In re Q.B. ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 59A20
Filed 11 December 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: Q.B.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 22
November 2019 by Judge Lee F. Teague in District Court, Pitt County. This matter
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020 but
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Timothy E. Heinle for petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social
Services.
R. Bruce Thompson II for appellee Guardian ad litem.
Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant mother.
DAVIS, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to reconsider whether respondent-mother (respondent) was entitled to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) to assist her in her termination of parental
rights proceeding. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to sua sponte conduct such an inquiry, we affirm the trial court’s
order terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Factual and Procedural Background
IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
This case involves a termination of parental rights proceeding initiated by
petitioner Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) against respondent on
the basis of neglect and dependency of her minor child “Quanna.”1 On 20 September
2017—approximately one month before the birth of Quanna—DSS received a report
regarding respondent and her family. DSS had prior involvement with respondent
dating back to 2012 due to reports concerning respondent’s alleged neglect of
Quanna’s three older siblings.
The 2017 report alleged that respondent was unable to properly care for herself
and for her existing three children. The report stated that respondent was selling her
food stamps, she was unable to provide proper housing, food, and other necessities
for her children, and the home was uninhabitable due to a lack of utilities and rat
infestation.
DSS visited the home to investigate and found it to be uninhabitable with no
indoor plumbing, no functioning utilities, a partially caved-in ceiling, no food in the
home, and a rat and cockroach infestation. The DSS visit also revealed that
respondent “appeared to be limited” intellectually, that she had a learning disability
and various health issues, and that the monthly social security income that the
household received was not being used to meet the basic needs of respondent or her
children. Accordingly, DSS began two simultaneous investigations into the
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile.
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Opinion of the Court
household—a DSS Child Protective Services investigation regarding respondent’s
three children and a DSS Adult Protective Services investigation into respondent’s
ability to care for herself and meet her own basic needs.
As part of the latter investigation, an Adult Protective Services petition was
filed after DSS substantiated caretaker neglect “as a result of [respondent] being a
disabled adult and her caretakers not meeting her basic needs.” Respondent’s
primary caretaker was her sister, who was also the designated payee for respondent’s
social security income. The investigation found that despite receiving $448 monthly
in food stamps and $735 monthly in social security income, respondent and her
children were not having their basic needs met.
Respondent gave birth to Quanna in November 2017. While respondent was in
the hospital, she became belligerent with hospital staff and demanded to be released
with Quanna, despite having no plans for transportation and having obtained no crib,
formula, diapers, or other necessities for the child. Moreover, after Quanna’s birth
the social security checks that the entire household had depended upon for income
were suspended. Accordingly, on 1 December 2017 DSS filed a petition alleging that
Quanna was a neglected and dependent juvenile and obtained nonsecure custody of
her.
Pursuant to a request by DSS, respondent completed a psychological
evaluation on 10 January 2018. The examiner, psychologist Rhonda Cardinale,
reported that respondent had an IQ score of 63, which fell within the low functioning
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IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
range of clinical impairment. Cardinale stated her opinion that respondent’s
evaluation “reflects that her overall level of intellectual functioning as well as her
overall level of adaptive behavior skills falls into the range of clinical impairment.”
Cardinale opined that due to respondent’s cognitive defects, she “would have
difficulty independently and adequately making positive decisions for herself” and
would “require assistance in ensuring that her basic needs are adequately met.”
Cardinale accordingly recommended that “the appointment of a guardian and/or legal
decision maker be considered” for respondent.
On 25 January 2018, the District Court, Pitt County, conducted a hearing at
the request of DSS to determine whether to appoint a GAL for respondent pursuant
to Rule 17 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to the juvenile
proceeding involving Quanna. The trial court subsequently entered an order on 15
February 2018 finding that although respondent was “low-functioning,” she
“underst[oo]d the role of the Court and the parties in the Courtroom as well as the
Court’s function in determining the status of the Juveniles.” The trial court concluded
that respondent was “not incompetent in accordance with Rule 17” and was “not
therefore entitled to a substitutive Rule 17 Guardian.”
