State v. Brent , 367 N.C. 73 ( 2013 )


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  •                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. 275PA11
    FILED 27 JUNE 2013
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    DEWAN KENNETH BRENT
    On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,
    unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    718 S.E.2d 736
    (2011), finding prejudicial error in a judgment entered on 16 February 2010 by
    Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Superior Court, Forsyth County, and ordering that
    defendant receive a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2013.
    Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy
    Attorney General, and Daniel P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, for the
    State-appellant.
    Charlotte Gail Blake for defendant-appellee.
    MARTIN, Justice.
    At defendant’s trial for possession of cocaine, a forensic scientist stated her
    expert opinion that a substance was cocaine, based upon her independent analysis
    of testing performed by another analyst in her laboratory. The Court of Appeals
    held that this testimony violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront
    witnesses against him. Because defendant failed to preserve for appeal the issues
    he raises before this Court, we reverse.
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    The State’s evidence at trial tended to show that on 2 April 2008 Corporal
    Michael Knight of the Winston-Salem Police Department detained defendant for
    trespassing on the premises of an apartment complex. After returning to his patrol
    vehicle to determine whether defendant had any outstanding arrest warrants,
    Corporal Knight walked back toward defendant, who was sitting on the curb. As
    Corporal Knight did so, he observed defendant’s left hand drop to his side and an
    “off-white rocklike object actually roll from his left pants area where his hand was
    at.” Officer Resendes, who had arrived to provide backup, also saw the object drop
    and noticed a white chalky substance on defendant’s left hand.         The officers
    confiscated the object and arrested defendant for trespassing.
    At the Forsyth County magistrates’ office, defendant signed a waiver of his
    Miranda rights and said he wished to speak with the officers. Corporal Knight and
    Officer Resendes then conducted an interview of defendant, during which defendant
    stated that the seized substance was cocaine which he had purchased for one
    hundred dollars. He further stated that he had intended to place the cocaine in his
    shoe but it rolled away and was seen by the officers. Defendant was subsequently
    indicted for felony possession of cocaine, second-degree trespass, and attaining
    habitual felon status.
    At trial the State sought to present expert testimony from a forensic drug
    chemist, Agent Jennifer Lindley, who worked for the State Bureau of Investigation.
    -2-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    After conducting a voir dire hearing on the matter, the trial court permitted Agent
    Lindley to testify “as to her independent opinion” based upon laboratory tests
    performed by another analyst. During direct examination of Agent Lindley, the
    following exchange occurred:
    Q.     [W]hen you reviewed the data that was generated
    in this case, were you able to form an opinion as to what
    the substance that was analyzed was?
    A.     Yes, sir.
    Q.     And what is your opinion?
    A.    It’s my opinion that the substance that was
    analyzed was cocaine base.
    On cross-examination, defense counsel further clarified the assumptions upon
    which Agent Lindley’s opinion rested.          For example, the following exchange
    occurred:
    Q.    Would it be fair to say that your opinion is based on
    these graphs and charts?
    A.     Yes, ma’am, it is.
    Q.     Not on any testing that you’ve done; correct?
    A.    The opinion I formed is based off of the reviewable
    data which was generated by the tests performed in this
    case.
    Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine and attaining habitual
    felon status. The Court of Appeals awarded him a new trial, holding that the expert
    opinion of Agent Lindley was a “mere summarization” of the report created by the
    -3-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    non-testifying lab analyst and therefore the admission of the opinion was error.
    State v. Brent, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    718 S.E.2d 736
    , 
    2011 WL 2462941
    , at *7 (2011)
    (unpublished).    We allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review to
    determine whether the lab analyst’s opinion based on the non-testifying analyst’s
    testing was admissible and whether any error was harmless.
    Before this Court defendant argues that “admission of State’s exhibit 6, the
    charts and graphs data prepared by [the non-testifying analyst], as well as Agent
    Lindley’s testimony that the substance was cocaine violated Mr. Brent’s right to
    confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.”          The State argues that
    admission of the expert’s independent opinion and the raw data the expert relied
    upon did not violate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We hold
    that defendant failed to make timely objections to preserve these issues for appeal.
    We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
    “Generally speaking, the appellate courts of this state will not review a trial
    court’s decision to admit evidence unless there has been a timely objection.” State v.
    Ray, 
    364 N.C. 272
    , 277, 
    697 S.E.2d 319
    , 322 (2010) (citation omitted); see also N.C.
    R. App. P. 10(a)(1). To be timely, the objection “must be contemporaneous with the
    time such testimony is offered into evidence.” State v. Thibodeaux, 
    352 N.C. 570
    ,
    581-82, 
    532 S.E.2d 797
    , 806 (2000) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 1155
    ,
    
