In re S.R. ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 172PA22
Filed 28 April 2023
IN THE MATTER OF: S.R.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, 283 N.C. App. 149 (2022), affirming an order entered on 8
June 2021 by Judge Caroline S. Burnette in District Court, Granville County. Heard
in the Supreme Court on 1 February 2023.
Edward Eldred for petitioner-appellant.
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, and Jacky L. Brammer, Assistant Parent
Defender, for respondent-appellee father.
EARLS, Justice.
This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights in a private setting
with no Department of Social Services involvement. Cases involving divorce and the
breakdown of marital relationships are often contentious, and each party may have
their own version of what has transpired. In cases involving children and the
termination of parental rights, both parents have a “fundamental liberty interest . . .
in the care, custody, and management of their child,” and this interest “does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents.” Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). To protect this vital interest and others, our legal system
operates under a set of procedures, one of which dictates that the trial court is the
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finder of fact. In re N.W., 381 N.C. 851, 857 (2022) (“[T]he trial court . . . [has the]
responsibility for evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, weighing the evidence,
and determining the relevant facts.” (citing In re R.D., 376 N.C. 244, 258 (2020))). In
contrast, this Court is not a fact-finding court. See id.In the context of termination of parental rights proceedings, the proper inquiry
is often fact-dependent and the trial court, as a fact-finding court, is in the best
position to determine the credibility of the witnesses before it and make findings of
fact. See id. With this in mind, this opinion underscores the importance of following
these procedures and the correct standard of review by applying the law only to those
findings of fact made by the trial court. In doing so, we affirm the Court of Appeals’
decision regarding the denial of the petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights
but modify its decision to clarify the correct standard of review at both the
adjudication and the dispositional stage.
I. Factual Background
The petitioner, Tiffany Roberto, and the respondent, Bruce Savard, were
previously married. On 23 April 2014, their only child, Sarah,1 was born. The day
before Sarah was born, Mr. Savard experienced a mental health related incident and
threatened to kill himself. Ms. Roberto contacted her current husband, Joe Roberto,
who successfully retrieved the gun from Mr. Savard. In June 2014, Ms. Roberto
sought and received an ex parte domestic violence protective order against Mr.
1 This is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the minor child.
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Savard, in part based on this incident. The couple then separated, and Mr. Savard,
who was an active-duty member of the United States Marine Corps, continued living
on the military base. Ms. Roberto went to live with Mr. Roberto.
Ms. Roberto and Mr. Savard’s divorce decree was entered on 8 June 2016.
Despite Ms. Roberto knowing Mr. Savard’s telephone number and home address, Mr.
Savard was served with notice of the complaint for divorce by publication and only
learned of the divorce eight days later, on 16 June 2016, through a text message from
Ms. Roberto. That same day, and in the same text message, Mr. Savard also learned
that as part of the divorce proceedings, Ms. Roberto was granted “the sole and
exclusive care, custody, and control” of Sarah.
Ms. Roberto and Mr. Roberto were married on 22 November 2016. Mr. Savard
paid child support for Sarah, which was withheld from his paycheck and mailed to
North Carolina Centralized Collections. Ms. Roberto sought legal advice about
terminating Mr. Savard’s parental rights and was counseled to stop the garnishment
of his wages through North Carolina Centralized Collections, such that Mr. Savard
would be personally responsible for payment and nonpayment could be used as a
ground to terminate his parental rights.
Toward the end of 2018, Ms. Roberto “closed [Mr. Savard’s] support case” but
“Mr. Savard was under the impression that he was no longer required to pay child
support as Ms. Roberto never informed him that he as [sic] not make payments
directly to her after his child support case was closed.” Thus, once child support
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payments were no longer collected through the garnishment of his wages, the child
support payments stopped. As a result, Mr. Savard accumulated past-due child
support obligations. Ms. Roberto asked Mr. Savard to relinquish his parental rights
to Sarah in exchange for her forgiving his child support debt, but he declined this
request.
In its order denying the petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights,
the trial court found that Mr. Savard made an effort to have a relationship with
Sarah. It also found that he attempted to exercise his supervised visitation rights
with Sarah and sent Ms. Roberto text messages asking about Sarah. However, Ms.