An adjudication hearing was conducted on the juvenile petition regarding
Quanna on 1 February 2018. Respondent stipulated to the facts alleged in the
petition. The trial court entered an order on 22 February 2018 determining that
Quanna was a neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court ordered DSS to
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Opinion of the Court
retain custody of Quanna and granted respondent weekly supervised visitation
sessions. Respondent was also ordered to obtain appropriate housing, complete a
parenting program and demonstrate skills learned, submit to drug screens, maintain
communication with DSS, comply with all recommendations made by Adult
Protective Services, and submit to a psychological evaluation.
On 25 April 2018, respondent was adjudicated to be incompetent in a separate
proceeding brought by DSS Adult Protective Services in Superior Court, Pitt County.
As a result, the Beaufort County DSS was appointed to serve as the guardian of her
person pursuant to Chapter 35A of the General Statutes.2 In addition, respondent
was assigned a Pitt County Adult Protective Services counselor, Priscilla Delano, to
help her manage her bills and healthcare needs. Delano also became the payee for
respondent’s social security checks.
Respondent underwent a parenting capacity evaluation with a psychologist,
Dr. Robert Aiello, on 5 April 2019. Dr. Aiello recommended that (1) respondent be
referred for individual counseling; (2) she submit to random drug tests to ensure she
refrained from using marijuana; (3) parties working with respondent “review written
documents with her carefully and in simple terms;” (4) respondent continue her payee
arrangement with Delano because she “should not be expected to manage funds
2 According to the superior court’s order, respondent’s guardian of the person was
authorized to maintain “the custody, care and control of the ward, but has no authority to
receive, manage or administer the property, estate or business affairs of the ward.”
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Opinion of the Court
independently;” and (5) Adult Protective Services continue to monitor and assist
respondent to see to her medical needs and ensure she was taking her prescribed
medications.
The trial court held permanency planning hearings in October 2018, January
2019, and May 2019. The resulting permanency planning orders concluded that
although respondent had completed parenting classes and attended visitation
sessions, she was still unable to properly parent Quanna independently due to her
mental deficiencies, inability to manage her finances, and lack of appropriate support.
The trial court consequently ordered that DSS cease reunification efforts with
respondent and adopted a primary permanent plan of guardianship with a court-
approved caretaker and a secondary plan of adoption for Quanna.
On 13 June 2019, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental
rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (a)(6) on the grounds of neglect and
dependency. A termination hearing was held on 24 October 2019. On 22 November
2019, the trial court entered an order concluding that the termination of respondent’s
parental rights in Quanna was warranted based on both grounds alleged by DSS. The
trial court entered a separate dispositional order that same day concluding that it
was in Quanna’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.3
Respondent appealed to this Court from both orders on 19 December 2019.
3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Quanna’s father, who is not a
party to this appeal.
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IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
Analysis
Respondent’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to sua sponte conduct a second inquiry into whether she should
be appointed a GAL under Rule 17 to assist her during the termination proceeding.
Section 7B-1101.1(c) of the Juvenile Code provides that a trial court may appoint a
GAL “[o]n motion of any party or on the court’s own motion” when a parent is
“incompetent in accordance with . . . Rule 17.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2019). In
essence, respondent’s argument is that although a Rule 17 hearing already took place
in January 2018, by the time the termination hearing occurred in October 2019 new
events had occurred that rendered it necessary for the trial court to re-examine
respondent’s competency. In support of her argument, respondent relies heavily on
In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 772 S.E.2d 451 (2015)—the leading decision from this
Court discussing the need for the appointment of a GAL under Rule 17 in a
termination proceeding.
