In re T.L.H. , 368 N.C. 101 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 457A14
11 June 2015
IN THE MATTER OF: T.L.H.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 765 S.E.2d 88 (2014), reversing an order
entered on 4 February 2014 by Judge Tabatha Holliday in District Court, Guilford
County, and remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings. Heard in
the Supreme Court on 21 April 2015.
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellant Guilford County Department of
Health and Human Services.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sye T. Hickey, Appellate Counsel for
appellant Guardian ad Litem, on behalf of the minor child.
J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellee mother.
ERVIN, Justice.
The ultimate issue before us in this case is the extent to which a trial court
must inquire into a parent’s competence to determine whether it is necessary to
appoint a guardian ad litem for that parent despite the absence of any request that
such a hearing be held or that a parental guardian ad litem be appointed. After
considering this issue in light of the record developed in this case, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into the
issue of whether respondent was entitled to the appointment of a parental guardian
IN RE T.L.H.
Opinion of the Court
ad litem given that the information available to the trial court raised a substantial
question concerning her competence. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent delivered her son, T.L.H., in April of 2013. At the hospital in which
T.L.H. was born, respondent voluntarily placed the child with the Guilford County
Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) based upon her concerns about
the safety of the home that she shared with her romantic partner, Adam McNeill.
Respondent’s concerns stemmed from the presence of illicit drugs in the residence
that she shared with Mr. McNeill and the unsafe environment created by certain
unsavory individuals who frequented the home. In addition, respondent
acknowledged that, even though she had been diagnosed as suffering from certain
mental health problems,1 she was not taking her prescribed psychotropic medication
at that time. Nonetheless, respondent clearly indicated that, instead of relinquishing
her parental rights in T.L.H., she wanted to work toward reunification with her son.
On 12 April 2013, DHHS filed a petition alleging that T.L.H. was a neglected
and dependent juvenile. In its petition, DHHS alleged, among other things, that
respondent “ha[d] been to the hospital on several occasions in the last year due to
mental health complications” and that she “has diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar, cannabis abuse and personality disorder.” At the request of DHHS, Judge
1 More specifically, respondent told a social worker that she had been diagnosed as
bipolar at age fifteen, that she had been diagnosed as schizophrenic in her twenties, and that
she had refrained from taking the medications that had been prescribed for her to treat these
conditions because they made her feel sick.
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Opinion of the Court
Betty Brown appointed Amy Bullock to serve as respondent’s guardian ad litem on a
“provisional/interim basis” in an order entered on 18 April 2013 that lacked findings
of fact or conclusions of law relating to the appointment issue and did not specify
whether Ms. Bullock was to act in a substitutive or assistive capacity.
After a hearing held on 16 May 2013, Judge Brown entered an adjudication
and disposition order on 5 June 2013 determining that T.L.H. was a dependent
juvenile, dismissing the neglect allegation without prejudice, retaining T.L.H. in
DHHS custody, and establishing a case plan under which respondent would visit with
T.L.H. At the time of the 16 May hearing, respondent did not have housing
independent of Mr. McNeill, with whom incidents of domestic violence had occurred.
However, respondent was on a Housing Authority waiting list. Respondent’s sole
source of income consisted of $473.00 in monthly Social Security disability benefits
that had been awarded based on her diagnosed mental conditions, including bipolar
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and narcolepsy. According to court summaries that
had been prepared by DHHS and T.L.H.’s guardian ad litem and submitted for Judge
Brown’s consideration:
[Respondent] has a history of substance abuse and has
diagnoses of schizophrenic, chronic paranoid type,
chronically noncompliant, marijuana dependence,
personality disorder, rule out borderline intellectual
functioning.
....
. . . [Respondent] is not consistent in her mental
health treatment and is not currently on medication.
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Opinion of the Court
[Respondent] does not come to visitation timely and needs
guidance for basic child care.
As a result, Judge Brown found in the 5 June 2013 order that:
11. [Respondent] has been to the hospital on several
occasions in the last year due to mental health
complications. According to the hospital records,
[respondent] is diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder,
Bi-polar Disorder, Cannabis Abuse and Personality
Disorder.
A permanency planning hearing, at which respondent testified, was held on 11
July 2013 before Judge Angela C. Foster. On 9 August 2013, Judge Foster entered
an order finding that respondent was not in compliance with her case plan “on any
level” and had not been visiting with T.L.H. on a regular basis. As a result, Judge
Foster relieved DHHS from any responsibility for making further efforts to reunify
respondent with T.L.H. and determined that the permanent plan for T.L.H. would be
adoption.