Roberto ultimately blocked Mr. Savard’s telephone number, and he was no longer
able to contact her by phone. Ms. Roberto also blocked Mr. Savard from contacting
her on social media. This left Mr. Savard with no reliable way to contact Sarah or her
mother. The trial court further found that “Mr. Savard regularly checks Facebook for
pictures of [Sarah]. He prints them out and keeps them in an album. While he has
been blocked from Facebook by most of Ms. Roberto’s family, he still finds a way to
find those pictures.”
The trial court also found that Mr. Savard had reached out to Ms. Roberto
about adding Sarah to his “insurance,” but Ms. Roberto never responded. Taking this
information together, the trial court concluded that Ms. Roberto knew how to contact
“Mr. Savard when it benefited [sic] her but ignored him at all other times” and this
“benefitted her agenda which was to terminate [Mr. Savard’s] parental rights.”
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On 25 July 2019, Ms. Roberto had Sarah’s last name legally changed from
Savard to Roberto. No service was effectuated on Mr. Savard, and “[h]e had no clue
his child’s name had been changed and had absolutely no notice of the proceedings.”
At the time of the trial court’s 8 June 2021 order, Sarah was seven years old and had
“no clue that Mr. Savard [wa]s her father.” Ultimately, the trial court found that Mr.
Roberto and Ms. Roberto had planned to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights since
at least 2018 and Ms. Roberto had “actively hindered and . . . precluded Mr. Savard
from being part of [Sarah’s] life.”
On 22 June 2020, Ms. Roberto filed a petition to terminate Mr. Savard’s
parental rights. She alleged that grounds for termination existed under N.C.G.S. §§
7B-1111(a)(1), (4), and (7) for neglect, failure to pay child support, and willful
abandonment of Sarah. On 10 September 2020, Mr. Savard filed his answer. The case
was heard in the trial court on 28 January 2021 and 18 March 2021. The trial court
entered its order on 8 June 2021, denying Ms. Roberto’s petition and concluding that
Ms. Roberto had failed to establish grounds to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental
rights. The trial court concluded that Sarah was not neglected, nor had Mr. Savard
“willfully failed without justification,” to pay child support for Sarah or “willfully”
abandoned Sarah. Ms. Roberto appealed, and the Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the trial court’s order. In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. 149 (2022). Now, we affirm
the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the denial of the petition to terminate Mr.
Savard’s parental rights but modify its decision to clarify the correct standard of
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review at both the adjudication and the dispositional stage.
II. Standard of Review
There are two stages involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding.
In re Q.P.W., 376 N.C. 738, 741 (2021). These are the adjudication stage and the
dispositional stage. Id. A different standard of review applies to each stage. Id. “At
the adjudication stage, the party petitioning for the termination must show by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental
rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247 (1997). If “[a] trial court’s finding of fact
. . . is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence[, it will be] deemed
conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary
finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019). We review whether the findings of
fact support the conclusions of law, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In
re K.N., 381 N.C. 823, 827 (2022) (citing In re S.C.L.R., 378 N.C. 484, 489 (2021)).
At the dispositional stage, the trial court’s assessment of the best interests of
the child is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 560 (2020).
“[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by
reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)). “We review
the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are supported
by competent evidence.” Id. (quoting In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020)), mindful
that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 provides that at the disposition stage “[t]he court may
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consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801,
that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best
interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).
Moreover, as is always true, a mistake of law is an abuse of discretion. State v.
Rhodes, 366 N.C. 532, 536 (2013) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100
(1996) (“[An abuse of discretion] standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond
appellate correction. A [trial] court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law.” (citation omitted)). At the dispositional stage, as with the
adjudication stage, the trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on
appeal. In re Q.P.W., 376 N.C. at 741. Because the present case did not proceed past
the adjudication stage, the proper standard of review in this case first requires this
Court to assess whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence even if the record contains evidence that would
support a contrary finding. In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 379.