In re T.L.H. concerned the circumstances under which a trial court is obligated
to sua sponte “inquire into a parent’s competence to determine whether it is necessary
to appoint a guardian ad litem for that parent” in the context of a termination
proceeding. Id. at 102, 772 S.E.2d at 452. The respondent-mother in that case had
voluntarily placed her newborn child in the custody of the Guilford County
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) shortly after the child’s birth in
April 2013, due to her concerns regarding the presence of illegal drugs in her
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Opinion of the Court
residence and the unsafe behavior of her romantic partner. She also acknowledged
that she suffered from mental health problems and she had not been taking her
prescribed psychotropic medications. Id.DHHS subsequently filed a petition in April 2013 alleging that the child was
neglected and dependent based, in part, upon allegations that the respondent “ha[d]
been to the hospital on several occasions in the last year due to mental health
complications” and that she “ha[d] diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar,
cannabis abuse and personality disorder.” Id. The petition also noted that the
respondent’s sole source of income was a monthly social security disability check “that
had been awarded based on her diagnosed mental conditions.” Id. at 103, 772 S.E.2d
at 453.
Later that same month, the trial court—at the request of DHHS—appointed
the respondent a GAL under Rule 17 on a “provisional/interim basis.” Id. at 103, 772
S.E.2d at 452. The GAL ultimately served as respondent’s advocate throughout the
spring and summer of 2013, appearing on respondent’s behalf at adjudication and
disposition hearings and at a subsequent permanency planning hearing. Id. at 104,
772 S.E.2d at 453. In September 2013, DHHS filed a petition to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights and also requested that the trial court make an inquiry
as to whether the respondent “need[ed] to have a Guardian ad Litem appointed for
purposes of the [termination] proceeding.” Id.-8-
IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing in November 2013. At this hearing,
the trial court released the respondent’s GAL “[w]ithout making any specific findings
concerning respondent’s mental condition or the reasons underlying [the GAL’s]
initial appointment.” Id. The termination hearing (at which the respondent did not
appear) occurred in January 2014, and the trial court entered an order terminating
respondent’s parental rights. Id. at 104–05, 772 S.E.2d at 453–54. On appeal, the
respondent argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by “failing to conduct
an inquiry concerning whether she was entitled to the appointment of a [GAL under
Rule 17]” in connection with her termination proceeding. Id. at 105, 772 S.E.2d at
454. We disagreed, holding that no abuse of discretion by the trial court had occurred.
Id.Initially, we noted that “[a] trial judge has a duty to properly inquire into the
competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when circumstances are brought
to the judge’s attention [that] raise a substantial question as to whether the litigant
is non compos mentis.” Id. at 106–07, 772 S.E.2d at 455 (citing In re J.A.A., 175 N.C.
App. 66, 72, 623 S.E.2d 45, 49 (2005)). Because such judgments are discretionary in
nature, we explained that “both the appointment of a [GAL] and the extent to which
an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be conducted” are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Id. at 107, 772 S.E.2d at 455.
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IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
We ultimately held that the trial court’s failure to conduct a Rule 17
competency inquiry did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Id. at 108, 772 S.E.2d
at 456. We explained our reasoning as follows:
As an initial matter, we note that the standard of review
applicable to claims like the one before us in this case is
quite deferential. Affording substantial deference to
members of the trial judiciary in instances such as this one
is entirely appropriate given that the trial judge, unlike the
members of a reviewing court, actually interacts with the
litigant whose competence is alleged to be in question and
has, for that reason, a much better basis for assessing the
litigant’s mental condition than that available to the
members of an appellate court, who are limited to
reviewing a cold, written record.
Moreover, evaluation of an individual’s competence
involves much more than an examination of the manner in
which the individual in question has been diagnosed by
mental health professionals. Although the nature and
extent of such diagnoses is exceedingly important to the
proper resolution of a competency determination, the same
can be said of the information that members of the trial
judiciary glean from the manner in which the individual
behaves in the courtroom, the lucidity with which the
litigant is able to express himself or herself, the extent to
which the litigant’s behavior and comments shed light
upon his or her understanding of the situation in which he
or she is involved, the extent to which the litigant is able to
assist his or her counsel or address other important issues,
and numerous other factors. A great deal of the information
that is relevant to a competency determination is simply
not available from a study of the record developed in the
trial court and presented for appellate review. As a result,
when the record contains an appreciable amount of
evidence tending to show that the litigant whose mental
condition is at issue is not incompetent, the trial court
should not, except in the most extreme instances, be held on
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Opinion of the Court
appeal to have abused its discretion by failing to inquire
into that litigant’s competence.