On 9 September 2013, DHHS filed a petition seeking to have respondent’s
parental rights in T.L.H. terminated on the grounds that T.L.H. was a neglected
juvenile, that respondent was incapable of properly providing for T.L.H.’s care and
did not have an appropriate alternate child care arrangement for T.L.H., and that
respondent’s parental rights in another child had previously been terminated2 and
respondent lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home for T.L.H.
2 Respondent has two other children in addition to T.L.H., neither of whom is in her
custody. An aunt has been appointed guardian for a daughter born in 2000. Respondent’s
parental rights in a daughter born in May 2004 were terminated on 18 September 2006.
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) (1), (6), (9) (2013). Among other things, DHHS alleged that
respondent’s parental rights were subject to termination for incapability pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) on the basis of her “narcolepsy, mental illness (including
Schizophrenia, Chronic Paranoid Type, Chronically Noncompliant, Schizo-Affective
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and level of functioning), failure to comply with mental
health treatment, and long history of using illegal substances (Cannabis
Dependency).” Moreover, DHHS requested that the trial court “make an inquiry as
to whether [respondent] needs to have a Guardian ad Litem appointed for purposes
of this proceeding.”
On 18 November 2013, Judge Thomas Jarrell, Jr., conducted a pretrial hearing
regarding the termination petition. Ms. Bullock, who had served as respondent’s
guardian ad litem at the adjudication and disposition hearing and at the permanency
planning proceeding, was present and stood “in for Attorney Edward Branscomb as
Attorney for Mother” at the pretrial hearing. Without making any specific findings
concerning respondent’s mental condition or the reasons underlying Ms. Bullock’s
initial appointment as respondent’s guardian ad litem, Judge Jarrell determined that
“Attorney Amy C. Bullock was released by operation of law effective October 1, 2013
as the mother’s guardian ad litem attorney of assistance.”
The termination petition came on for hearing before the trial court on 6
January 2014. Because respondent was not present when the case was called for
hearing, her trial counsel unsuccessfully sought to have the termination proceeding
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continued. On 4 February 2014, the trial court entered an order finding that
respondent’s parental rights in T.L.H. were subject to termination based upon all the
grounds enumerated in the petition and that T.L.H.’s best interests would be served
by terminating respondent’s parental rights.3 Among other things, the trial court
found as a fact that respondent “ha[d] been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder,
Schizophrenia, Schizo-Affective Disorder, and Narcolepsy”; that she “ha[d] a long
history of failing and refusing to take her mental health medications as prescribed
and recommended”; and that she “ha[d] also been diagnosed with Cannabis
Dependence, has a long history of the same, tested positive for Marijuana, and failed
to submit to a substance abuse assessment as requested.” Respondent noted an
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s termination order.
In her sole challenge to the trial court’s termination order before the Court of
Appeals, respondent argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing
to conduct an inquiry concerning whether she was entitled to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem. In re T.L.H., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 765 S.E.2d 88, 90 (2014). A
divided panel of the Court of Appeals determined that respondent’s contention had
merit, reversed the trial court’s termination order, and remanded this case to the trial
court for the purpose of determining whether respondent was, in fact, entitled to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 92. In dissent, Judge
3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of T.L.H.’s unknown father.
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Robert C. Hunter argued that Judge Jarrell had, in fact, conducted an inquiry into
the necessity for appointment of a parental guardian ad litem at the pretrial hearing,
that the record did not contain any indication that respondent’s mental condition had
deteriorated between the pretrial hearing and the termination hearing to such an
extent that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry into
the extent to which she was entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and
that the trial court had not abused its discretion by failing to make an inquiry into
respondent’s competence. Id. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 93-94 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
DHHS and T.L.H.’s guardian ad litem noted an appeal from the Court of Appeals’
decision to this Court. We reverse that decision.
The statutory provisions governing a parent’s entitlement to the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in termination of parental rights proceedings have changed
over time. Prior to 1 October 2005, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101(1) provided that a parental
guardian ad litem must be appointed “[w]here it is alleged that a parent’s rights
should be terminated pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(6), and the incapability to
provide proper care and supervision pursuant to that provision is the result of
substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or
another similar cause or condition.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101(1) (2003). From 1 October
2005 until 30 September 2013, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c) provided that “the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent if the court determines that there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the parent is incompetent or has diminished
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capacity.” Id. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2011). Under the pre-October 2013 version of N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1101.1(c), the difference between the roles assumed by a guardian ad litem,
whether substitutive or assistive, depended upon “[t]he extent of the parent’s
disability.” In re P.D.R., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 737 S.E.2d 152, 158 (2012). However,
effective for juvenile proceedings filed or pending on or after 1 October 2013, the
General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c) to authorize the appointment of
a parental guardian ad litem “for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with . . .