III. The Child Support Order
A trial court may terminate parental rights if
[o]ne parent has been awarded custody of the juvenile by
judicial decree or has custody by agreement of the parents,
and the other parent whose parental rights are sought to
be terminated has for a period of one year or more next
preceding the filing of the petition or motion willfully failed
without justification to pay for the care, support, and
education of the juvenile, as required by the decree or
custody agreement.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) (2021). In In re C.L.H., this Court explained that the party
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petitioning for termination of parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) must
show “the existence of a support order that was enforceable during the year before
the termination petition was filed.” 376 N.C. 614, 620 (2021) (quoting In re I.R.L., 263
N.C. App. 481, 485 (2019)). There, this Court concluded that because the trial court
had not made any “findings of fact that a child support order existed in the year prior
to the filing of the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights,” those factual
findings could not support termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4). Id. at
621.
Ms. Roberto argues that, although “not explicit, it is apparent” the trial court
and the Court of Appeals accepted that the child support order existed and was
enforceable. Ms. Roberto also argues that Mr. Savard also accepted this as true,
stating in his brief to the Court of Appeals that “[a]n [o]rder establishing Mr. Savard’s
child support obligation was entered on 24 November 2014.” Ms. Roberto states that
because of this admission and implicit acceptance of a child support order existing
and being enforceable, the trial court and Court of Appeals both erred in concluding
Mr. Savard’s parental rights could not be terminated.
However, the Court of Appeals found that although there was evidence in the
record to support termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4),
the trial court did not make any findings of fact to this effect. In re S.R., 283 N.C.
App. at 159–60. In doing so, the Court of Appeals analogized the present case to In re
C.L.H., determining that a trial court must make findings of fact as to whether a
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support order exists. Id. at 159. In In re C.L.H., this Court concluded that when “the
trial court fails to make findings of fact indicating that a child support order existed
or that the parent failed to pay support as required by the child support order, its
findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that grounds for termination exist
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).” In re C.L.H., 376 N.C. at 620 (cleaned up).
Here, the trial court only made findings that Mr. Savard paid child support and that
his child support payments stopped after Ms. Roberto elected to stop garnishment of
his wages through North Carolina Centralized Collections. However, the trial court
did not make a finding that an order existed requiring Mr. Savard to pay child
support.
Ms. Roberto urges this Court to apply In re Faircloth, which states that “by
failing to deny . . . certain allegations contained in the petition, [the respondent], in
fact, admitted” those allegations. 153 N.C. App. 565, 576 (2002). However, not only is
this case not binding on this Court, but here Ms. Roberto had the burden of proof and
cannot satisfy that burden simply by alleging unproven assertions that are not
directly denied. See In re K.S.D-F., 375 N.C. 626, 632 (2020) (“At the adjudicatory
stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-
1111(a) of the General Statutes.” (quoting In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019))).
Accordingly, the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that no grounds
to terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) was
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correct. See In re C.L.H., 376 N.C. at 620.
Furthermore, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4) requires that “for a period of one year
or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion” a parent act “willfully”
and “without justification [in failing] to pay for the care, support, and education of
the juvenile, as required by the decree or custody agreement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(4). To this effect, the trial court found that in the “one year or more next
preceding the filing of the petition,” Mr. Savard had not “willfully failed without
justification to pay for [Sarah’s] care, support and education . . . as required by decree
or custody agreement.” Thus, the trial court properly concluded that Mr. Savard’s
parental rights should not be terminated pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).
Because we find that the trial court made no findings of fact related to the
existence of a child support order or the willfulness of the respondent’s failure to pay
during the relevant period of time, we affirm that grounds were not established to
terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4).
Subsection 7B-1111(a) provides that “[t]he court may terminate the parental
rights” if it finds “one or more” of the grounds enumerated in the statute. N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111(a) (2021) (emphasis added). Here, while the trial court found that Mr.
Savard had stopped making child support payments once Ms. Roberto stopped the
wage garnishment through North Carolina Centralized Collections, it also found that
Ms. Roberto never informed Mr. Savard he was required to make child support
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payments directly to her.2 Moreover, according to the trial court’s findings, Ms.
Roberto tried to use Mr. Savard’s resulting child support debt as a bargaining chip,
promising to forgive the debt if he relinquished his parental rights to Sarah.