Id. at 108–09, 772 S.E.2d at 456 (emphasis added).
After carefully reviewing the record in In re T.L.H., this Court held that there
was sufficient evidence in the record to allow the trial court to reasonably conclude
that the respondent was competent. Id. at 109, 772 S.E.2d at 456. For example, we
noted that the respondent had exercised “proper judgment” in allowing DHHS to take
custody of her child shortly after his birth and had demonstrated a “reasonable
understanding of the proceedings” when she informed DHHS that—despite her
relinquishment of custody—she still wished to preserve her right to be reunified with
her child. Id. We also observed that the testimony the respondent had provided at her
permanency planning hearing was “cogent and gave no indication that she failed to
understand the nature of the proceedings.” Id. For instance, the respondent testified
that she had obtained medication to treat her mental conditions, discussed the need
for budgeting and careful management of her income, demonstrated an
understanding of the need to apply for subsidized housing, and testified that she had
moved into a new apartment after realizing that “obtaining an independent place to
live would allow her to become drug-free.” Id. at 109, 772 S.E.2d at 456-47. This Court
concluded that this evidence suggested that the respondent “understood that she
needed to properly manage her own affairs and comprehended the steps she needed
to take in order to avoid the loss of her parental rights.” Id.-11-
IN RE Q.B.
Opinion of the Court
In the present case, respondent asserts that these principles from In re T.L.H.
support the proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sua
sponte conduct a second Rule 17 competency hearing. She argues that at the time of
the 24 October 2019 termination hearing there was new evidence before the trial
court showing her diminished capacity that had not been available to the trial court
at the time of her initial Rule 17 competency hearing on 25 January 2018. Namely,
respondent points to (1) the results of her January 2018 cognitive evaluation (which
found her to have borderline intellectual functioning); (2) her official adjudication of
incompetency in April 2018; (3) the appointment of a legal guardian and an Adult
Protective Services counselor to manage her finances and medical decisions; and (4)
the results of her April 2019 parenting capacity evaluation (which recommended
against independent parenting).
We disagree with respondent’s argument, because we believe that here—as in
In re T.L.H.—the record contains “an appreciable amount of evidence tending to show
that [respondent] was not incompetent” at the time of the termination hearing. Id. at
108–09, 772 S.E.2d at 456. First, we note that respondent received a competency
hearing on 25 January 2018 in order to determine whether the appointment of a GAL
for her under Rule 17 was necessary. During this hearing, respondent was
represented by her attorney, and the trial court heard testimony from several
witnesses, including respondent, respondent’s sister, and several different social
workers connected to the case. The trial court also had access to the results of
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respondent’s cognitive evaluation, which was conducted several weeks prior to the
hearing. In its order entered 15 February 2018, the trial court found that although
respondent was “low-functioning,” she nevertheless “underst[oo]d the role of the
Court and the parties in the Courtroom as well as the Court’s function in determining
the status of the Juveniles.” The trial court concluded that respondent was “not
incompetent in accordance with Rule 17” and was therefore not entitled to a GAL
under Rule 17.
Second, respondent’s competency is supported by the fact that she attended all
hearings related to this matter (including three permanency planning hearings that
took place after January 2018), which gave the trial court a sufficient opportunity to
continue to observe her capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings. See In
re J.R.W., 237 N.C. App. 229, 235, 765 S.E.2d 116, 121 (2014) (“[T]he fact that
Respondent attended all but one of the hearings . . . gave the trial court ample
opportunity to observe and evaluate her capacity to act in her own interests.”).
