Gift Surplus, LLC v. State ex rel. Cooper ( 2022 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCSC-1
    No. 363A14-4
    Filed 11 February 2022
    GIFT SURPLUS, LLC, and SANDHILL AMUSEMENTS, INC.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, ex rel. ROY COOPER, GOVERNOR, in his
    official capacity, BRANCH HEAD OF THE ALCOHOL LAW ENFORCEMENT
    BRANCH OF THE STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MARK J. SENTER,
    in his official capacity, SECRETARY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
    DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ERIK A. HOOKS, in his official capacity,
    and DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF
    INVESTIGATION, BOB SCHURMEIER, in his official capacity.
    On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
    of the Court of Appeals, 
    268 N.C. App. 1
     (2019), reversing an order entered on 2
    February 2018 by Judge Ebern T. Watson III, in the Superior Court, Onslow County.
    Heard in the Supreme Court on 23 March 2021.
    Fox Rothschild LLP, by Elizabeth Brooks Scherer, Troy D. Shelton and Kip D.
    Nelson; Hyler & Agan PLLC, by George B. Hyler, Jr.; and Grace, Tisdale,
    Clifton, P.A., by Michael A. Grace for plaintiff-appellants.
    Joshua Stein, Attorney General, by James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor
    General, Olga Vysotskaya de Brito, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan
    Y. Park, Solicitor General, for the State.
    Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr. and Matthew L. Boyatt, for North Carolina Sheriffs’
    Association; Fred P. Baggett for North Carolina Association of Chiefs of Police;
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    and Jim O’Neill for North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys, amici
    curiae.
    HUDSON, Justice.
    ¶1         Gift Surplus, LLC, and Sandhill Amusements, Inc., (plaintiffs) sued Governor
    Roy Cooper and several state law enforcement officials (defendants) seeking a
    declaratory judgment that their operation of a sweepstakes through video game
    kiosks does not violate N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, North Carolina’s criminal prohibition on
    certain video sweepstakes. This case presents the third time plaintiffs have appeared
    before this Court seeking to avoid liability under North Carolina’s ban on video
    sweepstakes. The question presented here is whether plaintiffs’ new game, as
    modified since plaintiffs last appeared before this Court, is not “dependent on skill or
    chance” and is thus criminalized by N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 (2021), which prohibits the
    operation of sweepstakes conducted through video games of chance. As we held over
    one hundred years ago and reaffirmed when plaintiffs appeared before this Court
    challenging the video sweepstakes ban twelve years ago,
    [n]o sooner is a lottery defined, and the definition applied
    to a given state of facts, than ingenuity is at work to evolve
    some scheme of evasion which is within the mischief, but
    not quite within the letter of the definition. But, in this
    way, it is not possible to escape the law’s condemnation, for
    it will strip the transaction of all its thin and false apparel
    and consider it in its very nakedness. It will look to the
    substance and not to the form of it, in order to disclose its
    real elements and the pernicious tendencies which the law
    is seeking to prevent. The Court will inquire, not into the
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    name, but into the game, however skillfully disguised, in
    order to ascertain if it is prohibited. It is the one playing at
    the game who is influenced by the hope enticingly held out,
    which is often false or disappointing, that he will, perhaps
    and by good luck, get something for nothing, or a great deal
    for a very little outlay. This is the lure that draws the
    credulous and unsuspecting into the deceptive scheme, and
    it is what the law denounces as wrong and demoralizing.
    Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 
    366 N.C. 289
    , 289 (2012) (quoting State v.
    Lipkin, 
    169 N.C. 265
    , 271 (1915)). After “inquir[ing], not into the name, but into the
    game, however skillfully disguised” of plaintiffs, we hold that chance predominates
    over skill in plaintiffs’ new game and, accordingly, that this game is a game of chance
    that violates the sweepstakes statute. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision
    of the Court of Appeals.