The trial court also found that Ms. Roberto previously consulted an attorney
who counseled her to stop the wage garnishment so that if Mr. Savard failed to pay
child support, she could use that as a ground to seek termination of his parental
rights. Importantly, in weighing the evidence before it, the trial court determined
that Ms. Roberto “knew how to reach out to Mr. Savard when it benefitted her but
ignored him at all other times,” and this “benefit[t]ed [Ms. Roberto’s] agenda which
was to terminate [Mr. Savard’s] parental rights.” In the end, after weighing the
evidence, the trial court concluded the grounds necessary to terminate Mr. Savard’s
parental rights were not present.
However, because this case involves the adjudication phase in a termination of
parental rights proceeding, the abuse of discretion standard is not applicable. Thus,
to the extent the Court of Appeals opinion could be read to be applying an abuse of
discretion standard at the adjudication stage, we modify that portion of the decision
and note the correct standard of appellate review at this stage is whether the findings
2 Our decision should not be read as stating that a parent does not have a duty to “pay
a reasonable portion of the [financial] cost of care for [their] children.” See In re S.E., 373 N.C.
360, 366 (2020) (explaining that a parent “cannot hide behind a cloak of ignorance to assert
her failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children was not willful.”)
As we said in that case, “[t]he absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a requirement
to pay support is not a defense to a parent’s obligation to pay reasonable costs, because
parents have an inherent duty to support their children.” Id. (cleaned up).
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of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and whether the
findings support the conclusions of law. In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 379.
IV. Neglect and Abandonment
Although the Court of Appeals did not complete an analysis of these termination
grounds, it concluded that the record did not support termination on either ground.
In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. at 158. Our review of the record yields the same result.
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) parental rights can be terminated if the “parent has
. . . neglected the juvenile . . . within the meaning of [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-101.” Under the
statute, a neglected juvenile is
[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age (i) who is found to
be a minor victim of human trafficking under G.S. 14-43.15
or (ii) whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does
any of the following:
a. Does not provide proper care, supervision, or
discipline.
b. Has abandoned the juvenile.
c. Has not provided or arranged for the provision of
necessary medical or remedial care.
d. Or whose parent, guardian, or custodian has refused
to follow the recommendations of the Juvenile and
Family Team made pursuant to Article 27A of this
Chapter.
e. Creates or allows to be created a living environment
that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.
f. Has participated or attempted to participate in the
unlawful transfer of custody of the juvenile under
G.S. 14-321.2.
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g. Has placed the juvenile for care or adoption in
violation of law.
In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile,
it is relevant whether that juvenile lives in a home where
another juvenile has died as a result of suspected abuse or
neglect or lives in a home where another juvenile has been
subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly
lives in the home.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2021). Grounds of abandonment are established where a
parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six
consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition or motion, or the parent has voluntarily
abandoned an infant pursuant to G.S. 7B-500 for at least
60 consecutive days immediately preceding the filing of the
petition or motion.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Because the Court of Appeals determined the record did not
support either of these grounds it necessarily concluded the trial court’s findings of
fact were supported by competent evidence. In re S.R., 283 N.C. App. at 158.
First, regarding termination on the ground of neglect, Ms. Roberto asserts that
parental rights can be terminated for neglect if a parent neglects their child by
abandonment, citing In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020). The relevant period
for determining neglect by abandonment “is not limited to the six consecutive months
immediately preceding the filing of a termination petition.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71,
81 (2019). In some cases “a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights based on
neglect that is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing.” In re M.A.,
378 N.C. 462, 466 (2021). “However, for other forms of neglect, the fact that ‘a child
has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the
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termination hearing’ would make ‘requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to
show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . impossible.’ ” Id.(alteration in original) (quoting In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80). In those cases, “evidence
of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child . . . is admissible in subsequent
proceedings to terminate parental rights,” but “[t]he trial court must also consider
any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the
probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting In re
Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984)). If after weighing the evidence the trial court finds
“a likelihood of future neglect by the parent,” then it can find a neglect ground to
terminate parental rights. Id. (quoting In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020)).
Ms. Roberto claims that the trial court impermissibly limited its review to the
six months before Ms. Roberto filed the petition. However, this is incorrect as the trial
court explicitly noted “[t]he history of this case is extremely relevant in the analysis
of this matter,” and given that the trial court’s findings of fact go as far back as 2014,
there is no reason to conclude that the relevant history was limited to the six months
before Ms. Roberto filed her petition. Furthermore, the trial court specifically stated
that it reviewed Mr. Savard’s conduct outside of the six-month window to assess his
credibility. See In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 22 (2019) (“[T]he trial court may consider a
parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a parent’s credibility
and intentions . . . .” (quoting In re D.M.O., 250 N.C. App. 570, 573 (2016))).