Third, respondent’s testimony during the termination hearing on 24 October
2019 demonstrates that she understood the nature of the proceedings and her role in
them as well as her ability to assist her attorney in support of her case. Respondent’s
testimony indicated that she was able to comprehend all questions posed to her and
that she responded appropriately in a lucid and cogent manner. Her testimony
suggested that she understood (1) how her lack of contact with Quanna could impact
the strength of the bond between them; (2) how mental health issues can affect a
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person’s parenting abilities; (3) the importance of attending court proceedings
consistently and the effect that might have on her reunification efforts; (4) the
importance of complying with DSS recommendations and attending all DSS
appointments; (5) the correlation between her medications and her health along with
the importance of following her doctor’s recommendations; (6) the details of her payee
arrangement with DSS as the recipient of her social security income; (7) the need to
budget and manage money appropriately; (8) the importance of finding appropriate
housing if her children were to be returned to her care; and (9) how to obtain
emergency and medical care for her children.
The testimony offered by respondent here is similar to the testimony that was
given by the respondent in In re T.L.H. There, we determined that the respondent’s
testimony was cogent because it demonstrated that she (1) had a “reasonable
understanding of the proceedings” and their consequences; and (2) understood the
need to “properly manage her own affairs and comprehended the steps she needed to
take in order to avoid the loss of her parental rights,” such as consistently taking her
medications, properly managing her money, applying for subsidized housing, and
moving into a new apartment that would provide a drug-free environment. In re
T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 109, 772 S.E.2d at 456–47.
Moreover, as in In re T.L.H., the testimony of DSS social workers during
respondent’s termination hearing here demonstrated that she had the ability to
exercise “proper judgment” by finding appropriate housing on her own, completing a
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parenting program, maintaining contact with DSS, complying with recommendations
made by Adult Protective Services, submitting to psychological and parenting
evaluations, and attending all scheduled visits with Quanna. See id. at 109, 772
S.E.2d at 456. This evidence demonstrates that respondent understood the steps she
needed to take to reunify with Quanna and had the ability to complete the majority
of her case plan.
Respondent, however, attempts to distinguish her circumstances from those in
In re T.L.H., contending that there existed far more evidence in her case tending to
show a lack of competence. Specifically, respondent argues that—unlike the mother
in In re T.L.H.—(1) she received a great deal of assistance and government services
stemming from her cognitive limitations; (2) the results of her cognitive evaluation
showed that she had significantly diminished intellectual capacity; and (3) she was
formally adjudicated to be incompetent prior to the termination hearing. Respondent
thus argues that substantial evidence existed by the time of the termination hearing
that her mental state had deteriorated to the point that a re-examination of her
competency was necessary. We are not persuaded.
Admittedly, the record contained some evidence tending to cast doubt on
respondent’s competency, which may have supported a decision to conduct a second
Rule 17 competency inquiry had the trial court elected to do so. However, given our
deferential standard of review, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to sua sponte conduct another hearing on the issue of whether
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respondent was entitled to a GAL pursuant to Rule 17. See In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at
108–09, 772 S.E.2d at 456 (“[T]he standard of review applicable to claims like the one
before us in this case is quite deferential . . . . the trial court should not, except in the
most extreme instances, be held on appeal to have abused its discretion by failing to
inquire into [a] litigant’s competence.”) (emphasis added).
It is true that respondent’s cognitive evaluation demonstrated that she had an
IQ score of 63, which fell within the low functioning range of clinical impairment and
suggested that she may have difficulty in independent decision-making. It is also true
that respondent received various government services in connection with her mental
limitations, such as social security disability income and healthcare/money-
management assistance from Adult Protective Services.
However, as our case law demonstrates, neither mental health limitations nor
a low IQ constitute per se evidence of a lack of competency for purposes of Rule 17.
See In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 110, 772 S.E.2d at 457 (holding that a trial court is not
required to “inquire into a parent’s competency solely because the parent is alleged
to suffer from diagnosable mental health conditions”); see also In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C.
207, 210, 835 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2019) (holding that although the respondent had an
IQ of 64, the evidence did not suggest that her disability “rose to the level of
incompetence so as to require the appointment of a [GAL under Rule 17] to safeguard
[her] interests”); In re J.R.W., 237 N.C. App. at 234, 765 S.E.2d at 120 (“[E]vidence of
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mental health problems is not per se evidence of incompetence to participate in legal
proceedings.”).