    121 S. Ct. 1106
     (2011). “Moreover, [a] defendant los[es] his remaining opportunity
    -4-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    for appellate review when he fail[s] to argue in the Court of Appeals that the trial
    court’s admission of [the evidence] amounted to plain error.” Ray, 364 N.C. at 277-
    78, 
    697 S.E.2d at 322
     (citations omitted); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4).
    At trial defendant objected to the testimony related to the composition of the
    substance only outside the presence of the jury.          Defendant did not object to
    admission of either Agent Lindley’s opinion or the raw data exhibit at the time they
    were offered into evidence. Because an objection “must be contemporaneous with
    the time such testimony is offered into evidence,” defendant failed to preserve the
    alleged errors for review.    Thibodeaux, 
    352 N.C. at 581-82
    , 
    532 S.E.2d at 806
    .
    Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by reaching the merits of defendant’s
    argument on the issue of whether admission of the expert opinion violated the
    Confrontation Clause. Ray, 364 N.C. at 278, 
    697 S.E.2d at 322
    .
    Further, the other issue defendant raises before this Court—that the trial
    court erred by admitting the raw data upon which the expert relied—was not
    considered by the Court of Appeals because defendant failed to raise it in his brief
    before that court. Thus, defendant not only failed to preserve that issue through
    objection at trial but, had he preserved the issue, also would have abandoned the
    issue by failing to raise it in his brief before the Court of Appeals. See N.C. R. App.
    P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed
    -5-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    abandoned.”)    Because defendant has waived appellate review of the issues he
    raises, he is not entitled to a new trial.
    Moreover, even if defendant had preserved the issues he now raises, he would
    not be entitled to a new trial. As for the issue of the expert stating her opinion, we
    held in State v. Ortiz-Zape that “admission of an expert’s independent opinion based
    on otherwise inadmissible facts or data ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
    in the particular field’ does not violate the Confrontation Clause so long as the
    defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert.” State v. Ortiz-Zape,
    ___ N.C. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2013) (citations omitted). We emphasized
    that “the expert must present an independent opinion obtained through his or her
    own analysis and not merely ‘surrogate testimony’ parroting otherwise inadmissible
    statements.” 
    Id.
     at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (citation omitted). At trial the prosecutor
    handed Agent Lindley State’s exhibit number 6, which Agent Lindley explained
    contained three machine-produced graphs showing the results of infrared scans.
    Agent Lindley further explained that these graphs are produced when the machine
    passes a beam of light through a sample. “And depending on the interactions of the
    sample with that beam of light, we’re able to show a graph based on the absorbents
    of that sample at each different wavelength. We compare that graph to known
    standards and are able to make a determination based off of our comparison.”
    According to Agent Lindley’s testimony, she reviewed the data generated in this
    case, shown in State’s exhibit 6, and formed an “opinion that the substance that was
    -6-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    analyzed was cocaine base.” Agent Lindley formed an independent opinion based
    on her analysis of data reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. In stating her
    opinion, Agent Lindley did not repeat any out-of-court statements by a non-
    testifying analyst. Accordingly, Agent Lindley was the person whom defendant had
    the right to cross-examine, and her testimony stating her opinion did not violate
    defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. See 
    id.
     at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.
    The trial court also admitted State’s exhibit number 6, the machine-
    generated graphs showing the results of infrared scans. As we stated in Ortiz-Zape,
    machine-generated raw data, “if truly machine-generated,” are not statements by a
    person; they are “neither hearsay nor testimonial.” 
    Id.
     at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___
    (citations omitted).   Thus, machine-generated raw data, if of a type reasonably
    relied upon by experts in the field, may be admitted to show the basis of an expert’s
    opinion.   See 
    id.
     at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.     Here, consistent with the standard
    procedure in her crime laboratory, Agent Lindley analyzed the machine-produced
    graphs to form her opinion that the substance was cocaine. Admission of these
    machine-produced graphs to show the basis of Agent Lindley’s opinion did not
    violate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
    Defendant did not present timely objections at trial and thereby failed to
    preserve the issues he argues before this Court. He lost his remaining opportunity
    for appellate review by failing to allege plain error before the Court of Appeals.
    -7-
    STATE V. BRENT
    Opinion of the Court
    Even if he had presented timely objections at trial, he would not be entitled to a
    new trial because the trial court did not err in admitting either the expert’s opinion
    that the substance was cocaine or the exhibit showing the raw data from the testing
    instruments. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
    REVERSED.
    Justice BEASLEY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
    Chief Justice PARKER, concurring in the result only.
    Defendant having failed to preserve the alleged errors for appellate review, I
    concur in the result only.
    Justice HUDSON, concurring in the result.
    I agree with the majority’s analysis of the waiver issue.        However, the
    extended discussion of the merits of the case is entirely dictum, with which I do not
    agree for the reasons I have stated in dissenting opinions in State v. Ortiz-Zape, ___
    N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (329PA11) (Hudson, J., dissenting), and State v.
    Brewington, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013) (235PA10) (Hudson, J., dissenting),
    -8-
    STATE V. BRENT
    HUDSON, J., concurring
    and in a concurring opinion in State v. Craven, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2013)
    (322PA10) (Hudson, J., concurring). Therefore, I concur in the result.
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 275PA11

Citation Numbers: 367 N.C. 73, 743 S.E.2d 152, 2013 WL 3215758, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 654

Judges: Martin, Parker, Hudson, Beasley

Filed Date: 6/27/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024