Rule 17” of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.4 N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c)
(2013). An “incompetent adult” is defined as one “who lacks sufficient capacity to
manage the adult’s own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions
concerning the adult’s person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due
to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety,
senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition.” Id. § 35A-1101(7) (2013). As
4 According to Rule 17(b)(2):
In actions or special proceedings when any of the defendants are
. . . incompetent persons, whether residents or nonresidents of
this State, they must defend by general or testamentary
guardian, if they have any within this State or by guardian ad
litem appointed as hereinafter provided; and if they have no
known general or testamentary guardian in the State, and any
of them have been summoned, the court in which said action or
special proceeding is pending, upon motion of any of the parties,
may appoint some discreet person to act as guardian ad litem, to
defend in behalf of such . . . incompetent persons . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(2) (2003).
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a result, following the enactment of the 2013 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1,
respondent would have only been entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem
in the event that she was incompetent and would not have been entitled to the
continued assistance of a guardian ad litem who had been appointed based solely on
a finding of diminished capacity.
As the Court of Appeals has previously noted, “[a] trial judge has a duty to
properly inquire into the competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when
circumstances are brought to the judge’s attention [that] raise a substantial question
as to whether the litigant is non compos mentis.” In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 72,
623 S.E.2d 45, 49 (2005) (citation omitted). A trial court’s decision concerning
whether to appoint a parental guardian ad litem based on the parent’s incompetence
is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See State v. Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 230,
150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1966) (observing that a trial court’s competency determination
“rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and
observation of the particular [individual]”). A trial court’s decision concerning
whether to conduct an inquiry into a parent’s competency is also discretionary in
nature. In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. at 72, 623 S.E.2d at 49. For that reason, trial
court decisions concerning both the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the
extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be conducted are
reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard. In re M.H.B., 192 N.C.
App. 258, 261, 664 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2008) (citation omitted). An “[a]buse of discretion
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results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary
that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323
N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted).
According to both DHHS and T.L.H.’s guardian ad litem, Judge Jarrell did,
contrary to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, conduct an inquiry into the
issue of whether respondent was incompetent at the pretrial hearing. More
specifically, DHHS and T.L.H.’s guardian ad litem contend that Judge Jarrell could
not have concluded that respondent’s guardian ad litem “was released by operation
of law effective October 1, 2013” without determining that Ms. Bullock had been
appointed to serve as respondent’s guardian ad litem on diminished capacity grounds
and that respondent was not entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
competency-related reasons. As a result, DHHS and T.L.H.’s guardian ad litem
contend that Judge Jarrell actually determined that respondent was not incompetent
and that no further inquiry into her competence prior to the termination hearing was
necessary. We are not persuaded by this contention.
A careful review of the record provides no indication that Judge Jarrell
conducted any inquiry into respondent’s competence at the pretrial hearing.
Although Judge Jarrell apparently assumed that Ms. Bullock had been appointed as
respondent’s guardian ad litem on diminished capacity grounds, Judge Brown’s
appointment order simply does not indicate whether Ms. Bullock was appointed to
act in a substitutive or assistive capacity. In addition, given the absence of a
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transcript of the pretrial hearing, we have no assurance that Judge Jarrell inquired
into the issue of respondent’s competence during the course of that proceeding.
Finally, we note that Ms. Bullock stood “in for Attorney Edward Branscomb as
Attorney for Mother” at the pretrial hearing even though N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(d)
precludes “the guardian ad litem [from] act[ing] as the parent’s attorney,” N.C.G.S. §
7B-1101.1(d) (2013), which suggests that Ms. Bullock had stopped acting as
respondent’s guardian ad litem by the time of the pretrial hearing, a development
that would be consistent with the 1 October 2013 effective date of the current version
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c). As a result, we conclude that Judge Jarrell’s
determination that “[Ms.] Bullock was released by operation of law effective October
1, 2013” does not tend to indicate that Judge Jarrell inquired into respondent’s
competence at the pretrial hearing and suggests, instead, that the provisions of the
pretrial order relating to Ms. Bullock’s removal as respondent’s guardian ad litem
reflected a purely ministerial act.
Although we are unable to conclude that an inquiry into respondent’s
competence was actually conducted during the course of this proceeding, we are
equally unable to conclude that the apparent failure to conduct such an inquiry
constituted an abuse of discretion. As an initial matter, we note that the standard of
review applicable to claims like the one before us in this case is quite deferential.