It is also true that on 25 April 2018 respondent was adjudicated to be
incompetent by the Superior Court, Pitt County, and as a result was appointed a
guardian of her person and an Adult Protective Services counselor. However, we are
unable to agree with respondent that these facts mandated a sua sponte competency
determination.
Adjudications of adult incompetency are governed by Chapter 35A of our
General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 35A-1102. An adult guardian appointed under Chapter
35A generally has a broad range of powers with respect to the ward’s person and
property, N.C.G.S. § 35A-1241, whereas the duties of a GAL under Rule 17 appointed
solely for purposes of assisting a parent during a particular juvenile proceeding are
much more limited. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 17(e) (stating that a GAL “shall file
and serve such pleadings as may be required” to assist the parent).
Accordingly, in determining whether the appointment of a GAL under Rule 17
is necessary in a termination proceeding, our courts have typically limited the scope
of our examination to a determination of whether the parent is able to comprehend
the nature of the proceedings and aid her attorney in the presentation of her case.
See In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 108, 772 S.E.2d at 456 (finding that a litigant’s
competence may be demonstrated by her “reasonable understanding of the
proceedings” and by “the extent to which the litigant is able to assist his or her
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counsel”); In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. at 71, 623 S.E.2d at 48 (stating that when a
court inquires into the competency of a parent under Rule 17, the court must
“determine whether . . . the individual would be unable to aid in their defense at the
termination of parental rights proceeding”). Thus, it follows that an individual can
simultaneously be found incompetent under Chapter 35A yet not require a GAL
under Rule 17.4
Furthermore, we note that in August 2019 (two months prior to the
termination hearing), respondent’s guardianship was changed to a limited
guardianship. During the August 2019 guardianship hearing, the court found that
respondent “understands conversation and communicates personal leads,” “has the
capacity to communicate important decisions,” “[h]as capacity to appropriately relate
to friends and family members, has capacity to make decisions without undue
influence from others . . . and can utilize familiar community resources” for
assistance. The court therefore determined that respondent’s guardianship should be
changed from a full guardianship to a limited guardianship. As a result, her “rights
and privileges were increased,” and she was granted authority to “participate in
residential planning,” handle larger amounts of money, “maintain her personal
4 In fact, at least one commentator has acknowledged this precise scenario. See Janet
Mason, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR RESPONDENT PARENTS IN JUVENILE CASES, Univ. of N.C.
Sch. of Gov., 2014 Juvenile Law Bulletin 1, 20 (January 2014) (noting that “[a]ssessing
competence in relation to a person’s ability to participate meaningfully in the litigation also
leaves open the possibility that someone who could be adjudicated incompetent in a
proceeding under G.S. Chapter 35A . . . could participate meaningfully and assist the attorney
in a juvenile case without the involvement of a guardian ad litem”).
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property,” and independently make “decisions regarding any legal, medical, or social
issues pertaining to her children.”
Therefore, despite respondent’s prior adjudication of incompetency under
Chapter 35A, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by failing to sua sponte conduct a second inquiry into the need to appoint a GAL for
her under Rule 17.
In her final argument on appeal, respondent contends that when DSS filed its
termination petition it was under an obligation to request the appointment of a GAL
on her behalf. In making this argument, respondent cites Rule 17(c), which she
interprets as imposing a requirement that a petitioner seek the appointment of a GAL
if the petitioner has reason to believe that the respondent-parent is incompetent. See
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 17(c). She argues that DSS knew she was incompetent based
upon the allegations contained in its termination petition, which described her
limited capacity to care for Quanna, her inability to manage her funds appropriately,
her low IQ, and her impaired adaptive behavior skills.
This argument is unavailing. We do not discern any language in Rule 17(c)
that actually imposes a requirement on a county department of social services to
request the appointment of a GAL for a parent believed to be incompetent. Although
DSS did request in January 2018 that the trial court conduct an inquiry into the need
for appointment of a GAL for respondent, the making of such a request—while
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salutary—was not expressly required under Rule 17(c). Accordingly, this argument
is likewise without merit.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating
respondent’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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