    I.      Background
    ¶2         This case follows from the North Carolina General Assembly’s repeated efforts
    since 2006 to ban all video-gaming machines, including video poker and other video
    card games. Act of June 6, 2006, N.C. Sess. Law 2006-6, §§ 4, 12, 
    2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 4
    , 4–5, 7 (codified as amended at N.C.G.S. § 14-306.1A (2021)). Since this first
    prohibition was enacted, owners of video-gaming machines have developed machines
    with various interactive operations, in apparent efforts to circumvent the ban. See
    Hest, 
    366 N.C. at 291
    . In response to these perceived loopholes, the General Assembly
    enacted Session Law 2010-103, “An Act to Ban the Use of Electronic Machines and
    Devices for Sweepstakes Purposes,” codified at N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4. 2010 N.C. Sess.
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    Laws Ch. 408. N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 makes it illegal to “[c]onduct a sweepstakes
    through the use of an entertaining display.” N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(b).1
    ¶3          Following enactment of the law, purveyors of video-game kiosks that were
    purportedly for sweepstakes challenged the law on First Amendment grounds. In
    Hest, this Court held that N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 regulated conduct, with only incidental
    burdens on speech, and that the law was supported by a rational basis. 
    366 N.C. at 303
    . One of the plaintiffs here, Sandhill Amusements, was among a group of vendor-
    plaintiffs in a related case making the same First Amendment argument, which was
    rejected by this Court for the reasons stated in Hest. Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v.
    State, 
    366 N.C. 323
    , 324 (2012) (per curiam). Although the record shows Sandhill has
    a long history as a video-gaming company, in that lawsuit it argued it was a business
    that sold long-distance phone time, merely using video sweepstakes to promote its
    service.
    ¶4          In 2013, shortly after our decision in Hest, Sandhill began operating and
    distributing video-gaming kiosks for sweepstakes for plaintiff Gift Surplus. Gift
    Surplus operates an e-commerce website, www.giftsurplus.com, but does not
    maintain an inventory of the products it advertises and instead buys products as
    necessary to fill orders as a drop shipping business.
    A fuller history of the General Assembly’s efforts to combat the circumvention of
    1
    gambling laws is provided in Hest, 366 N.C. at 289–92.
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    ¶5          In its business arrangement with Sandhill, Gift Surplus designs sweepstakes
    kiosks that it licenses to third-party operators like Sandhill. Sandhill places the
    kiosks into operation in convenience stores and retail establishments across North
    Carolina. The establishments are predominantly patronized by low-income
    customers, who Gift Surplus has identified as its target demographic.
    ¶6          Gift Surplus’s kiosks appear like large video-game machines that look akin to
    video slot machines. When players put money into the kiosks, they receive what
    appear to be paper receipts called “e-credits” that can be exchanged either for
    products on Gift Surplus’s drop shipping website or to play Gift Surplus’s phone
    games. Players also receive sweepstakes entries which can be used to immediately
    play games on the kiosks. The kiosks offer five similar games, all featuring reel-
    spinning video resembling a slot machine. When the game begins, the reels spin, but
    the three slots never come to a stop in a complete line. Instead, players always have
    to “nudge” the slots up or down so that three symbols align on the middle line. In the
    initial iteration of these games, players only had to nudge one symbol into place to
    win.
    ¶7          The game also limits the number of players who can win meaningful prizes.
    On 75% of turns, the player will never be able to play for the largest prize of $2400
    and, under the original setup, could win nothing.
    ¶8          Gift Surplus and Sandhill subsequently filed the present lawsuit, seeking a
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    declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief initially
    against the Sheriff of Onslow County and then against the Governor and the present
    state defendants. A trial court judge issued a preliminary injunction for plaintiffs,
    which defendants appealed.
    ¶9           A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Sandhill
    Amusements, Inc. v. Sheriff of Onslow Cty., 
    236 N.C. App. 340
     (2014), rev’d per
    curiam, Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Miller, 
    368 N.C. 91
     (2015). Then-Judge Ervin
    dissented from the Court of Appeals majority, reasoning that plaintiffs could not show
    a likelihood of success on the merits at trial because chance predominated over skill
    in plaintiffs’ game and, accordingly, it violated N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, so the
    preliminary injunction should have been denied. Id. at 369–70 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
    On appeal, this Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and adopted the
    reasoning of Judge Ervin’s dissenting opinion. Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Miller,
    
    368 N.C. 91
     (2015).
    ¶ 10         On remand to the trial court, Gift Surplus made two changes to its games.