Affording substantial deference to members of the trial judiciary in instances such as
this one is entirely appropriate given that the trial judge, unlike the members of a
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Opinion of the Court
reviewing court, actually interacts with the litigant whose competence is alleged to
be in question and has, for that reason, a much better basis for assessing the litigant’s
mental condition than that available to the members of an appellate court, who are
limited to reviewing a cold, written record.
Moreover, evaluation of an individual’s competence involves much more than
an examination of the manner in which the individual in question has been diagnosed
by mental health professionals. Although the nature and extent of such diagnoses is
exceedingly important to the proper resolution of a competency determination, the
same can also be said of the information that members of the trial judiciary glean
from the manner in which the individual behaves in the courtroom, the lucidity with
which the litigant is able to express himself or herself, the extent to which the
litigant’s behavior and comments shed light upon his or her understanding of the
situation in which he or she is involved, the extent to which the litigant is able to
assist his or her counsel or address other important issues, and numerous other
factors. A great deal of the information that is relevant to a competency
determination is simply not available from a study of the record developed in the trial
court and presented for appellate review. As a result, when the record contains an
appreciable amount of evidence tending to show that the litigant whose mental
condition is at issue is not incompetent, the trial court should not, except in the most
extreme instances, be held on appeal to have abused its discretion by failing to inquire
into that litigant’s competence. Cf. Artesani v. Gritton, 252 N.C. 463, 467, 113 S.E.2d
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895, 898 (1960) (stating that, “[w]hen the court hears evidence to determine
competency, its factual conclusion will not be set aside on appeal if there be any
evidence to support the finding,” since “[t]he weight which the trial judge accords the
evidence rests in his discretion”).
A careful review of the record developed in the trial court compels the
conclusion that sufficient evidence tending to show that respondent was not
incompetent existed to obviate the necessity for the trial court to conduct a
competence inquiry before proceeding with the termination hearing. Respondent
exercised what appears to have been proper judgment in allowing DHHS to take
custody of T.L.H. at the hospital shortly after his birth. In addition, respondent
demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the proceedings that would inevitably
result from that decision when she informed DHHS that she wished to preserve the
right to attempt to be reunified with T.L.H. At the 11 July 2013 permanency
planning hearing, respondent testified that she had obtained Zyprexa to treat her
mental conditions, discussed the necessity for the use of budgeting techniques,
demonstrated an understanding of her need to apply for reduced-rate or subsidized
housing, and appeared to understand that, given her income limitations, she needed
to use her available financial resources carefully. Respondent’s testimony at the
permanency planning hearing was cogent and gave no indication that she failed to
understand the nature of the proceedings in which she was participating or the
consequences of the decisions that she was being called upon to make. In addition,
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respondent signed an apartment lease in November 2013, having previously testified
at the permanency planning hearing that obtaining an independent place to live
would allow her to become drug-free, given that “the only reason why the drugs was
ever exposed to me is because I was living in the environment around it.” As a result,
the record contains ample support for a determination that respondent understood
that she needed to properly manage her own affairs and comprehended the steps that
she needed to take in order to avoid the loss of her parental rights in T.L.H.
Acting in reliance on its decision in In re N.A.L., 193 N.C. App. 114, 118-19,
666 S.E.2d 768, 771-72 (2008), the Court of Appeals may have concluded that
allegations that a parent has been diagnosed with significant mental health
problems, standing alone, suffices to necessitate an inquiry into the parent’s
competence. In re T.L.H., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 90 (stating that
“allegations of mental health problems that raise a question regarding a parent’s
competence require the trial court to inquire into whether a GAL need be appointed”).
However, In re N.A.L. does not appear to us to require a trial judge to inquire into a
parent’s competency solely because the parent is alleged to suffer from diagnosable
mental health conditions. Instead, In re N.A.L. held that, given the particular facts
contained in the record developed in that case regarding the parent’s mental health
issues, an inquiry into the necessity for the appointment of a parental guardian ad
litem was required. In re N.A.L., 193 N.C. App. at 119, 666 S.E.2d 772. As a result,
assuming that In re N.A.L. is, as respondent suggests, a competency rather than a
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diminished capacity case, In re N.A.L. does not stand for the proposition that a trial
court must inquire into the necessity for the appointment of a parental guardian ad
litem solely because the parent has diagnosable mental health problems. See In re
J.R.W., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 765 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2014) (noting the Court of
Appeals’ “prior holdings that evidence of mental health problems is not per se
evidence of incompetence to participate in legal proceedings”), disc. rev. denied, ___
N.C. ___, 767 S.E.2d 840 (2015).5
Similarly, the trial court was not required to inquire into the appropriateness
of the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem simply because DHHS sought to
have respondent’s parental rights in T.L.H. terminated for mental health-related
grounds and requested the trial court to conduct a competency inquiry. In support of
its decision to reverse the trial court’s termination order and remand this case to that
court for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals pointed to “the trial court’s
reliance on [respondent’s multiple ongoing mental health conditions] to support
grounds to terminate her parental rights.” In re T.L.H., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 765
S.E.2d at 92. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the enactment of the 2005 amendment
to the relevant provisions of Chapter 7B of the North Carolina General Statutes, an
5The facts before the Court in this case, in which there is substantial evidence tending
to show that respondent understood the nature of the proceedings in which she was involved
and the steps that she needed to take to avoid losing her parental rights in T.L.H., differ
substantially from those at issue in In re N.A.L., in which the Court of Appeals made no
mention of any evidence tending to indicate that the mother understood the situation in
which she found herself, while referring to reports that the mother “repeatedly yelled and
shouted profanity” toward her child. 193 N.C. App. at 116, 666 S.E.2d at 770.
