State v. Thomsen , 369 N.C. 22 ( 2016 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. 308A15
    Filed 19 August 2016
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    ZACHARY DAVID THOMSEN
    Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of
    the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
    776 S.E.2d 41
     (2015), vacating an order
    granting appropriate relief and judgments entered on 13 December 2013 by Judge
    James M. Webb in Superior Court, Moore County, and remanding for a new
    sentencing hearing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2016.
    Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Assistant Attorney
    General, for the State.
    Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
    MARTIN, Chief Justice.
    Defendant Zachary David Thomsen pleaded guilty to rape of a child by an adult
    offender and to sexual offense with a child by an adult offender, both felonies with
    mandatory minimum sentences of 300 months. See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.2A, -27.4A
    (2013). Pursuant to a plea arrangement, the trial court consolidated the convictions
    for judgment and imposed a single active sentence of 300 to 420 months. After
    imposing the sentence, the court immediately granted its own motion for appropriate
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    relief and vacated the judgment and sentence.            It concluded that, as applied to
    defendant, the mandatory sentence violated the Eighth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution. The court then sentenced defendant to 144 to 233 months,
    pursuant to the Structured Sentencing Act. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c), (f) (2015).
    The State did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, it petitioned the Court of
    Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s order granting defendant
    appropriate relief. Defendant filed a response arguing that the Court of Appeals had
    already decided in State v. Starkey, 
    177 N.C. App. 264
    , 
    628 S.E.2d 424
    , cert. denied,
    
    636 S.E.2d 196
     (2006), that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a trial
    court’s sua sponte grant of appropriate relief, either by the State’s appeal or by writ
    of certiorari. The Court of Appeals allowed the State’s petition and issued the writ.
    In his merits brief before that court, defendant again argued that the court lacked
    jurisdiction. The State responded that, by issuing the writ, the court had already
    ruled that it had jurisdiction, and that it would violate the law of the case doctrine
    articulated in North Carolina National Bank v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 
    307 N.C. 563
    , 
    299 S.E.2d 629
     (1983), if another Court of Appeals panel overruled that decision.
    In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with the State. See State v.
    Thomsen, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    776 S.E.2d 41
    , 48 (2015). The court held that it was
    bound by the petition panel’s decision on jurisdiction and could not address it anew.
    
