue for the jury would be “[w]hether
    [defendant] Sandy Minor is entitled to the Property by adverse possession[.]”
    Although defendant testified at trial that only approximately eight acres of
    the tract were developed and that the improvements she described had been limited
    to those eight acres, her testimony and supporting evidence consistently indicated
    that she contended she owned the entire parcel and that her adverse possession
    claim encompassed all the subject property. Defendant’s tenth exhibit was a survey
    of the property. This survey is included in the appendix to defendant’s new brief
    and is labeled “Preliminary.” In her testimony identifying the survey prior to its
    introduction into evidence, defendant was asked about the extent of the property:
    Q.    How many acres is the 7949 Valley Falls
    Road property total?
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    A.    23.72.
    Q.    23.72 acres[?]
    A.    Yes.
    Q.    That’s the whole piece[?]
    A.    That’s the whole piece.
    Defendant added that the survey illustrated various zones and boundaries on the
    property and that a line drawn across the property in the survey separated the
    portion of the lot where the house and other improvements were situated from the
    swampy and hilly portions. When defendant was asked if she claimed all the land
    depicted in the survey or just the portion on the side of the line that contained the
    house, she responded that she adversely possessed the entire tract. When asked if
    she made “any efforts to conceal the fact that you were living on this -- the entire 23
    acres,” defendant responded, “No, I did not.” Later, when defendant again was
    asked, “[Y]ou’re not here saying you just own the house. You’re saying you own that
    whole land,” her response was unequivocal:           “Right.”   The record is devoid of
    evidence even implying that defendant sought adverse possession of anything less
    than the 23.72 acres.
    At the close of all the evidence, defendant submitted a proposed instruction
    that would have permitted the jury to find in the alternative that she adversely
    possessed only a portion of the property.           Specifically, defendant’s proposed
    instruction relating to the element of actual possession included the following: “If
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    the other elements of adverse possession are met, [defendant] is entitled to
    adversely possess all property actually possessed by her.”        The other pertinent
    portion of defendant’s proposed instruction reads:
    If on the first issue as to whether [defendant] is
    entitled to any of the real estate located at 7949 Valley
    Falls Road by way of adverse possession your answer is
    yes, it shall be your duty to determine what portion of the
    property [defendant] has adversely possessed and
    whether that portion is all or some lesser portion of the
    23.72 acres comprised by the piece of property.
    Plaintiffs’ attorneys opposed defendant’s requested instruction and drew the
    trial court’s attention to the pattern jury instruction on adverse possession, which
    the trial court said it already had reviewed several times. The trial court declined
    to include defendant’s proposed language in its instructions relating to adverse
    possession and generally followed the pattern instruction as to the elements of the
    claim.
    At the conclusion of the instructions but before the jury began deliberating,
    defendant again objected to the omission of the proposed language that would
    “allow[ ] the jury to determine if she possessed something less than the entire 23-
    acre parcel in the event that that portion of the property was actually possessed.”
    Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that the request did not conform to defendant’s
    evidence that she was seeking possession of the entire tract. The trial court again
    denied defendant’s request.
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    During deliberations, the jury sent out several questions, one of which was:
    “Is it within our power to divide the property?” After consulting with counsel, the
    trial court responded to the question by instructing the jury that:
    Now, you’ve asked about the -- was it -- was it in
    your power to divide the property. And my answer to that
    question is my instruction said to you initially that you
    were to decide the question of whether or not the property
    located at 7949 Valley Falls Road was actually possessed
    by -- by [defendant]. And that is as far as I am able to go
    today.
    The jury thereafter returned a verdict finding that defendant did not meet all
    requirements to own the property by adverse possession.
    Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to give the
    requested instruction regarding adverse possession of some of the property was
    prejudicial error. In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals majority affirmed “the
    trial court’s decisions and the jury’s verdict.” Minor v. Minor, ___ N.C. App. ___,
    ___, 
    737 S.E.2d 116
    , 120 (2012). In response to defendant’s argument that “the trial
    court erred in denying her request for an instruction on acquiring title to less than
    the entire tract,” the majority opinion concluded that she “failed to show that the
    jury was misled or that the verdict was affected by the trial court’s failure to give
    the instruction.” 
    Id.
     at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 118. In addition, the majority opinion
    stated that “[a]ny error in failing to so instruct the jury is harmless in light of the
    insufficiency of the evidence” as to the elements of “hostility and duration of”
    defendant’s possession. Id. at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 118.