    First, they added a “winner-every-time” modification, so that, on the 75% of turns on
    which users originally could not win any prize, retailers can set up the machine to
    award a token prize of a few cents. Second, Gift Surplus added a “double nudge”
    modification, so that instead of nudging one symbol to win, retailers could set up the
    machines to require players to nudge two symbols into place.
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    ¶ 11         After a bench trial, the trial court held that the sweepstakes game is lawful,
    relying on the new modifications made since remand to conclude that, based on the
    amended complaint and with the modifications, skill predominates over chance in
    plaintiffs’ new game, unlike the game in Sandhill.
    ¶ 12         The trial court further concluded that the sale of Gift Surplus’s “e-credits” was
    not a pretext for gambling. At trial, defendants presented evidence that the receipt-
    like e-credits are often thrown away rather than being redeemed in the online store
    or phone games. An officer in the Brunswick County Sheriff’s Office testified that he
    visited an establishment and observed players at the kiosks throw e-credits away
    and, after searching the trash, found over $10,000 of unused e-credit receipts.
    ¶ 13         Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals. At the
    Court of Appeals, the panel unanimously reversed the trial court judgment but issued
    three separate opinions. See Gift Surplus, LLC v. State ex rel. Cooper, 
    268 N.C. App. 1
     (2019). First, Judge Murphy, in an opinion joined by Judge Collins, held that, since
    plaintiffs’ new game was “visual information, capable of being seen by a sweepstakes
    entrant, that takes the form of actual game play, or simulated game play,” the
    sweepstakes was conducted through an “entertaining display,” regardless of whether
    the game was a game of chance or not. 
    Id.
     at 4–5. Judge Bryant concurred in the
    result and would have required that the game not depend on skill or dexterity and
    held that “the games at issue do not amount to games whose outcomes are determined
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    by skill and dexterity, but rather, chance.” 
    Id. at 13
     (Bryant, J., concurring in the
    result). Judge Collins joined fully with Judge Murphy’s opinion, but wrote a separate
    opinion reasoning that “[t]o the extent our Supreme Court’s adoption of Judge Ervin’s
    dissent in Sandhill signals the Court’s determination that a sweepstakes game falls
    within [N.C.G.S.] § 14-306.4’s “entertaining display” prohibition only when the video
    game is not dependent on skill or dexterity, I agree with Judge Bryant’s concurring
    opinion in this case . . .” Id. at 6–7 (Collins, J., concurring). Since the Court of Appeals
    held plaintiffs’ new game violated N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, it declined to reach the
    separate question of whether it also violated North Carolina’s prohibition on
    gambling. Id. at 5.
    ¶ 14          Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal based on a constitutional question, which this
    Court dismissed, and a petition for discretionary review, which was allowed.
    Defendants filed a conditional petition for discretionary review, which was also
    allowed.
    II.     Analysis
    ¶ 15          On appeal, plaintiffs first argue the Court of Appeals erred by applying a new
    legal standard for claims under the video sweepstakes statute rather than the
    predominant-factor test. Second, plaintiffs argue the application of the predominant-
    factor test is reviewed deferentially rather than de novo. Third, plaintiffs argue that,
    under the predominant-factor test, the trial court correctly determined that chance
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    did not predominate over skill in plaintiffs’ new game and Judge Collins in her
    concurring opinion at the Court of Appeals erred in stating otherwise., plaintiffs
    argue that their new game does not constitute gambling. We consider plaintiffs’
    arguments in turn.
    A. The Predominant-Factor Test Under N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4
    ¶ 16          Plaintiffs first argue the majority opinion below erred in failing to apply the
    predominant-factor test under N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 as applied in then-Judge Ervin’s
    dissent in Sandhill and as adopted by this Court. Defendants do not argue for the
    majority’s holding that it is not necessary to decide whether games “are chance or
    skill-based.” Gift Surplus, 268 N.C. App. at 4. We agree and hold that the majority
    opinion erred in failing to consider whether skill or chance predominates in the game
    under the sweepstakes statute as interpreted by this Court’s prior decision in
    Sandhill.2
    2Plaintiffs argue the majority erred in failing to apply the predominant-factor test for
    a myriad of procedural reasons, including that the Court of Appeals “swapped horses on
    appeal” for the appellant, that it violated the law-of-the-case doctrine, that defendants failed
    to make that argument before the trial court and so abandoned it under North Carolina Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 10, that even if properly raised defendants abandoned the argument
    on appeal under Appellate Rule 28(b)(6), that adopting a theory not argued offends notions
    of equity and fundamental fairness, and, taken together, violation of these doctrines
    contravenes the “principle of party presentation” recently enunciated by the Supreme Court
    of the United States. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 
    140 S. Ct. 1575
    , 1578–89 (2020).