    Id.
     Addressing the merits, the court held that defendant’s original sentence of 300 to
    420 months did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
    Id.
     at ___, 776 S.E.2d at 50. The
    -2-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    court then vacated defendant’s sentence and the trial court’s order granting
    appropriate relief, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. Id. A
    dissenting opinion maintained that the opinion panel was not bound by the petition
    panel’s decision on jurisdiction, and that the Court of Appeals did not have
    jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari that the State sought. See generally id. at
    ___, 776 S.E.2d at 50-55 (McGee, C.J., dissenting). Defendant appealed to this Court
    on the basis of the dissenting opinion.
    We therefore must address whether the Court of Appeals has subject-matter
    jurisdiction to review, pursuant to the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, a trial
    court’s grant of its own motion for appropriate relief. “We review issues relating to
    subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” State v. Oates, 
    366 N.C. 264
    , 266, 
    732 S.E.2d 571
    , 573 (2012).
    The North Carolina Constitution provides that “[t]he Court of Appeals shall
    have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may prescribe.”              N.C.
    Const. art. IV, § 12(2). The General Assembly has exercised this constitutional
    authority in N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) by giving the Court of Appeals “jurisdiction . . . to
    issue the prerogative writs, including . . . certiorari, . . . to supervise and control the
    proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-
    32(c) (2015). This statute empowers the Court of Appeals to review trial court rulings
    on motions for appropriate relief by writ of certiorari unless some other statute
    restricts the jurisdiction that subsection 7A-32(c) grants. See State v. Stubbs, 368
    -3-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    N.C. 40, 42-43, 
    770 S.E.2d 74
    , 76 (2015).             In other words, because the state
    constitution gives the General Assembly the power to define the jurisdiction of the
    Court of Appeals, only the General Assembly can take away the jurisdiction that it
    has conferred. Subsection 7A-32(c) thus creates a default rule that the Court of
    Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari. The
    default rule will control unless a more specific statute restricts jurisdiction in the
    particular class of cases at issue.
    In State v. Stubbs, we addressed whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
    to review a trial court’s grant of a defendant’s motion for appropriate relief by writ of
    certiorari. 
    Id. at 41
    , 770 S.E.2d at 75. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari
    in the Court of Appeals, seeking review of the trial court’s grant of appropriate relief
    for which the defendant had moved under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415. Id. at 41-43, 770
    S.E.2d at 75-76. We noted that another statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c), specifically
    addresses review of trial court rulings on section 15A-1415 motions for appropriate
    relief. Id. at 42-43, 770 S.E.2d at 76. But subsection 15A-1422(c), we concluded,
    contains no “limiting language . . . regarding which party may appeal a ruling” on a
    motion for appropriate relief that would alter the “broad powers” of review by
    certiorari that subsection 7A-32(c) grants. Id. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76. Importantly,
    we were not concerned with whether subsection 15A-1422(c) provided an independent
    source of jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ. See id. Rather, we
    focused on the absence of language in subsection 15A-1422(c) that would limit the
    -4-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    court’s review.   See id.   Finding none, we held that the Court of Appeals had
    jurisdiction to issue the writ. Id.
    The sole relevant difference between Stubbs and this case is that the trial court
    here granted appropriate relief on its own motion rather than on defendant’s. See
    Thomsen, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 776 S.E.2d at 43.             A defendant may move for
    appropriate relief under subsection 15A-1415(b)(4) if he “was convicted or sentenced
    under a statute that was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
    Constitution of North Carolina.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(b)(4) (2015). We recognized in
    Stubbs that the State can seek review by certiorari from a “ruling on a motion for
    appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415.” Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at
    76 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c) (2015)). N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420(d), in turn, provides
    that “[a]t any time that a defendant would be entitled to relief by motion for
    appropriate relief, the court may grant such relief upon its own motion.” N.C.G.S.
    § 15A-1420(d) (2015). But section 15A-1422 does not mention review of relief granted
    “pursuant to” subsection 1420(d). So the parties disagree on whether the trial court’s
    sua sponte motion was “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1415(b) or “pursuant to”
    subsection 15A-1420(d), as both were necessary here to give the trial court the
    authority to grant relief on its own motion.
    We ultimately do not need to decide this question because, in either case, the
    Court of Appeals would have jurisdiction to issue the writ. If the trial court made its
    motion “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1415(b), then the holding in Stubbs directly
    -5-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    controls. But even if the trial court made its motion “pursuant to” subsection 15A-
    1420(d), the Court of Appeals still has jurisdiction because nothing in the Criminal
    Procedure Act, or any other statute that defendant has referenced, revokes the
    jurisdiction in this specific context that subsection 7A-32(c) confers more generally.
    Section 15A-1422 includes a number of provisions that address appellate
    review of rulings on motions for appropriate relief, but makes no mention of
    subsection 15A-1420(d) or sua sponte motions. In defendant’s view, this means that
    the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review sua sponte grants of relief. But, as
    discussed above, just the opposite is true. The absence of “limiting language,” Stubbs,
    368 N.C. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76, regarding review of sua sponte motions means that
    the jurisdiction prescribed by subsection 7A-32(c) remains unchanged. We therefore
    hold that the Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of
    certiorari in this case.
    The presence of provisions in section 15A-1422 that limit the Court of Appeals’
    jurisdiction to review motions for appropriate relief in other contexts confirms that
    the General Assembly knows how to restrict that court’s jurisdiction when it elects to
    do so. For example, subsection (b) states that “[t]he grant or denial of relief sought
    pursuant to G.S. 15A-1414 is subject to appellate review only in an appeal regularly
    taken.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(b) (2015) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) states that
    “[t]here is no right to appeal from the denial of a motion for appropriate relief when
    the movant is entitled to a trial de novo upon appeal.” Id. § 15A-1422(d) (2015)
    -6-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    (emphasis added). And subsection (f) attempts to limit the jurisdiction of this Court,
    stating that “[d]ecisions of the Court of Appeals on motions for appropriate relief that
    embrace matter set forth in G.S. 15A-1415(b) are final and not subject to further
    review by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.” Id. § 15A-1422(f) (2015),
    invalidated in part as stated in State v. Blackwell, 
    359 N.C. 814
    , 
    618 S.E.2d 213
    (2005), vacated in part on other grounds by State v. Blackwell, 
    361 N.C. 41
    , 
    638 S.E.2d 452
     (2006), cert. denied, 
    550 U.S. 948
     (2007). In contrast, the conspicuous absence of
    any mention in section 15A-1422 of either subsection 15A-1420(d) or sua sponte
    motions compels the conclusion that the Court of Appeals lawfully issued the writ of
    certiorari in this case.
    Finally, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by
    Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to issue the writ of
    certiorari in this case. But, as we explained in Stubbs, if a valid statute gives the
    Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, Rule 21 cannot take it away.
    Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43-44, 770 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 1(c) (“These rules
    shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the appellate
    division as that is established by law.”)). To the extent that State v. Starkey holds
    otherwise, it is overruled.
    The parties have briefed a second issue—namely, whether the decision by the
    Court of Appeals petition panel to issue the writ constituted a ruling on jurisdiction
    that bound the subsequent opinion panel. Because we have addressed the underlying
    -7-
    STATE V. THOMSEN
    Opinion of the Court
    subject-matter jurisdiction question de novo, however, this additional issue is now
    moot. We also express no opinion on whether the State had a right pursuant to
    N.C.G.S. § 15A-1445(a)(3)(c) to appeal the trial court’s grant of appropriate relief. In
    a footnote in its brief before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that it did, but it
    has abandoned that argument in this Court. In any event, the Court of Appeals had
    jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari that the State sought. We therefore affirm
    the decision of the Court of Appeals.
    AFFIRMED.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 308A15

Citation Numbers: 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 651

Judges: Martin

Filed Date: 8/19/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024