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allegation that parental rights are subject to termination based upon incapability
stemming, directly or indirectly, from a parent’s diagnosable mental health
conditions does not automatically necessitate the appointment of a parental guardian
ad litem. Although the sort of mental difficulties that might support the termination
of a parent’s parental rights on the grounds of incapability may well show that the
parent is likely to be incompetent, such an inference is not necessarily correct. In
other words, while the test for incompetence is whether the parent “lacks sufficient
capacity to manage [her] own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions
concerning [her] person, family, or property,” N.C.G.S. § 35A-1101(7), the trial court
is allowed to terminate a parent’s parental rights for incapability if “the parent is
incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile” due to
“substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any
other cause or condition that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the
juvenile,” id. § 7B-1111(a)(6). The differences between the standard used in
determining competence and the standard used in determining whether a parent’s
parental rights are subject to termination for incapability prevents us from
concluding that the existence of an allegation that a parent’s parental rights are
subject to termination for incapability necessitates an inquiry into the parent’s
competence for purposes of the appointment of a substitutive guardian ad litem, even
if the party initiating the termination proceeding suggests that such an inquiry would
be appropriate.
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Admittedly, the trial court noted respondent’s mental health difficulties in the
termination order. However, in addition to stating her mental limitations, the
termination order focused upon respondent’s apparent unwillingness to make the
changes necessary to permit her to regain custody of T.L.H. More specifically, the
termination order found that: (1) after adjudication “[t]he mother failed to maintain
regular contact with [DHHS]”; (2) “the mother has been noncompliant with the
recommended mental health medication regimen”; (3) “[a]lthough the juvenile has
been in custody for eight months, the mother only visited the juvenile three times . . .
despite having had the opportunity to attend supervised visits once a week”; (4)
“[s]ince the juvenile has been in custody, the mother has made no significant progress
toward correcting the conditions that led to removal”; and (5) “[t]he mother does not
have the willingness to comply with mental health treatment and has declined an
assessment and possible treatment for her substance abuse.” As a result, the trial
court’s termination decision rested on considerations other than the fact that
respondent appears to have suffered from one or more diagnosable mental health
conditions.
We do not, of course, wish to be understood as holding that the trial court would
have had no basis for inquiring into respondent’s competence in light of her history
of serious mental health conditions. A trial court would have been well within the
bounds of its sound discretion to conclude that respondent’s lengthy history of serious
mental illness raised a substantial question concerning her competence sufficient to
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justify further inquiry. In fact, such an inquiry in this case might well have been
advisable. However, we are unable to conclude that the trial court could not have
had a reasonable basis for reaching the opposite result given the coherent manner in
which respondent testified at the permanency planning hearing and the other
indications in the record tending to show that respondent was aware of, and able to
appropriately participate in, the proceedings being conducted before the trial court.
As a result, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.6
REVERSED.
6 The Court of Appeals further determined that Judge Brown erred by failing to
delineate the role to be served by respondent’s guardian ad litem, In re T.L.H., ___ N.C. App.
at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 92, and that Judge Jarrell erred by failing to conduct a hearing to
determine the role respondent’s guardian ad litem had filled before removing respondent’s
guardian ad litem, id. at ___, 765 S.E.2d at 90. However, respondent did not seek review of
or advance any argument challenging either Judge Brown’s 18 April 2013 guardian ad litem
appointment order or Judge Jarrell’s 18 November 2013 pretrial order before the Court of
Appeals. As a result, since respondent did not properly preserve any challenge to the
lawfulness of either of these orders before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals’
determinations regarding those orders are reversed as well. See N.C. R. App. P. 10.
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