    While the majority opinion’s discarding of the predominant-factor test in interpreting
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 in favor of a theory not advanced by any party was doubtless procedurally
    improper, we need not reach these issues to hold that the majority below erred because it
    contravened binding precedent of this Court in Sandhill. See Cannon v. Miller, 
    313 N.C. 324
    ,
    324 (1985) (holding the Court of Appeals has no authority to overrule decisions of this Court).
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    ¶ 17         North Carolina’s criminal code prohibits sweepstakes conducted through
    electronic machines using video games of chance. This prohibition was codified at
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, entitled “Electronic machines and devices for sweepstakes
    prohibited.” Under this statute, a sweepstakes is defined as “any game, advertising
    scheme or plan, or other promotion, which, with or without payment of any
    consideration, a person may enter to win or become eligible to receive any prize, the
    determination of which is based upon chance.” N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(5). N.C.G.S. §
    14-306.4(b) provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to operate, or place into
    operation, an electronic machine or device to . . . [c]onduct a sweepstakes through the
    use of an entertaining display, including the entry process or the reveal of a prize.”
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306(b), (b)(1) (2019). The statute defines “entertaining display” as
    follows:
    [V]isual information, capable of being seen by a
    sweepstakes entrant, that takes the form of actual game
    play, or simulated game play, such as, by way of
    illustration and not exclusion:
    a.     A video poker game or any other kind of video
    playing card game.
    b.     A video bingo game.
    c.     A video craps game.
    d.     A video keno game.
    e.     A video lotto game.
    f.     Eight liner.
    g.     Pot-of-gold.
    h.     A video game based on or involving the random or
    chance matching of different pictures, words,
    numbers, or symbols not dependent on the skill or
    dexterity of the player.
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    i.     Any other video game not dependent on skill or
    dexterity that is played while revealing a prize as
    the result of an entry into a sweepstakes.
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(3).
    ¶ 18         In Sandhill, this Court adopted then-Judge Ervin’s opinion dissenting from
    the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals. Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Miller,
    
    368 N.C. 91
     (2015). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ervin reasoned that “given that
    [plaintiffs’] equipment and activities . . . clearly involve the use of electronic devices
    to engage in or simulate game play based upon which a participant may win or
    become eligible to win a prize, the only basis upon which [p]laintiffs’ equipment and
    activities can avoid running afoul of [N.C.G.S.] § 14-306.4(b) is in the event that the
    game or simulated game involved is ‘dependent on skill or dexterity.’ ” Sandhill, 236
    N.C. App. at 365 (Ervin, J., dissenting). In adopting the dissenting opinion, therefore,
    this Court necessarily held that sweepstakes conducted through an “entertaining
    display” under the statute is only prohibited when the game or simulated game is not
    “dependent on skill or dexterity.”
    ¶ 19         The majority opinion below, however, held that it “need not decide whether
    these sweepstakes are chance or skill-based in order to hold that they violate N.C.G.S.
    § 14-306.4,” noting that “[r]egardless of whether it is dependent on skill or dexterity, a
    video sweepstakes falls within the entertaining display prohibition simply if it is
    ‘visual information, capable of being seen by a sweepstakes entrant, that takes the
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    form of actual game play, or simulated game play[.]’ ” Gift Surplus, 268 N.C. App. at
    4–5 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(3)). It based its interpretation
    on the fact that the list of prohibited games in the definition of “entertaining display”
    in N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(3) was set out “by way of illustration and not exclusion.”