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    The dissenting judge argued that adverse possession may arise from a
    “ ‘claim [that] is limited to the area actually possessed’ ” by the claimant. Id. at
    ___, 737 S.E.2d at 120 (Elmore, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallin v. Rice, 
    232 N.C. 371
    ,
    373, 
    61 S.E.2d 82
    , 83 (1950) (emphasis added)). Thus, according to the dissent, the
    area actually possessed may represent only a portion of the “ ‘land embraced within
    the bounds of another’s deed.’ ” 
    Id.
     at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Wallin, 
    232 N.C. at 373
    , 
    61 S.E.2d at 83
    ). After summarizing defendant’s evidence suggesting
    that she possessed the developed part of the property, the dissent concluded, inter
    alia, that this evidence was “sufficient to allow a reasonable inference by the jury
    that [defendant] actually possessed at least some portion of the property.” 
    Id.
     at
    ___, 737 S.E.2d at 121. In addition, the dissenting judge argued that the error was
    prejudicial in light of the jury’s finding that defendant’s possession was hostile. Id.
    at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 120-21. Defendant appeals as of right on the basis of the
    dissent.
    We have stated that:
    [W]hen a request is made for a specific instruction, correct
    in itself and supported by evidence, the trial court, while
    not obliged to adopt the precise language of the prayer, is
    nevertheless required to give the instruction, in substance
    at least, and unless this is done . . . the failure will
    constitute reversible error.
    Calhoun v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 
    208 N.C. 424
    , 426, 
    181 S.E. 271
    ,
    272 (1935) (citations omitted); see also State v. Davis, 
    291 N.C. 1
    , 13-14, 229 S.E.2d
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    285, 293-94 (1976); Bass v. Hocutt, 
    221 N.C. 218
    , 219-20, 
    19 S.E.2d 871
    , 872 (1942).
    Accordingly, we consider whether the instruction requested is correct as a
    statement of law and, if so, whether the requested instruction is supported by the
    evidence. Calhoun, 
    208 N.C. at 426
    , 
    181 S.E. at 272
    .
    North Carolina recognizes claims for adverse possession of an identified
    portion of property owned by another. Wallin, 
    232 N.C. at 373
    , 
    61 S.E.2d at 83
    (“One may assert title to land embraced within the bounds of another’s deed . . . .”).
    A party seeking to prove adverse possession of a portion of a parcel has the burden
    of pleading and proving all elements of the claim, including that the possession was
    under “known and visible lines and boundaries” and that “[the] claim is limited to
    the area actually possessed.”    
    Id.
       Accordingly, if defendant’s counterclaim had
    specifically identified the portion of the 23.72 acre tract that she was claiming, and
    if she had presented evidence at trial to support all the elements of the claim, the
    trial court would have been obligated to give a jury instruction permitting the jury
    to find defendant adversely possessed that portion.
    Turning to the question whether the evidence supported the proposed
    instruction, we find that defendant did not plead adverse possession of a specified
    portion of the tract in her counterclaim and did not present evidence at trial that
    she adversely possessed only an identified portion of the property.        Defendant
    testified that the house and other buildings were on a part of the lot that she
    described as generally corresponding to a buried electronic dog fence marked with
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    some flags apparently protruding from the ground for the edification of the dog.
    However, even if we were to assume that this testimony describes a known and
    visible line or boundary, see N.C.G.S. § 1-40 (2011); Dockery v. Hocutt, 
    357 N.C. 210
    ,
    217-19, 
    581 S.E.2d 431
    , 436-37 (2003), this line does not correspond to defendant’s
    claim.     When specifically asked, defendant instead testified that she claimed
    property extending beyond the buried fence, but gave the jury no additional
    guidance as to where the property should be divided. As a result, even if the jury
    had been sympathetic to the notion that defendant adversely possessed a part of the
    parcel, she failed to meet her burden of establishing a claim under “known and
    visible lines and boundaries” and “limited to the area actually possessed.” Wallin,
    
    232 N.C. at 373
    , 
    61 S.E.2d at 83
    .
    To the contrary, at each opportunity defendant claimed every bit of the 23.72
    acres, and all her evidence supported this claim.          Her initial counterclaim for
    adverse possession defined the property in dispute as “7949 Valley Falls Road” and
    set out the elements for adverse possession without identifying then or later any
    subpart to which she limited her claim. The parties agreed in the pretrial order
    that the only disputed issue was whether defendant was entitled to “the Property”
    by adverse possession. Although defendant had numerous opportunities during the
    trial to present evidence that she sought adverse possession of a part of the
    property, she rebuffed every such invitation and left no doubt that she was seeking
    possession of the entire parcel.
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    MINOR V. MINOR
    Opinion of the Court
    Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on adverse
    possession of a portion of the property, and the trial court did not err when it
    declined to give her proposed instruction. The holding of the Court of Appeals is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
    case.
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