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Ms. Roberto also argues that the trial court did not ask whether Mr. Savard
previously neglected Sarah or whether there was a likelihood of future neglect if
Sarah was placed in Mr. Savard’s care. Ms. Roberto points to Mr. Savard’s prior
suicidal behavior as proof that he “assaulted Ms. Roberto in Sarah’s presence” and
that there was a likelihood of future neglect because Mr. Savard has not adequately
addressed his mental health needs. See In re G.C., No. 241A22, 2023 WL 2799798, at
*5 (N.C. Apr. 6, 2023) (“[T]here must be some physical, mental, or emotional
impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence
of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.” (cleaned up)). But Ms.
Roberto’s characterization of Mr. Savard’s suicidal ideation as an assault is not
supported by the trial court’s findings of fact. Rather, the trial court found that
although Mr. Savard had threatened suicide in Ms. Roberto’s presence, he was “not
threatening or combative” towards her or their unborn child, Sarah. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals was correct in holding that no grounds existed to terminate Mr.
Savard’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Second, regarding termination on the ground of willful abandonment, the
determinative period for adjudicating willful abandonment is the six consecutive
months preceding the filing of the petition. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7); In re A.A.M.,
379 N.C. 167, 172 (2021). “Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent
which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19 (quoting In re Young,
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346 N.C. at 251). Willful “intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a
question of fact to be determined from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257
N.C. 486, 501 (1962)). “If a parent withholds that parent’s presence, . . . love, . . . care,
the opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend support and
maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Ms. Roberto asserts that our holding in In re C.B.C. is instructive in analyzing
Mr. Savard’s actions during the relevant six-month period from 22 December 2019 to
22 June 2020. In In re C.B.C., this Court determined the parent had willfully
abandoned his daughter because he did not make an effort to pursue a relationship
with her. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 23. Specifically, the parent did not send cards or
letters or contact the petitioners to ask about the child’s well-being. Id. The parent
also did not take steps to modify the custody order, resume visitation, or provide
financial support for his daughter. Id. Although Ms. Roberto argues that Mr. Savard’s
actions are like that of the parent in In re C.B.C., the trial court saw the evidence
differently. Namely, the trial court found that “[w]hile Mr. Savard [had] not made
valiant efforts to forge a relationship with his daughter, he [had] made some efforts”
and these efforts were “often times . . . thwarted by Ms. Roberto.” Indeed, the trial
court found that “Ms. Roberto has actively hindered and essentially precluded Mr.
Savard from being part of [Sarah]’s life.” Perhaps most importantly, the trial court
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also found that Mr. Savard had “not shown an intention to give up all parental rights
to [Sarah].”
While Ms. Roberto claims that In re C.B.C. is instructive, that case does not
contemplate a situation, such as here, where one parent actively thwarts the other
parent’s ability to have a relationship with their child. Furthermore, to the extent
that Ms. Roberto claims that her efforts to preclude Mr. Savard from being a part of
Sarah’s life were justified by Mr. Savard’s prior domestic violence towards her, the
trial court did not make any findings of fact to support that any abuse had occurred.
The trial court made no findings that Mr. Savard had sexually assaulted Ms. Roberto
or that he had threatened her with a gun. Furthermore, as noted above, and as it
relates to Mr. Savard’s suicidal behavior, the trial court found that when Mr. Savard
threatened suicide, he was not acting in a manner that was “threatening or
combative” towards Ms. Roberto or their unborn child. Thus, based on the record
before it, the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude that no grounds existed to
terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights for willful abandonment pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(7).
We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and hold that there are no grounds to
terminate Mr. Savard’s parental rights to Sarah pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (4), or (7). We modify the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent the
Court of Appeals’ decision could be read to be applying an abuse of discretion standard
of review at the adjudicatory stage of this proceeding to reiterate that our review at
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the adjudicatory stage is to determine whether there is clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of fact, and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of law.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
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