    ¶ 20         We conclude that the majority erred in this interpretation of the sweepstakes
    statute. Although the list in question was not intended to be exhaustive, the list of
    types of game play included in the statute, including poker and other card games,
    bingo, and craps, contemplates only games of chance. Any doubt about whether the
    statute is only concerned with games of chance is resolved by subsection (i), the
    statute’s “catch-all provision,” see Hest, 
    366 N.C. at 292
    , which prohibits sweepstakes
    through “[a]ny other video game not dependent on skill or dexterity . . . .” The canon
    of construction ejusdem generis provides that “where general words follow a
    designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words should
    be construed as including only things of the same kind, character, and nature as those
    specifically enumerated.” Smith v. Smith, 
    314 N.C. 80
    , 87 (1985). Applying this
    principle to the catch-all provision, the logical implication of this provision is that the
    other games listed are also games “not dependent on skill or dexterity” and that only
    sweepstakes conducted through video games of chance are prohibited under N.C.G.S.
    § 14-306.4. In other words, the majority erred in concluding that the non-
    exhaustiveness of the list meant that the only limitation on other games being
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    included was that they must be video games and not that they must be games of
    chance. In doing so, the majority directly contravened the dissenting opinion in
    Sandhill that this Court adopted as its own, which held that a sweepstakes is not
    conducted through an electronic display when it involves a game or simulated game
    “dependent on skill or dexterity.” Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 365. Accordingly, we
    reaffirm our prior holding that N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 prohibits sweepstakes conducted
    “through the use of an entertaining display,” but only when the electronic display
    “takes the form of actual game play, or simulated game play” where the game in
    question is “not dependent on skill or dexterity.” N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(3); see
    Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 365.
    ¶ 21         The question, then, is not whether plaintiffs’ new game is conducted through
    an electronic display, but whether the video game is “not dependent on skill or
    dexterity.” In Sandhill, by adopting the dissenting opinion, we held that this
    reference to skill and dexterity incorporates “the traditional distinction between a
    game of skill and a game of chance pursuant to state law” such that it prohibits
    sweepstakes conducted through video games in which “chance predominates over
    skill.” Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 368. In Sandhill, relying on the Court of Appeals’
    prior decision in Collins Coin, Judge Ervin reasoned that “[a] game of chance is such
    a game as is determined entirely or in part by lot or mere luck, and in which
    judgment, practice, skill or adroitness have honestly no office at all, or are thwarted
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    by chance”; that “[a] game of skill, on the other hand, is one in which nothing is left
    to chance, but superior knowledge and attention, or superior strength, agility and
    practice gain the victory”; and, accordingly, that “[i]t would seem that the test of the
    character of any kind of a game . . . as to whether it is a game of chance or a game of
    skill is not whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which
    of these is the dominating element that determines the result of the game, to be found
    from the facts of each kind of game,” or, “to speak alternatively, whether or not the
    element of chance is present in such a manner as to thwart the exercise of skill or
    judgment.” Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 368 (quoting Collins Coin Music Co., 
    117 N.C. App. 405
    , 408 (1994)) (cleaned up). In Crazie Overstock Promotions, LLC v. State,
    argued the same day as this case, we summarized the predominant-factor test under
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 based on this caselaw as follows:
    [T]he relevant test for use in determining whether the
    operation of an electronic gaming device does or does not
    violate N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a) is whether, viewed in its
    entirety, the results produced by that equipment in terms
    of whether the player wins or loses and the relative amount
    of the player’s winnings or losses varies primarily with the
    vagaries of chance or the extent of the player’s skill and
    dexterity.
    
    377 N.C. 391
    , 2021-NCSC-57, ¶ 23. We reaffirm that the predominant-factor test is
    the applicable test for determining whether a video sweepstakes is conducted through
    a game of chance as prohibited under N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4.
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    B. The Standard of Review for the Predominant-Factor Test
    ¶ 22         Plaintiffs argue that defendants and Judge Collins’s concurring opinion
    propose the wrong standard of review in applying the predominant-factor test under
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that “[a] factfinder’s determination
    as to whether a game complies with the predominant-factor test is reviewed
    deferentially.” Plaintiffs contend “the proper standard of review of a trial court’s
    predominance analysis in a bench trial would be whether competent evidence
    supports the factfinder’s determination that skill or dexterity predominate over
    chance in a particular game.” Plaintiffs argue that “because the factfinder, whether
    judge or jury, is in the best position to conduct the balance or ‘weighing’ required by
    the predominant-factor test, the application of that legal standard is a factual issue
    entitled to deference.”
    ¶ 23         Defendants in turn argue, citing State v. Gupton, 
    30 N.C. 271
     (1848), that the
    question of whether a game is a game of skill or a game of chance—that is, the
    question of whether chance or skill predominates under the predominant-factor
    test—is a mixed question of law and fact, and, citing Gupton and Best v. Duke
    University, 
    337 N.C. 742
    , 750 (1994), that “mixed questions like these are reviewed
    de novo where, as here, there is no factual dispute about how a game is played.”
    Moreover, defendants note that while findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed
    for substantial evidence, an appellate court conducts “de novo review of a conclusion
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    of law that the trial court [has] mislabeled as a finding of fact.” Farm Bureau v. Cully’s
    Motorcross Park, 
    366 N.C. 505
    , 512 (2013).
    ¶ 24         In neither Sandhill nor Crazie Overstock, our Court’s recent cases applying
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, did we expressly state the standard of review exercised by
    appellate courts in evaluating a trial court’s determination of whether chance or skill
    predominates in a game under that statute. However, in both cases, our Court did
    not defer to the trial court’s conclusion as to whether chance or skill predominated in
    the game but freely substituted its own judgment based on the undisputed evidence.
    See Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 370 (“As a result, . . . I am compelled by the undisputed
    evidence to conclude that the element of chance dominates the element of skill in the
    operation of Plaintiffs’ machines.” (cleaned up)); Crazie Overstock, LLC, 2021-NCSC-
    57 ¶ 25 (holding based on the undisputed evidence that “chance necessarily
    predominates over the exercise of skill or dexterity” in the plaintiff’s game).
    Accordingly, we hold that whether chance or skill predominates in a given game is a
    mixed question of fact and law and is therefore reviewed de novo when there is no
    factual dispute about how a game is played. See Best, 
    337 N.C. at 750
    . This approach
    is consistent with Gupton, our first decision enunciating and applying the
    predominant-factor test to a game of “ten pins,” or modern-day bowling, where Chief
    Justice Ruffin, speaking for the Court, reviewed de novo the trial court’s
    determination that the indictment adequately alleged a “game of chance” prohibited
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    by our criminal laws and held that skill predominated over chance in the game. See
    Gupton, 
    30 N.C. at 275
    .
    C. Application of the Predominant-Factor Test
    ¶ 25         Having determined that the predominant-factor test will properly determine
    whether plaintiffs’ video sweepstakes is conducted through a game of chance as
    prohibited by N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4 and that the question of whether chance or skill
    predominates in plaintiffs’ new game is a mixed question of fact and law, we must
    now apply the predominant-factor test to the undisputed facts of plaintiffs’ new game
    to determine whether plaintiffs’ game is a game of chance. The question is “whether,
    viewed in its entirety, the results produced by [plaintiffs’] equipment in terms of
    whether the player wins or loses and the relative amount of the player’s winnings or
    losses varies primarily with the vagaries of chance or the extent of the player’s skill
    and dexterity.” Crazie Overstock, LLC, 
    377 N.C. 391
    , 2021-NCSC-57, ¶ 23.
    ¶ 26         In Sandhill, the dissenting opinion adopted by this Court held that chance
    predominated over skill and dexterity in plaintiffs’ game as then constituted because
    (1) “the machine and equipment at issue . . . only permitted a predetermined number
    of winners,” (2) “use of the equipment . . . will result in the playing of certain games
    in which the player will be unable to win anything of value regardless of the skill or
    dexterity that he or she displays,” (3) “the extent to which the opportunity arises for
    the ‘nudging’ activity . . . appears to be purely chance-based,” and (4) even assuming
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    Opinion of the Court
    “nudging” a symbol in one direction or another involves skill or dexterity, “this
    isolated opportunity for such consideration to affect the outcome [does not] override[]
    the impact of the other features” of plaintiffs’ game. Sandhill, 236 N.C. App. at 369.
    ¶ 27         Since our reversal of the preliminary injunction in Sandhill, plaintiffs contend
    that they have modified their game in two ways that support the trial court’s
    determination that chance does not predominate over skill or dexterity such that
    plaintiffs’ new game is not a game of chance and avoids the reach of N.C.G.S. § 14-
    306.4. First, plaintiffs argue its new game “contains a ‘winner-every-time’ feature”
    allowing every player who “nudges” the slot “to claim a monetary prize of some
    amount.” Second, plaintiffs argue “the ‘double nudge’ feature increases the amount of
    skill and dexterity required in the redesigned sweepstakes games.”
    ¶ 28         Defendants, in contrast, argue that plaintiffs’ new game, like its original game,
    is “similar to traditional reel-spinning slot machines,” and, like the role of chance in
    slot machines and poker, “chance controls the symbols that appear for players to
    nudge.” Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ two new modifications do not
    fundamentally alter the character of plaintiffs’ game and cause skill or dexterity to
    predominate over chance such that our holding in Sandhill as to plaintiffs’ original
    game no longer applies.
    ¶ 29         We first consider the change plaintiffs call a “ ‘winner-every-time’ feature.” In
    the original game, in 75% of turns a player took, the reels did not align so that a
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    Opinion of the Court
    nudge could nudge them into place and no prize could be won at all. In plaintiffs’ new
    game, on 75% of turns a “¢” symbol appears one “nudge” from the middle row. If the
    player nudges the ¢ symbol to the middle row, they now receive a nominal prize of
    some cents.
    ¶ 30         We hold the purported “winner-every-time” feature does not alter plaintiffs’
    game such that chance does not predominate over skill or dexterity. On 75% of turns
    players of plaintiffs’ games will still have no opportunity to compete for the largest
    possible prize of $2400. Plaintiffs argue that “the sweepstakes statute does not
    discriminate among different cash prizes,” and “money has value” irrespective of how
    little it is. N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(4) defines a “prize” as “any gift, award, gratuity,
    good, service, credit, or anything else of value. . .” But this definition has no bearing
    on whether the game in which the putative prize is awarded is “not dependent on
    skill or dexterity.” N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(a)(3). If chance determines the prizes for which
    players may play, then, as in the case of traditional slot machines, “the return to the
    player is . . . dependent on . . . chance.” State v. Abbott, 
    218 N.C. 470
    , 479 (1940).
    ¶ 31         We next consider the “double-nudge” modification which, plaintiffs argue,
    “increases the amount of skill and dexterity required in the redesigned sweepstakes
    games.” In the original games, two of the reels would automatically align and the
    third reel would show a symbol one tick out of alignment such that the player had to
    press a button to “nudge” the symbol once up or down into alignment to win a prize.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 32         In Sandhill, Judge Ervin assumed arguendo that “nudging” a symbol up or
    down into alignment involved skill or dexterity. On remand, the trial court concluded
    nudging involved skill because “data from actual game play in the field and data from
    lab tests, both regarding the single-nudge-only games, reveal error rates that show
    the games are dependent on skill.” The trial court also concluded the game involved
    dexterity because the games required both “fine motor control of the hands and visual
    accuracy” and “the ability to recognize and implement winning patterns” based on
    playing the game and the lab data. Finally, the trial court concluded the double-nudge
    modification increased the amount of skill and dexterity “[b]ecause the [player] must
    evaluate the game to determine the number of nudges required and then take the
    required action (one nudge or two separate nudges).”
    ¶ 33         Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ games involve skill and
    dexterity, we cannot conclude based on the undisputed record evidence that skill and
    dexterity have any more than a de minimis role in plaintiffs’ new games, whether
    they are required to make one or two “nudges” of the reels. Plaintiffs’ own expert,
    whose testimony concerning error data from lab tests is the basis for the trial court’s
    conclusion that nudging involved skill and dexterity, testified that, for the single-
    nudge game, players correctly nudged the reel into place between 86% and 90% of the
    time. While the trial court infers that the error rate for double nudging involves more
    skill and dexterity, that inference is by no means warranted. A game need not be won
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    Opinion of the Court
    100% of the time for there to be nothing more than a minimal level of skill or dexterity
    involved, and undisputed evidence shows that the skill and dexterity involved is
    essentially de minimis.
    ¶ 34         In applying the predominant-factor test, we view plaintiffs’ game in the
    entirety. In Hest, we observed that “the Court will inquire, not into the name, but into
    the game, however skillfully disguised, in order to ascertain if it is prohibited.” Hest,
    366 N.C. at 289. This approach is confirmed by N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4, which clarifies
    that “[i]t is the intent of this section to prohibit any mechanism that seeks to avoid
    application of this section through the use of any subterfuge or pretense whatsoever.”
    N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4(c).
    ¶ 35         Here, chance controls plaintiffs’ game by determining that in 75% of turns,
    players will not be eligible to play for the top prize and, indeed, cannot play for
    anything more than mere cents. Accordingly, just as is the case with a traditional slot
    machine, the return to the player in plaintiffs’ game is dependent on chance. Abbott,
    
    218 N.C. at 479
    . Nothing about the “nudge” (or even a “double nudge”) obviates this
    fundamental aspect of plaintiffs’ game. First, the skill and dexterity required to
    “nudge” a reel up or down is de minimis. More fundamentally, even assuming there
    was a meaningful level of skill or dexterity involved in the game, chance would always
    predominate because, when chance determines the relative winnings for which a
    player is able to play, chance “can override or thwart the exercise of skill.” Sandhill,
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    Opinion of the Court
    236 N.C. App. at 369. As in Crazie Overstock, LLC, “the extent to which a customer
    is able to win more than a minimal amount of money is controlled by the outcome of
    [Plaintiffs’ games’ initial reel spin] regardless of the level of skill and dexterity that
    the player displays while participating in [nudging the reels]. Crazie Overstock, LLC,
    2021-NCSC-57, ¶25. This situation is also analogous to the game of poker, which,
    despite involving a much greater level of skill, the Court of Appeals has held to be a
    game of chance because the drawing of “cards . . . at random” causes chance to
    predominate over skill. Collins Coin, 117 N.C. App. at 409; accord Joker Club, L.L.C.
    v. Hardin, 
    183 N.C. App. 92
    , 99 (2007) (“No amount of skill can change a deuce into
    an ace.”). Here, the “winner-every-time” modification to permit a nominal award of a
    few cents and the “double-nudge” modification are nothing more than “thin and false
    apparel” over the plaintiffs’ games that the law “will strip . . . [to] consider [the game]
    in its very nakedness.”3 Hest, 366 N.C. at 289 (citation omitted). After considering
    plaintiffs’ game when “viewed in its entirety,” we hold that “the results produced by
    [plaintiffs’] equipment in terms of whether the player wins or loses and the relative
    amount of the player’s winnings or losses varies primarily with the vagaries of chance
    [and not] the extent of the player’s skill and dexterity.” Crazie Overstock, LLC, 2021-
    3 Indeed, as defendants note, there is no guarantee that the “double-nudge” and
    “winner-every-time” modifications on which plaintiffs rely would even be available in actual
    game play since operators of kiosks may disable them or not stock the machine with coins.
    In such cases, the games are the same ones we held to be illegal in Sandhill.
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    Opinion of the Court
    NCSC-57, ¶ 23. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs’ game violates N.C.G.S. § 14-
    306.4(a)’s prohibition on sweepstakes conducted through video games of chance.
    D. Gambling
    ¶ 36         Plaintiff further argues its game does not constitute illegal gambling under
    North Carolina’s criminal code, while the State contends that it does. Since this Court
    holds that plaintiffs’ conduct violates one aspect of our State’s criminal code, we
    decline to reach this issue, which was also not reached by the Court of Appeals.
    III.   Conclusion
    ¶ 37         We conclude that in plaintiffs’ new game, as in their game addressed in
    Sandhill, chance predominates over skill and, accordingly, it is a video game of
    chance prohibited by N.C.G.S. § 14-306.4. Because this holding is dispositive of the
    case, we need not address the other issues raised by the parties. Accordingly, we
    modify and affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
    MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
    Justices ERVIN and BERGER did not participate in the consideration or decision of
    this case.